The examination of the cadet, which was signed at the foot by the defendant Sir William Young, was as follows: godt to noiso oda baThe answers to the followInstructions for filling by the cadet himself, in the in the answer. sy on questions must be written Ing 1992 batomp 29850 sd El to noitа9up 8 r9 presence of one of the clerks of the Cadet-office. our ships assitari Examination of Insert name of director, "I, Sir William Young, Bart., being one of the directors of the East India Company, beg leave to present the petitioner, William White Wotherspoon, as a cadet for the Madras Infantry, on one of my nominations for the season, provided he shall appear to you eligible station; and I do declare, that, from the character given of him by his father, who certifies that he is well acquainted with his family, character, and connexions, he is, in my opinion, a fit person to petition the East India Company for the appointment he now solicits. "Recommended to me on abo"WILLIAM YOUNG. by his father, "Examined and passed the 27th of November, 1844, by J. C. W., A. H., St. G. T." In the following Hilary Term, Crowder, on behalf of the defendant Charretie, and Cockburn, on behalf of the defendant Sir William Young, obtained a rule nisi for a new trial, on the grounds that it did not appear from the evidence that the defendant Sir Willlam Young had any power to sell or to confer the office of a cadet, such power being solely vested in the East India Company, and Sir William Young having only the right of nominating the candidate, who was, if approved of, afterwards appointed by the East India Company; that the appointment of W. W. Wotherspoon was neither to an office, commission, place, nor employment, but merely an inchoate right to an office, which was not perfected until he got out to India, where he received his commission; and, as to the first count, which was framed on the 3rd section of stat. 49 Geo. 3, c. 196*, that the evidence given in support of it Indies." By sect. 3 it is enacted, "that if any person or persons shall sell, or bargain for the sale of, or receive, have, or take any money, fee, gratuity, loan of money, reward, or profit, directly or indirectly, or any promise, agreement, covenant, contract, bond, or assurance, or shall by any way, device, or means contract or agree to receive or have any money, fee, gratuity, loan of money, reward, or profit, directly or indirectly; and also, if any person or persons shall purchase, or bargain for the purchase of, or give or pay any money, fee, gratuity, loan of money, reward, or profit, or make or enter into any promise, agreement, covenant, contract, bond, or assurance to give or pay any money, fee, gratuity, loan of money, reward, or profit, or shall by any way, means, or device contract or agree to give or pay any money, fee, gratuity, loan of money, reward, or profit, directly or indirectly, for any office, commission, place, or employment specified or described in the said recited act or this act, or within the true intent or meaning of the said act or this act, or for any deputation thereto, or for any part, parcel, or participation of the profits thereof, or for any appointment or nomination thereto or resignation thereof, or for the consent or consents, or voice or voices of any person or persons to any such appointment, nomination, or resignation, then, and in every such case, every such person, and also every person who shall wilfully and knowingly aid, abet, or assist such person therein, shall be deemed and adjudged guilty of a misde meanour." statute, sect. 3 not being intended to apply to those parties who have not in themselves the actual power of giving the appointment. In Michaelmas Term, 1848*, Dundas, Clarkson, Peacock, and Forsyth shewed cause.Sir John Jervis, A. G., Sir F. Thesiger, Sir D. First, the words "office, commission, place, or employment," in sect. 3 of stat. 49 Geo. 3, c. 126, were intended to embrace every official relation in which a person could stand to the Company. A cadetship, though perhaps not a commission, is a "place" within the meaning of that section. Secondly, the offence was complete, though Sir William Young had not the power of appointment. The first count does not state that the money was given for an appointment to the cadetship by Sir William Young. It is not a question whether the appointment was ever complete, but whether the defendants took money for the appointment. It appeared, however, that, if the person nominated was eligible, the appointment of the directors followed as a matter of course; and that a person could not obtain a cadetship without a nomination. If the argument on the other side was correct, no person would be indictable for giving or receiving money for an office, the appointment to which was in the Crown. The seventh count was also proved. Persons may traffic for the sale of an office, though they have no absolute control over the appointment to it. [They cited Hibblewhite v. M'Morine, (5 Mee. & W. 462).] If the defendants were guilty of an offence within the 3rd section, they are also guilty of an offence within the 4th section. Crowder and Warren, contra, for the defendant Charretiet.