The remaining fact to be noticed, which was alone conclusive upon the point as far as regards the present Congress, was, that after taking upon himself the labor to inquire into the opinions of members, especially in the other House, he was constrained to state that there were so many who were hostile to annexation, without a final antecedent settlement of some such line, that, without their votes for annexation, the friends of it would be in a minority; and without some such line, they could not, or would not vote for annexation at all. So that, by a simple process of arithmetic, the question was narrowed down to this; "Texas and a division of the territory, or Texas not at all."

This, however unwelcome the conclusion, was the naked truth; and it behoved the southern representatives in particular to meet the true issue, and all the responsibilities which that issue imposed upon them. He believed they would, because he believed they eught. In proposing this bill, he had himself yielded to this necessity, and accepted a choice of evils; and if it were adopted, he had no hope to express, and no prayer to make about it, except that it might be well for our common country. And if, on the other hand, it should fail, it would be because the South repudiated it; and the decision of his friends against it would probably convince him that there was an error in the proposition, whilst his own conscience approved the effort, unpretending as it was, to do his duty. He would not feel reproved hereafter for having practised a cowardly timidity at the first beginning of discord.

Mr. H. then proceeded to state the reasons why he thought the southern members and senators might unite in a support of the bill, notwithstanding this line of division, or some other that was more agreeable to both sides. The bill did not declare that Texas should not be admitted without the line. It only enacted that, with that condition in the compact, when lawfully ratified by both governments, it should be annexed.

It did not prevent any senator from voting against the compact, should he finally prefer to let Texas go sooner than agree to divide the territory. That was a point to arise, and to be settled hereafter.

It did not arrogate the right to instruct the President beforehand that, if Texas should refuse to assent to the line, or if on any other account it were omitted, no treaty ought to be made, or no compact submitted to legislative sanction.

It declared singly to Texas, and the President, and the world, what was true that we were ready, and assented beforehand to any compact the "Bupreme authorities" of Texas and the United States might make and ratify within the conditions stated-no more and no less leaving the South, the East, the West, and the North, to know that, at this session

28TH CONG.....2D SESS.

of Congress, and upon the conditions stated, a majority of Congress were in favor of Texas annexation; otherwise they were not. But if these conditions were not met, the question would go over, still as open as before-still surrounded by all its embarrassments, and big with the fate of the best government in the world.

The proposition was based upon the known fact that, without this compromise lire, or something like it, we had no prospect of immediate annexation. With such a line, it was almost certainly in our reach. That in fact, this was a bill for immediate annexation, in a proper sense of the words, as already explained. That, once separated from this slavery question, it would be the most popular political question in all sections that was ever presented to an American community, he had no doubt.

Again: the southern delegates, if hostile themselves to Texas, with such a line as may be offered us, ought to be willing to let it go before the people of the South, rather than reject Texas altogether. And if this bill were passed, and we preferred to await the decision of the people of the South upon the conditions, nothing was easier than to vote down the other bills after it, (which, it had been shown, would be rejected without it,) or to postpone them, but still leaving this door open to Texas to let her, and the people of the South, have time to say ay or no. Whether or not they will consent, with Missouri, whose resolutions upon this subject declared that though she desired annexation without conditions, yet, if not to be obtained without them, then Texas with a fair compromise.

For one, Mr. H said he wished to see the question terminated; and he could not doubt but his southern friends and associates would rather let the true issue be made and presented to the public mind fairly and directly. Although he dreaded to witness the agitation that would accompany its discussion, and the dangers to the Union as it is, sure he was that it could not be avoided, and no time could be a more propitious one than the present, for delays would increase the perils, not diminish them. The southern people were warmly attached to the Union, and the result would show it; so were the real people everywhere. He felt bound to do what he could to prevent discord; and heence he came at once to the responsible position he had ventured to take. He, however, had not taken ground against the South-not against his own home and his own section-no, not at all, not at all; but in their behalf-in behalf of a common country, whose senators (he thanked God for it) still formed, as he prayed they might always be, a council of brethren, representing the same country, and aiming to serve, protect, and defend the United States.

Mr. H. said if he had time, and could do it without appearing to be unmindful of the Senate's patience, and ungrateful for their attention to his remarks, (already much more extended than he expected,) he would give some of the reasons which had suggested the hope the belief, that the southern people would concur in a fair compromise of this point, since it had been insisted upon; but he must reserve them for some more fit occasion-perhaps until this matter was put to the people. But at present he would conclude by exhibiting, though in a short and summary manner, those considerations which had led him to adopt the 34th degree of north latitude for the compromise line, as it might otherwise appear to have been arbitrarily or capriciously fallen upon. He hoped these considerations, without lengthened comment, might attract the notice of senators, and claim their more experienced sanction; and that their more profitable reflection upon that part of the subject might bring it to a happy termination of some sort; and when he said this, he intended to embrace all sections and all parties.

Divesting himself of prejudice as far as his nature allowed of it, with the map before him, he had endeavored to see at what points the true interests of the nation indicated that this line should be run; and where it wou'd be likely to meet the reasonable expectations of both of the great sections, without sacrificing, to a degree which was inadmissible, the rights of either.

He saw that the extreme southern line of Texas ran with the 26th degree of north latitude, and the extreme north line with the 42d degree of north latitude; and the 34th degree of north latitude was a line half way from each. He saw that a line running with the 34th degree of north latitude would carry us from east to west, the whole length thereof, precisely and exactly along the southern boundary of those lands

Annexation of Texas-Mr. Haywood.

