Forging in a false name assumed for concealment, with a view to a fraud, of which the forgery is part, is sufficient to constitute the offence. And if there be proof of the prisoner's real name, it is for him to prove that he used the assumed name before the time he had the fraud in view, even in the absence of proof as to what name he had used for several years before the fraud in question. (1)

In the following case, the general proposition that the use of a mere fictitious name is in itself sufficient to constitute forgery was first established. James Bolland was indicted for having, with intent to defraud one Cardeneaux, forged an endorsement in the name of James Banks on the back of a promissory note for £100, and for uttering the same. The maker and the payee of the note were real persons, and when the note came into the hands of Bolland, he at first endorsed it in his name, and tried to negociate it to one Jesson, who, however, said he would not be able to negociate it with Bolland's endorsement on it; whereupon Bolland said he could take his name off. Another person in company with Bolland then began with a knife to erase the name, and, after all but the initial letter "B" was scratched off, Bolland said, Dont seratch it all out. I will think of some other name beginning with a B;" and he then made the name Banks. Jesson took the note, saying that he should be asked who Banks was, and Bolland said "He is a publican of Rathbone place." Jesson afterwards applied to Cardeneaux to discount the note, and obtained some money on account of it: and being pressed shortly afterwards by Bolland for the amount of the note, Jesson took and introduced Bolland to Cardeneaux, and told the latter that Bolland was the owner of the note. Cardeneaux enquired who Banks was, to which Bolland answered that he was a man of property and lived in Rathbone Place. Cardeneaux then gave Bolland the money in notes and cash, without asking him to endorse the note, as Jesson had before told him that it was better that Bolland's name should not appear on it, as he had been a sheriff's officer. It further appeared that the maker and a previous endorser became bankrupts before the maturity of the note; and when Cardeneaux applied to Bolland, for payment, at the maturity of the note, the latter denied having discounted any note with him, and said his name was James Bolland and that he had never seen Cardeneaux before. After Bolland was arrested, some person in the name of James Banks paid the £100 to Cardeneaux; but no such person as James Banks of Rathbone Place appeared to exist. Bolland was found guilty, sentenced to death, and executed. (2)

In a case where the prisoner was indicted for uttering a forged deed, purporting to be a power of attorney from Elizabeth Tingie, administratrix of her father Richard Tingle, deceased, late a marine belonging to His Majesty's ship the Hector, to F. Predham, of Bernard's-inn, &c, empowering the said Predham to receive all prize-money due to her, &c., the facts were clearly proved, and the prisoner was convicted. But a doubt was entertained, whether, as Richard Tingle had died childless, and as there was no such person as Elizabeth Tingle, the case amounted to forgery; and the point was referred to the consideration of the twelve judges. Eleven of them were very clearly of opinion, that it was forgery. (3)

A person endorsing a fictitious name on a bill of exchange to give it currency, will be guilty of forgery; and in a case which was stated to the judges, they were all of opinion, that a bill of exchange drawn in fictitious names, when there are no such persons existing as the bill imports, was a forged bill. (4)

If three persons, A. B. and C., have authority jointly to draw out money from a bank, and A, one of them, draw out the money by a cheque signed by himself and D. and E., two strangers who personate B., and C., it is forgery. (5)

(1) R. v. Peacock, R. & R. 278.

(2) R. v. Bolland, 1 Leach, 83; 2 East, P. C. 958.

(3) R. v. Lewis, Fost, 116.

(4) R. v. Wilks, 2 East, P. C. 957.

(5) R. v. Dixon, 2 Lew. 178.

Where the prisoner obtained money from B., for a cheque on Jones, Lloyd & Co., purporting to be drawn by G. Andrews in favour of,-Newman, Esq. or bearer, telling him that it was for Mr. Newman, of Soho Square, in whose service he was for three months, and that Mr Newman had put his name on the back; and it appeared, upon an indictment for forging and uttering the cheque, that no person of the name of G. Andrews kept an account with Jones, Lloyd & Co., that Mr Newman of Soho Square did not write his name on the back of the cheque, and that the prisoner was never in that gentleman's service; Parke, J., held this to be sufficient prima facie evidence that G. Andrews was a fictitious person, and told the jury that if G. Andrews really drew the cheque, the prisoner might produce him or give some evidence upon the subject. The prisoner was convicted. (1)

