takes it with all the infirmities belonging to it. Crossley v. Ham, 13 East, 498. A bill paid at maturity cannot be reissued, and no action can afterwards be maintained upon it by a subsequent indorsee; but if it be paid and indorsed before it becomes due, it will be a valid indorsement, in the hands of a bonâ fide indorsee (y). If a bill of exchange, payable to the order of a third person who has indorsed it, be dishonoured when due and taken up by the drawer, it ceases to be negotiable (z). But it is otherwise if the bill be payable to the drawer's own order. "A bill of exchange is negotiable, ad infinitum, until it has been paid or discharged on behalf of the acceptor. If the drawer has paid the bill, it seems that he may sue the acceptor upon the bill, and if instead of suing the acceptor he put it into circulation on his own indorsement only, it does not prejudice any of the other parties who have indorsed the bill, that the holder should be at liberty to sue the acceptor" (a). But the drawer of an accommodation bill is in the same situation as the acceptor of a bill for value; he is the person ultimately liable; and his payment discharges the bill altogether (b). IV. Of Presentment for Acceptance :— Acceptance, p. 380. Qualified Acceptance, p. 381. Liability of the Acceptor, p. 383. Non-Acceptance and Notice thereof, p. 384. Notice to Drawer, p. 385. Notice to Indorser, p. 387. Protest, p. 389. Lost Bill, p. 391. Liability of the Drawer on Non-Acceptance, p. 391. Presentment for Acceptance. When a bill is drawn payable within a certain time after sight, it is necessary, in order to fix the time when the bill is to be paid, to present it to the drawer for acceptance. In other cases, it is not essentially necessary for the holder to present the bill before it is due; but it is advisable to procure an acceptance, if possible; for by that means another debtor is added to the drawer, who becomes a new security, and consequently makes the bill more negotiable. There is not any fixed time when a bill drawn payable within a certain time after sight, shall be presented to the drawee.. But due diligence must be used, and care taken that the bill be presented within a reasonable time. (y) Burbridge v. Manners, 3 Camp. 194; Morley v. Culverwell, 7 M. & W. 174; Attenborough v. Mackenzie, 25 L. J., Exch. 244. (z) Beck v. Robley, 1 H. Bl. 89, n.; Barham v. Caddy, 9 A. & E. 281. (a) Per Lord Ellenborough, in Callow v. Lawrence, 3 M. & S. 95; Hubbard v. Jackson, 4 Bing. 390. (b) Lazarus v. Cowie, 3 Q. B. 459; Parr v. Sewell, 16 C. B. 684. "The only rule which can be applied to all cases of bills of exchange is, that due diligence must be used. Due diligence is the only thing to be considered, whether the bill be foreign or inland, or whether the bill be payable at or so many days after sight, or in any other Per Buller, J., 2 H. Bl. 569. It seems that whether due diligence has been used is a question of law, but dependent upon facts, viz. the situation of the parties, their places of abode, and the facility of communication between them. See Darbishire v. Parker, 6 East, 3. The holder went to the place at which the bill was addressed. Finding the house shut up, he inquired for the drawee in the neighbourhood; this was held to be a sufficient presentment in Hine v. Allely (c), recognized in Buxton v. Jones (d), where Tindal, C. J. said, it was not necessary to present the bill to the drawee personally. If he chose to remove from the house, pointed out by the bill as his place of residence, he was bound to leave sufficient funds on the premises. Acceptance. Formerly an acceptance, or promise to accept, an existing (e) bill, by collateral writing (f), or even by parol (g), (except for the purpose of charging the drawer of an inland bill with damages and costs, see 3 & 4 Ann. c. 9, s. 5,) was equally binding with an acceptance on the face of the bill; provided the expressions used clearly and unequivocally (h) meant an acceptance of the bill. By stat. 1 & 2 Geo. IV. c. 78, s. 2, no acceptance of any inland bill after the 1st of August, 1821, was sufficient to charge any person, unless such acceptance were in writing on such bill, or, if there were more than one part of such bill, on one of the said parts. An unsigned acceptance (i), written on the face of a bill of exchange, was not made invalid by this statute; but it was a question for the jury whether it was intended to operate as an acceptance in its present form, or to be subsequently completed by signature. This statute extends to every part of the United Kingdom, and applies to the case of a bill drawn in one part of Scotland or Ireland, upon another; but a bill drawn in Ireland upon a person in England, is not an inland bill within the foregoing section, and consequently might be accepted without writing on such bill (k). But now by stat. 