which the United States had conveyed to the Indian nations removed since 1830, from the east to the west side of the Mississippi river, with a solemn guaranty to each tribe that they should never be disturbed. He saw that that part of the Red river which belonged to Texas would lie south of a line that ran along the 34th degree of north latitude; and by leaving it in the southern territory, we should be making the whole of that stream (as it ought to be) the property of States having like interests and similar domestic institutions; for it was known to the Senate that the Red river ran through parts of Arkansas and Louisiana. He saw that the Indian nations, which had been settled by the United States on the west of the Mississippi river, had not extended their possessions towards the west beyond 100 degrees of longitude; but, on the east, they were located up to, and all along, the western borders of the American States, as far south as 34 degrees north latitude, and as far north as 40 degrees north latitude, and perhaps there were a few settlements one degree, or more, further north; but, as before stated, none of the eastern Indians were settled under treaty west of 100 degrees longitude. He then saw a large extent of country bounded all the way on the west side, and as far as 100 degrees of longitude on the south side thereof, by the territory of Texas; and he knew that this territory belonged to the United States, though it had never been annexed to the United States. By attaching to that territory all that part of Texas lying north of 34 degrees north latitude, and running a lie along the Indian boundaries with 100 degrees of longitude, the whole of it together would form a tract of country quite as large, if not larger, than the territory of Texas south of 34 degrees of north latitude; and recollecting that if Texas were ceded to the United States without conditions, the relation between the whole territory of Texas and this government would be identically the same as that in which the United States stood to Nebraska, (for such was the name of the northern territory he had alluded to,)-viz: that the United States would be the owner of the whole as one unannexed territory--he had concluded that the division by a line to run with 34 degrees north latitude was neither unequal nor inequitable. He had therefore adopted it as a reasonable compromise upon both sides. The Senate might judge for themselves.

There were some other things, he knew, that were to be taken into this account. It was worse than useless to offer compromises which would not probably be accepted by Texas and approved at home. So, it was not possible to arrange a question of this sort to the mutual satisfaction of all parties, by divisions that were exactly equal in the quantity of land on each side of the line. He hoped he had lifted his mind up to the subject, and therefore he had an eye not singly to the acres of Texas on each side of the proposed line, but to the spirit of former compromises, and the political bearing of the question. He confessed that he had been solicitous to fix upon a line which he could recommend to the contented and hearty assent of his own section, and yet he had not been able to perceive a reason why it should not be the limit of any demand by his northern associates. The great and important object, as it had been professed by them, (and he did not mean to doubt their sincerity,) was to fix now and immutably a line above or beyond which the institutions of negro slavery should not go; and that for this there was a political necessity without any special regard to the particular points at which the line itself should run, provided it were not evasive and illusory; and if all that were true, their purpose would seem to have been accomplished by accepting a line east and west along with 34 degrees north latitude, as proposed in the bill.

Again: it would be seen by a reference to the map, that by running the compromise line as proposed by the bill, the Indian nations sent thither from this side of the Mississippi would have southern States upon their south and east sides, and non-slaveholding Territories and States on the west side; and it would thereafter cease to be the separate interest of either to force them from their position; and if all the sympathy of this Christian land were not to be concentrated or exhausted upon the negro race, tt might be well to enlist a portion of it, if possible, to direct our counsels in behalf of the poor Indians whom we have pushed off and transported, and whom interest willagain drive further and further, in despite of paper promises, except it could be counteracted by a wise forecast and some kind provision of the law at this early day, for a system that might probably

Senate.

postpone for a long time all selfish efforts to dispossess them. That could not be effected without making it the interest of their neighbors to keep them where they are; or if that could not be done, then why not avoid making it the policy of a par. ticular sectional interest in the immediate neighborhood to drive them off? Those who believed that the southern people were afflicted with a spirit of slavery propagandism, deluded as they were upon that point, might show their sincerity in removing the temptation that is constantly presented now to make room for another slave State between the 34th degree and 36 degrees north latitude by driving off the Indians; for, by the Missouri compromise, slavery had not been prohibited therein; and in yielding their claims down to the 34th degree in Texas, the South would be accomplishing by the arrangement something, if not a great deal, to secure the red man in his new home forever. But he must not pursue this topic in detail, or he would consume too much time. One thing he would be permitted to say, and that was, that while he had never detected in himself any temptation to yield to sickly sympathies in any of the sterner duties of his public station, his heart always beat quick at a sense of Indian wrongs. Yet he confessed it was not so much a motive with him for proposing the line at the 34th degree of north latitude as it was a recommendation of its fitness, after he had fixed upon it, that perhaps it might be some security to them. He would take a bond of fate to get protected, and to leave undisturbed, the Indian nations whom the United States had removed west of the Mississippi, under solemn vows before God and the world, not to molest them forever, and he should rejoice to do it. But, alas, it was impossible. Communities were governed by their interest, and the interest of communities was too strong for the counsels of man; but it was submitted to those whose sympathies for the red man, and whose love of justice and mercy might bring them to think with him upon Indian rights and Indian wrongs, to guard, if they can do it, their future prospects in the land where they were transplanted, and to decide whether anything would be so likely to secure the red men against future reluctant, involuntary removals (so called) as the fixing of this compromise line exactly at the points where these poor tribes will be surrounded, one-half by non-slavery States, and one-half by States where negro slavery was to be tolerated. Then jealousy in one, at the increase of political power in the other class of States, might check the encroachments of both upon the home of the Indians. Then the territory south of 34 degrees being open to emigration from southern States, will at least postpone-and it might be to a far distant day -any eager and irrepressible desire to occupy the last territory that was left south of 36 degrees, for southern emigration. Then the communities on neither side of these Indian lands would have any exclusive right or peculiar interest in the reversion, the enjoyment of which was postponed by the oc cupation of the Indians—an interest which all experience had shown makes men restless beyond endurance.

As at present advised, he should be uncandid not to say that he believed the South had better take Texas with a reasonable, but not an evasive, capricious division, than to reject it altogether! He was quite certain that the southern people had rather have the Union and Texas, with such a division line adopted in harmony and brotherly love, than to divide the Union, in feeling or in fact, in the pursuit of undivided Texas! At all events, he would let the people answer that question for themselves.

He was not to be stopped in acquiring Texas for fear that some State might threaten to quit the Union. If any was foolish enough to retire from the family because another member was admitted into it, that was to be looked to when she was actually quitting, though there was really no danger of it. But if there were any who contemplated a retirement from the Union by the South because Texas could not be constitutionally admitted, he could not now, and he would not hereafter, lead, or join, or follow, such a cause. He was for Texas and the Union-for bringing Texas in the Union. But he was for the UNION, TEXAS OR NO TEXAS. And he did not believe there was any different spirit prevailing at the South, or North, or anywhere else, amongst the people. If there should be, his lot was cast in the South, and he must abide her decision-her fate. God only knew (he could not tell) whether there might not be ambitious or bad men who would be willing to excite the people by clam

28TH CONG.....2D SESS.

ors, and subject them to strife, agitation, and discord, until many of them might be ultimately betrayed into discontent, indifference, disaffection, and ultimate hostility even, against the Union. But it was not so now. The people everywhere were Union men.

