is the work of each parish. Here all the statutory duties of overseers under stat. 43 Eliz. c. 2, are devolved on the guardians. [He cited Reg. v. The Poor-law Commissioners (11 Adol. & Ell. 558; 4 Jur. 335) and Reg. v. The Governors of the Poor of St. Andrew, Holborn, (6 Q. B. 78; 8 Jur. 688).]

Unthank, for the defendants.-The powers given by the statute must be strictly pursued. (Reg. v. The Church Trustees of St. Pancras, 3 Adol. & Ell. 535). First, the 32nd section of stat. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101, authorises the Poor-law Commissioners to combine "parishes" and "unions," which words are subject to the interpretation clause in stat. 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76. The order in question combines unions with a corporation of guardians of the poor. The corporation of a parish is not a parish or union within the interpretation clause, nor is the order equivalent to naming parishes within the ancient boundaries of the city of Bristol. The order is too general. By sect. 32 the auditor is to audit the poor-law accounts only, whereas the order gives him authority to audit all accounts. [Wight man, J.-The order directs him to audit" according to the laws in force for the time being for the administration of the relief of the poor."] The writ commands the defendants to render "a full and distinct account of all monies, matters, and things committed to their charge, or received, held, or expended by them." The corporation of the governor and guardians of the poor receive large sums of money applicable to other purposes besides the maintenance of the poor. The sums applicable to lunatics expended by this corporation are for a different district. [He referred to sects. 6, 29, 33, 35, 37, 38, 67, and 68 of stat. 3 Geo. 4, c. xxiv, and to sects. 10, 12, 13, 15, 17, and 34 of stat. 1 Vict. c. lxxxvi.] Reg. v. The Governors of the Poor of St. Andrew, Holborn, (6 Q. B. 78; 8 Jur. 688), was decided on sect. 47 of stat. 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76, which is more extensive than sect. 32 of stat. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101. In that case, under sect. 47 of stat. 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76, it was immaterial whether the sums were or were not expended for the relief of the poor, if the accounts related to "the collection, receipt, or distribution of the monies assessed for the relief of the poor." Under sect. 32 of stat. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101, the monies must be "assessed for and applicable to the relief of the poor." The duty of the auditor, under stat. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101, is to control the expenditure, not the receipt, of money. Again, in that case two rates were originally made; but when the Metropolitan Police Act passed the one became unnecessary, because the new rate was to be paid out of the poor-rate. In Bristol the rate is no more a poor-rate than a dock-rate or a rate for lunatics. [He referred to sects. 7 and 29 of stat. 3 Geo. 4, c. xxiv.] The order is incorrect as to the statement of incorporation: when the order was made, the corporation of the governors of the poor was not co-extensive with the ancient limits of the city. The 105th section of stat. 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76, does not take away the jurisdiction of this Court of deciding whether the order is good or bad. The argument on the other side must go the length of saying that this Court is to enforce an order which it sees to be bad. [Lord Denman, C. J.-If the order was clearly beyond the act, I do not think that any acquiescence would give it validity. Patteson, J.-The effect of sect. 105 seems to be, that, if a bad order is removed, it must be obeyed pending the decision of the Court, though it may be ultimately quashed.] The 105th section controls all other Courts except this.

Tomlinson, in reply.-The 47th section of stat. 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76, and the 32nd section of stat. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101, are not inconsistent, though they have different objects in view. [Lord Denman, C. J.-What do you say to the mixing up of the accounts? Wightman, J. -The writ does not direct the defendants to render an account, so far as concerns the relief of the poor: it

