of the pleadings and the evidence, so far as they relate to him; although, after the discussions which took place upon the interlocutory applications in this case with respect to the substance of this suit, it would probably not be right to enter again much into detail as to matters of fact or of law, since not only are the circumstances, upon my belief of which I continued the injunction, now established, but that upon my strong suspicion of which I thought myself then not warranted to act judicially is as clearly proved-I mean the participation of Mr. Judge knowingly in that matter, which, to use the mildest expression, is to be called a breach of trust. His case is one of entire and undissembled dishonesty. There may possibly be a legal difference between the act of a man who, at a low price, buys from a domestic servant goods which the buyer knows to have been treacherously stolen by the servant from that servant's master, and the act of Mr. Judge, in acquiring from the man called Middleton, under the circumstances, and in the manner in which Mr. Judge did acquire, the disputed impressions: there may possibly, I say, be a legal distinction-morally, there is none equitably, there is none. It now appears, that, when Mr. Judge obtained the impressions from Middleton, Mr. Judge knew the connexion which was subsisting between Middleton and Brown. It appears that Mr. Judge was at that time aware of the origin and the authorship of the works in question; nor can it be supposed for a moment, by an intelligent or rational being, that Mr. Judge could have imagined Middleton to have become I will not say the seller, but the possessor, of the impressions which Mr. Judge bought of him, without faithlessness, fraud, and treachery on the part of that man. It would, indeed, be a slur upon jurisprudence, and a dishonour to the administration of justice, were a plaintiff in such a case to seek protection and redress in vain. It has been said by the learned counsel for Mr. Judge, that there are objections to the frame of the bill in this case. I think those objections have no weight whatever. Whether the impressions were taken by the hand of the plaintiff, by the hand of his Consort, by the hands of both, by the hand of Mr. Brown, or by the hands of any of Mr. Brown's servants or agents, is a point altogether without materiality. It is true that the bill does not specifically distinguish the works of the Queen from those of the plaintiff, or those which are the joint work of the Queen and the plaintiff; but this defect, if it exists, or might have existed, is entirely removed by the catalogue which is stated in the bill, and which forms part of the evidence. It is, indeed, possible that the injunction, to the extent to which it is worded, with respect to the works of the Queen, may be open, in point of extreme strictness, to doubt or question, supposing any question upon that subject to be now open. But, assuming the doubt to be well founded-assuming the question to be open, I apprehend it to be entirely without materiality; for so far as, in extreme strictness, protection ought not to be afforded by an injunction in the present form, the protection must be afforded in the other case, covering everything which ought not to be considered as covered by this. Still, if the defendant desires that the language of the injunction to be now continued, or to be now granted, should be framed upon an extreme and close attention to that state of things, I think him entitled to have it done, and it shall be done. Substantially, he must remain permanently under the prohibition under which he is now placed, and be placed under that further prohibition under which his co-defendant, Mr. Strange, is placed. It has been said that the Court ought not to act, or ought not to make a permanent or final order, in this case, without giving the defendant an opportunity of defending himself at law upon the question. Considering the current of modern

decisions, however strong my own opinion on the point of law, I should, perhaps, have thought him entitled so to insist, had the case remained in that position, in point of evidence, in which I considered it to be at the time when the question of granting or continuing the injunction was before me. It is not, however, now in that position. The breach of trust is clearly established; and, therefore, there can be no reason why such a question should be withdrawn from its original, its regular, its proper forum. The breach of trust being established, were the plaintiff's case to fail at law, I should equally interfere in his favour. It is then said, that neither the copies of the catalogue, nor the impres sions that have been taken, can be delivered up, or be directed to be given up, inasmuch as the defendant contends he is entitled to the property in the materials. With regard to the catalogue, I think no such question arises. They must be either cancelled or destroyed; and, without destruction, they can hardly be cancelled. In regard to the impressions, it might be right to attend to the defendant's claim had the impressions been upon a material of intrinsic value upon a material not substantially worthless, except for the impression, which, by the wrongful act of the defendant, has been placed there. That case, however, does not arise. The material here is substantially worthless, except for that in which the defendant has no property. There, consequently, can be no reason why the effectual destruction of the subject should not be directed by the Court; in doing which, I repeat, I abstain from giving any opinion as to the particular mode of proceeding which the Court ought to adopt in a case similar in all points, except as to the intrinsic value of the material. With regard to the costs, my own impression is, that it is according to the course of the Court, where the merits appear to the Court to require such a course, to direct a pauper to pay the costs up to the time when he became a pauper. If it is not the course of the Court, the costs will not be given; but, if it is, I am assuredly bound not to refuse the costs, when the defendant's case appears to me to fail in law, in equity, in truth, and in common honesty. The injunction in the other case will cover anything which is left uncovered by the reformed injunction in this.

COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH. SITTINGS IN BANC AFTER EASTER TERM.

REG. v. THE JUSTICES OF THE WEST RIDING OF YORKSHIRE, (TAMWOrth v. Barnsley).-May 12. A Lunatic Pauper, who is not shewn to be a proper Person to be confined in a County Asylum or Licensed House, under Sect. 48 or Sect. 49 of Stat. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 126, may be removed under an ordinary Warrant of Removal.

In 1844, T. W., with his Wife and an Idiot Son aged Thirty-three, were removed, under an Order of Removal, to the Appellant Parish, which was never appealed against. At the End of Four Days, T. W. received a Promise of a Weekly Allowance for the future Maintenance of his Son, and he returned with them to his House in the Respondent Parish, which he had retained in the Care of Two of his Children: he always intended to return. Upon Appeal against a subsequent Order for the Removal of T. W. and his Wife and Son, the Grounds not raising the Question whether T. W. was chargeable by Reason of the Relief given for his Son-Held, that the Order of Removal in 1844 was conclusive as to the Chargeability of the Father at that Time, and that the Order of Removal appealed against must be taken to have been made on Account of the Chargeability of the Father; and that the Removal under the Order of Removal in 1844 constituted a Break in the Five Years' Residence

are to make annual returns of pauper lunatics chargeable to the parish or union. By sect. 48 it is imperative upon a justice of the peace, before whom any person is brought, and proved to be lunatic, to order him to be conveyed to the county asylum, or some licensed house. By the interpretation clause, sect. 84, the word "lunatic" includes an idiot; and there is nothing in the act which points to a difference between a harmless idiot and a dangerous lunatic. [They referred to sects. 49 and 50.] [Patteson, J.-The 48th section uses the word "idiot," but it provides only for lunatics chargeable to the parish: here the father was chargeable.] While the idiot was within the age of sixteen the father would perhaps be chargeable, if the parish officers did not apply for an order; but here the lunatic was thirty-three years old. If the relief given to the lunatic is the father's chargeability, no lunatic who lived with his father would be removable. [They referred to Rex v. Mile-end Old Town, (4 Adol. & Ell. 196).] Further, an idiot cannot have the animus morandi which is necessary to justify the removal, under stat. 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 12. (Rex v. Woolpit, 4 Adol. & Ell. 205). That statute was not intended to apply to lunatics. [Coleridge, J.-Suppose the case of an infant, instead of a lunatic: is the animus morandi anything more than that which may be inferred from the general circumstances of the case?] That would be sufficient in the case of an infant, but not in the case of a lunatic. At common law the custody of the body of a lunatic is the right of the Crown. (17 Edw. 2, c. 9; Beverley's case, 4 Co. 123 b, 126; Fitz. N. B. 232). Secondly, the facts which occurred in 1844 did not constitute a break in the residence, because the pauper always had an intention to return; and, therefore, the paupers were irremovable by sect. 1 of stat. 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66. (Reg. v. Tacolnestone, ante, p. 80, decided since the cases of Reg. v. Halifax, 12 Jur. 789, and Reg. v. Seend, Id. 939). Again, the time during which the father received relief is not to be excluded in the computation of the five years, because the relief was given to the lunatic through the hand of the father, and the father was not chargeable. If the parents had refused to maintain the lunatic they would not have been within the vagrant laws. Overend, contra. First, the justices, by their order of removal in 1842, found all the paupers included in it chargeable; and, not being appealed against, it was conclusive as to the fact of settlement, and all the facts stated in it; and the quarter sessions held that they could not go into the question whether the paupers were chargeable or not. Removal under an order puts an end to residence. This case is not distinguishable from Reg. v. Halifax (12 Jur. 789) and Reg. v. Seend, (Id. 939)." In Reg. v. Tacolnestone (ante, p. 80) there was no removal under an order. Secondly, the order for the removal of the idiot was properly made. Suppose that, when a lunatic is brought before a justice, the medical man is not satisfied that he is a proper person to be confined, the justice would have no power to make an order for his removal to the county asylum, or a licensed house, under sect. 48 of stat. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 126. The 55th section enacts, "that every pauper lunatic chargeable to any parish, who shall not be in an asylum or licensed house, shall be visited every three months by the medical officer of the parish or union, and that a list of such lunatics, in the form given in Schedule (E), shall be sent once in every three months, by such medical officer, to the clerk of the peace of the county or borough; and the said list shall state whether any such lunatic is or is not, in the opinion of such medical officer, fit to be at large, and is properly taken care of." That section contemplates the propriety of some lunatics being in other places than county asylums and licensed houses. The proviso, in some degree, limits that construction of the enactment; but it is difficult to understand what is meant by the reference to paupers "who shall have lately become

