the High Court of Chancery shall hear and determine all applications for time to plead, answer, or demur, and for leave to amend bills, and for enlarging publication, and all such other matters relating to the conduct of suits in the said court as the Lord Chancellor, with the advice and assistance of the Master of the Rolls and the Vice-Chancellor, or one of them, shall by any general order or orders direct, in such manner and under such rules and regulations as by any general order or orders, to be also issued by the Lord Chancellor, with the advice and assistance aforesaid, shall be directed; and that it shall be lawful for either party to appeal by motion from the order made on such application, to the Lord Chancellor, Master of the Rolls, or Vice-Chancellor, and that the order made on such appeal shall be final and conclusive.” Bethell and Kinglake, for the motion. Stuart and J. V. Prior, in support of the Master's order, proposed to read affidavits which had been sworn and filed since the date of the order, and with reference to the present application. Bethell objected that these affidavits could not be received. He relied upon the word "appeal," in sect. 13 of the statute, as excluding new evidence upon applications of this kind. Stuart and J. V. Prior, contra, contended, that the were at liberty to bring before the Court, by affidavits which were not before the Master, any relevant matter. They referred to an admission made by the other side, in the course of argument, that, if the Master had refused to make any order, they might then have come to the Court with additional evidence; and argued, that, because the Master had decided in their favour, it was unreasonable that they were to be in a worse position; that the act did not say that no further evidence was to be received by the Court; and that, as the order on appeal was to be final, it ought not to be made on imperfect evidence, but upon all that could be brought forward. VICE-CHANCELLOR.-It is clear, as I understand the course of the Court, that, where parties have applied to the Master, and the Master has made an order, that can only be disturbed by appeal, by motion, from the order made on such application. I do not enter into the question, because it is unnecessary to do so, whether, if the Master makes no order, there may not be an application to the Court, on affidavits which were not before the Master; but it is certain, on the language of the statute, that, if he does make an order, such an application can only be by way of appeal, and ex vi termini; whether the Master's order is right or wrong, can be determined only on the facts before the Master. Therefore I am of opinion that I ought not to receive these affidavits. VICE-CHANCELLOR KNIGHT BRUCE'S COURT. Ex parte ASHBURNER, in re The Liverpool and MANCHESTER SAW-MILLS AND TIMBER JOINT-STOCK COMPANY.-June 21. List of Contributories-Joint-stock Companies Windingup Act, 1848. A Party who had possessed Shares, but which were for feited for Non-execution of the Company's Deed, was placed upon the List of Contributories, and the Time appointed by the Master, under the 78th Section of the Act, had long passed; yet, on Motion, supported by Affidavits satisfactorily explaining to the Court the Delay and Non-attendance before the Master, he was permitted to go in and dispute his Liability to be placed on the List. This was a motion that Robert Ashburner might be excluded from the list of contributories of the Company, or that the Master might be directed to review his decision as respected the placing of the name of the said Robert Ashburner upon such list of contributories, or that the said Robert Ashburner might be allowed to dispute his liability to be placed upon such list, notwithstanding that the day fixed by the said Master, under the 78th section of the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 45, had long passed. Freeling supported the motion, and stated, that, from the affidavit of Robert Ashburner, it appeared that he was an allottee of twenty shares in the Company, and paid 17. per share, as a first instalment, on the 20th April, 1836: that on the 23rd July following he paid 207. more, being a second instalment, at the same rate: that some time afterwards he received a notice, stating that if he did not, within a stated time, sign the deed, his shares would be forfeited; and, determining to lose his money and have nothing more to do with the concern, he took no notice of the application, and heard no more of the subject till February, 1849, when he received the usual notice from the official managers, informing him that they had included his name in the list of contributories delivered to the Master, who would proceed on the 1st March to settle the same: that he thought the letter was some plan of swindlers to extort money from him, and knowing that he had heard nothing of the Company for twelve years, and believing his shares forfeited, he did not notice the letter: that on the 