siderable weight to the project of a council, whose concurrence is made constitutionally necessary to the operations of the ostensible Executive. An artful cabal in that council would be able to distract and to enervate the whole system of administration. If no such cabal should exist, the mere diversity of views and opinions would alone be sufficient to tincture the exercise of the executive authority with a spirit of habitual feebleness and dilatoriness. But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the Executive, and which lies as much against the last as the first plan, is that it tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility. Responsibility is of two kinds to censure and to punishment. The first is the more important of the two, especially in an elective office. Man, in public trust, will much oftener act in such a manner as to render him unworthy of being any longer trusted, than in such a manner as to make him obnoxious to legal punishment. But the multiplication of the Executive adds to the difficulty of detection in either case. It often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to determine on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures, ought really to fall. It is shifted from one to another with so much dexterity, and under such plausible appearances, that the public opinion is left in suspense about the real author. The circumstances which may have led to any national miscarriage or misfortune are sometimes so complicated that, where there are a number of actors who may have had different degrees and kinds of agency, though we may clearly see upon the whole that there has been mismanagement, yet it may be impracticable to pronounce to whose account the evil which may have been incurred is truly chargeable. "I was overruled by my council. The council were so divided in their opinions that it was impossible to obtain any better resolution on the point." These and similar pretexts are constantly at hand, whether true or false. And who is there that will either take the trouble or incur the odium of a strict scrutiny into the secret springs of the transaction? Should there be found a citizen zealous enough to undertake the unpromising task, if there happen to be collu sion between the parties concerned, how easy it is to clothe the circumstances with so much ambiguity as to render it uncertain what was the precise conduct of any of those parties! In the single instance in which the governor of this Statel is coupled with a councilthat is, in the appointment to offices, we have seen the mischiefs of it in the view now under consideration. Scandalous appointments to important offices have been made. Some cases, indeed, have been so flagrant that all parties have agreed in the impropriety of the thing. When inquiry has been made, the blame has been laid by the governor on the members of the council, who, on their part, have charged it upon his nomination; while the people remain altogether at a loss to determine by whose influence their interests have been committed to hands so unqualified and so manifestly improper. In tenderness to individuals, I forbear to descend to particulars. It is evident from these considerations that the plurality of the Executive tends to deprive the people of the two greatest securities they can have for the faithful exercise of any delegated power: first, the restraints of public opinion, which lose their efficacy, as well on account of the division of the censure attendant on bad measures among a number as on account of the uncertainty on whom it ought to fall; and, secondly, the opportunity of discovering with facility and clearness the misconduct of the persons they trust, in order either to their removal from office, or to their actual punishment in cases which admit of it. In England, the king is a perpetual magistrate; and it is a maxim which has obtained for the sake of the public peace, that he is unaccountable for his administration, and his person sacred. Nothing, therefore, can be wiser in that kingdom, than to annex to the king a constitutional council, who may be responsible to the nation for the advice they give. Without this, there would be no responsibility whatever in the executive department—an idea inadmissible in a free government. But even there the king is not bound by the resolutions of his council, though they are answerable for the advice 1 I.e., New York. they give. He is the absolute master of his own conduct in the exercise of his office, and may observe or disregard the counsel given to him at his sole discretion. But in a republic, where every magistrate ought to be personally responsible for his behavior in office, the reason which in the British Constitution dictates the propriety of a council, not only ceases to apply, but turns against the institution. In the monarchy of Great Britain, it furnishes a substitute for the prohibited responsibility of the chief magistrate, which serves in some degree as a hostage to the national justice for his good behavior. In the American republic it would serve to destroy, or would greatly