lunatic." Further, an idiot is a person who from his birth never had any capacity. The 45th section of stat. 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76, which enacts that nothing in that act shall authorise the detention in any workhouse of any dangerous lunatic, insane person, or idiot, for any longer period than fourteen days, applies to such idiots as are dangerous, and coincides with the construction of this section which the respondents contend for. [Coleridge, J.-The sessions do not enter into the circumstances of the particular case, but decide that no idiot is removable under an ordinary order for the removal of the poor.] Therefore it is only necessary to shew that there is a class of lunatics or idiots which the Legislature contemplates as not removable to a county asylum or licensed house. [He was then stopped.]

PATTESON, J.-With respect to the question, whether there was a break in the residence, it is impossible to distinguish this case from Reg. v. Halifax (12 Jur. 789) and Reg. v. Seend, (Id. 939). We must take it that the order of removal in 1842 was made in respect of the chargeability of the father, and, being suspended on account of the illness of the son, was ordered to be carried into execution in 1844 on account of the chargeability of the father-under what circumstances we have no means of ascertaining. The expression of the father, that the justices sent him and his wife with his son because they thought they were the properest persons, is too vague to found any conclusion upon. The order of 1842 is conclusive that the father was chargeable at the time of making it. It was said, that the idiot son only was chargeable as part of the father's family, and, therefore, that the father was not removable; but the grounds of appeal do not touch the question, whether the father was chargeable only by reason of relief given to his idiot son. We do not know whether the paupers were removed by the justices on that ground, or on some other ground. Then the question is, whether the residence of the paupers in the respondent parish was broken by that removal; and the cases which I have mentioned are decisive. We ought not to enter into nice distinctions. Whenever an order of removal has been made and carried into execution by the removal of the paupers under it, we must hold that there is a break of residence, however short the absence may be. Therefore the residence of the paupers in the respondent parish, subsequent to the order in 1842, cannot be taken into account. With respect to the order at present in question, the justices who made it have treated the father as chargeable-upon what ground we know not. If the relief was given only on account of the idiot son, one of the grounds of appeal ought to have been, that the father was not chargeable; and the question would have been raised, whether the father would be chargeable by reason of relief so given. That question need not now be considered.

Whether a pauper idiot is removable as part of his father's family depends upon the construction of stat. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 126; and the matter seems very clear, when it is pointed out, that two classes of pauper lunatics are contemplated by stat. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 126, viz. those who are proper to be confined, and those who are to be at large. There is nothing to shew, that the idiot son, in this case, is not of the latter class. There is no doubt that those lunatics who are proper to be confined cannot be sent to their parish, but must be sent to the county asylum or a licensed house. But it is clear, that the statute, by the provisions of sect. 55, contemplates others who ought to be permitted to remain at large. [Pashley referred to the 8th section, as explaining the 55th section.] By the last proviso of the 8th section it is provided, that workhouses may be taken and used for the reception of pauper lunatics; but still the question is open, whether all pauper lunatics are to be confined, or whether some may remain * Lord Denman, C. J., was absent on account of illness.

at large; if the latter, then they may be removed as other paupers. Mr. Pashley argued, that at no time could a pauper lunatic be removed, because he can have no animus morandi. It is not necessary to enter into that question, though I apprehend that he may have a sufficient intention of staying where he is to make him removable. The case of Rex v. Woolpit (4 Adol. & Ell. 205) was a very peculiar case. If any distinction can be made upon the words of stat. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 126, between a pauper idiot who becomes chargeable, and is not a member of his father's family, and one who is, the right to remove is stronger in the case of a lunatic who is an unemancipated member of his father's family, as this lunatic is. The order of sessions, therefore, must be quashed.

COLERIDGE, J.-We are only called upon to decide upon two of the objections on which the quarter sessions have given their judgment.

The first objection is taken in the abstract form, that under no circumstances can a pauper idiot be removed by an ordinary order of removal. I am of opinion, that, so taken, it cannot be sustained. The stat. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 126, contemplates two classes of lunatics, under which word idiots are included:-First, those who are fit to be confined, who are to be dealt with under sects. 48 and 49. It appears to me, that by coupling together the order for the reception of the patient and the medical certificate given in Schedule (E), which are referred to in sect. 48, and in the latter of which the lunatic is described as "a proper person to be confined," it is a condition necessary to found the jurisdiction of the justice to make the order for the removal of the lunatic to a county asylum or a licensed house, that he should be a lunatic proper to be confined. Lunatics of that class cannot be removed under an ordinary order of removal; but the lunatic in this case is not of that class. Secondly, those who are fit to be at large, who are to be dealt with under sect. 55. And this removes the hardship which would have been created by an enactment requiring the removal of harmless lunatics out of the care | of their parents, though willing to take care of them, and the sending of them to a county asylum or licensed house. Therefore, in order to justify such a removal, the pauper must not only be insane, but in a state making it necessary, in the judgment of the justice before whom he is brought, to confine him.