uses the style of incorporation; and by that term the defendants would have to account to the auditor for more than concerns the relief of the poor. The writ is general, and would include everything.] The act itself divides the accounts: the monies are in the hands of the defendants, in their corporate character, for another purpose. In Reg. v. The Governors of the Poor of St. Andrew, Holborn, (6 Q. B. 78; 8 Jur. 688), the writ called for all the accounts, but the auditor had no power to audit any but those relating to the poor. [Wightman, J.-The account which the defendants are required to give is a general one. In Reg. v. The Governors of the Poor of St. Andrew, Holborn, it was limited by the words "so far as related to the monies assessed for the relief of the poor."] The last sentence of the writ overrides the whole, and the words "in pursuance of and according to the provisions of the several statutes in that behalf" point to the general law as limiting the audit. [Patteson, J.-I do not see how the writ could go in any other form as to the receipt of money, because, so far as I understand the local acts, the money is received by the defendants jointly for all purposes. Wightman, J.-What effect do you give to sect. 23 of stat. 1 Vict. c. lxxxvi, which, though passed after the Poor-law Amendment Act, contains no reference to it? Suppose the auditor, appointed by the Poor-law Commissioners, audits the accounts to the 25th March, and disallows certain items, are they to include in the accounts the sums disallowed, or not?] That difficulty occurs in the case of incorporations under most local acts, and under Gilbert's Act, 22 Geo. 3, c. 83, wherever there is a publication of accounts. [Wightman, J.-Those are cases of local acts passed before the Poor-law Amendment Act.] All the acts for the amendment of the laws relating to the poor are to be construed as one act. (Sect. 18 of stat. 5 & 6 Vict. c. 27, and sect. 74 of stat. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101). Cur. adv. vult.

Lord DENMAN, C. J., now delivered the judgment of the Court.-The questions in this case are, first, whether the Poor-law Commissioners had power to include Bristol in a district for auditing accounts, under the provisions of stat. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101; secondly, whether, if they had that power, it has been duly exercised.

As to the first question, the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101, s. 32, authorises the commissioners to combine the parishes and unions into districts for the auditing of accounts. The 109th section of stat. 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76, which is incorporated into stat. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101, provides that the word "parish" shall include every city maintaining its own poor, and the word "union" shall include any number of parishes incorporated for the relief or maintenance of the poor under any local act. We find, that, by a local act, 3 Geo. 4, c. xxiv, a corporation is constituted for the relief and maintenance of the poor of the different parishes in the city of Bristol, out of a common joint fund. We cannot, therefore, doubt that Bristol is both a city maintaining its own poor, and so a parish within the interpretation clause alluded to, sect. 109 of stat. 4 & 5 Will. 4, c.76; and also consists of a number of parishes incorporated for the relief and maintenance of the poor, and so is an "union" within the same clause. It is true, that the local act does not, totidem verbis, unite the parishes, nor incorporate them; but it does incorporate a body of persons to administer the relief and maintenance of the poor out of a joint fund, and that is precisely the same thing. It is true, also, that the same local act gives the corporation so constituted various other powers, and the collection and in part administration of various other funds; but we have already decided, in Reg. v. The Governors of the Poor of St. Andrew, Holborn, (6 Q. B. 78; 8 Jur. 688), that this circumstance does not take away the power of the commissioners to appoint an auditor, as the law then stood, much less does

it affect their power under the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101, passed since that decision. We think, therefore, that the commissioners had power to include Bristol in the district for auditing accounts.

Secondly, we think that that power has been duly exercised. The order, indeed, combines, in terms, various unions named in it, and "the corporation of the poor of the city of Bristol," instead of using the words "the city of Bristol," or "the union of the city of Bristol," or "the incorporated parishes in the city of Bristol." But there is no magic in words, and the meaning of the order is abundantly clear.

It was further objected, that the order is too large in its terms, and the writ of mandamus also; for, by the use of the terms, "the corporation of the poor of the city of Bristol," they are made part of the district for auditing accounts, not only in respect of the relief and maintenance of the poor, but in respect of every other duty which is cast upon them by the local act. It may be observed, that the title, "The Corporation of the Poor of the City of Bristol," is not the title of incorporation given in the act, which is, "The Governor, Deputy-Governor, Assistants, and Guardians of the Poor of the City of Bristol." But if it were the true title, still the order plainly shews that they are combined with the other unions only in respect of the relief and maintenance of the poor; and the power of the auditor to audit and allow or disallow items of account is limited in the same way by the stat. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101. The writ of mandamus directs the production of all accounts, and that is right; for all must be produced, and all monies received must be accounted for; but the audit, as to allowing or disallowing items, must be limited as above stated.

We decide this case on the merits; but we wish to be clearly understood, that we do not thereby intend to lay down that it is open to any persons to disobey or to dispute the validity of an order of the Poor-law Commissioners, otherwise than by writ of certiorari, under the 105th section of stat. 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76, as a general rule, whether there may or may not be exceptions in case of any manifest want of jurisdiction. Our judgment must be for the prosecutors of this writ of mandamus.-Judgment accordingly.

