evidence was payable to four persons of whom Magdalene Isherwood was one), as joint executrices. Held, by all the judges, that the indictment was sufficient, and that the charge was proved. (1)

Deeds, bonds, debentures, etc.-(Art. 423 A. u). A power of attorney to transfer government stock has been held to be a deed. (2) But the forging of such a power of attorney is the subject of a distinct provision contained in clause A (0) of article 423.

The giving of an administration bond, in a false name, is a forgery. (3)

Warrants or orders, etc., for money, etc.-(Art. 423 A u). It is not necessary that a document, in order to constitute it a warrant or order for the payment of money, should appear to be so on its face. It is sufficient if the party to whom it is addressed has been in the habit of treating similar documents as warrants, etc, for the payment of money. Therefore, a document in the form of a mere receipt, given by a depositor to a building society that received money on deposit, may properly be described in an indictment, as a warrant for payment of money, if, by the custom of the society, such receipts are, in fact, treated as warrants for the payment of money. (4)

A draft upon a banker has been held to be a warrant and order for the payment of money, (5) although post-dated. (6) So was even a bill of exchange; (7) and an order to pay "all my prize money due to me for my services on board His Majestys' Ship Leander," without specifying any particular sum. (8)

14

Where the instrument was an order to pay the prisoner, or order, the sum of £4. 5s. being a month's advance on an intended voyage to Quebec in the ship Mary Ann" as per agreement with G. M. master; and the prisoner had written in the margin of the order, " On receiving this cheque I agree to sail, and to be on board within sixteen days from the date of this cheque;" it was held an order for the payment of money. (9)

A foreign letter requesting a correspondent in England to advance money, it being proved that such letters are, in the course of business, treated as orders, was held to support a charge of forging an order for the payment of money. (10)

A writing, purporting to authorize the bearer to receive money deposited in a bank by a friendly society, and purporting to be signed by the principal officers of the society, the bank having received the money cn terms of repayment to the order of the society), was held to be well described as a warrant for the payment of money, and it was held no objection that the defendant was himself a member of the society. (11)

A forged paper was as follows:-"This is to certify R. R. has swept flues and cleaned the bilges, and repaired four bridges of the Princess Victoria. J. N £4. Os. 10;" and it was proved that, by the course of dealing between the parties, this voucher, if genuine, would have authorised L. & Co. to pay the £4.0. 10. Held, sufficient to support an indictment charging it as a warrant for the payment of money. (12) But a paper reading as follows:-"I hereby

(1) R. v. Winterbottom 1 Den. 41; 2 C. & K. 37; Arch. Cr. Pl. & Ev. 21 Ed. 667. (2) R. v. Fauntleroy, 1 Mood. C.C. 52; 2 Bing 413; 1 C. & P. 421.

(3) R. v. Barber, 1 C. & K. 434.

(4) R. v. Kay, L. R., 1 C. C. R. 257; 39 L. J. (M. C.) 118.

(5) R. v. Willoughby, 2 East, P. C. 944.

(6) R. v. Taylor, 1 C. & K. 213.

(7) R. v. Sheppard, 1 Leach 226; R. v. Smith, 1 Den. 79.

(8) R. v. McIntosh, 2 East, P. C. 942.

(9) R. v. Bamfield, 1 Mood. C. C. 417. See R. v. Anderson, 2 M. & Rob. 469; and R. v. Howie, 11 Cox 320.

(10) R. v. Raake, 2 Mood. C. C. 66; 8 C. & P. 626.

(11) R. v. Harris, 2 Mood. C. C. 267; 1 C. & K. 179. (12) R. v. Rogers, 9 C & P. 41.

certify that the within named W. M is gaining his living by hawking," the production of which was necessary to enable the defendant to obtain payment of a sum of money,-was held not to be a warrant or order for the payment of money, and to be the subject only of forgery at common law. (1)

Money orders issued by the Post-Office have been held to be warrants and orders for the payment of money. (2)

A writing in the form of a bill of exchange but without any drawee's name cannot be charged as an order for the payment of money; at least unless shewn by averments to be such. (3)

forged draft on a banker, in a fictitious name, or in the name of a person who never kept cash with the banker is a warrant or order for the payment of money; for it imports, upon the face of it to be an order by a person having authority to make it. (4)

A forged draft in the name of a person who does keep cash with the banker is an order, whatever be the state of that person's account at the time. (5)

