resisted by the Court, if it suspects that the petitioner thereby seeks to close the mouth of such co-respondent; on the other hand,

3692. Former Rule.-Formerly, a co-respondent could not be in any way withdrawn or excluded; but, by an amendment of the law, 3693. Revised Rule.-The Court now has power to discharge a co-respondent from the suit, at the instance of the petitioner, but not at the instance of the respondent.

3694. When Available Witnesses.—A co-respondent, after being discharged by the Court from the case, is then eligible as a witness, and can be compelled to attend and give evidence, just as though he had never been named as a co-respondent.

THE CITATION.

3695. On All the Parties.-Every co-respondent, as well as the respondent, must be served with a 'citation ” (3491), calling upon them to answer to the suit, and they are bound to answer, or fail at the peril of consequent adverse judgment.

3696. Address Unknown.-Where the address of any person to be cited upon a petition for divorce is unknown, it is sufficient to send it by post or messenger, addressed "late of" the last place known as such address; but,

3697. Personal Service.-The Court enforces personal service, as far as possible; and

3698. Through Solicitor.-The Court will not allow a suit to proceed upon the mere undertaking of a solicitor to accept service of a citation; and

3699. Co-Respondent's Husband. If the co-respondent is a married woman, the citation should if possible, under a rule of Court, be served upon her in the presence of her husband.

THE ANSWER.

3700. As a Defence.-Any person who is served with a citation upon a petition in the Divorce Court, is entitled to put in a defence, technically called an answer."

"

3701. Interval Allowed.-The interval wherein answer to a citation will be admitted is always stated upon the citation.

3702. Eight Days Usual.-Eight days is the usual time given for an answer to a citation; but,

3703. Six Weeks.-Where it was shown that the party cited was in America, six weeks was allowed for the answer.

COLLUSION.

3704. Shallow Lawyers.-Some lawyers, who ought to have

known better, have blunderingly confounded collusion with connivance, an error for which non-professional persons might be excused in the absence of express warning; therefore,

3705. Distinction of Terms.-In considering collusion, between parties to a petition for divorce, it is expressly necessary to bear in mind that the term must not be confounded with "connivance," which comes under notice at an earlier stage of the proceedings (3590); though,

3706. Slight Indication Sufficient.—As with connivance, so with collusion, the theory of the law (3590) causes the Court to watch with a peculiarly jealous eye for the slightest indication of a tendency to make divorce a gratification instead of a punish

ment.

ILLUSTRATIVE SUGGESTIONS.

3707. Tired of Each Other.-Supposing John and Mary, being husband and wife, grow mutually tired of each other, and there is no countervailing consideration of family or property, of course they would both desire and be glad of a divorce. The case may be put even stronger, thus:

3708. Cross Motives.—Supposing John desires to marry Julia, and Mary entertains a preference for Marmaduke, and supposing Julia and Marmaduke respectively reciprocate the affection entertained towards them, of course it would suit the views of all parties to procure a divorce between John and Mary as soon as possible; hence,

3709. Collusive Suit.-If Mary commits adultery, or is only presumed to have committed adultery, with Marmaduke, John may thereupon petition for a divorce.

3710. Concealed Facts.-John may not be entitled to a divorce. He may himself have been guilty of adultery (3636) with Julia ; he may have ill-treated Mary; he may be guilty towards her of everything she could be permitted to plead; namely, connivance (3590), cruelty (3355), desertion (3450), and wilful neglect and misconduct ; yet,

3711. Apparent Suppression of Evidence.-It has been decided that the absence of a defensive plea on the part of a wife, or her refraining from interrogating witnesses, cannot of itself be admitted as evidence against a petition (3353); therefore,

3712. Divorce Inevitable.-If Mary refrains from pleading in opposition to the petition; if Julia keeps quiet as to her knowledge of the circumstances; if Marmaduke does not dispute his

delinquency; and if the Court fails otherwise to become informed of the facts, it must grant the required divorce.

3713. Reward of Guilt.—In the case suggested, the granting of a divorce would be to reward four guilty parties and to punish nobody (3590), and such an abuse of its functions is what the Court stigmatises as collusion.

OBJECT OF AFFIDAVIT.

3714. It is for the purpose of making collusion as difficult as possible that the Act requires every petitioner, upon presenting a petition, to make affidavit that "No collusion or connivance exists between myself and my said wife" [or "husband," as the case may be] (3674); and

3715. Extreme Severity of Punishment.—If such declaration be untrue, and the Court should discover its untruth, the party making the declaration, upon conviction of having made it falsely, is liable to the severest punishment known to the law, short of capital execution; notwithstanding,

3716. Dead Letter. - Numerous cases prove that the terrible severity of the law, in threatening to punish false declarations, is a dead letter, and is rarely resorted to in a mild form, even in the most flagrant and palpable cases; and, in fact,

3717. Deliberate Lies.-It is clearly evident that many of the declarations made in the Divorce Court are deliberate lies, and that,

3718. Simulated Opposition.-A large proportion of the opposition so assiduously exhibited in the Divorce Court is advisedly simulated, in order to meet the requirements of a law which appears designed to encourage ingenuity in deceit and fraud.

