that the grant shall be good, for that which is good; and void, for that which is void." Per Lawrence, J., 8 East, 236. As where the plaintiff declared, that the defendant, by deed, granted to him in fee, provided that if the grantor paid so much money, it should be lawful for him to re-enter, and that the defendant covenanted to pay the money to the plaintiff, and assigned for breach the nonpayment of the money. After judgment, it was objected, that nothing passed by the deed for want of inrolment, which was admitted; and hence it was inferred, that the covenant was void. But Holt, C. J., said, that it was not material whether any estate passed; for the covenant to pay the money was a distinct, separate, and independent covenant (f). So where a rector granted an annuity out of his benefice, which is void by 13 Eliz. c. 20 (g), and in the same deed covenanted personally to pay the annuity; it was held, that, although the statute avoided the security of the rentcharge upon the living, yet it did not affect the personal covenant (h). So though a bill of sale for transferring the property in a ship, by way of mortgage, may be void as such, for not reciting the certificate of registry, as was required by 26 Geo. III. c. 60, s. 17(); yet the mortgagor may be sued on a collateral covenant, for the payment of the money contained in the same deed (k). In like manner, although a covenant by the lessee for the payment of the property tax, and for indemnifying the landlord from it, was void by 46 Geo. III. c. 65, ss. 115, 195; yet that would not avoid other independent covenants in the lease, such as the covenant for the payment of the rent (1). Where A. covenants not to do an act which it was then lawful to do, and a subsequent statute compels him to do such act, this statute extinguishes the covenant; but if A. covenants not to do an act then unlawful, and a subsequent statute makes it lawful to do the act, the covenant is not extinguished (m). The assignee of a void lease cannot maintain an action for a breach of any of the covenants contained in the lease. Tenant in tail demised land for ninety-nine years, and covenanted for himself and his executors for the quiet enjoyment of the lessee. The tenant in tail died without issue. After his death, the lessee assigned to the plaintiff, who entered, but shortly after was ejected by the remainder-man, whereupon the plaintiff brought an action against the executors of the tenant in tail for a breach of the covenant; but it was held, that it would not lie: for, the lease being void at the time of assignment, no interest passed under it (n). The plaintiff declared, that by deed made between her, as attorney (f) Northcote v. Underhill, Salk. 199. (g) See Shaw v. Pritchard, 10 B. & C. (h) Sloane v. Packman, 11 M. & W. 770. (k) Kerrison v. Cole, 8 East, 231. (1) Gaskell v. King, 11 East, 165. See Fuller v. Abbott, 4 Taunt. 105. (m) Brewster v. Kitchell, Salk. 198. for I. S. on the one part, and the defendant on the other part, she demised a house to the defendant, and that he covenanted (not saying with the plaintiff) to pay the rent to I. S., and then assigned a breach in non-payment of rent, to the damage of the plaintiff (the attorney). It was objected that the lease was void, and that an action could not be maintained upon it, especially by the plaintiff, who was the attorney only, and to whom the rent was not reserved; neither was there any covenant with the plaintiff, the words being general, that he covenanted to pay the rent to I. S.; that the power was not pursued by a lease in the name of the attorney, for it ought to have been in the name of the principal. The court gave judgment for the defendant, observing that in a good lease the rent might no doubt be reserved to a stranger who was not a party to the deed, but not in the present case, where the deed was void; that the deed being void, so as not to pass any interest in the land, it was but just that it should be void as to the reservation of rent, especially where the covenant was not with the plaintiff, and where the rent was not reserved to her (0). IV. Of particular Express Covenants. 1. For Title, p. 510. 2. Not to Assign without Licence, p. 517. 4. To Insure, p. 523. 