Where, on the contrary a man obtains goods upon his own draft on a banker, with whom he does not keep cash, the proper mode of proceeding against him criminally is by indictment for the false pretence. (6)

The cases on this subject were all considered by the judges in R. v. Vivian, (7) in which they laid down the principle that any instrument for the payment of money under which, if genuine, the payer might receive the amount against the party signing it, might properly be considered as a warrant for the payment of money; and that it was equally such, whatever were the state of account between the parties, and whether the party purporting to sign it had at the time funds in the hands of the party to whom it was addressed or not. In that case the forged instrument was as follows:- Mr M. will be pleased to send by the bearer £10 on Mr H's account, as Mr H. is very bad in bed, and cannot come himself." Signed "M. R., foreman, St. A. foundry." M. was a clerk of bankers, with whom H. kept an account, and by drafts on whom he paid his workmen. M. R. was H's foreman, having authority to pay the workmen, but not to draw for the money. H. being ill in bed, the defendant forged this paper in M. R's name, and obtained the £10 from M. by means of it. Although M. R. had, himself, no account with the bankers the defendant was held properly convicted; because by the instrument, if genuine, M. R. said in effect that he had authority from H., who had an account with the bankers; and as against him (M. R.), therefore, it was as much a warrant as if he himself had such account, and would equally have bound him.

It has been held that a warrant for the payment of money need not be addressed to any particular person; but that it was sufficient if it would, if genuine, have been an authority to a certain person to pay the account mentioned in it: (8) and where the forged instrument was thus, “Sir, please pay," ete., it was held that it might be shewn by evidence to be an order for the payment of money, and for whom it was intended. (9)

A written promise to pay a specified sum or such other sum not exceeding

(1) R. v. Mitchell, 2 F. & F. 44.

(2) R. v. Gilchrist, 2 Mood. C. C. 233; C. & Mar. 224.

(3) R. v. Curry, 2 Mood. C. C. 218.

(4) R. v. Lockett, 2 East, P. C. 840; 1 Leach, 94: R. v. Abraham, 2 East P.

C. 941.

(5) R. v. Carter, 1 Den. C. C. 65: 1 C. & K. 741.

(6) See R. v. Lara, 6 T. R. 565, R. v. Flint, R. & R. 460; R. v. Jackson, 3 Camp. 370 and see p. 320, ante.

(7) R. v. Vivian, Den. 35; 1 C. & K. 719.

(8) R. v. Rogers, 9 C. & P. 41.

(9) R. v. Snelling, Dears 219: 23 L. J. (M. C.) 8.

the same, as A. B. may incur by reason of his sureyship is an undertaking for the payment of money. (1) So, also, is a document purporting to guarantee a master a certain amount in money against the dishonesty of a clerk; (2) and an I. O. U. given by a debtor to his creditor, to obtain further time for payment of the debt, to which I. O U. the debtor affixes, besides his own signature, a forged signature of a third party as surety. (3)

A sailor's shipping note purporting to be signed by the master, and reading as follows." In consideration of F. sailing as steward in the brig K. from the port of L., I undertake to pay to F., or bearer, £2 five days after the said brig shall sail from the said port," is an undertaking. (4)

Accountable receipts.—(Art. 423 v.) It has been held that a pawnbroker's ticket or duplicate is an accountable receipt for goods (5)

If a person with intent to defraud and to cause it to be supposed, contrary to the fact, that he has paid a certain sum into a bank, make in a book, purporting to be a pass-book of the bank, a false entry, which denotes that the bank has received the sum, he is guilty of forging an accountable receipt for money. (6)

Warrants for the delivery of goods, etc.—At the London Docks a person bringing a " tasting order" from a merchant having wine there, is not allowed to taste until the order has across it the signature of a clerk of the company. The defendant uttered a tasting order with the merchant's name forged to it by presenting it to the company's clerk for his signature across it, which the clerk refused. It was held to be, in this state, a forged order for the delivery of goods. (7)

66

An order to deliver my work to bearer" (and which, in evidence, was explained to mean an order to Goldsmith's Hall to deliver certain plate which a silversmith had sent there to be marked), was held to be a warrant or order for the delivery of goods. (8)

Requests for payment of money, or delivery of goods, etc.-(Art. 423, Cj). It has been held that a request for the delivery of goods need not be addressed to any one; (9) and that it need not be signed by a person who can compel a performance of it, or who has any authority over or interest in the goods. (10)