23rd April he received a further notice from the official managers, stating that the Master would proceed on the 24th May to make a first call on all the contributories: that he was advised by his solicitor at Liverpool to take no steps in the affair. The learned counsel said, that from other affidavits it appeared that the directors of the Company, from their books, which had been carefully examined, considered Mr. Ashburner to have ceased to be a mem ber of the Company ever since 1836, and that his shares had been forfeited for want of compliance in respect of the deed. Bacon and Follett, for the official managers, objected to any evidence being read, on an appeal from a decision of the Master, other than the proceedings before him, as was directed by the 99th section of the Winding-up Act. Freeling contended, that the present was not an appeal, at any rate, so far as the alternative contained in the latter part of the notice of motion was concerned, and therefore the 99th section did not apply. KNIGHT BRUCE, V. C., decided upon having the explanation of Mr. Ashburner read from his affidavit relative to his non attendance before the Master, and considered the same sufficient; on which Bacon did not offer any opposition to his being at liberty to dispute his liability, but resisted the other parts of the notice of motion, on condition that Mr. Ashburner paid the costs. Freeling then abandoned the earlier part of the motion, and stated that the means by which Mr. Ashburner's name was on the list at all was a mistake in some official, for the Master had held, in the affairs of this Company, as appeared by a note to Hawthorne's case, (De G. & S. 587), that allottees, whose shares had been declared to be forfeited, were not contributories. KNIGHT BRUCE, V. C.-Let Mr. Ashburner be at liberty to go in before the Master and dispute his liability to be placed upon the list of contributories, as asked by the latter part of the notice of motion; and let him pay the costs of the motion. In re THE OXFORD AND WORCESTER EXTENSION AND there was due to his firm 1907. and upwards, being a of a Joint-stock Company, made an Order for Delivery up to the Official Manager of all Books, Papers, &c. in the Hands of the Company and their Solicitors: the Solicitors claimed a Lien for Costs, the Amount of which was not disputed:-Held, that the Solicitors were not bound to deliver up the Papers while their Costs were unpaid; and so much of the Order as required the Delivery up of the Papers by them was discharged. An order was made for winding-up the affairs of this Company. Sir George Rose, the Master charged with the winding-up, made an order, dated the 22nd June, 1849, whereby he ordered and directed that the said Company, and G. W. K. Potter and C. Collingridge, both of &c., and every of them, should, within eight days-The Winding-up Act takes away, although not by from the service thereof, deliver up to William Turquand the younger, of &c., the official manager of this Company, all books of account, deeds, instruments, cash, bills, notes, papers, and writings of and belonging to the said Company, in their, any or either of their, custody, possession, or power. Messrs. Potter & Collingridge, on the 26th June, gave notice of motion to the official manager for the discharge of so much of the order of Sir George Rose whereby they were ordered to deliver to him all books, &c. In support of this motion, Mr. Collingridge, by his affidavit, stated, that there was then (26th June, 1849) due to him and his partner, from the Company, the sum of 1907. and upwards, the balance due to them (after giving specific credit for the sums of 30%. 19s. 5d. and 531. 18s. 2d.) for business done and money expended by him and his partner for the Company, upon the retainer of the Company, and for fees and charges due to him and his partner in respect thereof: that he and his partner were entitled to and claimed a lien upon all the books of account, deeds, instruments, papers, and writings of and belonging to the said Company, then in the custody, possession, or power of him and his partner, in respect of what was so due and owing to them: that he and his partner were advised that they ought not to be compelled to deliver over to any person whatsoever the said books of account, deeds, instruments, papers, and writings, or any of them, until he and his said partner had been paid and satisfied what was due and owing to them: that Sir George Rose at first made a four-day order for delivery of the books, &c., but he afterwards extended such order to a period of eight days, in order that deponent and his partner might have the opportunity of appealing to the Court against his order. Terrell, for the motion, stated, that the Company was dissolved on the 28th November, 1846, under the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 28, (Lord Dalhousie's Act), upon a resolution that the dissolution should not be an act of bankruptcy. In May, 1849, the order was obtained