68 STATUTES OF LIMITATION. for the periods specified in the act of 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 100 (k), conclusively bars the right of all parties, even the Queen, to recover tithes, unless such payment has been made, or enjoyment had, under an express written consent or agreement. Thus, too, by the Prescription Act (1), the length of time which constitutes the period of legal memory, or, in other words, which affords a legal title, has in respect of incorporeal rights, been definitely fixed; while by the act of 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, English, and 3 & 4 Vict., c. 105, Ir. (m), (k) Amended by 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 83. See Fellowes v. Clay, 4Q. B. 313; 3 G. & D. 407, S.C.; where the Court of Queen's Bench was equally divided on the question, whether a lay landowner could sustain a claim of exemption from tithes, by proof of non-payment for one of the periods named in § 1 of 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 100, without other proof of any legal origin of the exemption. See also Salkeld v. Johnson, 2 Com. B. 749; where the Common Pleas was also equally divided on a similar question, when the exemption was claimed, not in respect of all tithes, but of particular articles, some being of modern introduction. (1) The St. 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 71, limits the period of legal memory as follows: -In cases of rights of common or other profits or benefits arising out of lands, except tithes, rent, and services, primâ facie to thirty years, and conclusively to sixty years, unless it shall appear that such rights were enjoyed by some consent or agreement expressly given or made by deed or writing (§ 1); in cases of aquatic rights, ways, or other easements, primâ facie to twenty years, and conclusively to forty years, unless it shall be proved, in like manner, by written evidence, that the same were enjoyed by consent of the owner (§ 2); and in cases of lights, conclusively to twenty years, unless it shall be proved, in like manner, that the same were enjoyed by consent (§ 3). § 4 directs that the beforementioned periods shall be deemed those next before some suit or action respecting the claims, and further defines what shall amount to an interruption. § 7 provides for parties who are under legal disabilities. In the United States, the courts are inclined to adopt the periods mentioned in the statutes of limitation, in all cases analogous in principle. Coolidge v. Learned, 8 Pick. 504; Melvin v. Whiting, 10 Pick. 295; Ricard v. Williams, 7 Wheat. 110. (m) § 3, of 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, and § 32, of 3 & 4 Vict., c. 105, Ir., respectively enact, that actions of debt for rent, upon an indenture of demise, actions of covenant or debt upon any bond or other specialty, and actions of debt or scire facias upon recognizance, shall be brought within twenty years after the cause of such actions or suits; actions of debt upon any award where the submission is not by specialty, or for any fine due in respect of any copyhold estate, or for an escape, or for money levied on any scire facias, within six years after the cause of such actions or suits; and actions for penalties, damages, or sums of money given to the party grieved by any statute now or hereafter to be in force, within two years after the cause of such actions: "Provided that nothing herein contained shall extend to any action given by any statute, where the time for bringing such action is or shall be by any statute specially limited." § 4 of the one act, and § 33 of the other, provide for parties under legal disabilities, and §§ 5 & 34 state the effect of an acknowledgment in writing or part payment. STATUTABLE LIMITATIONS OF PROSECUTIONS. 69 the time within which actions of covenant and debt on specialties, and actions for penalties may be brought, is expressly limited. So, under the recent act for regulating suits relating to meetinghouses and other property held for religious purposes by dissenters, the usage for twenty-five years immediately preceding any such suit, shall be taken as conclusive evidence that the religious doctrines, opinions, or mode of worship, which for that period have been taught or observed in these houses, may properly be taught or observed, provided the contrary is not declared by the instrument declaring the trusts of such houses, either in express terms or by reference to some other document (m). § 62. There are also many statutes which limit the period within which particular offenders may be prosecuted. Of these, the act of 7 Will. 3, c. 3, is the most remarkable, as it enacts, that no person shall be prosecuted for any high treason or misprision within the act, other than a design or attempt