DOMICILE in that country for an indefinite period." Lopes, L. J., in In re Grove, 40 Ch. D. 242. Habitation in a place with the intention of remaining there forever, unless some circumstance should occur to alter his intention. Lord Wensleydale, in Whicker v. Hume, 7 H. L. Cas. 124, 164. That place to be regarded as a man's domicile which he has freely chosen for his permanent abode, and thus for the center-at once for his legal relations and his business. The term permanent abode, however, excludes neither a temporary absence nor a future change, the reservation of which faculty is plainly implied; it is only meant that the intention of mere transitory residence must not at present exist (Savigny). Domicile is the seat, purely moral and juridical, which the law attributes to each person for the exercise of the rights existing for or against such person. Marcadé, Explic du Code Nap. t. 1, No. 334. Domicile is nothing else than the legal seat, the juridical seat of every person,— the seat where he is considered to be in the eyes of the law, for certain applications of the law, whether he be corporeally found there, or whether he be not found there. Ortolan Explication des Institutes, t. 1, No. 80, p. 402. Domicile consists in the moral relation of a man with the place of his residence, where he has fixed the administrative seat of his fortune, the establishment of his affairs. Proudhon Cours de Droit Francais, t. 1, p. 119. The place where one is established and resides with his wife, children, and family, and the greater part of his movable property. El Diccionario de Legislacion, p. 180. Quoted in Holliman v. Peebles, 1 Tex. 673, 688. The domicile of a person is where he has his true, fixed permanent home, and principal establishment, and to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning. Actual residence is not undispensable to retain a domicile after it has once been acquired, but is retained by the mere intention not to Domicile, then, is the place in which both in fact and intent, the home of a person is established without any existing purpose of mind to return to a former home; it is the place where the person lives, in distinction from the place where he transacts his business; the place where he chooses to abide, in distinction from the place in which he may be for a temporary purpose; the place which he has chosen, in distinction from one to which he may be exiled; if he is entitled in law to command where his place of residence shall be, it is the place which he has himself selected, in distinction from any place which another may have selected for him; if the person is an infant or a married woman, it is the place which the husband or father has ordained, in distinction from the place of the person's own choice; it is ordinarily, in the case of the wife, the place where the husband has his domicile; every person has a domicile; no person has but one; it is the place which the fact and the intent, combining with one another and with the law, gravitate to and center in, as a home. Bishop on Marriage & Divorce, vol. II., bk. 2, sec. 118. One may be said to have a domicile in that place in which constitutes the principal seat of his residence, of his business pursuits, connections, attachments, and of his political and municipal relations. Wilson v. Terry, 11 Allen, 206. There must be both the fact of abode and the intention of remaining indefinitely, to constitute a domicile. Hageman v. Fox, 31 Barb. (N. Y.) 476. Domicile is that place in which habitation is fixed, without any present intention of removing therefrom. State v. Moore, 14 N. Hamp. 454. A residence at a particular place, accompanied with positive or presumptive proof of continuing in it an unlimited time. In re Wrigley, 8 Wend. (N. Y.) 142. Domicile is the habitation fixed in any place, with an intention of always staying there, or at least without any inten Domicile, in a legal sense, is where the person has his true, fixed and permanent home and principal establishment, and to which whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning. Cadwalader v. Howell, 3 Harr. (N. J.) 144. (Quoting Story Conf. L. 39.) In whatever place an individual has set up his household goods and made the chief seat of his affairs and interests; from which, without some special avocation, he has no intention of departing; from which, when he has departed, he is considered to be from home; and to which, when he has returned, he is considered to have returned home. In this place there is no doubt whatever he has his domicile. White v. Brown, 1 Wallace, Jr. (U. S. C. C.) 262. Domicile means the place where a man establishes his abode, makes the principal seat of his property, and exercises his political rights. Chase v. Miller, 41 Pa. St. 403, 420. "Domicile is a residence acquired as a final home. To constitute it there must