for winding-up the affairs of the Company, at which time there was a bill of costs due to Messrs. Potter & Collingridge. He contended, that, the solicitors having a lien on the papers for a bill of costs for professional duties performed for the Company, they were not bound to deliver up the papers till their debt was discharged. It was true, that the 28th and 66th sections of the Winding-up Act were most extensive in their words as to books and papers, but they were manifestly controlled by the 58th, which enacted, "that, except as is by this act expressly provided, nothing in this act contained, nor any petition or order under the same for the dissolution and winding-up, or for the winding-up, of any company, shall extend or enlarge, diminish, prejudice, or in any wise alter or affect the rights or remedies of creditors or other persons not being contributories of the company;" and then, nor shall alter or affect any contracts or engagements entered into by or with the company, or any person acting on behalf of the same, previously to any such petition; nor any actions, suits, or other proceedings pending at the date of such petition." Mr. Collingridge, by his affidavit, swore, that 66 express words, by the 28th and 66th sections, all such lien as is now claimed, even if such a lien exists at all. If there be any lien, it can be maintained against the Company only up to the time of the dissolution, and after that time the remedy is only against individuals, and not against the body. If the Court shall hold that there is this lien, and that the official manager shall not take them without discharging the lien, the effect will be to prevent any step being taken in the matter of the reference, for the official manager has no funds, and can have no funds, applicable to such a purpose. To permit the existence of such a lien would be, in truth, to repeal the act of Parliament. The solicitors were only creditors of the Company, and entitled to be paid by that body, and had no right to call upon the official manager to pay a large sum of money out of his own pocket before he could get possession of the materials on which alone he could effectually act. The official manager only wanted the use of the papers for the purposes of his duty, and would return them to the solicitors, leav ing their lien for their costs untouched. [Knight Bruce, V. C.-Yes; that is, use the papers for all the purposes of the winding-up, and then, when they are of no more value than waste paper, return them to the solicitors.] It was quite clear that the act of Parliament did not intend to leave any part of the question arising under a winding-up of a company's affairs to the old rules and practice of law, but that the whole should be settled, and the whole claims discharged, and the whole liabilities arranged under the powers thereby conferred. The motion ought, therefore, to be refused. Terrell was not called on to reply. KNIGHT BRUCE, V. C.—I cannot discover in this act of Parliament any intention on the part of the Legisla ture to commit so enormous an act of injustice as to deprive a solicitor of his lien on the papers of his client for his unpaid bill of costs. Had there been any such intention on the part of the Legislature, I should have found it expressed in the act. Not finding this, and not finding that the debt, alleged to be due to the solicitors, is denied by the respondents to be due to them, I cannot make the order or support the order on the solicitors. I cannot hold that anything in this act of Parliament deprives the solicitors of their lien. It is only proper to say, that, in making the order discharg ing so much of the order of the Master as is sought, I am not doing anything contrary to the Master's judg ment, since he expressly made his order with a view of bringing the question before the Court, he not having given any opinion on the matter. July 10.-Cairns stated, that the official manager had offered the solicitors, that, if they would abandon their lien on the papers, he would consent to an order being made on him by the Court, that the amount of their bill of costs should be discharged out of the first money coming to his hands from the contributories. As that offer had been declined, the official manager pressed the Court for an order in the same words as the offer which had been made. Terrell, for the solicitors, said, the offer of a contingency had been made to them, which, as a matter of course, they refused to accept. The official manager had originally insisted on his right to have the papers, and without discharging the claim; and, the Court having decreed against him, he now came to try and force the solicitors to take a chance of payment. KNIGHT BRUCE, V. C.