to assassinate the sovereign, unless the bill of indictment be found within three years after the commission of the offence (n). So, all suits, indictments, or informations, for any offence against the act for the prevention of smuggling, or any other act relating to the customs, must be exhibited within three years, if brought in a superior court, and, if brought before one or more justices, within six months, next after the date of the offence committed (o). So, the prosecution for every offence against the night-poaching act, must be commenced within six calendar months, if punishable upon summary conviction, and within twelve calendar months, if punishable upon indictment, or otherwise than upon summary conviction (p). The commencement of the prosecution here spoken of is not the preferring the indictment, but the laying an information, and the obtaining a warrant of apprehension; or at least the issuing a warrant of commitment; and therefore, where the prisoner was apprehended and committed within the twelve months, though the indictment was preferred after the expiration of that term, it was held that the prosecution was commenced in time (q). Whether the preferring an indictment which is (m) 7 & 8 Vict., c. 45, § 2. (n) §§ 5 & 6; extended to Scotland, by 7 Ann., c. 21. See Fost., C. L. 249. (0) 8 & 9 Vict., c. 87, § 134. (p) 9 Geo. 4, c. 69, § 4; 7 & 8 Vict., c. 29. by all the judges; R. v. Austin, 1 id. 621. (2) R. v. Brooks, 2 C. & Kir. 402, 70 STATUTABLE LIMITATIONS OF PROSECUTIONS. ignored, would be deemed such a commencement of the prosecution as would warrant the conviction of the party upon a subsequent indictment, preferred more than a year after the offence was committed, may admit of more doubt; and the point, though discussed, has never been determined (r). Again, every prosecution under the English Marriage Act (s), must be commenced within three years after the offence committed, and the prosecution for every offence punishable upon summary conviction by virtue of this act, or of the act for registering births, deaths, and marriages (†), or of 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict., c. 22, which was passed to amend these acts, must be commenced within three months after the commission of such offence (u). So, under the act for marriages in Ireland, and the registering of such marriages, the limitations of prosecutions are fixed in like manner at three years and three months, according as the offences are punishable upon indictment or summary conviction (v). So also, no prosecution against any person for making a false declaration, in order to procure a marriage out of the district in which the parties dwell, shall take place after the expiration of eighteen calendar months from the solemnisation of such marriage (w). Again, the prosecution for every offence punishable on summary conviction under the act relating to larcenies (x), or the act relating to malicious injuries (y), must be commenced within three calendar months after the commission of the offence. Clauses of a similar nature will be found to be introduced in a vast variety of other statutes, to which it is here considered unnecessary to make particular reference. § 63. It may admit of a serious doubt, whether all, or, indeed, the majority of, these statutes of limitation depend on the doctrine of presumption. Some of them do so undoubtedly, but others appear to rest solely on the broad ground of general expedience and justice. Interest reipublicæ ut sit finis litium, is a maxim sanctioned by all civilised states: and the legislature, in passing most of these statutes, probably never intended to recognise any legal pre () R. v. Killminster, 7 C. & P. 228. (t) 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 86. (v) 7 & 8 Vict., c. 81, §§ 48 & 78. (x) 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29, § 64. (s) 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 85, § 41. CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTIONS AT COMMON LAW. 71 sumption, but their simple object was to check protracted litigation. When a party has been in undisputed possession of property for a considerable length of time, it is harsh to deprive him of that, which, however obtained, has now acquired the character of a vested interest. No presumption of a former grant is necessary to give validity to his title. It rests on the fact of long uninterrupted enjoyment. So, when a person has foregone a claim for many years, there is no need for presuming that he has, in reality, been satisfied; it is sufficient to say, that his right to recover is lost by his own negligence. Indeed, the statute of James, which has been held not to discharge the debt, but merely to bar the remedy, is strongly confirmatory of these views (2). Before leaving