-First, a cadetship is not an "office, commission, place, or employment," within stat. 49 Geo. 3, c. 126. A cadetship is only a capacity to take a commission or By sect. 4 it is enacted, "that if any person or persons place in the service of the East India Company. A shall receive, have, or take any money, fee, reward, or profit, place must have some rights and liabilities, some dudirectly or indirectly, or take any promise, agreement, covenant, ties and pay belonging to it; whereas, if the party contract, bond, or assurance, or by any way, means, or device nominated declined to go to the East Indies, he would contract or agree to receive or have any money, fee, gratuity, only forfeit a privilege. [Coleridge, J.-The petition loan of money, reward, or profit, directly or indirectly, for states, that the petitioner, who had received the nomiany interest, solicitation, petition, request, recommendation, nation, "is desirous of entering the military service of or negotiation whatever made or to be made, or pretend- the Company as a cadet." Erle, J.-If the cadet ed to be made, or under any pretence of making or causing would not go to the East Indies, would he not be reor procuring to be made, any interest, solicitation, peti- moved from his place? I do not understand what tion, request, recommendation, or negotiation in or about, definition of the word "place" excludes a cadetship.] or in anywise touching, concerning, or relating to, any nomination, appointment, or deputation to, or resignation of, Stat. 33 Geo. 3, c. 52, which first mentions cadets, conany such office, commission, place, or employment as afore- tains, in sects. 57 and 58, provisions relating to "the said, or under any pretence for using or having used any in- offices, places, or employments in the civil line of the terest, solicitation, petition, request, recommendation, or ne- Company's service." By sect. 59 the court of directors gotiation in or about any such nomination, appointment, are prohibited from sending out, in the capacity of deputation, or resignation, or for the obtaining or having ob- cadets or writers, or in any other capacity, more pertained the consent or consents, or voice or voices of any person or sons than will be necessary to supply the proper compersons as aforesaid, to such nomination, appointment, deputa-plement of officers and servants; and sect. 60 prescribes tion, or resignation; and also, if any person or persons shall give the age at which persons" shall be capable of acting, or pay, or cause or procure to be given or paid, any money, fee, gratuity, loan of money, reward, or profit, or make, or cause cadet.” or being appointed or sent, in the capacity of writer or or procure to be made, any promise, agreement, covenant, con[They also referred to stat. 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. tract, bond, or assurance, or by any way, means, or device c. 70.] In Jacob's Law Dictionary a cadet is said to contract or agree to give or pay, or cause or procure to be be "the younger son of a gentleman: particularly apgiven or paid, any money, fee, gratuity, loan of money, reward, plied to a volunteer in the army waiting for some post." or profit, for any solicitation, petition, request, recommenda- [They also referred to Johnson's Dictionary and Richtion, or negotiation whatever, made or to be made, that shall ardson's Dictionary.] Secondly, assuming that a cadetin anywise touch, concern, or relate to any nomination, ap- ship is a place, the first count was not proved. The pointment, or deputation to, or resignation of, any such office, offence contemplated by the 3rd section of stat. 49 commission, place, or employment as aforesaid, or for the Geo. 3, c. 126, is the receiving money by a person who obtaining or having obtained, directly or indirectly, the consent or consents, voice or voices of any person or persons of any person or persons to any such nomination, appointment, as aforesaid, to any such nomination, appointment, depu- or deputation, or resignation aforesaid; then, and in every such tation, or resignation; and also, if any person or persons case, every such person, and also every person who shall wil. shall, for or in expectation of gain, fee, gratuity, loan of money, fully and knowingly