-I understand the case to be this:-The solicitors have a sworn lien on the papers; they have not discharged themselves, nor have they been discharged; they have an insolvent client-a client who is, in effect, a dead insolvent-and they are asked to produce the papers for the use of other parties, and are told that they may have them back when used. As they decline to do this, and as the Court could not make an order compelling them to do so, without subverting the law of the country, they are offered a contingency-that is, if there is money they are to be paid. Now, if money is received, the official manager will have incurred no risk in paying the bill of costs out of his own pocket, as he can repay himself; while, on the other hand, if money is not received, the person, as between the two, to run the risk is the official manager, and not the solicitors. The offer now made is to destroy the solicitors' lien and then return the papers, giving them the chance of payment. Let so much of the Master's order as requires the delivery up of the papers by the solicitors be discharged. Ex parte HALL, in re THE NORTH OF ENGLAND JOINT- married Robert Taylor. In the Company's books, and throughout the registry returns, she is called Outerston whenever she is mentioned. It seems she never took the name of Taylor. The proceedings between Hall and the bank are regardless of the forms of the trustdeed. The question is, whether, notwithstanding their irregularity, John Hall is, as regards the Company, a member. It is necessary, first, to consider the relation in which Elizabeth Outerston, before the execution of the deed of trust, stood to the Company. She was executrix and residuary legatee, and received dividends, by her agent, for several years. If she had not married, and had continued to receive dividends, it would have been doubtful whether the official manager ought to include her in the list in her own right, or as executrix. (See the case of Armstrong, before the Lord Chancellor, on appeal). According to Vice-Chancellor Knight Bruce's judgment, she could be included only as executrix, and I should consider that judgment as a rule. But by her own act, prior to her marriage, she dealt with these shares, not only as executrix, but in her own right; she assigned these shares as her own property to Hall, as trustee for her. If Hall and Elizabeth Outerston had complied with the deed of settlement, and he had been duly received into the Company as a trustee for her, there can be no doubt but that he must have been included in the list, because the terms are express that the Company shall look only to the trustee, and not to the cestuis que trust. He has not complied with those terms; but has he not so acted as to entitle the official manager to say, 'You renounced or waived observance of the requisitions of the deed; the Company also renounced or waived them. You represented yourself as trustee of these shares; you claimed and received dividends as such trustee; we paid you dividends as such trustee. All objections which might arise from not adopting the machinery of the deed are removed by your and our conduct? (See The Cheltenham and Great Western Railway Compnay v. Daniel, 2 Railw. Cas. 728, in which is cited The Sheffield and Manchester Railway Company v. Woodcock, 7 Mee. & W. 574). In the former case, Lord Denman, C. J., says, I think the point is conclusively settled by The Sheffield and Manchester Railway Company v. Woodcock.' That case shews that all difficulties which may arise from not adopting the machinery of the act (the private act) are got over by the conduct of parties who claim to be E. O., Widow, as residuary Legatee under a Will, of which she was Executrix, became entitled to Six Shares in a Joint-stock Banking Company. J. H., as Agent for E. O., received the Dividends, and before her second Marriage she assigned the Shares to J. H., as a Trustee for her, and then married one T. The Books of the Company contained an Entry relating to the Deed, but without the Year of its Date, and J. H. continued to receive the Dividends, as Agent for E. O., by her Widow's Name. The Name of J. H. was not returned to the Stamp-office as registered Owner of the Shares until after the Bank stopped Payment. On the winding-up the Affairs of the Company, J. H. was held to be a Contributory in Respect of the Six Shares, but limited in Liability to the Date of the Deed of Assign-placed in the situation of proprietors, and are so placed ment of them to him. accordingly. In this case, Hall's conduct is equivalent An order was made for the winding-up the affairs of to a claim to be a proprietor. If Hall is not included in this Company, and Master Farrer returned on the list the list, no one else can be. It is clear that the husband of contributories the name of John Hall, in respect of (Taylor) cannot be, for the shares were not vested in six shares, as trustee for Elizabeth Outerston. On that Elizabeth Outerston when he married her: it is equally occasion he gave the following written note of his deci- clear that she cannot be included. I reluctantly come to sion:-"Elizabeth Outerston was the widow of Andrew the conclusion that I must include John Hall, as trustee Outerston, who was a holder of six shares. She is his for Elizabeth Outerston. He is so described in the list. sole executrix and residuary legatee. Probate was pro--J. W. F.