Upon an indictment for forging and uttering a bill of exchange, purporting to be drawn by T. W. of Nottingham and to be accepted by T. K., Market place, Birmingham, which bill was passed to the prosecutor by the prisoner, who represented his name to be King, of King Square, which he said was chiefly his property, the prosecutor proved that he made inquiry for T. W. of Nottingham, and could not find him; that he had been twice to Birmingham after T. K., but could find no such person, and that he had made enquiries at King Square, for the prisoner, but could hear of no such person; but he admitted that he was a stranger at these places, and no person acquainted with them was called; Parke, J., after consulting the judges present, held this to be sufficient evidence to go to the jury of the bill being a fictitious one, although he told them that it was not very satisfactory, and not the usual evidence upon such occasions. (2)

Where the prisoner was indicted for forging and uttering a cheque on Greenwood & Co. army agents and bankers, purporting to be drawn by J. Weston; and a clerk in the army department was called to prove that J. Weston kept no account with his employers; he admitting that he did not know the names of all the customers, but adding that he knew of no customer named J. Weston, and that, upon inquiry of the other clerks, he found that there was no such person: Parke J. with the concurrence of Patteson J. and Gurney B., held this to be prima facie evidence sufficient to call upon the prisoner to show who J. Weston really was. (3)

If a person write an acceptance in his own name to represent a fictitious firm, with intent to defraud, it is a forged acceptance; for, if an acceptance represent a fictitious firm, it is the same as if it represented a fictitious person. The prisoner was indicted for uttering a forged acceptance of a bill of exchange, and it appeared that the prosecutor, in consequence of a newspaper advertisement, went to No. 3, Jewin-court, Jewin-street, and there saw the prisoner, and said he called in reference to the advertisement, which statted that money was to be obtained on freehold property, life interest, &c.: when the prisoner enquired the nature of the property, which the prosecutor described, and told the prisoner he wanted £150; the prisoner then said he had clients at Ipswich, who would purchase the property, and desired the prosecutor to call again in a few days, which he did; when the prisoner said he had seen his clients, and would give the prosecutor £100, which the prosecutor agreed to, and he ultimately agreed to take in payment two bills of exchange of £50 each. The prisoner said he had already received the bills from his clients and he produced them, accepted, and ready prepared, with the exception of the signature of the prosecutor as drawer; the prosecutor enquired who "Nicholson and Co.," the acceptors, were, and what they were; the prisoner said they were general merchants, residing at Ipswich and were highly respectable men, and that the bills would be paid at maturity. There was no address on the bills but Jewin-court, Jewin-street," as their address, but the prisoner said that, although

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3

(1) R. v. Backler, 5 C. & P. 118.
(2) R. v. King, 5 C. & P. 123.
(3) R. v. Brannan, 6, C. & P. 326.

they lived in Ipswich, the acceptors would be in town, and the bills would be paid at Praed and Co's, Fleet street, where they were made payable.

The prosecutor then, at the prisoner's request, put his name on the bills as drawer, and signed and handed to the defendant a deed transfering his property. When the bills matured, they were not paid. A clerk at Praed and Co's. proved that no firm of the name of Nicholson and Co. banked there, nor any person of the name of Nicholson; and a witness from Ipswich proved that he was well acquainted with that town and neighborhood, and knew nothing of any firm of Nicholson and Co., general merchants, there, and that he had made enquiries of the tax collectors and at the post-office, and had not been able to find any such firm or any general merchant named Nicholson. It was further proved that the bills, except the acceptance, were wholly in the handwriting of the prisoner, and that he had deposited the prosecutor's deed of transfer as a collateral for a joint note of hand. For the defence, a witness proved that he had seen a Thomas Nicholson at the prisoner's office many times, but was not positive whether he had been there when the prosecutor was, nor had he seen him write; and it was submitted for the defence that the acceptance was in the handwriting of this Thomas Nicholson, and that therefore it could not be deemed to be a forgery, as the adopting of a false description or addition was not a forgery, according to the case of Rex. v. Webb (1). For the prosecution, the application of Rex. v. Webb was denied, as the addition of "and Co.", even if the jury should be of opinion that the acceptance was written by a T. Nicholson, rendered the acceptance that of a fictitious firm, and the false making of a note or acceptance in the name of a non-existing firm was a forgery; and Rex. v. Parkes (2) was relied on as an authority. Bosanquet, J. said to the jury. The first question is, whether this acceptance is a forgery. Upon that point, if you think that it was not written by T. Nicholson, the case is relieved from doubt or difficulty. But it is said, on the part of the prisoner, that, if it was written by T. Nicholson, it is no forgery. I have no doubt, however, that the writing of an acceptance of an existing person without authority, or of the name of a firm or person non-existing, in an acceptance of a bill of exchange, with intent to defraud, is a forgery; and my opinion is, that if this acceptance was written by Nicholson to represent a fictitious firm, and with intent to defraud, it would amount to a forged acceptance. If you think that the acceptance represents that of a fictitious firm, it is the same thing as if it represented that of a fictitious person, and I should recommend you to find the prisoner guilty of having uttered a forged acceptance, if the evidence satisfies you that he knew it was forged, and that he uttered it with intent to defraud the prosecutor."