One word only (said Mr. H.) upon what this bill did not contain. It recognised no necessity of negotiating for Mexico as a party to any compact with Texas, antecedent to its execution and ratification. The reasons for that, he would not detain the Senate to hear. The subject had been heretofore elaborately discussed, and any remarks of his would be but a useless repetition of old stories, often better told by others. After Mexico found out that we were resolved upon our course of ac tion, and the United States are in possession, it might be deemed expedient by her government to negotiate for boundaries; and that, in his judgment, was the proper time for negotiating with Mexico. This bill anticipated that; and, as well to do her justice as to save her pride, provision was made for that and no more; yet so as not to cede any part of our ancient limits, nor so as to recognise any title of Mexico to Texas. These provisions were to form a part of the compact; because that would hereafter exclude any question of power in the general government to cede a part of this territory in settling the boundaries.

In reply to some remarks of Mr. MOREHEAD of Kentucky, Mr. H. said that, without going over the argument again, he hoped to be pardoned for re-stating the ground he had taken; and it would show wherein the senator from Kentucky [Mr. MOREHEAD] had misapprehended what Mr. H. meant by calling this bill a bill for the immediate annexation of Texas; and perhaps it might remove the constitutional objection to it which had been started.

That to annex a territory to the United States and to acquire a territory, were, in his view, two very different and distinct things. To anner a territory was neither more nor less than to extend the laws of the United States over such territory and the people thereof. To acquire a territory, however, was to gain the property therein by the action of the proper authority of government, as by treaty and cession, or, as some said, by legislative compact. That this bill was one to extend our laws over Texas; but to take effect whenever Texas might be constitutionally acquired, and not before. That in that sense it was a bill to annex Texas to the United States, and nothing more.

That Nebraska, for example, belonged to the United States, but it had never been annexed to the United States-viz: our laws had never been extended over it. And if it were proposed to annex Nebraska by extending our laws over that territory, the proposition would have to be made in Congress; and the act, whenever done, must be an act of legislation, and is could not be done otherwise.

That in the case of Nebraska, the territory had been acquired already by a treaty of cession, but it could not be annexed to the United States by a treaty; and, therefore, a bill to extend our laws over it would plainly and necessarily be a proposition for immediate annexation, by an act of Congress. So in the case of Texas: a bill to extend our laws over it (as this was) was plainly a proposition for immediate annexation by act of Congress. But it could not take effect, as this bill was not to take effect until Texas might be constitutionally otherwise acquired. Thus we should be separating the question of annexation from the mode of acquisition, and leaving it as another and distinct inquiry what department of our government was competent to acquire Texas. In that sense, he had called this a bill for Texas annexation; and he thought it was the only proper meaning of annexation. It was, as he had said, immediate annexation. But by "immediate," he meant not today, nor to-morrow, nor before sunset. "Immediate" was a relative term; and it meant, as soon as the object or subject upon which our legislation was to operate could in a constitutional manner be brought within its influence, and then that the legislation of the present day might operate upon it proprio vigore, and without new legislation.

In that view of the subject, the constitutional point was unquestionably removed, and could not interpose any barrier in the mind of senators against the progress of this bill.

APPENDIX.

NOTE A.

It will be observed that this bill prohibibts negro slavery

Oregon Bill-Mr. Cary.

in the territorial governments, but not in the States to be formed in Texas.

The power of the general government to impose conditions upon a State is not conceded by it, nor intended to be so. The prohibition of negro slavery in a territorial govern ment, however, gives to such Territory every reasonable security against it that can be asked, because a Territory once settled by non-slaveholders will be apt to exclude negro slavery from it whenever it becomes a State. This distinction is noticed in order to point attention to the fact that the bill surrenders nothing of the constitutional ground taken by the South in the debates upon the Missouri compromise, and supported by the advocates of State rights throughout the country.

NOTE B.

This bill does not interfere with any bill to "admit Texas as a new State into the Union;" and, to prevent any possible construction of that kind, the last section was introduced. On the contrary, it was supposed to be the opinion of every one that Texas was too large for a single State, and this bill was framed so as to open the way for receiving and annexing as a Territory all that part of the present republic of Texas which might not be included in the new State of Texas. suming that Texas was too large for one State, some of the inconveniences proposed to be avoided by a precedent act of annexation like this were shortly these, viz:

As

Congress cannot attach conditions to the admission of States. The power of Congress in respect to admitting new States is permissive only. Congress "may admit new States," &c. The State itself must be the actor. The new State, already formed by its own people, comes into the Union by the leave of Congress. And it is more than doubtful whether a State can hold foreign territory, or territory out of the State limits, after she has come into the Union, without a change of our constitution. Wherefore, it would be expedient, if not necessary, for Texas to cede to the United States so much of her territory as might not be included in the new State anterior to the period of such new State coming into the Union; and, with this act in force, the President might negotiate such a cession upon fair terms, which being ratified, the "new State" might then come into the Union without embarrassment under a separate act to admit the "State of Texas." Whether this be a right view of the subject or a wrong one, is not now to be discussed; and it is only stated so as to illustrate one mode in which this bill was designed to advance, but not to retard other projects-particularly "a bill to admit Texas as a new State into the Union."

NOTE C.