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, "no acceptance of any bill of exchange, whether inland or foreign, made after the 31st of December, 1856, shall be sufficient to charge any person unless the same be in writing on such bill, or if there be more than one part of such bill in one of the said parts, and signed by the acceptor or some person duly authorized by him." (c) 4 B. & Ad. 624. (e) Johnson v. Collings, 1 East, 98. (h) See Rees v. Warwick, 2 B. & A. 113; Powell v. Jones, 1 Esp. N. P. C. 17. (i) Dufaur v. Oxenden, 1 M. & Rob. 90, Patteson, J. (k) Mahoney v. Ashlin, 2 B. & Ad. 478. Qualified Acceptance.-A qualified acceptance is, when the drawee undertakes to pay the bill in any other manner than according to the tenor and effect thereof. This species of acceptance, if qualified with a condition, is called a conditional acceptance. The holder of a bill may consider a qualified acceptance as a nullity, and protest the bill for non-acceptance, after which he is precluded from insisting upon it as an acceptance (1); but if the holder acquiesces in it, then such an acceptance becomes absolute only on the performance of the condition, which must be averred in the declaration. If the acceptor of a bill cancels his acceptance, and the holder causes it to be noted for non-acceptance, he thereby precludes himself from contending, that an acceptance of a bill once made cannot be retracted in point of law (m). Whether an acceptance once made could be cancelled by the acceptor, while the bill remained in his hands, was considered as doubtful. Lord Kenyon, C. J., is said to have determined at nisi prius, that it could not. See 6 East, 200, and 15 East, 20. But it has since been solemnly determined that it can. Cox v. Troy, 5 B. & A. 474 (n). If an agreement to accept is conditional, and a third person takes the bill, knowing of the conditions annexed to the agreement, he takes it subject to such conditions. Per Lord Mansfield, C. J., delivering the opinion of the court, in Mason v. Hunt, Doug. 299. Formerly it was a question whether an acceptance making the bill payable at a particular place was a qualified acceptance. By the 1 & 2 Geo. IV. c. 78, it was, however, enacted, that an acceptance payable at a banker's or other particular place is, as against the acceptor, a general acceptance, unless the acceptor express in his acceptance that the bill is payable there only and not otherwise or elsewhere. Whether an acceptance be conditional or absolute is a question of law (0). A bill of exchange dated 8 September, 1856, drawn and payable four months after date, was accepted in these words--"Accepted, payable at Messrs. O. & Co., London.-No. 1756. Due December 11th, 1856;" and then followed the signature of the acceptor in a different handwriting. It was held, that this was not a qualified acceptance, and that the bill became due on the 11th January, 1857 (p). The following cases will illustrate the nature of qualified accept ances Defendant accepted a bill of exchange, to pay it when goods consigned to him, and for which the bill was drawn, were sold. Plaintiff counted upon the custom of merchants. After verdict for (1) Sproat v. Matthews, 1 T. R. 182. (o) Sproat v. Matthews, 1 T. R. 182. (p) Fanshawe v. Peet, 26 L. J., Q. B. 314. plaintiff it was moved in arrest of judgment, that this acceptance, depending on the contingency of the sale of goods, was not within the custom of merchants, or negotiable. But the court (after consideration) held it good; for though the plaintiff might have refused to take such an acceptance, yet he might submit to take it. And it would affect trade if factors were not allowed to use this caution, when bills are drawn before they have an opportunity to dispose of the goods (q). So where defendant accepted a bill of exchange upon account of the ship Thetis, when in cash for the said vessel's cargo, and the plaintiff averred, that at the day when the bill became payable, the defendant was in cash for the said ship's cargo; it was objected, in arrest of judgment, that the defendant was not liable by this conditional acceptance; but the court overruled the objection (r). So an answer, that the bill would not be accepted till a navy bill was paid, was held a conditional acceptance to pay when the navy bill should be discharged (s). So when the