Where the prisoner represented that M. C. was dead, and had left £50 or £60, which was in the hands of A. D.. and that he wanted mourning, and brought a forged paper purporting to be signed by A. D., and containing the following:"Please let W. T. have such things as he wants for the purpose; I have got the amount of £27 for M. C. in my keeping these many years,"-it was held to be a forged request for goods. (11)

A paper which contained the following:-" Please let the lad have a hat, and I will answer for the money, E. B."-was held to be a request for the delivery

(1) R. v. Reed, 2 Mood. C. C. 62 : 8 C. & P. 623.

(2) R. v. Jovce, L. & C. 576; 34 L. J. (M. C. 168.

(3) R. v. Chambers, L. R., 1 C. C. R.

341; 41 L. J. (M. C.) 15.

(4) R. v. Anderson, 2 M. & Rol. 469. See also R. v. Howie, 11 Cox 320; and R. v. Bamfield, 1 Mood. C. C. 417

(5) R. v. Fitchie, Dears. & B. 175; 26 L. J. (M. C.) 90.

(6) R. v. Moody, L. & C. 173; 31 L. J. (M. C.) 156; R. v. Smith, L. & C. 168; 31 L. J. (M. C.) 154.

(7) R. v. Illidge, 1 Den. C. C. 404; 2 C. & K. 871.

(8) R. v. Jones, 1 Leach, 53.

(9) R. v. Carney, 1 Mood. C. C. 351; R. v. Cullen, 1 Mood. C. C. 300; R. v. James, 8 C. & P. 292; R. v. Pulbrook, 9 C. & P. 37.

(10) R. v. Thomas, 2 Mood C. C. 16. (11) R. v. Thomas, 7 C. & P. 851.

of goods; and it was also held that it was not the less a forged request for the delivery of goods because it might also be a forged undertaking for the payment of money. (1)

A letter written to a wholesale house in London in the name of a customer in the country, as follows:-"I shall feel obliged by your paying Mr. B. the sum of £27s. 8d., and debiting me with the same; you will please have a receipt, and add the amount to invoice of order on hand," '-was held to be a request for the payment of money. (2)

Acquittances, receipts, etc.-(Art. 423 C k). The difference between the receipts covered by this clause and the accountable receipts or acknowledgements dealt with in clause A. (v) seems to be this, that, in the one case (clause A. v) the receipt is for money or goods deposited with and left in charge of the person receiving the same, and to be accounted for, while, in the other, it is merely a receipt for money or goods in the nature of an acquittance or discharge. For instance when A., a banker, receives a deposit of money from B., a depositer, A's receipt is an accountable receipt for money which he takes charge of for B., to whom he must account for it; but when B., in afterwards withdrawing the money so deposited with A. gives a receipt for it, B's receipt is then a mere acquittance or discharge.

A turnpike toll-gate ticket is a receipt for money. (3)

Where it was shewn to be the custom of bankers to give, on deposits of money, receipts in the following form,-" Received of A. B. £85 to his credit This receipt not transferable;" and to repay the same with interest, on the return of the receipt with a name written on it; it was held that the forging the name of A., B., and receiving the money due, on its return, was a forging and uttering of an acquittance for the £85 and interest. (4)

424. Uttering forged documents.-Every one is guilty of an indictable offence who, knowing a document to be forged, uses, deals with, or acts upon it, or attempts to use, deal with, or act upon it, or causes or attempts to cause any person to use, deal with, or act upon it, as if it were genuine. and is liable to the same punishment as if he had forged the document.

2. It is immaterial where the document was forged.

The mere shewing of a forged receipt to a person with whom the defendant was claiming credit for it has been held to be an uttering, although the defendant refused to part with the possession of it. (5)

Where a pawnbroker, upon the hearing of an application against him under 39 & 40 Geo. 3, c. 99, s. 14, to compel him to deliver up goods pledged with him, (the money advanced, with interest, having been repaid) produced and delivered to the magistrates, through the hand of his attorney, a forged duplicate, as the genuine one which he had given when the goods were pledged, and which he had received back when the money was repaid, it was held to be an uttering by the pawnbroker. (6)

A placed a forged receipt for poor-rates in the hands of B., for the purpose of inspection only, in order by representing himself as a person whose poor-rates, were paid, to fraudulently induce B. to advance money to C., for whom he, A.,

(1) R. v. White, 9 C. & P. 282.