The objection to this bill that it does not go far enough,. applies with equal, if not greater force, to the pending reso lution in Congress for admitting Texas as a State. The latter cannot forth with incorporate Texas into the Union, any more than this bill. Besides, the resolutions for admitting Texas as a State do not, all of them, give a present absolute assent to such admission, nor do all of them go so far as to admit Texas upon the single condition of her own future assent. They provide for nothing more than that a new constitution of Texas shall be laid before the next Congress, where it may be rejected at last; and before that period, the nation will probably be agitated to its very centre. Yet it has been shown that the admission of a part of Texas as a State such part as may be allotted by herself for that purpose-could be affected by a simple unconditional enactment for its admission, separate from this bill, and with less opposition, and under fewer embarrassments, than the whole of Texas, provided some act like this were in force, which empowered the purchase of the extra territory, and provided for its cession and annexation to the United States before the admission of Texas was consummated by her. This seemed to me more advisable, but by no means the only mode of proceeding; it is more advisable, because a large part of the r public of Texas is still occupied by the native Indians, whose protection belongs appropriately to the United States. But it may suffice to say that, by taking them into the Union as a part of the (now) State of Texas, (as we must if all of Texas be made one State.) we should be adding embarrassments to this subject infinitely above the value of any reasonable estimate in mere MONEY, which it were wise to avoid. As for leaving a larger part of the territory out of the State of Texas, and still unceded to the United States, no one will probably assent to that; for, in that case, the "new State of Texas would either be abandoning her title to the extra territory by her own voluntary act of coming into the Union with narrowed limits, and Mexico might assert a claim to it by "remittur;" or, if that were not so, we should have a State in the Union owning territories out of the Union, viz: owning foreign territory-which would be exceedingly unwise, if not clearly unconstitutional.

If a State of the Union can own territories outside of her limits as a State, then, in case of an invasion of those territories, would not the general government be obliged to defend them? If the Indian title has to be extinguished in such territories, it must be done by treaty with the Indans, and, as a State of the Union cannot make treaties, but is expressly forbidden to do it by the constitution, it seems to be a ne cessary consequence that the general government would have to make all such treaties and pay the price of them; and yet the general government cannot hold the lands for the United States, and cannot buy from Indians the territory of a State of the Union, except it shall be for the benefit of the State to whom the lands belong. If Texas, with all her territory, were admitted as a new State into the Union, may not the State government afterwards, at their pleasure, extend their laws over the lands in the occupancy of Indi ans, and thereby constrain the general government to defend the State against Indian resistance? If that be so-and it is recollected that more than three-fourths of Texas is now in the possession of the wildest aborigines-the possible, if not the probable, danger of putting the general government in that position will be obvious, &c., &c.

Since writing these remarks, the House of Representatives have passed resolutions, which, although they do not absolutely admit Texas as a new State, yet look to the future admission of the whole territory as one State, and they will no doubt be fully discussed in the Senate. That discussion I will not now anticipate, though I had intended to say something upon the subject.

H. of Reps.

REMARKS OF MR CARY,

OF MAINE.

In the House of Representatives, Feb. 1, 1845.— On the bill to establish a Territorial Government over Oregon.

Mr. CARY said he had determined to participate in this debate only in consequence of the extraordinary course of the gentleman from Massachusetts, [Mr. WINTHROP,] who had not merely defended the pretensions of Great Britain in the matter of the Oregon Territory, but had gone out of his way to pass a general eulogium upon the foreign policy of that country. As to the validity of the American claims to the whole of the Oregon territory, it was too well settled in the minds of the people of this Union to be the proper subject of further controversy. For one, he (Mr. C.) was prepared to go on, and enforce those claims against all adverse pretensions, and at all hazards, although he believed that the danger of a collision with Great Britain had been greatly exaggerated. These war alarms had been sounded too often to deter him from acting with a just regard to the honor of the nation. At any rate he was surprised to hear apprehensions of war expressed by the gentleman from Massachusetts, as the present indications were that the constituents of that gentleman were about to retire from the Union. It appeared, from recent intelligence, that they had assembled in convention at Faneuil Hall to consider the expediency of dissolving this Union, in the event of the annexation of Texas, If the Union became involved in a foreign war, they, at least, would escape its consequence, by severing the political ties which have bound them to the fortunes of the American Confederacy.

Mr. WINTHROP here interposed, and said that, at the convention referred to, a proposition had been made to dissolve the Union, but that it was only made on the authority of an individual member, and was unanimously repudiated by the convention.

Mr. CARY resumed, and said that the proposi. tion to dissolve the Union was at least considered by the convention referred to, and that if it was nominally rejected, it was only to save appearances for the present. The whole tone of that convention was revolutionary and treasonable. Its proceedings throughout were tinctured by the same anti-American spirit which had always characterized the dominant political party in the old federal State of Massachusetts. Whatever might be the case with others, that State had nothing to fear from a war with Great Britain. English commanders would as little think of bombarding Boston as Liverpool. They knew who their friends were, and would make no attacks upon their own household.

After the manner in which the gentleman from Massachusetts had commenced his remarks, it was not surprising that he should have read with approbation from a speech of Mr. Huskisson, delivered in Parliament in 1830, in support of British pretensions upon this continent. He (Mr. C.) had himself quoted that same speech, and the same paragraph of that speech, in the debate upon the Texas question, to prove that British statesmen took ground in that matter identical with the positions of the Federal party in this country. And now we hear a leading member of that party, not merely taking British ground, but quoting and relying upon British authority to sustain it. The gentleman from Massachusetts was thus seen to assume voluntarily the identical position which he (Mr. C.) had previously assigned to the Federal party of the North.

The gentleman from Massachusetts was certainly under no necessity of making a second-hand use of the arguments of British statesmen. His own arguments in favor of British pretensions had been marked by great ability, and would compare favorably with the efforts of Huskisson and Sir Robert Peel in the same cause. They would be read with satisfaction on the other side of the Atlantic, if not on this side, and be quoted with applause in the British Parliament, although they would probably fail to command the approbation of the American people.

The gentleman from Massachusetts had said that the present Secretary of State of the United States was a Democrat; and had inquired if members of

28TH CONG.....2D SESS.

the Democratic party were not willing to trust him to settle this Oregon question by negotiation. The high functionary referred to, said Mr. C., was, in deed and in truth, a Democrat and a patriot. He deserved and enjoyed the confidence of the country. But experience, which had taught us that Federal administrations might occasionally come into power, forcibly admonished us that the office of Secretary of State might possibly fall into unworthy hands. Some new instance of political vicissitude might bring another Webster into the Department of State. Let us, said Mr. C., guard against such dangers, and settle permanently the limits of our country, before Federal diplomatists again obtain power to dismember and disgrace us, under pretence of settling disputed boundary lines.