-25th April, 1849." "Since I wrote the duced after her husband's death. She employed John Hall, as a friend, to receive the dividends on these shares, and received them through him. Previous to the marriage of Elizabeth Outerston with Robert Taylor, she assigned these shares and other property to John Hall, upon trust to receive the income thereof, and pay the same to her separate use, with the usual clauses against anticipation, &c. The marriage with Mr. Taylor took place in 1842. Notice of this assignment, and that John Hall was made trustee of these shares, was given to the bank soon after the marriage, and an entry thereof made in the bank book, but there is no evidence to shew by whom the notice was given-it is an inference from the entry. The returns to the Registryoffice are very irregular, and it was not until after the stoppage of the bank that the name of John Hall was returned as trustee of Elizabeth Outerston. It only came out in the progress of the case that this lady had above opinion, it has occurred to me that John Hall is, in truth, a trustee for Elizabeth Taylor, not Outerston. The objection to the notice has not been taken; perhaps he could not be heard to make it, as the official manager has adopted Hall's own representation of himself, with a full knowledge of the marriage. I must include Hall as 'trustee for Elizabeth Taylor. Since I wrote these notes, a further affidavit has been left by Hall. I have given him opportunity to observe upon it, but I conclude that he does not wish to do so. The affidavit does not alter my view of the case.-J. W. F.31st May, 1849." A motion was now made, on behalf of John Hall, that the decision of the Master might be reversed, and that his name might be struck out of the list of contributories of the Company. The additional facts appearing were, that the deed of assignment to Mr. Hall was dated the 23rd March, 1842, and that the entry in the Company's books was this-" John Hall, 26, Brandling-place, is appointed trustee by deed of the 23rd March, and is invested with the absolute control over them;" that the date of the year did not appear in that entry; and that the dividend warrants were signed by Mr. Hall, sometimes "For the executors of A. Outerston;" sometimes "Per Pro. Eliz. Outerston," and sometimes "For the trustees of Mrs. A Outerston and self." Hallett, in support of the motion. Mr. Hall was never accepted by the Company as a shareholder, although he admits that he himself accepted the trusts of the deed of assignment to him. It is plain that the bank never considered him a shareholder, for up to the time of its stoppage of payment they never returned his name to the Stamp-office as owner. In every case of his signature of the dividend warrants his name appears, not as owner, but as agent, varying only in the form of agent, namely, for whom he was such. [The cases of Fenwick and of Armstrong (1 De G. & Sm. 557 and 565) were cited.] Bacon and Headlam, who appeared on behalf of the official manager to oppose the motion, were not called on. KNIGHT BRUCE, V. C.-Several cases have occurred in which, as in this case, the formalities prescribed to be pursued and observed in the transfer of shares have not been observed, but have been admitted to have been waived, and yet the parties have been held to be contributories. This, I apprehend, is very clearly one of these cases. The motion asks me to strike Mr. Hall's name out of the list. It is impossible for me to do so. If he wishes to have himself described in this list as liable for losses only from the 23rd March, 1842, (the date of the settlement, when he became trustee), according to what I have decided, at least in one case, he is entitled to it. As, however, this is not asked by the motion, it will not exempt the party moving from paying the costs. Ex parte HOLT, in re THE LIVERPOOL AND MANCHESTER SAW-MILLS AND TIMBER JOINT-STOCK COMPANY.August 4. Joint-stock Companies Winding-up Act, 1848-Time for dissenting from Liability as Contributory before the Master. Body, summarily, upon the Ground that he had pub lished a Pamphlet reflecting upon the Dean and Chapter, in the Administration of the Cathedral Funds, in Reference to certain of the Scholars. Upon Motion for an Injunction-Held, that the Master, according to the true Construction of the Statutes by which the Cathedral was governed, was to be considered only as an Officer of the Cathedral Church, appointed to perform One of the Duties imposed by the Founder; that his Office was not One of Trust, giving this Court Jurisdiction to interfere on his Behalf, as Schoolmaster; and that the Court had no Power to prevent a Party from being displaced from his Office, pendente lite, unless a special Case for that Purpose was made by the Proceedings. This was a motion for an injunction, at the instance of the Rev. Robert Whiston, clerk, head