diminish, the intended and necessary responsibility of the Chief Magistrate himself. The idea of a council to the Executive, which has so generally obtained in the State constitutions, has been derived from that maxim of republican jealousy which considers power as safer in the hands of a number of men than of a single man. If the maxim should be admitted to be applicable to the case, I should contend that the advantage on that side would not counterbalance the numerous disadvantages on the opposite side. But I do not think the rule at all applicable to the executive power. I clearly concur in opinion, in this particular, with a writer whom the celebrated Junius pronounces to be "deep, solid, and ingenious," that "the executive power is more easily confined when it is ONE"; that it is far more safe there should be a single object for the jealousy and watchfulness of the people; and, in a word, that all multiplication of the Executive is rather dangerous than friendly to liberty. A little consideration will satisfy us that the species of security sought for in the multiplication of the Executive is unattainable. Numbers must be so great as to render combination difficult, or they are rather a source of danger than of security. The 1 De Lolme. (Hamilton's note.) A Swiss constitutional writer (born at Geneva, 1740, died 1806) who lived in England for some years and wrote a treatise on The Constitution of England (1771, English edn, 1775). united credit and influence of several individuals must be more formidable to liberty than the credit and influence of either of them separately. When power, therefore, is placed in the hands of so small a number of men as to admit of their interests and views being easily combined in a common enterprise, by an artful leader, it becomes more liable to abuse, and more dangerous when abused, than if it be lodged in the hands of one man; who, from the very circumstance of his being alone, will be more narrowly watched and more readily suspected, and who cannot unite so great a mass of influence as when he is associated with others. The Decemvirs of Rome, whose name denotes their number,2 were more to be dreaded in their usurpation than any one of them would have been. No person would think of proposing an Executive much more numerous than that body; from six to a dozen have been suggested for the number of the council. The extreme of these numbers is not too great for an easy combination; and from such a combination America would have more to fear than from the ambition of any single individual. A council to a magistrate, who is himself responsible for what he does, are generally nothing better than a clog upon his good intentions, are often the instruments and accomplices of his bad, and are almost always a cloak to his faults. I forbear to dwell upon the subject of expense; though it be evident that if the council should be numerous enough to answer the principal end aimed at by the institution, the salaries of the members, who must be drawn from their homes to reside at the seat of government, would form an item in the catalogue of public expenditures too serious to be incurred for an object of equivocal utility. I will only add that, prior to the appearance of the Constitution, I rarely met with an intelligent. man from any of the States, who did not admit, as the result of experience, that the unity of the executive of this State was one of the best of the distinguishing features of our constitution. Ten. (Hamilton's note.) JOEL BARLOW (1754-1812) Barlow was born at Redding, Connecticut, on 24 March, 1754. He attended Dartmouth College and Yale College, and was graduated from the latter. During college vacations he served as a volunteer in the Revolutionary army, and, after his graduation, as a chaplain. Before holding the latter post he had begun the study of the law. In the early 1780's he settled at Hartford, working as a journalist and perhaps looking forward to a legal career. But he was also writing poetry, and in 1787 published The Vision of Columbus, a reflective poem of considerable length (4,700 lines), which was received with warm praise not only in America, but also in England and France. In the following year Barlow went to France as an agent of a group of speculators who styled themselves the Scioto (Ohio) Land Company. It is said that he was ignorant of the fraudulent nature of the enterprise. In France he became a supporter of the Revolution, and went almost as far in identifying himself with the movement as did Paine. While he was visiting England (1791–1792) he published in London a poem entitled The Conspiracy of Kings, and he was delegated by the London Constitutional Society to present an address to the French Convention. In 1792 he published a political tract in Paris, Advice to the Privileged Orders in the Several States of Europe (a later republican tract, published in Philadelphia, 1801, was entitled: Joel Barlow to his Fellow-Citizens in the United States). In 1792 he also was a candidate for membership in the Convention, and it was while he was forwarding his candidacy in Chambéry that