this subject, we cannot refrain from introducing a celebrated passage from one of Lord Plunkett's speeches, relative to the statutes of limitation. "If time," says his lordship, " destroys the evidence of title, the laws have wisely and humanely made length of possession a substitute for that which has been destroyed. He comes with his scythe in one hand to mow down the muniments of our rights; but in his other hand the lawgiver has placed an hour-glass, by which he metes out incessantly those portions of duration, which render needless the evidence that he has swept away" (a). § 64. In other cases, the common consent, by which this class of legal presumptions is established, is declared through the medium of the judicial tribunals, it being the common law of the land; and these decisions of the courts are respected, equally with the enactments of the legislature, as authoritative declarations of an imperative rule of law, against the operation of which no averment or evidence is received. Thus the courts conclusively presume that every sane person, above the age of fourteen, is acquainted with the criminal law of the land; and the maxim "ignorantia juris, quod quisque tenetur scire, neminem excusat," is uniformly recognised in this country, as it formerly was in ancient Rome (b). Indeed, this doctrine has been carried so far, as to include the case of a foreigner, who was here charged with a crime, which was no offence (2) Spears v. Hartly, 3 Esp. 81; Higgins v. Scott, 2 B. & Ad. 413. (a) See Statesmen of the Time of George III., by Lord Brougham, 3rd Ser., p. 227, note. (b) 1 Russ. C. & M. 25; 1 Hale 42; Ff. 22, 6, 9. 72 CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTIONS OF CRIMINAL INTENT. in his own country (b). In like manner, a sane man of the age of discretion, is conclusively presumed to contemplate the natural and probable consequences of his own acts; and therefore the intent to kill is conclusively inferred from the deliberate violent use of a deadly weapon (c). So, on an indictment for cutting with intent to do the prosecutor some grievous bodily harm (d), the judges held that the prisoner was rightly convicted, though it appeared that his real intent was to wound another person (e); and an intent to defraud a particular party will be conclusively presumed on an indictment for forgery, provided the defrauding of such party would be the natural result of the prisoner's act, if successful (f). The law, in such a case, will not relax the rule, even though it should be proved that the prisoner did not entertain the intention charged (g). In like manner, on a charge of arson for setting fire to a mill, an intent to injure or defraud the mill-owners will be conclusively inferred from the wilful act of firing (h); and if a (b) R. v. Esop, 7 C. & P. 456, per Bosanquet & Vaughan, Js. (c) 1 Russ. C. & M. 515–518; R. v. Dixon, 3 M. & Sel. 15. But if death does not ensue, till a year and a day, (that is, a full year,) after the stroke, it is conclusively presumed, that the stroke was not the sole cause of the death, and it is not murder. 4 Bl. Com. 197; Glassford Ev. 592. The doctrine of presumptive evidence was familiar to the Mosaic Code; even to the letter of the principle stated in the text. Thus, it is laid down in regard to the manslayer, that “if he smite him with an instrument of iron, so that he die," or, "if he smite him with throwing a stone wherewith he may die, and he die," or, "if he smite him with a hand-weapon of wood wherewith he may die, and he die; he is a murderer.” See Numb. xxxv. 16, 17, 18. Here, every instrument of iron is conclusively taken to be a deadly weapon; and the use of any such weapon raises a conclusive presumption of malice. The same presumption arose from lying in ambush, and thence destroying another.-Ib. v. 20. But, in other cases, the existence of malice was to be proved, as one of the facts in the case; and in the absence of express malice, the offence was reduced to the degree of manslaughter, as at the common law. Ib. v. 21, 22, 23. This very reasonable distinction seems to have been unknown to the Gentoo Code, which demands life for life, in all cases, except where the culprit is a Brahmin. "If a man deprives another of life, the magistrate shall deprive that person of life."-Halhed's Gentoo Laws, b. xvi. § 1, p. 233. (d) Under the repealed act of 43 Geo. 3, c. 58. (e) R. v. Hunt, 1 Moo. C. C. 93. (ƒ) R. v. Beard, 8 C. & P. 148, per Coleridge J.; R. v. Hill, id. 276, by all the judges; R. v. Cooke, id. 582. (9) R. v. Sheppard, R. & R. 169; R. v. Mazagora, id. 291; R. v. Geach, 9 C. & P. 499. The prisoner may also be convicted on a count charging the real intent, R. e. Hanson, C. & Marsh. 334, by all the judges. (4) R. v. Farrington, R. & R. 207; R. v. Philp, 1 Moo. C. C. 263. |