aid, abet, or assist such person therein, reward, or profit, solicit, recommend, or negotiate, in any man- shall be deemed and adjudged guilty of a misdemeanour." ner, for any person or persons, in any matter that shall in anywise touch, concern, or relate to any such nomination, appointment, deputation, or resignation aforesaid, or for the obtaining, directly or indirectly, the consent or consents, or voice or voices * Nov. 20, before Lord Denman, C. J., Coleridge, Wightman, and Erle, JJ. † Sir William Young had died since the rule nisi was granted. has the place to dispose of. Though Sir William Young had the power of nominating to the cadetship, the power of appointing to it was in the East India Company. If the 3rd section included a person who had not the disposal of the office, the 4th section would not be necessary. The indictment describes the cadetship as an "office, commission, place, and employment;" and, therefore, it must satisfy all those words. In Reg. v. Williams, (2 Car. & K. 51), which was an indictment for forging "a certain warrant and order for the payment of money," Wightman, J., held, that the instrument given in evidence was a warrant for the payment of money, and not an order; and directed an acquittal, because it did not fulfil the description in the indictment. [Lord Denman, C. J.-If an indictment charged the forging of two warrants, and the forgery of one only is proved, it would be sufficient. I do not see why it would not be sufficient to prove one of several objects mentioned, as well as one out of a number of the same objects. His Lordship referred to Reg. v. Gilchrist, (C. & M. 224; 2 Moo. C. C. 233). Wightman, J.—In Reg. v. Williams the instrument fulfilled one part of the description, and not the other; there was a variance in matter of description; and I followed the decision in Rex v. Crowther, (5 C. & P. 316).] This is equally matter of description. An office within stat. 5 & 6 Edw. 6, c. 16, is an office of profit. Stat. 49 Geo. 3, c. 126, incorporates the provisions of that act, and adds three other descriptions. In 2 Black. Com. 36, an office is defined to be "a right to exercise a public or private employment, and to take the fees and emoluments thereunto belonging." Cur, adv. vult. Lord DENMAN, C. J., now delivered the judgment of the Court. This was an indictment on the 49 Geo. 3, c. 126, which extends the provisions of the 5 & 6 Edw. 6, c. 16, to offices, commissions, places, and employments under the appointment of the East India Company; and charged the defendant with receiving money for an appointment and nomination to a certain office, commission, place, and employment of a cadet in the Company's service. The only question remaining, after much ingenious discussion at the Bar, was, whether a cadetship was proved at the trial to fall under any one of those descriptions. The money must be paid for the nomination. It was perfectly clear, from the official documents themselves, that the directors have the power to nominate, and that, in this instance, "the director's nomination" was made in favour of William W. Wotherspoon, whose father paid 20007. for it, as a cadet for the Madras Infantry. A proviso to the nomination is annexed-"provided he shall appear eligible for that station." But all nominations are made subject to that condition. We think the indictment, therefore, fully proved; and we ought to add, that our judgment has been de layed by accidental circumstances, not by any doubt which we have felt.-Rule discharged. EASTER TERM. REG. v. THE JUSTICES OF GLAMORGANSHIRE, (Pyle and Cowbridge).-May 5. By Sect. 62 of Stat. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 126, which empowers Two Justices to make an Order for the Maintenance of a Lunatic Pauper, the Guardians or Overseers upon whom the Order is made may appeal against it, in like Manner as if the same were a Warrant of Removal, and the Appeal shall be subject to the same Regulations in all respects as an Appeal against a Warrant of Removal. Stat. 11 & 12 Vict. c. 31, contains Provisions amending the Proceedings on Appeals against Orders of Removal:-Held, that, by virtue of Sect. 62 of Stat. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 126, Appeals against Orders of Maintenance, in the Case of Lunatic Paupers, are subject to the Regulations made and to be made from Time to Time respecting Appeals against Orders of Removal, and, therefore, to the Provisions of Stat. 11 & 12 Vict. c. 31. In Hilary Term, (Jan. 25), Pashley obtained a rule calling upon the justices of the county of Glamorgan to shew cause why a writ of mandamus should not issue, directed to them, commanding them to enter continuances and hear an appeal by the overseers of the poor of the hamlet of Pyle, in the parish of Pyle and Kenfig, in the said county, against an order, dated the 6th October, A. D. 1848, adjudging the place of the last legal settlement of Edwin Richards, a pauper lunatic, to be in the said hamlet of Pyle, and ordering the said overseers to pay to the overseers of the poor of the parish of Cowbridge, in the said county, and to the proprietor of a certain licensed house, certain sums of money in respect of the past and future lodging, maintenance, medicine, clothing, and care of the said Edwin Richards during his confinement in the said house. It appeared from the affidavits on which the rule was obtained, that, on the 6th October, 1848, two justices of Glamorganshire made the order in question, and thereby adjudged the settlement of the pauper lunatic to be in the hamlet of Pyle, being a place maintaining its own poor; and also ordered payment of 30%. 158. 6d. to the overseers of Cowbridge, being the expenses of the maintenance, &c. of the lunatic from the 8th October, 1847, to the 6th October, 1848. On the 7th October, 1848, a duplicate of the said order, together with copy certificate of chargeability, notice of chargeability, and statement of particulars of the lunatic's settlement in the hamlet of Pyle, was served on one of the overseers of the said hamlet, and payment of the said sum of 301. 15s. 6d. was then demanded from him. On the 19th of the same month, the attornies for the hamlet of Pyle applied for copies of the depositions on which the order was made, which were furnished to them on the 25th of the same month. At the January sessions in 1849, the appellants applied by counsel for leave to enter an appeal against the said order, and to respite the same until the following April sessions. The re In determining whether a cadetship falls within the act as an office, commission, place, or employment, we must consider the object of the enactment. It was, undoubtedly, to prevent all corrupt bargains, for the sake of patronage, in matters of public concernment; and, with that view, it is immaterial to inquire whether that to which the nomination is sold can be described with most critical correctness by any of those terms. Each of them may have an appropriate tech-spondents had received no notice of appeal, but, having nical meaning, and yet may with sufficient accuracy answer the general intention of the act. To this extent we think the description right. In common parlance, we should not ordinarily say, that a military officer holds an office, or that a judge holds a commission; yet that language might properly be used respecting them: the words "place and employment" are so general as to comprehend those and every other advantageous position that the party can gain by nomination to a specific thing. A cadetship in the Madras Infantry is truly described by each of those words; and plainly each of them here only relates to one place and transaction. accidentally heard a day or two previous to the January sessions that such an application would be made, they instructed counsel to oppose it, on the ground that notice of appeal ought to have been given within twentyone days after service of the order, notice of chargeability, and particulars of settlement, or within fourteen days after copies of the depositions had been supplied, in conformity with sect. 9 of stat. 11 & 12 Vict. c. 31. The counsel for the respondents also contended, that, inasmuch as the order, &c. were served ten days before the October sessions, which were held on the 17th October, the appellants ought to have been prepared to try their appeal at the January sessions. The counsel for the appellants admitted, that no notice of appeal had been given; but submitted, that, in the absence of such notice, it was in the discretion of the Court, whe ther it would allow the appeal to be entered and respited or not. The chairman refused the application in the following words:" As it is put to our discretion, we think notice should have been given; and we, there fore, refuse the application." In this Term*, 191 respect to be treated as an order of removal.] The 54th section of stat. 9 Geo. 4, c. 40, gave a right of appeal against the adjudication of the settlement of a lunatic pauper, in like manner and under like restrictions and regulations as against any order of removal, giving reasonable notice thereof to the clerk of the peace of such county who shall be respondent in such appeal, which appeal the justices of the peace assembled at the said general quarter sessions are authorised and empowered to hear and determine, in the same manner as appeals against orders of removal are now heard and determined. And, in Reg. v. The Justices of the West Riding of Yorkshire, (10 Jur. 886), Williams, J., held, that only so much of the provisions in sect. 79 of stat. 4 & 5 Will. 4, c176, as was applicable to lunatic paupers could be applied to an order of adjudication of the settlement of a lunatic pauper. Secondly, the appeal given by stats. 