The gentleman from Massachusetts had gravely asked, when and where Great Britain had acquired a single acre upon this continent since the close of the revolutionary war? He (Mr. C.) would refer that gentleman to the three millions of acres which she had wrested from Maine by a long series of ag gressions, ending in a mock and fraudulent negotiation. The title of Maine to this lost territory was as perfect and undeniable as her title to any of the territory which she yet possessed. And how had it been wrested from her? By gross fraud and hypocricy, commencing with the British Government, and abetted and made effective by Daniel Webster, then Secretary of State of the United States. Maine was entrapped into becoming a party to the negotiations which terminated in the treaty of Washington, by assurances that Lord Ashburton, the British diplomatist, was invested with full powers to settle her disputed boundary line, and was disposed to settle it upon a just and equitable basis. Yet, although crediting these false assurances, Maine was careful, in appointing commissioners to treat here with Lord Ashburton, to tie them down with precise and positive instructions. Those instructions were disregarded and disobeyed by the commissioners, and a treaty was entered into which was authorized neither by the Legislature nor the people of Maine.

Mr. MORSE, of Maine, here interrupted Mr. Cary, and inquired if he (Mr. C.) was not a member of the Senate of Maine in 1843, and chairman of a committee to consider and report upon this treaty of Washington? What sort of a report was made by that committee, and what was the fate of that report in the Legislature?

Mr. CARY resumed. He was in the Senate of Maine in 1843, and, as the chairman of a committee raised upon that subject, had submitted a report upon the treaty of Washington. Not having that report at hand, he went on to explain and defend the posi. tions which it contained, and said that he should, in preparing his remarks for publication, incorporate with them copious extracts from that report.

[Subjoined are extracts from the report referred to, made by Mr. CARY in the Senate of Maine, on the 21st of March, 1843:

On the 11th of April, 1842, Mr. Daniel Webster, Secretary of State for the United States, addressed a letter to the Governor of this State, in which he announced that Lord Ashburton had arrived at Washington, "charged with full powers from his Sovereign, to negotiate and settle the different matters in discussion between the two Governments," and that in reference to the boundary question in particular, Lord Ashburton had "autho. rity to treat for a conventional line, or line by agreement, on such terms and conditions, and with such mutual considerations and equivalents, as might be thought just and equitable." In the same letter, Mr. Webster requested Maine to unite in an attempt to agree upon such a conventional line," by appoint ing commissioners clothed with power to assent to the terms and conditions which might result from a negotiation to be car. ried on at Washington.

The idea prominently and distinctly conveyed by this letter, is, that Lord Ashburton had "full powers" in reference to the proposed negotiation, and the amplest authority to assent to any "terms and equivalents" connected with the conventional line to be agreed upon, without any restriction, except that they should be thought just and equitable" The same idea is un. derstood to have been communicated by Mr. Webster in letters addressed to several members of the Legislature, during its extra session commencing in May, 1842; and it is further understood that he urged upon that Legislature, through these and other channels, that the commissioners to be appointed by them must be clothed with "full powers," in order to be placed upon an equal footing with Lord Ashburton, and that the negotiation would otherwise fail at its very commencement.

In consequence of Mr. Webster's letter of the 11th of April, 1842, and without having received, as the committee know or believe, any different or additional information as to the actual powers of Lord Ashburton, the Governor of this State, in the exercise of his constitutional power, convened a special session of the Legislature in May, 1842.

The views and impressions under which the Legislature act

Oregon Bill-Mr. Cary.

ed during its special session in May last, corresponding as they did with the views and impressions of the people, are too re cent and too notorious to require, in the opinion of the commit tee, any further statement either of their general charact r, or of the causes which originated them. It is sufficient to say, and the assertion is not susceptible of a fair contradiction, that the Legislature, at the time referred to, acted under a full belief that Lord Ashburton was clothed with full powers to adjust the disputed boundary upon principles of equity and justice; that he was authorized and disposed to waive the vexa jous pretensions previously maintained by Great Britain; and that while he was undoubtedly anxious to obtain a portion of Maine, important to the convenience of the colonies of that nation, he was ready and willing to offer, as an equivalent therefor, territorial concessions which would have left our importance, as a State, unaffected. The narrow strip of land lying between our eastern line and the Saint John River, from the Grand Falls southerly to the Eel River, together with Grand Menan and the adjoining islands in Passamaquoddy Bay, afforded the means for such concessions interesting to us, and at the same time not inju. rious to Great Britain's colony of New Brunswick. That the offer of equivalents of substantially that character was confi. dently and universally expected in this State, during the period of the special session of our Legislature in May last, is not a matter, in the opinion of the committee, which can ever be drawn into doubt or dispute.

The committee are not, however, compelled to rely upon an appeal to the public recollection of the opinions prevalent at the period referred to, satisfactory and convincing as they well know such an appeal must be.

More precise and authentic evidence of the expectations of the Legislature exists in the resolves under which the commis. sioners to treat (through Mr. Webster) with Lord Ashburton, received their appointment.

One of these resolves, and it is the only one which beats upon the question under discussion is in the words following:

"Resolved, That this State cannot regard the relinquishment by the British Government of any claim heretofore advanced by it to territory included within the limits of the line of this State, as designated by the treaty of 1783, and uniformly claimed by Maine, as a consideration or equivalent within the meaning of these resolutions "

Nothing can be clearer than this language. It announces with a definiteness which leaves no room for mistake, the principles upon which Maine was willing to negotiate.

She was willing to assentto a new line of boundary, which might be more convenient for both parties, and for that purpose was ready to yield a portion of her territory for adequate equiva. lents But she would not admit that there was any doubt in regard to the line actually existing, and which she had uniformly claimed, nor did she attach importance enough to the counter claim of Great Britain to regard its withdrawal as the least equivalent or consideration for any action on her own part. Every acre within the line of 1783, she claimed as indisputably and beyond controversy her own. and for every acre to be yield. ed she demanded an ample indemnity. She refused to go into the negotiation upon the principle of compromise. Rejecting all idea of concession, and standing firmly upon her inanifest rights, she declared her fixed determination to regard the pretensions of Great Britain as a nullity, and her fixed refusal to huy her peace, by yielding to those pretensions in the least degree. But while refusing to settle the pending disputes, upon the obnoxious principle of yielding a portion of her rights for the sake of quieting and confirming the remainder, she was ready, at the same time, to assent to a new line of boundary upon honorable terms and equivalents, to be adjusted, not upon the principle of pusillanimous concession, but of mutually ad vantageous exchanges.