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS.-TRINITY TERM. KINNING V. BUCHANAN.-April 21 and June 25. Trespass-Warrant of Commitment, pursuant to the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 127, invalid for Want of Summons-Evidence-Pleading.

In Trespass for false Imprisonment the Defendant pleaded in Justification a Judgment recovered in an inferior Court of Record, and an Order subsequently made, under the 8&9 Vict. c. 127, by the Judge of that Court, for the Payment of the Debt and Costs by the Plaintiff by Instalments; and shewing that such Instalments were not paid, and that the Judge had thereupon ordered the Committal of the Plaintiff. The Plea then alleged, that the Judge," duly, and according to the Form of the Statute in such Case, then and there made a Warrant in Writing," setting out a Warrant of Commitment, and averring that the Defendant, as the Attorney for the Judgment Creditor, delivered the Warrant to the Officers, by whom and under which Warrant the Plaintiff was arrested. To this Plea the Plaintiff replied, that the Judge did not order that the Plaintiff should be committed Modo et Formâ. The Defendant, at the Trial, produced a Warrant of Commitment corresponding with that described in the Plea; but neither the Warrant so produced nor that described shewed on the Face of it that there had been any previous Summons to the Plaintiff to shew Cause why he should not be committed:-Held,

that the Warrant so produced was invalid, and that the Plaintiff was entitled to have the Verdict found for him on the Issue on the second Plea, as that Plea, to be good, must be understood to allege that the Judge made a valid Order.

Held, also, that, as the Defendant justified by a special Plea, acting under the Order of Commitment, he could not justify without producing a valid Order. This was an action of trespass for assault and false imprisonment. The defendant pleaded, first, not guilty; secondly, that, before the said time when &c., to wit, on the 5th October, A. D. 1846, William Townley levied his certain plaint against the now plaintiff in the court of our Lady the Queen, before Thomas Challis, Esq., then being one of the sheriffs of the city of London, in his compter, situate in the parish of St. Giles Without, Cripplegate, in the ward of Cripplegate Without, in the same city, and within the jurisdiction of the same court, according to the custom of the said city, for a cause of action personal arising within the jurisdiction of the said Court, and such proceedings were thereupon had; that afterwards, to wit, on the 5th December, A. D. 1846, at the said court then held before the said sheriff, at the Guildhall of the said city of London, and within the said city, and within the jurisdiction of the said Court, the said William Townley, by the consideration and judgment of the said Court, recovered against the now plaintiff as well a certain debt of 197. 19s. as also 31. 12s. 6d. for his costs of suit, as, by the record and proceedings thereof still remaining in the said court, appears; and afterwards, and after the passing of an act of Parliament passed in the ninth year of the reign of our Lady the now Queen, intituled "An Act for the better securing the Payment of small Debts," and before the said time when &c., to wit, on the 5th December in the year last aforesaid, the plain. tiff then being indebted to the said William Townley in a sum not exceeding 201., besides costs of suit, by force of the said judgment, to wit, the sum of 191. 19s, the said William Townley made application, by peti tion and note in writing, according to the form in Schedule (B) to the said act of Parliament annexed, to the said Court, the same being an inferior court of record for the recovery of debts in and for the city of London, and then being held at the Guildhall afore said, in the said city, and within the jurisdiction of the said Court, to wit, within the city of London; and the said Court then having a judge who was a bar rister at law, that is to say, Edward Bullock, Esq., barrister at law, then being the judge of the said court; by which said petition and note in writing the said William Townley requested the said Court to summon the plaintiff to answer touching the debt due to the said William Townley, by the judgment of the said Court, on his, the said William Townley's, behalf and thereupon the said Court, afterwards, to wit, on the 7th December, A. D. 1846, upon the said application of the said William Townley, granted to the said William Townley a summons, according to the form in Schedule (A) unto the said act of Parliament annexed, by which said summons the plaintiff was required to appear at the Sheriff's Court, London, (being the said court), to be holden at the Guildhall of the city of London, in the said city, on Saturday, the 12th De cember, A. D. 1846, at a quarter to ten of the clock in the forenoon of the same day precisely, to answer such questions as might be put to him touching the not having paid to the said William Townley the sum of 237. 11s. 6d., being the amount of the said debt and costs recovered by the said judgment; and the said William Townley then obtained the said summons from the said Court, and the plaintiff was, afterwards, and before the return of the said summons, to wit, on the said 7th December in the year last aforesaid, and within the jurisdiction of the said Court, to wit, at