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 12, and 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 11, must be made to the next practicable sessions. (Rer v. The Justices of the West Riding of Yorkshire, 4 M. & S 327; Patteson, Jin Rev. The Justices of Monmouthshire, 1 Har. & W.411; 3 Dowl. 306). The application of the appellants in this case was to enter and respite, for the purpose of trying the appeal at the second sessions after the orders 2 Archbold shewed cause. First, by sect. 62 of stat. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 126, after empowering two justices to make an order of maintenance upon the parish in which they adjudicate the settlement of the lunatic pauper to be, it is provided, that the guardians of any union or parish, or the overseers of any parish, township, or place affected by such order, may appeal against the same in like manner as if the same were a warrant of removal; and, in case of such appeal, the guardians of the union or parish, or the overseers of the parish, township, or place, or the clerk of the peace of the county to which such lunatic was chargeable before such order was made, may defend such appeal, and the persons appealing, or intending to appeal, and the persons defending such appeal, shall have all the same powers, rights, and privileges, and be subject to the same regulations in all respects, as in the case of an ap-Pashley and Benson, contra.First, the appellants peal against a warrant of removal." By sect. 9 of stat were entitled to make the application to enter and 11 & 12 Vict. c. 31, it is enacted, that no appeal respite at the sessions next following the order, without shall be allowed against any order of removal, if notice giving notice, though more than thirty-five days had of such appeal be not given, as required by law, within elapsed between the receipt of the order and the holding the space of twenty-one days after notice of charge- of the sessions. (Reg. v. The Justices of London, 9 Q ability and statement of the grounds of removal shall B. Rep. 4; 110 Jur. 457). The case of "Ret. The have been sent by the overseers or guardians of the re- Justices of Monmouthshire (1 Har & W. 111; 3 Dowl. moving parisk to the overseers or guardians of the parish 306) cannot be supported. The next practicable ses to which such order shall be directed, unless, within sions are such to enter and respite, as well as to enter such period of twenty-one days, a copy of the deposi- and try. The sessions in January were the next practi last-mentioned overseers or guardians, in which case a 72). Secondly, stat/ 8 9 Victs to the tions shall have been applied for, as aforesaid by the cable sessions. (Rey The Justices of Surrey, 10 Jur. & relates entirely further period of fourteen days after the sending of such to lunatics, The only removal is to the asylum, against ไม copy shall be allowed for the giving of such notice of which there is no appeal.An order of maintenance has appeal. By virtue of the proviso in sect. 62 of stat. no analogy to an order of removal. In stat. 11 & 12 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, the law relating to appeals against Viet c. 31, the Legislature were dealing exclusively orders of removal, as altered to topped, wiet of governs with orders of removal, and did not contemplate orders appeals against orders of maintenance of lunatics; and, of maintenance of lunatics, as appears from the pream therefore, notice of appeal ought to have been given, in ble, and from sect. 16: When the provisions of a sta pursuance of sect. 9 of stat. 11 & 12 Vict. c. 31, within tute are, by a clause in a subsequent statute, incor fourteen days after copies of the depositions were sent. porated into that statute, and the first statute is res Further, stat. 11 & 12 Vict. c. 31, applies to appeals pealed by a third statute that repeal does not affect against lunatic orders: there are no restrictive words the incorporation of those provisions in the second sta in it, and the appellants treated the case as within the tute. Verba relata inesse videntur. Stat, 8 & 4 Vict. c. act, because copies of they applied to the clerk of the peace for 54, contains an appeal clause, (Sect. 4):9and, therefore, copies of the depositions. An appeal against an order the provisions of stat. 4 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76, as to sendof maintenance involves against the settle- ing notice of appeal, were previously repealed as to shire, (6 Q. B. Rep. 343; 8 Jur: 778), it was held, Geo. 3, c. 78, was substantively ment; and whenever the 79th section of lunatics. In Reg. v. The Inhabitants of Merioneth? can stat. 