The other objection is founded on stat. 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66; and I am of opinion, that, under the circumstances, there was a complete break in the five years' residence required by that statute. The order of removal in 1842 was for the removal of the father and mother as well as the idiot son, and the father and mother must be taken to have been chargeable as well as the son. They were all removed under it, and there was no appeal from it; therefore it is conclusive of the facts stated in it, unless made wholly without jurisdiction; and, therefore, de facto, the residence was broken. It is admitted, that, generally, removal under such an order constitutes a break in the residence; but the circumstances of this case are relied on to get rid of that admission, viz. that the father retained his house in the respondent parish, the absence for a few days only, the intention to return, the residence being continued after the return, and the relief being received subsequently only for the maintenance of the idiot son. I am of opinion, however, that they do not prevent the break in the residence from taking place. The mere intention to return does not make any difference. The question is, whether the father had a right to return; and it is clear, that a person who is chargeable has no such right. The chargeability of the father de facto continued; and, though it is said that the application of the relief was to the idiot son, we must take it to have been a chargeability of the father.

WIGHTMAN, J.-I am of the same opinion on both grounds of appeal.-Order of sessions quashed.

BAIL COURT.-HILARY TERM. CROCKFORD v. TUCKER.-Jan. 29. Nonsuit, Judgment as in Case of-Practice on Writ of Trial-Remanet. Where a Cause is set down for Trial before the Undersheriff, which, owing to the Course of Business, does not come on, no fresh Notice of Trial is necessary, the Cause going over to the next Sitting as a Remanet. If the Plaintiff neglect to alter the Return-day of the Writ of Trial, when such Alteration is requisite, and the Cause is not tried, he is guilty of Default, and the Defendant is entitled to move for Judgment as in Case of Nonsuit.

This was a rule calling on the plaintiff to shew cause why the defendant should not have judgment as in case of nonsuit, for not proceeding to trial pursuant to notice. The following were the facts:-The declaration was for goods sold and delivered. Plea, general issue. After issue joined, the plaintiff obtained an order to try the cause before the Sheriff of Middlesex; accordingly notice of trial was given for the 8th May, 1847. On the day appointed for the trial the plaintiff's attorney attended with his witnesses, but, owing to there being several causes set down previous, the cause did not come on. Upon this, an order was obtained to alter the teste and return of the writ of trial and jury process, which was again lodged with the under-sheriff, and a fresh notice of trial was given for the next sitting; but from the same cause the trial did not come on, since which no further step was taken in the cause; whereupon the present rule was obtained, against which

T. W. Saunders now (Jan. 29) shewed cause.-The present rule must be discharged; the plaintiff has made no default, but done all that it was possible for him to do to try the cause. If from the press of business the plaintiff is prevented trying, it is no ground for judgment as in case of nonsuit. The words of the 14 Geo. 2, c. 17, s. 1, are, if the plaintiff shall neglect to bring such issue on to be tried," according to the course and practice of the said courts respectively." Here the plaintiff has done all that was necessary for him to do: on two occasions he was ready and in attendance for the purpose of trying his cause. The fact of the cause not being tried was owing to no default of the plaintiff. If the cause is a country cause, and is made a remanet, the statute does not apply. In Middlesex and London the practice seems to be different, and the reason is, because no new notice of trial is necessary, the cause coming on as if the sittings had been continued. (Ham v. Greg, 6 B. & C. 125). A defendant may, if he wishes, at any time take the cause down by proviso. (Denman v. Bull, 3 Bing. 499).

H. Simon, in support of the rule, was stopped by the Court.

ERLE, J.-It is not a question of fact, it is simply a matter of practice, whether the sittings at the sheriff's court are analogous to the sittings in this court. According to the practice, as I understand from the Masters, notice of trial for one sitting before the sheriff is good notice for the next sitting, if, by the course of business, the cause is not reached. The entry, in the first instance, of the writ, is an entry for trial; and if the cause is not called on, the writ may be again entered, without additional expense, although it may be necessary to alter the return-day; for which purpose the plaintiff's attorney can obtain the writ, and make the alteration, as a matter of course, when the undersheriff again receives it. The notice is still good; therefore, by analogy, it comes within the rule applicable to causes entered for trial in London and Middlesex, where, if, after a cause has been made a remanet,