master of the Rochester Grammar-school, to restrain the Dean and Chapter of the Cathedral Church of Rochester from removing the plaintiff from the office of upper or head master of the free grammar-school of the cathedral church of Rochester, and from proceeding to the elec tion of any other person as head master of the said school during the plaintiff's retention and incumbency of such office; and from impeding, or in any manner interfering with, the plaintiff, as such head master of the school, in the enjoyment of his rights, interests, and privileges as head master; and from commencing any action or other proceeding against the said plaintiff, for disturbing him in his office, or in the exercise or performance of his powers or duties, or in the enjoyment of his rights, interests, and privileges, or any of them. It appeared that the plaintiff, who was a fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, had been appointed to the office of head master of the school, by the dean and chapter, in 1842. He was removed from it, in the manner hereinafter mentioned, on the 27th June last. From the bill and the affidavits, it appeared, that, early in 1848, Mr. Whiston had called the attention of the dean and chapter to the language of the statutes, and to the propriety of augmenting four exhibitions to the university, upon the ground that the sum now paid to the reign of Henry VIII, and intended to be given by the exhibitioner did not correspond with that given in the founder, regard being had to the value of the cur rency. This was an application, on behalf of Mr. Holt, for that the four scholars were not receiving what was inThe plaintiff urged upon the dean and chapter leave to go in before the Master to dispute his liability tended by the founder, and that, instead of giving them to be placed on the list of contributories of the above 57. each, they would be nearer the mark if they allowed Company. He had sold his shares, and on receiving about 601., and he referred to the opinions of antiquathe usual notice from the Master charged with winding-rians, and especially those of Nicholls and Hallam. On up its affairs, he applied to the party who was an ori- the 30th June, 1848, the following answer was sent to ginal promoter of the scheme, who told him, that, as Mr. Whiston:he had sold his shares, he need not trouble himself about the matter, and he accordingly destroyed the notice and failed to attend. Forster supported the application, and cited Ex parte Ashburner, (ante, p. 691). Follett appeared for the official manager, and opposed. KNIGHT BRUCE, V. C.-Let this gentleman have liberty to go in before the Master. He must pay the costs of this application, and must prosecute his claim to exemption on or before the 16th November next. "Dear Sir, I am instructed by the dean and chap ter to inform you that the chapter have taken into con sideration your letters of the 9th February and the 26th instant, respecting the augmentation of the allowances doubt the correctness of the facts you mention, but that to the four university scholars, and that they do not you are mistaken in your inferences respecting the ob ligation imposed upon them by the statutes, 66 am, &c., "GEORGE ESSELL." Mr. Whiston, in answer to this, said he was glad to find that there was so little difference of opinion between him and the defendants as to the facts, and that the only question between them was as to the inference to be drawn from them. He reminded them that it was not a question of inference, but of construction, upon the words of the statute, which, inter alia, contained the words, "Statuimus ut ex bonis ecclesiæ nostræ quatuor scholares pauperes in academiis nostris semper alantur," which were to be translated thus:"We ordain that out of the funds of our church four poor scholars be always maintained in our universities." sent year, reference was made to the 3 & 4 Vict. c. 113, On the 21st July the chapter clerk replied thus: "Dear Sir,-The dean and chapter desire me to state that they are sorry to find, from your letter of the 3rd instant, that their sentiments, expressed in my letter to you of the 30th June, have been much misunderstood by you. The accidental omission, indeed, of a few words in my letter, may have led, in part, to this misconception of their meaning. The dean and chapter intended me to say, that they did not doubt the correctness of the facts you mentioned respecting the changes which have taken place in the value of money, but that they dissented from the conclusion at which they presumed you wished to arrive, that they are bound to increase the exhibitions of the scholars. And as they then intended, so they now desire, to close the correspondence with you on the subject, by this expression of their opinion, since, however well-intended your application may have been, they cannot admit the principles upon which it is founded. I am, &c., "GEORGE ESSELL." 