answer was, "it will not be accepted until the ship with the wheat arrives from Scotland:" this was held to import a promise to accept the bill on the arrival of the cargo; and that the cargo having arrived, the defendant was liable as acceptor (t). Defendant accepted a bill of exchange to pay part of the sum of money mentioned in the bill; this was held to be valid, although it was contended, that such partial acceptance was not within the custom of merchants (u). If the payee of a bill annexes a condition to his indorsement before the bill has been accepted, the drawee, who afterwards accepts it, is bound by that condition; and if the condition is not performed, the property in the bill reverts to the payee, and he may recover the contents against the acceptor (x). Where the defendant accepted a bill of exchange in these terms, "accepted on condition of its being renewed until the 28th November, 1844," it was held that the word "renewed" might be read "extended," and that the plaintiff was at liberty to treat the acceptance, as he had done in the declaration, as an acceptance of the bill itself, making it payable at an extended time (y). There is also a kind of acceptance, called acceptance supra protest, where a bill being refused acceptance by the drawer, is accepted by some third person for the honour of a party to it. "It is an undertaking to pay if the original drawee upon a presentment to him for payment should persist in dishonouring the bill, and such dishonour by him be notified by protest to the person who has accepted for honour" (z). (q) Smith v. Abbott, Str. 1152. (y) Russell v. Phillips, 14 Q. B. 891; S. C. 19 L. J., Q. B. 297. (z) Per Ellenborough, C. J., in Hoare v. Cazenove, 16 East, 391; and see Mitchell v. Baring, 10 B. & C. 11. Liability of the Acceptor.-The acceptor, by reason of his acceptance, which is prima facie evidence of his having in his hands effects of the drawer to answer the amount of the bill, is considered as the principal debtor, and primarily liable to all the parties to the bill; and an express agreement only will discharge him. The acceptor undertakes to pay the sum specified in the bill, and inte rest according to the legal rate of interest where the bill becomes due; but his engagement does not extend any further; consequently the acceptor of a foreign bill is not liable for re-exchange (a). Any party to the bill may maintain an action against the acceptor, if the bill is not duly honoured. If the holder of a bill of exchange brings separate actions against an acceptor (b), drawer, and indorser, at the same time, the court will stay the proceedings in any stage of the action against the drawer, or any of the indorsers, upon payment of the amount of the bill and costs of that particular action; and will now (by R. G. Trin. T., 1 Vict.) stay proceedings in the action against the acceptor, on the same terms; though formerly he must have paid the costs in all the actions, because he was the original defaulter and the occasion of all those costs (c). The holder of a bill of exchange, having been informed that the acceptor had not received any consideration for it, and that he had accepted the bill merely to accommodate the drawer, for several years after it became due, received interest upon the bill from the drawer, and neglected to call upon the acceptor for payment. At length he brought an action against the acceptor; and it was held that it would well lie; and Buller, J., said, that nothing but an express agreement would discharge an acceptor; and the plaintiff's conduct in this case only meant, that he would try to recover the amount of the bill from the drawer, who was the true debtor, if he could (d). But the holder of the bill may discharge the acceptor by parol (e). The drawee (who was also the payee) of a foreign bill of exchange drawn in three parts, accepted and indorsed one part to a creditor, to remain in his hands until some other security was given for it; and afterwards accepted and indorsed another part, for value, to a third person. The acceptor substituted another security for the part first accepted, whereupon it was given up to him: it was held, that the holder of the part secondly accepted was entitled to recover on the bill against the acceptor (f). An acceptance in blank charges the acceptor for the amount which the stamp will cover, and for the time limited by the stamp laws, and is an "authority "authority" to anybody to draw upon the ac (a) Woolsey v. Crawford, 2 Camp. 445. (c) See Cornes v. Taylor, 10 Exch. 441. See Steele v. Harmer, 4 Exch. 1 (in error). 449. |