1. Covenants for Title are frequently termed real covenants, and run with the land: see ante, p. 496. The covenants for title usually entered into by the vendor, on a conveyance in fee, are four in number (p), viz. Ist. That he has good right to convey; 2nd. For quiet enjoyment; 3rd. For freedom from incumbrances; 4th. For further assurance. Where in covenant against the executors of J. W. the declaration stated that J. W. granted land, &c. to the plaintiff in fee, and after warranting the land, &c. against himself and his heirs, covenanted that he was, notwithstanding any act by him done to the contrary, lawfully seised in fee simple, and that he had full right and power, &c. to convey the same, and that the plaintiff should quietly enjoy without interruption from himself or any person claiming under him; and, lastly, that he, his heirs, or assigns, and all persons claiming under him, should make further assurance; and assigned a breach, that J. W. had not at the time of making the indenture, &c. good right, power, &c. to convey or assure the premises in manner aforesaid. It was held, that the intervening general words, "full right, power, &c. to convey," were either part (0) Frontin v. Small, Str. 705. (p) The covenant for title, viz., "that the vendor is seised in fee," is now usually omitted, being, in fact, comprehended in that for good right to convey. See Sugd. V. & P. 487 (13th ed.) of the preceding special covenant, "that he was, notwithstanding any act by him done to the contrary, &c., seised in fee:" or if not, that they were qualified and restrained by all the other special covenants to the acts of himself and his heirs (q). So where the defendant, the assignor of a term, covenanted with his assignee that he had done no act to encumber the premises assigned, and that notwithstanding any such act the lease was a subsisting lease, and that he had good right to assign the premises in manner aforesaid; it was held, that the covenant was qualified and restrained to the assignor's acts only (r). Covenant for quiet enjoyment during a term "without the interruption of J. M., his executors, &c., or any other person or persons whomsoever, claiming any estate in the premises, and that freely discharged, or otherwise by J. M., his heirs, executors, &c., defended and indemnified from all former gifts, grants, &c. made by J. M. or by their or either of their acts, &c.," preceded by a covenant that the lease was a good lease, notwithstanding any act of J. M., and followed by a covenant for further assurance by J. M., his executors, &c., and all persons whomsoever claiming any estate in the premises under him or them. It was held, that the covenant for quiet enjoyment extended only against the acts of the covenantor and those claiming under him, and not against the acts of all the world, for that, to construe it in the larger sense, would be inconsistent with the other covenants, especially the first (s). But where the defendants covenanted that, notwithstanding any act by them done to the contrary, they were seised of the land conveyed in fee; and also, that they, notwithstanding any such matter or thing as aforesaid, had good right to grant the premises; and likewise, that the plaintiff should quietly enjoy the same without the disturbance of them, "their heirs or assigns, or for or by any other person or persons whatsoever; and that the plaintiff should be indemnified by them and their heirs against all other incumbrances whatsoever, except the chief rent payable to the lord of the fee; it was held, that the general words of the covenant for quiet enjoyment were not necessarily to be restrained by the language of the antecedent covenants for title and right to convey; although those covenants were certainly of a limited kind, and provided only against the acts of the defendants. Lord Ellenborough, C. J. (who delivered the opinion of the court), observed:-"The covenant for title and the covenant for right to convey, are indeed what are somewhat improperly called synonymous covenants; they are, however, connected covenants, generally of the same import and effect, and directed to one and the same object; and the qualifying language of the one may therefore properly enough be considered as virtually (q) Browning v. Wright, 2 B. & P. 13 ; Barton v. Fitzgerald, 15 East, 529. transferred to and included in the other of them. But the covenant for quiet enjoyment is of a materially different import, and directed to a distinct object. The covenant for title is an assurance to the purchaser, that the grantor has the very estate in quantity and quality which he purports to convey, viz. in this case an indefeasible estate in fee simple. The covenant for quiet enjoyment is an assurance against the consequences of a defective title, and of any disturbances thereupon. For the purpose of this covenant, and the indemnity it affords, it is immaterial in what respects, and by what means, or by whose acts, the eviction of the grantee or his heir takes place if he be lawfully evicted, the grantor, by such his covenant, stipulates to indemnify him at all events. And it is perfectly consistent with reason and good sense, that a cautious grantor should stipulate in a more restrained and limited manner for the particular description of title which he purports to convey, than for quiet enjoyment."