The opinions as to the powers and intentions of Lord Ashbur ton, which prevailed in the Legislature during its special ses sion in May last, and the principles upon which the Commis sioners elected by it were instructed to assent to a settlement of the Northeastern Boundary line, having been thus briefly sketched, it remains to inquire, how far those opinions turned out to be well founded, and how far those principles were respected in the final adjustment of the question.

The commitee do not think it necessary, or indeed proper, to go into a detailed examination of the negotiations which termipated in the recent treaty of Washington. They propose only to compare its results so far as they affect Maine, with the expectations and hopes which induced her to become a party to it.

Soon after the arrival of our Commissioners at Washington, it was announced to them, (through Mr. Webster,) by Lord Ashburton, that he had no power to offer to Maine, by way of equiva lent, any territory belonging to the adjoining colonies of Great Britain. Instead of being clothed with the "full powers" de. @cribed in Mr. Webster's letter of April 11, 1842, he had not only no power, but was absolutely forbidden to negotiate upon the basis so confidently anucipated by Maine. Instead of being able to treat for the surrender of Grand Menan, the strip of land from Eel River to the Grand Falls, or anything else territorially desirable to Maine, his powers and instructions were, simply, to get as much of our territory as possible, and to pay us as little as possible, and that only in dollars and cents. In the "equivalents" he was prepared to offer, he was tied down by far different restrictions than that they should be thought just and equitable" He was, in fact, interdicted from offering the only "equivalents" which, in any fair mind, could possibly be "thought just and equitable," or which had ever been antici pated by Maine.

Maine, on more than one occasion, and by more than one functionary of the General Government, has not been treated in this matter of the northeastern boundary as she has endea vored to deserve." But never before has she had occasion to complain of a treachery so signal as that which induced her to participate in a negotiation with a Minister farbidden by his instructions to yield anything which she had a right to expect, under official assurances that he had "full powers" to treat, and was prepared to treat upon any terms which should "be thought just and equitable." The experience of Maine had tangut her to expect perfidy from Great Britain, but she might reasonably claim fair dealing from the diplomatic Secretary of the Union of which she is a member. If this claim has shared the fate of others equally reasonable, it only adds another to the list of grievances of which she has to complain.

The spirit with which Lord Ashburton entered upon the ne gotiation corresponded as little with the expectations of Maine as did the powers with which he was clothed. So far was he from yielding the pretensions of his Government, or from being willing to treat upon the basis of a substantial acknowledgment of our title, that it may be truly said, that no British negotiator

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has ever assumed a tone more arrogant, pressed unfounded claims with more tenacity, or made unavoidable concessions with more reluctance.

The comittee will not review the published correspondence between Lord Ashburton and Mr. Webster, in which there is so much deserving of criticians, but will proceed at once to the inquiry whether the line of boundary fixed for Maine, with its terms, equivalents, and considerations, was such as we had a right to expect, or as our commissioners, within the spirit of the instructions under which they were appointed, were authorized to assent to.

The treaty of Washington conveys and transfers to Great Britain, of the Territory of Maine, 4,119 square imies, or 2,636,160 acres, being the territory awarded to Great Britain by the King of the Netherlands, and in addition thereto, 693 square miles, or 571,520 acres, on this side of the line of the Dutch award; making a total of 5,012 square miles, or 3,207,690

acres.

The equivalents stipulated for Maine, are,

1st.

A right of navigation down the St. John, under certain restrictions and limitations. 2d. The payment to Maine and Massachusetts, to be equally divided between them, of the sum of 300,000 dollars, by the United States.

3d. The satisfaction to Maine and Massachusetts respectively, of "all claims for expenses incurred by them in protecting the said heretofore disputed territory, and making a survey thereof, in 1838."

That the pecuniary stipulations in favor of Maine, together with the rights of navigation, which the committee have consi dered, constitute a consideration utterly inadequate for upwards of three thousand square miles of valuable territory, is a proposi tion too plain to ned argument. It is sufficient to say that the British negotiator himself did not affect to maintain any such position.

In his letter to Mr. Webster, under date of July 11, 1842, Lord Ashburton says: "I would further suggest for your considera. tion whether, supposing the division by the King of the Netherlands to be admitted to satisfy fairly the equity of the case be tween the parties, what is proposed to be added by Great Britain, viz; the strip on the 45th parallel of latitude, and the use of the navigation of the Saint John, be not an ample compensation for what we ask in return, viz: that barren strip above the upper Saint John, which is wanted for no other purpose than as a boundary; for which purpose it is admitted on all sides to be most convenient."

All which Lord Ashburton claims, amounts simply to this, that the right of navigation in the St. John, together with the strip of land conceded to the States of New Hampshire, Vermont, and New York, are an equivalent for the 893 square miles on the northwest boundary of Maine, described by him as the "barren strip above the upper St John." The basis of his proposition is, that the line of the Dutch award satisfies "fairly the equity of the case between the parties," and the variations from it in his own favor, he supposes to be fairly met by the compensations which he proposes.

Maine, however, never assented to any such basis. She has never admitted that any line, other than that of 1783, met "fairly the equity of the case between the parties," and she had a right to expect not merely an indemnity for the 893 square miles upon her northwest, but an indemnity also for the 4,119 square miles upon her northeast.

Lord Ashburton attaches a value to the British claim, while Maine has ever insisted upon regarding it as a nullity.

Lord Ashburton views the award of the Dutch King as a fair settlement of the questions in dispute, and is willing to pay for only so much as he ob ains beyond the line of that award. Maine, on the contrary, insisted upon all her rights up to the line of 1783, and instructed her commissioners to yield nothing within that line, without ample indemnity. Such indemnity she has not obtained, even upon Lord Ashburton's own estimate of the value of the compensations and equivalents to which he assented.