he had placed before him the hasty pudding (boiled Indian meal) which took him in memory back to his own land and caused him to write the poem here reprinted. It "is certainly his most original and enduring poem and also one of the best pieces of humorous verse in our early literature." It "is a mock-heroic of the conventional eighteenth-century type. The pastoral scenes are native, not imitated, the diction is simple and natural, and the humor, though rather thin, is sufficiently amusing." (S. M. Tucker, Camb. Hist. Am. Lit., I.) In 1795 Barlow went to Algiers as American consul, where he remained two years. During this time he procured the release of some American prisoners. In 1798 he was back in Paris, and was of some service to the American government there. At the same time he engaged in speculations which were so successful as to yield him a moderate fortune. In 1805 he returned to the United States, and two years afterwards published a large expansion of his Vision of Columbus-in its new form called The Columbiad-in which he sought to outstrip Homer as the creator of a national epic. His ambition was mistaken and the poem was at once set down a failure-a verdict which no later generation has cared to dispute. In 1811 Madison appointed Barlow Minister to France. In the following year he set out for Wilna to hold a conference with Napoleon. Owing to the hardships of the journey he fell ill, and died near Cracow, Poland, on 24 December, 1812. Shall cool and temper thy superior heat, Flow like the genial juices o'er my tongue, Could those mild morsels in my numbers chime, And, as they roll in substance, roll in rhyme, No more thy awkward, unpoetic name Should shun the muse or prejudice thy fame; But, rising grateful to the accustomed ear, All bards should catch it, and all realms revere! 30 Assist me first with pious toil to trace Through wrecks of time, thy lineage and thy Swells in the flood and thickens to a paste, Then puffs and wallops, rises to the brim, Drinks the dry knobs that on the surface swim; The knobs at last the busy ladle breaks, And the whole mass its true consistence takes. Could but her sacred name, unknown so long, Rise, like her labors, to the son of song, If 'twas Oella whom I sang before,1 50 I here ascribe her one great virtue more. But o'er the world's wide climes should live secure, Far as his rays extend, as long as they endure. Dear Hasty Pudding, what unpromised joy Expands my heart, to meet thee in Savoy! Doomed o'er the world through devious paths to roam, Each clime my country, and each house my home, 60 My soul is soothed, my cares have found an end; I greet my long-lost, unforgotten friend. town, How long in vain I wandered up and down, Where shameless Bacchus, with his drenching hoard, Cold from his cave usurps the morning board. London is lost in smoke and steeped in tea; No Yankee there can lisp the name of thee; The uncouth word, a libel on the town, Would call a proclamation from the crown.70 For climes oblique, that fear the sun's full rays, Chilled in their fogs, exclude the generous maize; A grain whose rich, luxuriant growth re quires Short, gentle showers, and bright, ethereal fires. But here, though distant from our native shore, With mutual glee, we meet and laugh once more. The fame of Sol's sweet daughter should be In different realms to give thee different known, 1 Peruvian princess, said to have discovered the art of spinning. Barlow had sung her praise before in The Vision of Columbus, Bk. II. names. Thee the soft nations round the warm Levant Polanta call; the French, of course, Polante. E'en in thy native regions, how I blush Insult and eat thee by the name Suppawn. 90 Thy name is Hasty Pudding! thus my sire Was wont to greet thee fuming from his fire; And while he argued in thy just defense With logic clear he thus explained the sense: "In haste the boiling caldron, o'er the blaze, Receives and cooks the ready powdered maize; In haste 'tis served, and then in equal haste, With cooling milk, we make the sweet repast. 100 Delicious grain, whatever form it take, Let the green succotash with thee contend; Let beans and corn their sweetest juices blend; Let butter drench them in its yellow tide, And a long slice of bacon grace their side; Not all the plate, how famed soe'er it be, Can please my palate like a bowl of thee. 140 Some talk of hoe-cake, fair Virginia's pride! Rich johnny-cake this mouth has often tried; Both please me well, their virtues much the There are who strive to stamp with dis- With suet lined, leads on the Yankee feast; The charlotte brown, within whose crusty sides repute The luscious food, because it feeds the brute; In tropes of high-strained wit, while gaudy prigs Compare thy nursling, man, to pampered pigs, With sovereign scorn I treat the vulgar jest, The milk nutritious: am I then a calf? 120 Sure the sweet song I fashion to thy praise, Runs more melodious than the notes they raise. My song, resounding in its grateful glee, No merit claims: I praise myself in thee. My father loved thee through his length of days! For thee his fields were shaded o'er with maize; |