-The C. J. added: "I do not find any case in which it is held that the covenant for quiet enjoyment is all one with the covenant for title, or parcel of that covenant, or in necessary construction to be governed by it, otherwise than as, according to the general rules for the construction of deeds, every deed (as was said by Hobart, C. J., Winch, Rep. 93, Sir George Trenchard v. Hoskins) is to be construed according to the 'intention of the parties, and the intents ought to be adjudged of the several parts of the deed, as a general issue out of the evidence; and intent ought to be picked out of every part, and not out of one word only. Consistently, therefore, with that case, and with every other that I am aware of, we are warranted in giving effect to the general words of the covenant for quiet enjoyment; and which are entitled to more weight in this case, inasmuch as they immediately follow and enlarge the special words of covenant against disturbance by the grantors themselves; and to restrain the generality of these words, thus immediately preceded by express words of a narrower import, would be a much stronger thing than to restrain words of like generality by an implied qualification arising out of another covenant where no such general words occurred. The person using the general words could not forget that he had immediately before used special words of a narrower extent. If the covenant containing both the special and general words stood by itself, there would be no pretence for refusing effect to the larger words; and if this could not be done in favour of express words of a narrower import in the same covenant, I cannot possibly understand upon what ground it should be done in favour of implied words of narrower import, which occur in another separate covenant, addressed, as has been before said, to a distinct object" (t); and see per Park, J., Nind v. Marshall. Where a lessor covenanted with his lessee for quiet enjoyment, (t) Howell v. Richards, 11 East, 633; acc. Young v. Raincock, 7 C. B. 310. without disturbance by the lessor, "or any other person lawfully claiming or to claim, by, from, or under him;" it was held, that an entry and seizure of the goods on the premises, by the collector of land-tax, for arrears due from the lessor before the demise, was not a proceeding within the terms of the covenant (u). Where the lessor covenanted for quiet enjoyment without let, suit, &c. by him, any person claiming under him," and at the time of the lease was possessed of the equity of redemption only in the demised premises, and subsequently the mortgagee gave notice to the lessee to pay rent to him, and the lessee, on finding his lease defective, gave up possession, it was held, that there was an eviction, or at all events a molestation of the lessee, within the terms of the covenant, by a person claiming under the lessor (x). If the purchaser of lands sells them, and afterwards takes a reconveyance from his vendee, with a covenant for a good title, he may, notwithstanding, maintain an action against the original seller on his covenant for a good title (y). A general covenant for quiet enjoyment does not extend to tortious entries by a stranger (z). In the Year Book, 26 Hen. VIII. 3 b, is the following case:-A man made a lease for years by indenture, and by a clause in that lease covenanted to warrant the demised premises during the term of the lessee; afterwards the lessee was ousted by one who had not any right to the premises; and the question was, whether the lessee should have writ of covenant against the lessor or not: and Englefield, J., said, "The lessee shall not have writ of covenant against his lessor where he is ousted by wrong, for he may have writ of trespass or ejectione firme against him who ousted him; but if he was ousted by one who had title paramount against him, as in that case he cannot have any remedy [against the person ousting him], he may have writ of covenant against the lessor by force of the warranty: quod fuit concessum per plusors." See also 26 Hen. VIII. 3 b, pl. 11; F. N. B. 342, (4to ed.) The doctrine laid down in the foregoing case is not confined to covenants in leases for years, for in Dudley v. Folliott, 3 T. R. 584, it was adjudged, that a general covenant in a conveyance of lands in fee, that the grantor had legal title, and that the grantee might peaceably enjoy the premises without the interruption of the grantor and his heirs, or any other person, did not extend to the acts of wrong-doers; but only to the acts of persons claiming by a legal title. The distinction taken in these cases illustrates the reason of the |