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The jury found the prisoner guilty of uttering the acceptance knowing it to be forged, and that it was not written by T. Nicholson, (3)

It is immaterial whether any additional credit be gained by using the false

name.

:

Edward Taft, was tried for forging an endorsement on a bill of exchange for fifty pounds, in the name of John Williams; and having been found guilty, the following case was submitted to the consideration of the twelve Judges The bill of exchange was drawn payable to the order of Messrs. Renwicke and Mee, by whom it was endorsed generally, and it afterwards became the property of one William Wheewall, out of whose pocket it had been picked or lost, with other things. The prisoner had, on the same night, endeavoured to negotiate it; but, being disappointed, he proceeded to Market Harborough, where he bought a horse of the landlord of the inn, and offered him the bill to change. The landlord, not having cash sufficient in the house, carried it to a banker's in the town, where the clerk told him that it was very good paper, for that he knew the payee who had endorsed it, and that if he, (the landlord), would put his name on the back of it, it should be immediately

(1) R. v. Webb, R. & R. 405.

(2) See R. v. Parkes and Brown, at p. 383, ante.

(3) R. v. Rogers, 8 C. & P. 629.

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discounted. The landlord, however, not knowing the person from whom he had received it, refused to endorse it; but told the clerk that the gentleman was then at his house, and he would go and fetch him. He accordingly went to the prisoner, who accompanied him to the banker's, where the clerk told the prisoner that it was the rule of their house never to take a discount bill, unless the person offering such bill endorsed it; but that if he would endorse the bill in question, it should be discounted. The prisoner immediately endorsed it by the name of John Williams," and the banker's clerk, after deducting the discount, gave him the cash for it. The prisoner's name was not John Williams. The judges were unanimously of opinion that this was a forgery within the statute on which the indictment was framed; for, although the fictitious signature was not necessary for the prisoner's obtaining the money, and his intent in writing a false name was probably only to conceal the hands through which the bill had passed, yet it was a fraud both on the owner of the bill, and on the person who discounted it; as the one lost the chance of tracing his property, and the other lost the benefit of a real endorser, if by accident the prior endorsements should have failed. (1)

It has been held that an order on a banker, for the payment of money, falsely purporting to be made by one who kept cash with such banker, was a forgery, though made in a fictitious name, or in the name of one who had no authority to draw on the banker; (2) and that a receipt, in a fictitious name, endorsed on a bill of exchange was also a forgery, although it did not purport to be the name of any particular person. (3)

In one case, where the credit was without doubt given personally to the prisoner, the security tendered being considered as his alone, the judges agreed unanimously that the offence amounted to a forgery. The prisoner was indicted for forging and also for uttering, knowing it to be forged, the following order for payment of money, and with intent to defraud James Elliott.

"Green Street 31 July 1781.

SIRS,

Pray pay to Mr John Atkins, or bearer, six pounds six shillings; value received. Yours &c.

To Messrs BROWN, COLLINSON AND CO.,

Lombard Street."