The rights of navigation secured to her in the St. John, and the concessions upon the 45th parallel of latitude, made to New Hampshire, Vermont, and New York, and the benefits secured to Maine, by means of a pecuniary commutation at the experse of the Treasury of the United States, were not pretended by the British negotiator himself to be more than an equivalent for the territory which he obtained on this side of the line of the Dutch award. For all which Maine loses on the other side of the line of that award, amounting to upwards of four thousand square miles of territory, she obtains no compensation, even according to the exagerated estimate put by her adversary in the negotiation, upon the value of the equivalents which he yielded.

The committee cannot feel justified in closing this report, without emphatically disclaiming the existence of any such spirit in any portion of the people of Maine, as the American Secretary appears to have believed prevailed in the American Senate. A map hunted up among the archives of the French capital, by Mr. Jared Sparks, is understood to have been privately communicated to the Senate by Mr. Webster, with the purpose of proving the claims of Maine to be entirely unfounded, and of urging upon the Senate the ratification of the treaty pending before them, in order to avoid, before it was too late to remedy them, the consequences of a discovery by the British diplomatists of the true extent of the rights of their country. It is deeply to be regretted that the original privacy of such a communication had not been better preserved. Certainly, the spirit which dictated it could not have found an answering chord in the bosom of a single Senator. The inducement presented by it to the Senate was predicated upon nothing more nor less than the desirabili y of clinching a bargain which defrauded an unsuspecting adversary. No code of morality, with which the offering of such an inducement is consistent, is cher ished, as the committee believe, by any considerable portion of the people of Maine. They have insisted upon the line of 1783, as believed by them to be susceptible of demarcation upon the face of the earth, only because they were inteligently convinced that it was one of their clear and roanifest rights. If satisfied by more evidence that they had been in error, it would never afford them pleasure to have overreached an adversary, nor satisfaction to enjoy what justly belonged to others.

If so high a functionary of this Government as the Secretary of its diplomatic department has been capable of presenting to the Senate of the United States an inducement so unworthy as the one upon which the committee have commented, it does not seem unjust to believe that he may have also intended to coerce the ratification of the treaty, by destroying all hopes of success

Resolved, That the terms of the treaty of Washington, concluded en the 9th day of August, 1842, so far as they affect the State of Maine, are not satisfactory to the people thereof.

Resolved, That the hopes and expectations, under which the State of Maine consented to participate in the negotiation which eventuated in the Treaty of Washington, are greatly disappointed by the result of that negotiation.

Resolved, That the true meaning and intent of the resolves passed by the Legislature of Maine, on the 26th of May, 1842, entitled Resolves in relation to the Northeastern "oundary of this State," did not authorize the Commissioners, elected under said resolves, to surrender any portion of the territory within the line of the treaty of '83, as claimed by Maine, without a full equivalent therefor.

Such, said Mr. CARY, was the true position of Maine in reference to the treaty of Washington. Her commissioners in assenting to it, had transcended their authority. The positions taken in the report which had been referred to, and which he intended to incorporate with his published remarks, had never been controverted, and never could be successfully assailed. That report was adopted in the Senate of Maine by a triumphant vote: if his recollection served him correctly, only five out of the thirty-one members of that body voted against it. The report was, it was true, defeated and rejected in the House of Representatives. This result, however, although to be regretted, left the facts and reasonings of the report as incontestable and impregnable as they were before. The Senate of Maine, in 1843, was a purely Democratic body, and not contaminated by the intermixture of a single Federalist. Its adoption and endorsement of the report referred to, vindicated the Democracy of Maine from any participation in the dismemberment of her territory. The rejection of that report in the House, by federal votes and federal arts, was only another demonstration of the British instincts of federalism, visible at all times and in all places. His Whig colleagues here, (Messrs. SEVERANCE and MORSE,) were both members of that House, and one of them (Mr. S. vIBANCE) was a dissenting member of the committee from which the report emanated. They could either of them describe, much better than he (Mr. C.) could, by what means and combinations they effected the rejection of the report in the House, and he left it to them to do so. He (Mr. C.) would only undertake to speak for the Senate, of which he was a member. He would add, however, that, in his opinion, neither Mr. SEVERANCE nor Mr. MORSE could gain any credit by boasting the success of their efforts to strangle and defeat a report which vindicated the integrity of Maine, and placed the shame of her misfortunes where it belonged.

Mr. SEVERANCE here interrupted Mr. CARY, and inquired if the commissioners of Maine, who as sented to the treaty of Washington, were not taken equally from both the great political parties? And if so, why it had happened to be so?

Mr. CARY resumed, and said the fact was as suggested by the inquiry of his colleague. The commissioners were four in number, and consisted of two Federalists and two Democrats. They received their appointment from a Legislature which was strongly democratic. Probably his colleague (Mr. SEVERANCE) found it difficult to understand how Whigs could have received office from Democrats. His colleague belonged to a party which, when out of power, always talked fluently of proscribing proscription, but which, when in power, did nothing but proscribe Democrats. The reason, probably, why these commissioners were taken from both parties was, to make both parties responsible for what might be done. It was a weak and mistaken policy, and proved ruinous to the interests of Maine. The two Federal commissioners, immediately on their arrival at Washington, fell an unresisting and apparently willing prey, to the alternate arts and threats of Daniel Webster. One of the Democratic commissioners was so prostrated by ill health as to take no effective part in what was done. The whole brunt of the battle was thrown upon the remaining Democratic commissioner. He alone resisted the combined strength of Webster and Ashburton, and obtained all that was obtained from them in favor of his State. If he yielded at last, what he

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ought never to have yielded, it was from the extreme pressure of embarrassments, which it was almost impossible to resist.

No, said Mr. CARY, Maine never assented to the treaty of Washington. She neither authorized it in advance, nor did she endorse it after its consummation. Her entire Democratic press, with a single exception, pronounced it infamous. The people had always repudiated it. It had only obtained countenance from a faction, which was British at all times, and in all things; a faction which had recently signalized its propensities by resisting the annexation of Texas, under the secret instigation of British statesmen, and which was now on the eve of throwing itself against a measure imperiously demanded for the protection of our rights in the beautiful territory of Oregon. This faction defended the treaty of Washington, and well it might. Under that treaty Maine was despoiled of her territory, and the Treasury of the United States was bled, to pay a part of the expenses of the operation. Great Britain got everything, and paid nothing. At any rate, if she paid anything, the money never got beyond the pockets of Daniel Webster.