be: (1) residence, actual or inchoate; (2) the non-existence of any intention to make a domicile elsewhere." Hartford v. Champion, 58 Conn. 275, quoting Wharton on Conflict of Laws, § 21. "Home or domicile, is a place where the person has a right to be. The idea of a right to be and remain at a particular place is inseparable from the conception of home or domicile." Jericho v. Burlington, 60 Vt. 533, quoting Ross, J., in Berlin v. Worcester, 50 Vt. 23. Chief Justice Shaw's Rule. No exact definition of "domicile" can be given, as it depends on no one fact or combination of circumstances, and must be determined in each particular case from the whole, taken together. People v. Moir, 207 Ill. 189. Technical Sense. In a strict legal sense, that is properly the domicile of a person where he has his true, fixed, permanent home and DOMICILE principal establishment, and to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning. Holt v. Hendee, 248 Ill. 295; Hayes v. Hayes, 74 Ill. 314; Hutchings v. Hutchings, 137 Ill. App. 496. Acquisition. A man may acquire a domicile if he be personally present in a place and elect it as his home, even if he never design to remain there always, but design at the end of some short time to remove and acquire another. Kreitz v. Behrensmeyer, 125 Ill. 193. "I would venture to suggest that the definition of an acquired domicile might stand thus: "That place is properly the domicile of a person in which he has voluntarily fixed the habitation of himself and his family, not for a mere special and temporary purpose, but with a present intention of making it his permanent home, unless and until something (which is unexpected, or the happening of which is uncertain) shall occur to induce him to adopt some other permanent home.'" Per Kindersley, V.-C., Lord v. Colvin, 4 Drew. 376; 28 L. J. Ch. 366. "A person can have but one domicile properly so-called, e.g., for the purpose of succession to personalty. It is either the domicile of origin or a domicile of choice. Domicile of origin is fixed by the domicile of the parent at the time of birth. It is that of the father if the child is legitimate; if illegitimate, that of the mother. The domicile of origin prevails until the person has manifested and carried into effect an intention of acquiring a settled home elsewhere. That is called his domicile of choice. When a person, having acquired a domicile of choice in a new country, abandons that country as the country of his home, and has not acquired animo et facto a settled home in another country, he is deemed by law to have reverted to and become domiciled in the country of his domicile of origin. The domicile of origin again continues until a new domicile of choice is acquired." Somerville v. Somerville (1801), 5 Ves. 750-792. DOMICILE Actual Residence Not Required. Actual residence is not indispensable to retain a domicile after it is once acquired, but it is retained, animo solo, by the mere intention not to change it and adopt another. Hayes v. Hayes, 74 Ill. 314. Distinguished from Residence. Another principle which may be considered as well settled is that a residence once established may be abandoned or lost without having acquired another. In regard to domicile, a word not used in pauper laws, it is different. This cannot be lost without gaining another. Every person owes some duties to society, has some obligations to perform to the government under which he lives, and from which he receives protection. These duties and obligations are not to be laid aside at will, but rest upon and attach to the person from the earliest to the latest moment of his life. It is imposed upon him by the law, at his birth; and though when arriving at legal age he may choose the place where it shall be, it is not at his option whether he shall be without any. With regard to a residence or home it is entirely different. This is a matter of privilege exclusively. It imposes no public burdens, but is private in its nature, relates to personal matters alone, and is the place about which to a greater or less extent cluster those things which supply personal needs or gratify his affections. Hence it is purely and solely a matter of choice, not only where it shall be, but also whether there shall be any. North Yarmouth v. West Gardiner, 58 Me. 207, 211. "The request for a ruling treats the word 'domiciled' as equivalent to the statutory word 'resident.' Such is the usual but not universal meaning of the word as used in our statutes; Stoughton v. Cambridge, 165 Mass. 251; and in McDaniel v. King, 5 Cush. 469, such was held to be its meaning as used in the original statute of insolvency in this state. St. 1838, c. 163, § 19. "The question what constitutes domicile is mainly a question of fact, and the element of intention enters into it. Per DOMICILE sonal absence for a while does not necessarily