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76, such provision must be that the clause as to costs, int enact ay Act 3 therefore, 38 4 in stat. 13 made applicable to the case of a pauper lunatic, incorporated into stat. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 126. (Wightman, J., in Reg. v. The Justices of Middlesex, 5 D. & L. 9; 11 Geo. 3, c. 59, with reference to county bridges; and Jur. 803; Erle, J., in Ex parte The Churchwardens and was s not repealed when stat. 5 & 6 Will. 4, Overseers of Monkleigh, 5 D. & L. 404; 12 Jur. 354; and c. 50, repealed in general terms stat. 13 Geo. 3, c. 78. in Reg. v. Tyrwhitt, 12 Jar. 557). [Patteson, J.-Sup- [Patteson, J.The incorporating clause, sect. 1 of stat. I pose an order of maintenance, and the parish upon which 43 Geo. 3, c. 59, enacted, that the matters and things it is made pays the money, and the pauper recovers and contained in the statute relating to highways should goes back to the parish and becomes chargeable there, be extended to county bridges," as fully and effectually and he is removed by order to the parish which paid as if the same and every part thereof were herein reunder the order of maintenance, would that parish be pealed and re-enacted." Coleridge, J.-The difficulty concluded as to the settlement? Coleridge, J.-The here is, that the provisions of stat. 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76, order of maintenance might be made when the lunatic cannot be read into stat. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 126. The prohimself might be the only person who could give evi- viso of sect. 62 of stat. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 126, cannot be dence of the last place of his legal settlement. Patteson, construed literally, and must, therefore, be construed J.-Therefore the order of ler of maintenance is not in every liberally.] The provisions of stat. 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76, may be introduced into stat. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 126, and then construed according to the subject-matter of that act. [They also referred to Reg. v. The Inhabitants of Breconshire, (3 New Sess. Cas. 234; ante, p. 422); Reg. * April 26, before Patteson, Coleridge, and Erle, JJ. Lord Denman, C. J., and Wightman, J., were absent on account of illness. We are furnished, too, with a very applicable ana the ordinary case of a common-law action given by v. Stock, (8 Adol. & Ell. 405); and Reg. v. Arkwright, | the maintenance of lunatics. This consideration seems (ante, p. 300).] [Erle, J.-The stat. 9 Anne, c. 20, to open the door for a more liberal construction, and to for rendering the proceedings upon writs of mandamus, the considering the enactment merely as a provision that in certain cases, more speedy and effectual, affords an the procedure should always adapt itself to that which analogy. Sect. 2 of that statute directed that the plead- prevails in regard to appeals against orders of removal, ings after the return, and the subsequent proceedings as that may be from time to time modified. Convenitherein, should be the same as in an action on the case for ence certainly points to this. To whatever extent the a false return. The pleadings in actions on the case imperfections which may be removed as to the one have been altered by the Uniformity of Process Act; were felt in the other, they will be removed; and, in and yet it has never been contended that such altera- two matters certainly very cognate to each other, unitions were not applicable to proceedings upon writs of formity of practice will prevail. mandamus.] It must be contended, on the other side, that all possible changes which are made in the law re-logy suggested from the Bench in the argument. In lating to appeals against orders of removal are to be incorporated, from time to time, in stat. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 126. Cur. adv. vult. PATTESON, J., now delivered the judgment of the Court.