unlawful'; whether the occasion of the sale, publishing, or exhibition of certain classes of books, engravings, &c. is such as might be for the public good,' and whether there is evidenee for the jury of 'excess.' Again, all the provisions relating to libel are so drawn that wide latitude would be left to the jury in determining whether a given publication is or is not libellous.

"We believe, upon the whole, that upon a detailed examination of the Draft Code, it will be found that, in respect of elasticity, it makes very little, if any, change in the existing law. It clears up many doubts and removes many technicalities, but it neither increases nor diminishes. to any material extent, if at all, any discretion at present vested in either Judges or Juries."

Although, as above stated, the opinions of the Judges on the Bills sent to them by Lord Cranworth were unfavorable, it would seem, from the following extracts from some of their letters, that the main objection of the Judges was not directed so much against the principle of codification itself as against any such system of codification as might involve the repeal of the rules of the common law.

LORD CHIEF BARON POLLOCK said: "The abolition of the common law might be productive of very dangerous consequences. I have no such confidence in the sagacity of any man or any set of men as to expect that every possibility can be anticipated and every contingency be provided for. Under the protection of the common law (aided by such statutes as have been passed in furtherance of it), I know that the peace of society and the safety of individuals is amply provided for; but I cannot feel the same security if the common law be abolished, and we have nothing to look to but a code."

BARON PARKE said: "I feel bound to state that in my opinion the proposed measure, which is to abrogate the common law with respect to criminal offences, and put an end to all its rules and definitions of offences, is a measure likely to produce no benefit in the administration of criminal justice, but decidedly the reverse. My objection to the proposed measure by no means rests upon any want of care and skill in the Commissioners, in the preparation of the proposed statutory codes, but is founded on the danger of confining provisions against crimes to these enactments, and repealing in this respect the rules of the common law, which are clear and well understood, and have the incalculable advantage of being capable of application to new combinations of circumstances perpetually occurring, which are decided when they arise, by inference and analogy to them, and upon the principles on which they rest. Whatever

care be used in defining offences, and in the language of the proposed enactments, it will be impracticable to make the definitions embrace every possible case that can arise, and consequently many acts which are criminal, and closely fall within the principle of the rules of the common law, will be dispunishable, whereas, if the common law is suffered to continue, it may justly and legally be applied to them."

BARON ALDERSON: "Let the Bill be confined to consolidating and amending, if necessary, the statute law as to these crimes, and adding new provisions where doubts have arisen from inconvenient constructions by the Courts, either of the words of antecedent statutes, or of the rules of the common law in particular cases; but let us retain the rules and principles of the common law as they have been handed to us from our predecessors."

MR. JUSTICE COLERIDGE: "I cannot but express an earnest hope that our common law, that is, the principle of an unwritten traditionary law, may not be taken from us. Like many other things in our constitution, it may seem objectionable in theory, but in its results is found to produce the greatest good."

MR. JUSTICE WIGHTMAN: "Our existing criminal law being partly written and partly unwritten, the former parts being contained in a great many statutes, and the unwritten part to be collected from a mass of authorities to be found in the reports and the works of text writers upon the subject, is scarcely, if at all, accessible to the bulk of Her Majesty's subjects, nor indeed to any except such as are lawyers by profession; and there can, I apprehend, be no doubt but that if a statute or statutes or code could be framed with such accurate and clear definitions and provisions as would with certainty and precision include all offences known to the criminal law, and as certainly exclude all other cases, it would be one of the greatest of public benefits. The law would be at once accessible and certain. With respect to so much of the criminal law as is founded upon statutes, I am not aware of any well-founded objection that could be made to the reduction of it into a single statute or partial code, or of any difficulty in the framing of such a statute. The case, however, is very different with respect to that part of the criminal law which depends upon the common law. In applying the rules and principles of the common law to any particular case, the Court is not fettered nor embarrassed by being obliged to put a construction upon particular words or expressions, but it is sufficient if the case falls within any rule or principle to be deduced from the authorities. If, however, the whole of the criminal law were reduced into one or more statutes,

that part of it which now depends upon the common law would become statute law, and, like other statute law, must be construed according to the words and expressions used in the statute and not according to general rules and principles, at the risk of raising difficulties, uncertainties, and doubts, from which the law as it exists at present may be free, and which it may not be easy or even possible to foresee until the law, as altered, is subjected to the test of actual practice and experience."