change one's domicile, and personal presence in a place for a somewhat prolonged period does not necessarily establish domicile there." Olivieri v. Atkinson, 168 Mass. 28, citing Viles v. Waltham, 157 Mass. 542; Borland v. Boston, 132 Mass. 89; Chicopee v. Whately, 6 Allen 508; Harvard College v. Gore, 5 Pick. 370, 374. "Domicile, it is said, means something more than residence; that it includes residence with an intention to remain in a particular place. Thus a foreign minister has not his domicile where he resides. Domicile is the habitation fixed in any place, with an intention of always staying there, or at least without any present intention of removing therefrom. The residence of a foreign minister at the court to which he is accredited, is only a temporary residence. He is not there animo manendi. The same may be said of the officers, soldiers and seamen, in the army and navy. They may be said to have their domicile in one place and their actual residence in another. But generally residence and domicile mean the same thing. The place where a man carries on his established business, and has his permanent residence is his domicile." Crawford v. Wilson (1848), 4 Barb. 520. "Residence" and "domicile" are not to be held synonymous. "Residence" is an act. "Domicile" is an act completed with an intent. A man may have a residence in one state or country and his domicile in another, and he may be a non-resident of the state of his domicile in the sense that his place of actual residence is not there. Keller v. Carr, 40 Minn. 430. "There is, however, a wide distinction between domicile and residence, recognized by the most approved authorities everywhere. Domicile is defined to be a residence at a particular place, accompanied with positive or presumptive proof of an intention to remain there for an unlimited time. To constitute a domicile, two things must concur-first, residence; secondly, the intention to remain there. Domicile, therefore, means more than residence. A man may be a DOMICILE resident of a particular locality without having his domicile there. He can have but one domicile at one and the same time, at least for the same purpose, although he may have several residences." Long v. Ryan, 30 Gratt. 719, citing Pilson v. Bushong, 29 Gratt. 229; Mitchell v. United States, 21 Wall. 350. "Residence is not domicile, though domicile is the legal conception of residence. Domicile is residence combined with intention. It has been well defined to be a residence at a particular place, accompanied with positive or presumptive proof of an intention to remain there for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any one time, though he may have numerous places of residence. place of residence may be, and most generally is, his place of domicile, but it obviously is not by any means necessarily so, for no length of residence without the intention of remaining will constitute domicile." Stout v. Leonard (1874), 37 N. J. Law. 495. Home. His Home and domicile may, and generally do, mean the same thing; but a home may be relinquished and abandoned while the domicile of the party, upon which his civil rights and duties depend, may in legal contemplation remain. Exeter v. Brighton, 15 Me. 58, 60, Weston, C. J. Subject to the distinction that a man may be in fact homeless but cannot be in law without a domicile, the popular term "home" is practically identical with the legal idea of domicile. Still, a man may be domiciled in a country, without having a fixed habitation in any particular spot there, e.g., a man who passes his life in lodgings which he changes from time to time. The breaking up of an establishment does not of itself constitute an abandonment of domicile in the country where it occurs. Per Chitty, in In re Craignish [1892] 3 Ch. 180, citing Dicey Domicil 42-55. Naturalization Distinguished. "Naturalization and domicile are very different things. A man may be domi DOMICILE ciled in England, although all his life he is a foreign subject." Cotton, L. J., in In re Grove, 40 Ch. D. 236. Inhabitancy. But as a man is properly said to be an inhabitant where he dwelleth and hath his home, and is declared to be so by the constitution for the purpose of voting and being voted for; and as one dwelleth and has his home where he has his domicile, most of the rules of the law of domicile apply to the question, where one is an inhabitant. Shaw, C. J., Otis v. Boston, 12 Cush. 44, 49. Married Women. "The domicile of a married woman is during coverture the same as, and follows, the domicile of her husband." Dolphin v. Robins (1859), 7 H. L. Cas. 390423. Under English Law. An English subject is domiciled in every part of England; but that is not so in foreign countries where the law of domicile prevails. There a man is domiciled at the particular part of the dominions where he was born, and there are certain acts which he cannot perform unless at his place of domicile. Pollock, C. B., In re Capdevielle, 2 Hurl. & Colt, 985, 1018. The words "domiciled in England," in sub.