expenditure, the net receipts might be obtained, and a proper sum would then have to be deducted for tenants' profits, and for interest on capital, rates and taxes, the cost of renewal, repairs and insurance of buildings and plant, and renewal of the mains. It was held also, in accordance with The Queen v. Mile End Old Town, and The Queen v. The West Middlesex Waterworks Company, that the stations, works, buildings, etc., ought to be valued as fixed property, deriving some additional value from their being used as part of the gas-works. It was held, also, that the rateable value of the mains and pipes, which would be the residue, after deducting the net rateable value of the stations, works, buildings, and lands within the respondents' township from the value of the whole rateable property of the company, must be apportioned among the different townships, not simply according to the extent of the mains contained in each, but keeping in view also the fact, that part of them contributed directly, and part only indirectly, to the profits, as had been held in The Queen v. The West Middlesex Waterworks Company.—(R. v. The Sheffield United Gaslight Co., 32 L. J., M. Ca. 169.)

POOR-RATE.-The E. C. Railway Company were rated to the poor-rates of the parish of A., in respect of their line of railway running through the parish. The company made a gross charge to their customers for goods carried over their line, such charge including not only the carriage along the line, but also the various services rendered at the stations in loading, unloading, etc. No appropriation was made in the books or accounts of the company of such last portion of the amount charged for the carriage of goods; but according to the clearing system mentioned in the Railway Clearing Act, 1848, 13 & 14 Vict., c. 28, the appellants calculated the terminal charges upon L.6036, the gross parochial earnings in A. to be L.2829, and they contended that the gross amount of parochial earnings was the difference between those two sums. It was held, the stations were to be treated as only indirectly contributing to the profits of the line; that the amount of the terminals, and the amount of the expenses incurred in earning them, were parts of the general earnings and expenses of the line, and were to be treated as any other part of the gross receipts and outgoings, and therefore, that the appellants were wrong.-(R. v. The Eastern Counties Rail. Co., 32 L. J., M. Ca. 174.)

TRUCK ACT.—If an artificer, engaged in an employment which comes within 1 & 2 Will. IV., c. 37, receives of his own accord goods at a shop kept by his employer, and a corresponding amount is deducted by his employer from his wages at their next settling, this is a payment of wages in goods within the meaning of section 3, and subjects the employer to the penalties of section 9. If payment of wages has been made in goods, no subsequent payment of the wages in cash can purge the offence so committed; the provisions of the Act which declare the payment void, and also illegal and punishable, being cumulative. (Wilson v. Cookson, and Fisher v. Jones, 32 L. J., M. Ca. 177.)

COMPANY.-A company cannot covenant not to oppose a bill, which, if passed, would deprive the shareholders of the protection afforded by the Wharncliffe t order. Wood, V. C.-Though a public company may apply for an Act of Parliament, it cannot legally covenant with a third party to do so, since it would thereby render its funds liable in the event of its not applying. Shareholders in a company, the directors of which have affixed the company's seal to an agreement, some of the provisions whereof are illegal, are entitled to have the agreement set aside, so far as it is ultra vires, leaving the operation of the rest of the agreement to be adjusted by litigation or otherwise between the contracting parties.-Maunsell v. The Midland Great Western (of Ireland) Rail. Co., 32 L. J., Ch. 513.)

THE

JOURNAL OF JURISPRUDENCE.

COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE.

1 General View of the Criminal Law of England. By James Fitzjames Stephen, M.A., of the Inner Temple, Barrister-atLaw, Recorder of Newark-on-Trent. Macmillan and Co. 1863.

THIS book has already attained to a high position both in the legal world and in the estimation of the general public. It is not a specimen of the ordinary stamp of English law books. Such books are usually written, either for the use of students and practitioners in courts of justice, in which case they are so crowded with matters of detail and reference as to be unreadable by the public, or they are written by men who are waiting for business, as advertisements of efficiency on the part of the author in some special department of law, and, as such, are addressed to solicitors and agents, from whom the writer looks for his reward. Books written with either of these objects have their own value; and if they are good they are appreciated, but the numbers of their readers must necessarily be limited to the members of that profession for whom they are intended. They do not appeal to the reading public; and if they did, the public would not listen to them. Mr Stephen, however, does appeal to the public. His book is addressed to it as well as to the legal profession, and it has met with appreciation on both sides. It is intended neither for practical use, nor for an introduction to professional study. Its object is to give an account of the general scope, tendency, and design, of an important part of our institutions, of which surely none can

VOL. VII. NO. LXXXIV. DECEMBER 1863.

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have a greater moral significance, or be more closely connected with broad principles of morality and politics, than those by which men rightfully, deliberately, and in cold blood, kill, enslave, and otherwise torment their fellow-creatures.' It is, in short, a very successful attempt to treat what appears to be strictly professional topics in a popular way, or, at least, to throw a sufficient amount of interest round a difficult subject, as to make it intelligible and valuable to the majority of people. And it is no light task to handle easily, and at the same time thoroughly, such a subject as the general scope and bearing of the Criminal Law of England, without derogating from its dignity. Yet Mr Stephen succeeds in doing so ; and his success is mainly due to his natural subtlety of mind, his clear logical reasoning, the originality of his, speculation, a perspicuous and polished style, an arrangement that proves at once the perfect mastery of his subject, and an educated and scholar-like tone, that is not always met with in legal treatises.