Mr. HAMLIN, of Maine, here interrupted Mr. Cary, and asked him whether the commissioners of Maine had ever assented to the treaty of Washington, further than by saying that Maine would not object to it, if the Senate of the United States, in view of all the circumstances, thought proper to ratify it.

Mr. CARY resumed, and said, that the commissioners of Maine had given their assent only in the manner and with the qualifications suggested by his colleague; and it was due to them and to Maine that the country should be reminded of this fact. In their note of July 22, 1842, communicating to Mr. Webster this conditional assent, they said:

"The commissioners of Massachusetts have already given their assent, on behalf of that Commonwealth. Thus situated, the commissioners of Maine, invoking the spirit of attachment and patriotic devotion of their State to the Union, and being willing to yield to the deliberate convictions of her sister States as to the path of duty, and to interpose no obstacles to an adjustment which the general judgment of the nation shall pronounce honorable and expedient, even if that judgment shall lead to a surrender of a portion of the birthright of the people of their State, and prized by them because it is their birthright, have determined to overcome their objections to the proposal, SO FAR AS TO SAY, that if, upon mature consideration, the Senate of the United States shall advise and consent to the ratification of a treaty corresponding in its terms with your proposal, and with the conditions in our memorandum accom. panying this note, (marked A,) and identified by our signatures; they, by virtue of the power vested in them by the resolves of the Legislature of Maine, give the assent of that State to such conventional line."

Nothing, said Mr. C., could be clearer than this language. It remitted the whole matter to "the general judgment of the nation," as represented in the Senate of the United States. And was Maine now to be reproached because she had thus deferred “to the deliberate convictions of her sister States ?" Was this to be the reward of that "spirit of attachment and patriotic devotion to the Union," which she has always displayed, and never more signally, or at the cost of greater sacrifices, than in reference to the treaty of Washington? Was she to be taunted with cowardice because she had yielded up her territory to the supposed requirements of the peace and general interests of the whole country?

Mr. HAMLIN again interrupted Mr. Cary, and inquired whether Maine had ever received the pecuniary indemnities stipulated in the treaty of Washington.

Mr. CARY resumed, and said that Maine had as yet received those indemnities only in part, and that large sums were still held back from her, both by Great Britain and by the United States. By the fifth article of the treaty of Washington, Great Brtain agreed, within six months after its ratification, to pay over for the use of Maine and Massachusetts, such moneys and bonds belonging to the "disputed territory fund," so called, as belonged to those States respectively. These moneys were paid, and bonds given, to the authorities of New Brunswick for timber cut on the disputed territory, and were held in trust for whichever party to the dispute, the title of the land upon which the timber was cut might finally be adjudged. All the timber cut, or nearly all of it, was from lands awarded to Maine by the treaty of Washington; and yet she had not, down to this time, received a single dollar. The six months

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had elapsed long ago, and yet the British authorities held on to the "fund." They would neither pay it over, or render an "account" of it, although such account was expressly stipulated by the treaty.

The same fifth article of the treaty provided that the United States should "pay and satisfy said States, [Maine and Massachusetts] respectively, for all claims for expenses incurred by them in protecting the said heretofore disputed territory." This stipulation also had never been complied with. Maine had been repulsod at the Treasury Department by quibbles and fine-drawn constructions, and numerous claims which she had presented, and which were most clearly within the treaty, were suspended by the accounting officers of this Government, and perhaps would be finally rejected altogether. At the very best, Maine could not hope to recover back one-half of the expenditures, direct and indirect, in which the dispute as to her boundaries had involved her. Nor, in fact, was it wonderful that this Government should be grudging and reluctant in the payments which it was obligated to make by the treaty of Washington. That treaty transferred the territory of Maine to Great Britain, and threw the burden of what little indemnity was stipulated for Maine, upon the United States Treasury. Great Britain got everything, and paid nothing, while the United States paid everything, and got nothing. Great Britain danced, Maine fiddled for her, and the United States paid the fiddler. Such was the glorious diplomacy conceived by the intellect of a "Godlike" Secretary of State.

Another indemnity stipulated for Maine by the treaty of Washington was, the "free navigation of the St. Johns," which she had enjoyed for years before, under an act of Parliament, and which had since been practically nullified by the authorities of New Brunswick, acting under the authority and sanction of the Home government. The net result of the whole matter was, that Maine had enjoyed this "free navigation" before the treaty, and had lost it since. Instead of gaining anything, she had lost all the rights which she had exercised before, and had nothing left but the privilege of making, unavailing remonstrances and complaints.

What had happened in respect to the State of Maine, should admonish us to resist British aggressions at the threshold in the matter of the Oregon Territory. Unresisted wrongs were ripened by time linto a species of right. We must act promptly, or lose our rights on the Pacific ocean altogether. The convention of 1818, renewed in 1827, gave Great Britain rights of joint occupancy in the Oregon Territory. This was bad enough, and ought to be put an end to as soon as the provisions of that convention would admit of it. But the actual state of things was still worse. Great Britain was fast acquiring sole occupation and jurisdiction. Her act of Parliament, of 1821, had extended the rights of a Canada fur company over the Oregon Territory. Great Britain often proceeded in this way to effect her projects of colonization and conquest. She was prompted to do so by the double motive of economy, and of avoiding direct responsibilities. She had acquired a vast empire and a hundred millions of subjects in the East Indies, through the instrumentality of a mercantile company. Some of her colonies in New England were originally commenced in the same way. A Canada fur company was now doing the work of British aggression in the Oregon, and would soon perfect the work, unless met by prompt and energetic measures. The passage of the bill before the House was one of the measures which the times demand, and it should receive his (Mr. C.'s) hearty and unhesitating support. His constituents were ready for it, and would sustain it at all hazards. They had no part or let in the Hartford Convention of the last war, and would not now be found assembling in any Faneuil Hall convention to plot the overthrow of the government, and the dissolution of the Union. They would sustain the country, with their blood and treasure, against enemies without and traitors within. They were the ardent, unterrified, and uncompromising friends of the immediate annexation of Texas, and of the inmediate occupation of Oregon. They were not to be diverted from their purposes either by miserable appeals to sectional prejudices, o by any vaunting menaces of British power. Thei