(2) R. v. Thorn, 2 Mood. C. C. 210; C. & Mar. 206. See, also, R. v. Roberts, 2 Mood. C. C. 258; C. & Mar. 652.

(3) R. v. Fitch, R. v. Howley, L. & C. 159.

(4) R. v. Atkinson, 2 Mood. C. C. 215 ; C. & Mar. 325.

(5) R. v. Radford, 1 Den. 59 : 1 C. & K. 707.

(6) R. v. Fitchie, Dears. & B. 175 ; 26 L. J. (M. C.) 90.

proposed to become surety for its repayment. Held to be an uttering: the rule there laid down by the Court being that a using of the forged instrument in some way, in order to get money or credit on it, or by means of it, is sufficient to constitute the offence of uttering. (1)

On an indictment for uttering forged bonds in England; it was held that such uttering was sufficiently proved by evidence of the bonds having been posted in England to a firm at Brussels for negociation. (2)

The giving of a forged note to an innocent agent, or to an accomplice is a disposing of and putting away of the note. (3)

Where several, by concert, were privy to the uttering of a forged note, which was uttered by one only in the absence of the others, he who uttered it was held to be a principal, and the others, accessories before the fact. (4) But, now, they would all be principals. (See articles 61 and 62 pp. 35 and 36, ante.)

A conditional uttering is as much a crime as any other. Where the defendant gave a forged acceptance, knowing it to be so, to the manager of a bank where he kept an account, saying that he hoped this bill would satisfy the bank as a security for the money he owed them, and the manager replied that that would depend on the result of enquiries as to the acceptors; this was holden a sufficient guilty uttering. (5)

The using, dealing with or acting upon the document knowing it to be a forgery constitutes the offence, under this article 424.

The guilty knowledge of the document being forged is, in nearly all cases, proved by evidence of facts from which the jury may presume it.

Upon an indictment for uttering a forged bank-note, knowing it to be forged, proof that the defendant had passed other forged notes, when proved by legitimate evidence, was held to raise a probable presumption that he knew the particular note in question to be forged. (6) And, if, in addition to this, it be proved also that the defendant, when he passed the notes, gave a false name or a false address, it will amount to a violent presumption.

Even where the uttering by the defendant of other forged notes is the subject of a distinct indictment, the evidence has been admitted. In one case, in which authorities against the admissibility of such evidence were cited, Lord Denman, C. J. said that he could not conceive how the relevancy of the fact to this charge could be affected by its being the subject of another charge.” (7)

**

In another case Alderson, B. admitted such evidence. (8)

On an indictment for engraving or uttering notes of a foreign prince, evidence of a recent engraving or uttering of notes of another foreign prince was held admissible in proof of guilty knowledge (9)

Where it appeared that the defendant sold a forged note to an agent employed

(1) R. v. Ion, Den. 475: 23 L. J. (M. C.) 166.

(2) R. v. Finkelstein, 15 Cox, 107.

(3) R. v. Palmer, 1 N. R. 93; R. & R. 72; R. v. Giles, 1 Mood. C. C. 166.

(4) R. v. Soares, R. & R. 25 : R. v. Badcock, R. & R. 249; R. v. Stewart, R. &

R. 363; R. v. Davis, R. & R. 113; R. v. Morris, R. & R. 270; 2 Leach, 1096; R. v. Harris, 7 C. & P. 416.

(5) R. v. Cooke, 8 C. & P. 582

(6) R v. Millard, R. & R. 245; R. v. Moore, 1 F. & F. 73; R. v. Wylie, 1 N. R. 92 R. v. Tattersal, 1 N. R. 94; R. v. Ball, 1 Camp. 324; R. & R. 132; R. v. Hough, R. & R. 120; R. v. Green, 3 C. & K. 209; R. v. Salt, 3 F. & F. 834; R. v. Colclough, 15 Cox, (Ir. C. C R.) 92.

(7) R. v. Cadwallader, Lewis, Carnarvon Sum. Ass 1840.

(8) R. v. Acton, 1 Russ. 407. See, also, R. v. Foster, Dears. 456; 24 L. J. (M. C.) 134.

(9) R. v. Balls, 1 Mood. C. C. 470; 7 C. & P. 429.