MR. JUSTICE CRESSWELL: "I cannot but think that the abrogation of the common law will be attended with very considerable danger." MR. JUSTICE CROMPTON: "I think it unadvisable to lose the advantage of the power of applying the principles of the common law to new offences, and combinations of circumstances, arising from time to time, which it is hardly possible that any codification, however able and complete, should effectually anticipate."

Among the changes in the law already made by Canadian statutes, in recent years, and now confirmed by the Criminal Code, are the following:

The abolition of appeal to the Privy Council. (51 V., c. 43, s. 1.) The right of taking evidence of child, without oath. (53 V. c. 37, sec. 13).

The abolition of the right of aliens to a Jury de medietate linguæ. (R. S. C., c. 174, s. 161).

The abolition of Solitary Confinement, the Pillory, and Deodands, (R. S. C., c. 181, ss. 34, 35).

The Amendments in the law as to Seduction and Defilement of girls, Indecent Acts, Gross Indecency, Incest, Bigamy, Polygamy, Malicious Injuries, Procedure, etc. (53 V. c. 37, secs. 3-31.)

The punishment of Municipal corruption. (52 V., c. 42, s. 2.)

The Code provides that, in future, there shall be no committal for trial by a coroner; and that there shall be no jury de ventre inspiciendo.

It abolishes Attainder, Outlawry, and pleas in abatement.

The terms LARCENY, EMBEZZLEMENT, etc., are abolished, and the word THEFT is substituted, as a general term, to comprise all acts of fraudulent taking, and of fraudulent conversion, misappropriation, and breach of trust.

It also abolishes the distinction between felonies and misdemeanors, and modifies, in accordance with this change, the regulation of arrests, bail, jury challenges, etc.

The distinction, (for many years past merely nominal), between principal offenders and accessories before the fact is also abolished; and so, also, is the rule that a wife, committing an offence in the presence of her husband, is presumed to act under compulsion.

The terms "malice" and "malice aforethought" are discontinued; and corresponding changes are made in the definitions of murder and manslaughter.

As a general rule, no indictment can, in future, be preferred, without a preliminary enquiry before the Magistrates.

A prisoner may examine witnesses at the preliminary enquiry; and he may make admissions at his trial.

Writs of error are abolished, and alterations are made in regard to appeals and new trials; and, in particular, the right is given to the Minister of Justice to order a new trial.

The following appear to be new offences:

Breach of trust.

Being masked or disguised by night.

Bribery and corruption of or by a Judge or a member of parliament. Conspiracy to bring a false accusation of crime.

Conspiracy to defile a woman.

Disobedience to orders of Court.

Fabricating evidence.

False accounting by clerks.

False statements by public officers.
Killing child in mother's womb.
Misconduct in respect to dead bodies.

Neglecting to obtain assistance in child birth.

Personation.

Selling offices.

Sending false telegrams.

Sending a telegram or letter in false name.

Spreading false news.

Stealing, between husband and wife, when living apart.

There are also, (amongst other changes and modifications noted

in the comments), some alterations and amendments, of more or less importance, in regard to the following subjects:

Abduction.

Accessories after the fact.

Arson.

Articles of the Peace.

Amendments at Trial.

Attempts.

Bigamy.

Burglary.

Calling the jury panel.

Compensation for loss of property.

Conspiracies.

Costs.

Disabilities.

Escapes and Rescues.

False statements by promoters, directors, &c. of Companies.

Forgery.

Indictments.

Indecent Acts.

Jurisdiction of General or Quarter Sessions.

Libel.

Limitations of time for prosecuting offences.

Manslaughter.

Mischief.

Murder.

Non-suspension of Civil Remedy.

Nuisances.

Obscene books, pictures, etc.

Perjury.

Rape.

Restitution.

Riots, etc.

Suicide.

Taking verdict on Sunday.

Trial.

Venue.

Witchcraft.

And, by sec. 4 of the Canada Evidence Act 1893, the accused and the husband or wife of the accused are made competent witnesses