66. On the following day Mr. Whiston wrote as follows to the chapter clerk: "In compliance with the desire of the dean and chapter, I abstain from any further discussion of the question between us, and refrain from any comment on your letter of yesterday; but my duty to the grammarschool compels me to ask this question-am I to understand that the dean and chapter refuse to comply with the following clause in their statutes: Statuimus ut ex bonis ecclesiæ nostræ quatuor scholares pauperes in academiis nostris semper alantur?' "I remain, &c., 5.40, and to the decision of Lord Langdale, M.R., in The "Dear Sir,-I shall be at Rochester next week. Con- to the bishop, who finally wrote to him as follows:- April 23, 1849. 566 "Dear Sir,-After due inquiry, I find that the Court of Chancery is the proper tribunal before which you must lay your complaint against the Dean and Chapter of Rochester. I remain, your faithful servant, "G. ROCHESTER." The plaintiff laid a statement of the case and a portion of the correspondence before the public, in a pamphlet, on the subject of "Cathedral Trusts," dated the 26th May following. The plaintiff was shortly after "R. WHISTON." This note was acknowledged by the chapter clerk two days after. On the 23rd August, Mr. Whiston again wrote to the chapter, informing them of his intention to appeal to the proper authority, and claiming also the maintenance of the twenty foundation scholars. On the 3rd October he again wrote to the chapter clerk, stating his resolution, in consequence of the "unsatis-wards summoned by the canon in residence, who comfactory issue" of the correspondence, to take the advice plained of his neglect in not attending with the boys at of counsel, which he accordingly did in about three the cathedral on Whit-Monday, when one of the boys weeks afterwards. The opinion was favourable to the had disturbed the service. On the 27th June he was plaintiff's construction of the statutes of foundation and summoned, in the evening, at six o'clock, to the chapendowment, and stated, that if the dean and chapter, ter-room, (having been invited so to do a day or two as the treasurers, refused to provide for the purposes previously), when, the dean and chapter being assemspecified, application should, in the first instance, be bled, the following document, being a deed of deprivamade to the bishop, as visitor, to correct the evil; but tion, was read to him:-"To all to whom these presents that, probably, the visitor, in the exercise of his dis- shall come, the Dean and Chapter of the cathedral cretion, would think it proper that the matter should church of Christ and the blessed Virgin Mary, of Rogo to the Court of Chancery, to be adjusted there, and chester, send greeting. Whereas Robert Whiston, would so act as to effect that object. On the 15th and clerk, Master of Arts, master of the grammar-school of 27th December the plaintiff wrote to the Bishop of Ro- the said cathedral church, has lately written, and caused chester upon the subject, and his lordship, on the 30th, to be printed and published, a pamphlet, intituled said, "I will cause the petition you have laid before me Cathedral Trusts and their Fulfilment,' of which the to be heard as soon as I shall have had an opportunity scope and tendency are to cast odium on the dean and of consulting with my legal advisers as to the proper chapter of the said cathedral church, and the dean and mode of proceeding. The illness of the chancellor of canons thereof, individually, and to hold them up, colthe diocese (Dr. Lushington) may for some time prevent lectively and individually, to the reproach and conthis from taking place." His lordship added, "The tempt of the subordinate members of the cathedral, the Ecclesiastical Commissioners, as well as the Dean and inhabitants of the city, and her Majesty's subjects in Chapter of Rochester, are a party interested in the ques- general; and which pamphlet contains many scandation you have mooted. You will, therefore, perceive that lous and libellous passages, directed against the dean the latter cannot give any definite reply to your me- and chapter of the said cathedral church, and the dean morial without first consulting the commissioners. All and canons thereof, individually, and also against the this will cause delay; and I am afraid you must look lord bishop of the diocese, the visitor of the said catheforward to a longer state of suspense than you have been dral church, and likewise against the members of divers prepared to expect." In the plaintiff's letter to the other cathedral churches, particularly at page 42, where bishop, of the 27th December, reference had been made the dean and chapter of the said cathedral church of to three precedents of proceedings upon appeals to vi- Rochester are charged with a violation of ordinances, all sitors of cathedrals and colleges, and in the plaintiff's of which they have solemnly sworn to observe and with reply to his lordship, on the 13th January of the pre-suppressing, to their own profit, offices and payments |