The volume commences with an historical sketch of English criminal law, and is then divided into three parts-Crime, Procedure, and Evidence, which are severally treated at considerable length. The historical chapter is the least satisfactory portion of the book. History is not the author's strong point. Much of the chapter is compiled with great ability and conciseness; the right points are taken up, and the nail is hit upon the head, but there is no spirit in the strokes. Mr Stephen's heart does not seem to be in the details of history. He has no affection for history or interest in it; but to make his work complete, he has been compelled to touch upon it. The result is, a want of thoroughness and a failure in the working out of minute details; and these drawbacks give this chapter the appearance of a fragment of a greater work. It is more like a student's abridgment of a history of criminal law, than what it professes to be, an introduction to a philosophical treatise upon the subject. It is only fair to say, that the author does not purpose to give an exhaustive account of the historical growth of criminal procedure. 'I have designedly,' he says 'omitted everything which did not seem to me essential to the observations which I propose to make on the different parts of our system.' Those omissions, however, are to be regretted; because if this book is intended to take the position of a really great book on criminal law, and if permanent and not transient popularity is desired, it ought to have contained more than the elements of a good history.

It is in the remaining portion of his book that Mr Stephen's strength lies. In the more philosophical portions, those namely проп zpon crime and evidence, he appears at his best. In these chapters be raises, discusses, and answers a variety of questions, that are thoroughly congenial to his mind. As they are introduced one. after another, now as to the relation of criminal law to morality,now as to specific criminal intention,-now as to insanity and the relation of it to responsibility and intention; or again, as to the nature of evidence and belief, the classification of evidence as direct and circumstantial, the rules as to the competency or incompetency of witnesses, as these questions, and other kindred topics arise, Mr Stephen enters on his work with pleasure. Whether as an opponent or a partisan, no one can fail to be interested in the manner in which these questions are discussed. And if at times we are inclined to doubt the utility of the results that are arrived at, and to say that the author's love of running matters up to principles, and of speculating from a distance with a shrewd and almost ultra-practical sense on human nature and social life, may be carried to extremes, we cannot fail to admire the power of mind, the suggestiveness of the remarks, and the subtlety of speculation which are displayed in these discussions.

It is not our purpose to enter into a minute criticism of Mr Stephen's views on the various important subjects that are discussed in this volume. That has been done already in the periodicals of the day, and would be out of place here. Neither do we purpose to dwell upon the accounts of celebrated cases which are introduced at length at the end of the volume, to illustrate the distinguishing characteristics of English and French procedure. It is enough to call attention to the manner in which these cases are narrated. No better model of criminal reporting could be found; and any one who values clearness, impartiality, precision, and terseness in such reports, will find them most instructive. Instead of dwelling on these subjects, we propose to take Mr Stephen's volume as a text-book, and to attempt to convey a general idea of the working of French and English criminal practice, and to show wherein these two systems are superior, and where inferior, to our own.

All criminal procedure is carried on upon one of two principles, or some modification of these principles. When a crime has been committed, the examination into the circumstances takes the form

either of a litigation or of an investigation. It is either a private matter between two parties to be conducted through the agency of the injured party, in which case, he demands the punishment of the aggressor, and the judge moderates between them; or it is a public matter, in which the State is interested, and in that case it assumes the form of a public inquiry into the truth of the matter, and the public demand the punishment of the criminal. This may be shortly expressed by saying, that a trial may be viewed as a litigation or as an inquisition. It may be a question as to which is the true mode of procedure; or perhaps when the advantages and disadvantages of the two systems are weighed together, it may appear that the most satisfactory method of conducting criminal work, and the most conducive to the suppression of crime, is a combination of the two systems.

As we proceed in the consideration of this subject, it will appear that the English system is as nearly as possible purely litigious, the French system purely inquisitorial, and that the Scotch system, though inclining more to the litigious than the inquisitorial, is in reality a combination of the two.

The English system of procedure, we say, is as nearly as possible purely litigious. It consists of four steps: the detection and apprehension of offenders, the preparation of the case for trial, the trial and sentence, and the execution of the sentence. It is with the two first steps that we are more immediately concerned. The trial is conducted, with some slight differences in procedure, much as it is with us in Scotland, on the litigious principle. It is unnecessary to describe the process.

When a crime has been committed, it is at once brought under the notice of the police authorities. They intrust the case to some individual policeman, who, after inquiry, brings the person on whom his suspicions fall, before the justices in petty sessions. It is their duty to investigate the grounds of suspicion. This investigation is conducted in the simplest manner. No questions are put to the accused, and no public officer of responsibility conducts the examination of the witnesses. The whole business is in the hands of the magistrate's clerk, who is generally an attorney of some standing and experience. He attends the petty sessional court, arranges the order of business, takes down the deposition of the complainant and his witnesses, reads over the depositions to the witnesses, weighs the evidence, points out flaws, suggests improvements, advises the bench,