DISTINCTIVE INTERPRETATIONS.

3719. Consent to the Offence.-Formerly, collusion was interpreted to mean a mutual consent to and approval of the commission of the offence charged in the petition; but,

3720. Consent to the Petition. Modern interpretation of collusion supposes it to be a consent to, or acquiescence in the petition, entertained by the party petitioned against; therefore,

3721. Mutual Desire Sufficient.-Collusion exists in any and every case where the husband and the wife both desire a divorce or judicial separation (3477).

3722. Mutual Agreement Unnecessary.-Agreement together to present a petition is not necessary to constitute collusion; for,

3723. Glad Reception of Citation.—If a husband presents a petition, without the knowledge of his wife, and she, when cited thereon, gladly receives the information that her husband has petitioned, THAT IS COLLUSION; therefore,

3724. Advantage of Astuteness.-When a wife has become liable to a divorce, and desires the divorce herself, and receives a citation to answer her husband's petition, she must astutely suppress every indication of satisfaction, which might be fatal to the proceedings; on the other hand,

3725. Advantage of Hysterical Joy.-According to the strict letter of authoritative decisions, all that a guilty wife has to do is to make demonstrative exhibitions of joy (feigned or real) at her husband's proceedings against her, and to trump up thereon evidence of collusion, and the husband is necessarily defeated; more especially is this easy, because,

3726. Concocted Collusion.—Though the declaration in the affidavit that "no collusion exists" may be perfectly true at the time, collusion may arise or set in, actively or passively, before the case is tried; on the other hand,

3727. Concealed Collusion.-When collusion is as far as possible concealed, it may be brought out in evidence, to the discomfiture of all parties.

RELUCTANT EVIDENCE.

3728. Pecuniary Arrangement. —A husband petitioned for a divorce, and it slipped out in cross-examination that he had made a pecuniary concession to the wife on condition that she should not oppose. The discovery was fatal to the petition.

3729. A Too-Candid Solicitor.-A husband's solicitor admitted that he expected to be paid by the wife's father, from which collusion was inferred, with fatal consequences.

3730. A Too-Astute Solicitor.—A solicitor, in the prosecution of a wife's petition, refused to say whether he was employed by the husband: collusion was presumed and the petition dismissed; notwithstanding,

3731. Presumption not Admissible.-Collusion, though secretly existing and suspected, will not be presumed unless satisfactory evidence of its existence be extorted; therefore, after all,

THE WISDOM OF "DAMAGES."

3732. Most Effectual Check.-The institution of "damages" against the co-respondent is the most effectual check to collusion. 3733. Exemplary Damages.-In the case of John (3708), if he

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fails to claim in his petition exemplary damages, according to the circumstances of the parties, the Court will want to know why he is so indulgent, and in the absence of the most conclusive evidence, collusion will be presumed; for,

3734. Nominal Damages.—Nominal damages will not do: anything like an appearance of willingness to accept nominal damages will induce the Court to suspect, and in the absence of the most positive proof to the contrary, to presume collusion.

.3735. Motives for Disclosing Collusion.-In the case of Marmaduke (3708), he may be delighted to proceed, until he perceives that the business must necessarily cost him £5,000 (3669); a hard fact, calculated to cool his ardour, and to induce him to reflect upon the wisdom of frustrating the arrangement.

JURY CASES.

DAMAGES.

3736. Jury Essential.-When parties to a divorce case are not agreed as to damages, a jury is essential; but,

3737. Amount.—The decision of a jury about damages is limited to the question of amount; for,

3738. Disposal.-The disposal of damages rests entirely with the Court.

INCRIMINATING FACTS.

3739. Jury not Essential.—In trying questions of facts, alleged in the Divorce Court, a jury is not essential; so that,

3740. No Fury.-Unless special movement for a jury is made for the investigation of facts, the Court proceeds without one; but, 3741. Option of Parties.-Either of the parties to a suit in the Divorce Court may move for a jury to try facts; and

3742. The Court may Accede.-In most cases the Court will accede to the empannelling of a jury, at the motion of either of the parties; and

3743. The Court must Accede.-In all cases of divorce the Court must accede to a motion for a jury duly made by either of the parties; and

3744. Discretion of Court.-Though neither of the parties to a suit moves for a jury, the Court may order one to be empannelled, solely at its own discretion; for,

3745. Objection Fruitless.-When the Court moves for a jury, an objection by either of the parties is of no avail.