H. TURNER.

It appeared that the prosecutor was a silversmith; and the prisoner, having looked out several goods at his shop, to the amount of six guineas, pulled out his purse, as if going to pay for them, saying, "I believe I have not cash enough about me, but here is a draft on a banker, which is the same thing as money, for it will be paid when presented." He accordingly laid the draft on the counter. Mr. Elliott looked at the draft as it lay on the counter; and seeing it was upon a house he knew, he took it, the sum being a small one, and the prisoner having a genteel appearance: and he then took his order-book, for the purpose of making a memorandum of the prisoner's direction; and supposing his name to be the same as that in which the draft, which he conceived to be the prisoner's, was signed, he wrote, "H. Turner, Esq." The prisoner looked over him, and desired him to add "Junior, Noah's Row, Hampton Court," and then went away. Mr. Elliot further stated, that he gave credit to the prisoner and not to the draft. It appeared that no person of the name of H. Turner kept cash at Brown and Collinson's, or lived in Green-street; nor could such a place as Noah's Row, or such a person as H. Turner, jun., be found at Hampton

(1) R. v. Taft, 1 Leach, 172; See R. v. Marshall, R. & R. 75.

(2) R v. Lockett, 1 Leach. 94; R. v. Abraham, 2 East P. C. 941. (3) R. v. Taylor, 1 Leach, 214; R. v. Francis, R. & R. 209.

Court. Upon these facts the jury found the prisoner guilty, and he received judgment of death; but the execution of the sentence was respited on a doubt, whether, as Mr. Elliott had sworn that he gave credit to the prisoner, and not to the draft, it could amount to the crime of forgery. The twelve judges were unanimously of opinion that the conviction was right; for it was a false instrument, not drawn by any such person as it purported to be, and the using the fictitious name was only for the purpose of deceiving. (1)

In another case a conviction for forgery was held to be right, where the fictitious name used by the prisoner in the forged instrument was found by the jury to have been assumed by him with the intention of defrauding the prosecu tor, although the prisoner's real name would, as admitted by the prosecutor, have carried with it as much credit as the assumed name. (2) But it was held that where a man, who had long been known by a fictitious name, drew a bill in that name, it was not a forgery. (3)

It is forgery for a person, having authority to fill up a blank acceptance or a cheque, for a certain sum, to fill it up for a larger amount. Therefore, if a person gives another a blank acceptance, and at the time limits the amount either by writing upon it, or otherwise, and, if in the filling up of the acceptance that amount be exceeded with intent to defraud the acceptor, or any other person, it is forgery under clause (a) of article 421. The following is a case of this kind. The prisoner was indicted for forging the following bill of exchange:

"London, August 20, 1836.

£500.

Two months after date pay to my order the sum of five hundred pounds, value received.

To the Rev. C. H. JENNER,

No. 1, Chesterfield street, May Fair."

C. TAYLOR.

It appeared that in consequence of an advertisement offering to lend money, Mr Jenner wrote, stating that he was anxious to borrow £500, and afterwards saw the prisoner, to whom he said he wanted money; the prisoner asked how much; Mr Jenner said £200, and some discussion arose as to Mr Jenner's means of repaying it. The prisoner said he had the money, and appointed to meet Mr Jenner the next day in London. Mr Jenner on the next day saw the prisoner, who took from his pocket-book a stamped piece of paper, and wrote something on the upper corner of it on the left hand, which Mr Jenner could not then distinguish, and which he handed to Mr Jenner, and requested him to write, on it, "accepted and his name; which Mr Jenner did, and he also wrote on it "at the Bank of England," at the prisoner's desire. The prisoner said he should leave Mr Jenner for some purpose; Mr Jenner said "Then of course you will leave the check with me." The prisoner said that was unnecessary, and said

99

To show you there can be nothing wrong there are the figures denoting £200 written in the corner." Mr Jenner then looked at the corner and observed written in the corner £200; which figures Mr Jenner stated must have been written before he wrote his acceptance. The prisoner then took the check away, and the parties were to meet at the bank coffee-house in half-an-hour. Mr Jenner went there, but the prisoner did not come. Mr Jenner stated that he never gave the prisoner any authority to fill up that paper for a greater sum than £200. Early in August the prisoner told one Edwards he had an acceptance of Mr Jenner's for £500 which he wished him to buy; and subsequently Edwards agreed to buy the bill for five shillings in the pound. He then saw it, and it

(1) R. v. Sheppard, 1 Leach, 226.

(2) R. v. Whiley, R. & R. 99. See also, R. v. Marshall, R. & R 75. (3) R. v. Aickles, 2 East, P. C. 968; R. v. Bontein, R. & R. 260.