-s. 1 (d), s. 6, Bankry. Act, 1883, mean domiciled in England as distinguished from Scotland or Ireland as well as from foreign countries. Ex. p. Cunningham, Re Mitchell, 53 L. J. Ch. 1067. Under French Law. Le domicile de tout Français, quant á l'exercice de ses droits civils, est au lien ori il a son principal éstablishment (French Code, art. 102). The domicile of every Frenchman, as to the exercise of his civil rights, is at the place where he has his principal establishment. Several French cases describe domicile as "the place allotted to everybody for the use of his civil rights." Melizet's Case, Bulletin des Arrêts de la Cour de DOMICILE Cassation, January, 1869, p. 16; s. C. Dalloz, Recueil Périodique, 1869, pt. 1, p. 264, Sirey, 1869, pt. 1, p. 138, and Otts' Case, Bulletin, etc., January 1869, p. 17. Changes. * Mere "A domicile once acquired is presumed to continue until it is shown to have been changed. * * The change cannot be made except facto et animo. Both are alike necessary. absence from a fixed home, however long continued, cannot work the change. There must be the animas to change the prior domicile for another. Until the new one is acquired, the old one remains." Mitchell v. United States, 21 Nal. 353; Tuttle v. Wood (1902), 115 Ia. 509; Wayne v. Greene, 21 Me. 361; Lindsay v. Murphy, 76 Va. 430. "The causes which impelled the claimant to abandon his own, and fly to the country of the enemy, were not for the purpose of business, or any other lawful purpose or reason whatever. He is represented as flying from the supposed destructive vengeance of his fellow-citizens. A visit superinduced by such terrors, must, perforce, have the characteristics of permanency-of intention to change domicile." State v. de Casinova (1846), 1 Tex. 408. Domicile of Choice. "Domicile of choice is a conclusion or inference which the law derives from the fact of a man fixing voluntarily his sole or chief residence in a particular place, with an intention of continuing to reside there for an unlimited time. This is a description of the circumstances which create or constitute a domicile, and not a definition of the term. There must be a residence freely chosen, and not prescribed or dictated by any external necessity, such as the duties of office, the demands of creditors, or the relief from illness; and it must be residence fixed not for a limited period or particular purpose, but general and indefinite in its future contemplation. It is true that residence originally temporary, or intended for a limited period, may after DOMICILE wards become general and unlimited, and in such a case, so soon as the change of purpose, or animus manedi can be inferred, the fact of domicile is established." Cotton, L. J., in In re Grove, 40 Ch. D. 234, quoting Lord Westbury in Udny v. Udny, Law Rep. 1 H.L. (Sc.) 458. "The idea of a domicile, independent of locality, and arising simply from membership of a privileged society, is not reconcileable with any of the numerous definitions of domicile to be found in the books. In most, if not all of these, from the Roman Code (10, 39, 7) to Story's Conflict (§ 41), domicile is defined as a locality as the place where a man has his principal establishment and true home. Probably Lord Westbury was more precisely accurate, when he stated, in Bell v. Kennedy (Law Rep. 1 H. L., Sc., 320), that domicile is not mere residence, 'it is the relation which the law creates between an individual and a particular locality or country.' The same learned lord, in Udny v. Udny (Law Rep. 1 H. L., Sc. 458), speaking of the acquisition of a residential domicile, said: 'Domicile of choice is a conclusion or inference which the law derives from the fact of a man fixing voluntarily his sole or chief residence in a particular place, with an intention of continuing to reside there for an unlimited time.' According to English law, the conclusion or inference is, that the man has thereby attracted to himself the municipal law of the territory in which he has voluntarily settled, so that it becomes the measure of his personal capacity, upon which his majority or minority, his succession, and testacy or intestacy must depend. But the law which thus regulates his personal status must be that of the governing power in whose dominions he resides, and residence in a foreign country, without subjection to the municipal laws and customs, is therefore ineffectual to create a new domicile. Their Lordships are satisfied that there is neither principle nor authority for holding that there is such a thing as domicile arising from society, and not from connection with a locality." Abd-ul-messih v. Farra, 13 App. Cas. 439, 440, per Lord |