-In this case the question is, whether the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 31, applies to appeals against orders for the maintenance of pauper lunatics; and it arises upon these facts:-The rules of procedure upon appeals against orders of removal had been established by many statutes and decisions between the 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 12, and 8 & 9 Vict. c. 126, and formed a well-known body of law for adjudicating on the settlement of paupers, and some minor matters connected therewith. By the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 126, provisions were made for adjudicating on the settlement of pauper lunatics and ordering maintenance, and an appeal was created; and, inasmuch as the settlement and some minor matters connected therewith would be for adjudication, the procedure on appeals against orders of removal was adopted, and the appellant was to appeal against an order for maintenance, in the same manner as if the same were a warrant of removal. It was not the adoption of one statute or of one rule of practice, but a whole form of procedure, consisting of various stages from the origin of a suit to the execution of the judgment thereon. It was obvious that the proceedings on the two classes of appeals could not be exactly indentical; but the purposes of both classes were so analogous, that no difficulty was foreseen in applying the law according to that analogy. Afterwards, it was considered by the Legislature that several defects existed in this procedure, as well in respect of examinations as otherwise; and the statute in question was passed for the amendment thereof. As the provisions relate in terms only to the procedure on appeals against orders of removal, it has been contended that they do not extend to appeals against orders of maintenance in the case of lunatics. But we have come to a contrary conclusion. The Legislature, when making the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 31, must be taken to have been aware that appeals against orders for maintenance were required by law to be conducted in the same manner as appeals against orders of removal*. Then that law remaining unaltered, and the procedure upon appeals against orders of removal being amended, it seems to follow, that proceedings upon appeals against orders of maintenance should be conducted in the amended manner. Whether the words in stat. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 126, which we have cited, and on which the argument turns, be restrained to the law as it existed when the statute passed, or be held to adapt themselves to such changes as may from time to time be made, it is admitted, that in neither case can they be carried out in literal fulness. No one contends that the procedure on appeals against orders of removal, as it existed when the statute passed, could be carried out in every particular in regard to orders for By sect. 11 of stat. 11 & 12 Vict. c. 31, it is enacted, "that stat. 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76, and all acts to amend and extend the same and the present act, shall (except so far as the provisions of any former act are altered, amended, or repealed by any subsequent act) be construed as one act.” The rule must, therefore, be discharged.—Rule discharged. ERRATA in Reg. v. St. George, Hanover-square. Page 425, col. 1, line 9, after "sufficient," add "and that the order of removal was bad on its face," line 11, after "confirmed," add "The only question argued in this court was as to the sufficiency of the notice." line 12, for "admitted, on the argument in this court," read "objected at the sessions." col. 2, line 3, after "Wallinger," add "Serjt." Page 426, col. 1, line 39, for "quashed," read “confirmed." note, for "Nov.," read " April." BAIL COURT.-HILARY TERM. Affidavit to hold to Bail-Variance-Arrest under 1 & 2 In an Affidavit under the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, the Plaintiff In this case the defendant was arrested under a judge's order, in pursuance of the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, and held to bail. The affidavit of the plaintiff, upon which the arrest was made, stated, that the defendant was indebted to the plaintiff in 60%. for principal money due to him, as "indorsee of a bill of exchange," &c., (describing the bill as in the ordinary forms of an affi davit to hold to bail on an inland bill of exchange). In other respects it was correctly set out. The declaration, however, was upon a foreign bill of exchange, and contained the averments usually inserted in declarations on foreign bills of exchange; whereupon Butt moved for a rule calling upon the plaintiff to shew cause why an exoneretur should not be entered upon the bail-piece, on the ground of there being a variance between the affidavit to hold to bail and the declaration. [Erle, J.-I do not see from the affidavit that it is an inland bill. Is not "bill of exchange" applicable equally to either inland or foreign, and, therefore, may include a foreign bill?] The form of declaring is not the same as on an inland bill of exchange. In Arnani v. Castrique, (2 D. & L. 432; S. C., 13 Mee. & |