that the said Edward Bullock did not order that the plaintiff should be committed for forty days to her Majesty's Debtors Prison for London and Middlesex, in the city of London, modo et formâ, &c. At the trial, before Coltman, J., at the Middlesex Sittings after Hilary Term, 1847, the defendant produced, in support of the issue on the second plea, a warrant of commitment, which, in terms, corresponded with the plea, and was the same as is set out in Ex parte Kinning, (4 C. B. 507). The plaintiff contended that the second plea was either bad, or, if, by reason of its being alleged that the judge duly made his warrant, it could be treated as good, it must involve, in the issue taken on it, the necessity of shewing a valid order of commitment; whereas the one produced was not valid, as decided in this court, (4 C. B. 507), for want of its appearing on the face of it that the plaintiff had been summoned to shew cause why he should not be committed. The defendant, on the other hand, contended, at the trial, that such question was not involved in the traverse which had been taken, and that it was sufficient if he shewed that an order had been made in the terms pleaded. Under the direction of the learned judge a verdict was found for the plaintiff on the first issue, and for the defendant on the second. A rule nisi having been obtained, on the part of the plaintiff, for a new trial on the ground of misdirection, or for judgment non obstante veredicto, cause was shewn against it in Easter Term last, by Byles, Serjt., and Peacock, for the defendant, who contended, for the reasons urged at the trial, that the issue on the second plea was proved by the order of commitment, which was produced; and that the second plea was good, first, because such second summons to shew cause was not necessary; secondly, if it were, it sufficiently appeared by the plea that the plaintiff had been so summoned; and, thirdly, that the order being by a court of competent jurisdiction, it protected the defendant, who acted under it.

Pashley and Henniker, for the plaintiff, supported the rule. Cur, adv. vult. June 25.-WILDE, C. J., now delivered judgment.After stating the pleadings, his Lordship said:-On the trial, the defendant, in order to sustain this issue, produced a commitment made by the judge of the sheriff's court, which corresponded with that described in the special plea, but which contained no statement of any previous summons to the plaintiff to shew cause why he should not be committed. The jury, under the direction of the learned judge, found, on this evidence, for the defendant. A rule was afterwards obtained, on behalf of the plaintiff, to shew cause why there should not be a new trial for misdirection, or judgment for him non obstante veredicto; and the ground for the rule was, that the order was bad for want of such previous summons, and that either the plea, in order to make it a good plea, must be understood to allege that the judge made a valid order, in which case he ought to have directed the jury to find for the plaintiff; or that the plea was no good bar, for want of the allegation of such previous summons, in which case the plaintiff would have been entitled to judgment non obstante veredicto. In shewing cause, it was contended, on behalf of the defendant, that the traverse did not put in issue the validity of the order, but only the question, whether, in fact, the order was made as described in the plea; and, therefore, the verdict was properly found for the defendant. And further, that it was not essential to the plea that the order should be valid, inasmuch as the defendant appeared to have merely done the duty of an attorney of one of the litigant parties, in execution of the order of a judge of a court of competent jurisdiction; and that an attorney so acting is protected, whether the order be valid or not. It was also contended that the order was good on the face of it, for it was not

necessary that the issue of the summons should be stated. But we are of opinion that these arguments are not well founded. It is true, if an attorney does no more than set a court of competent jurisdiction in motion on behalf of his client, he is no trespasser, notwithstanding such court should, on his motion, do an act of trespass by its officers; and he would, therefore, be entitled to the verdict under the plea of not guilty, if an action were brought against him in respect of such an act of trespass. But where, by a special plea, like the one in question, he attempts and undertakes to justify his acts under it, we are of opinion he can only make out his justification by shewing the written authority under which he acted; and, consequently, it is essential to the defence, in the present case, that the order relied upon should be a valid order. Accordingly, we think the plea, when it avers that the judge of the sheriff's court duly, and according to the form of the statute, ordered the plaintiff to be committed for forty days, &c., must be understood to aver that the judge made a valid order to that effect; and the replication, by denying that he did order that the plaintiff should be committed, in manner and form, &c., raised an issue which the defendant cannot support, without proving a valid order; for, if this issue were to be found for him, it would be inferred, after verdict, that the judge at the trial had construed the plea in the sense requisite for its validity, and that, consequently, such an order had been proved, otherwise the jury would have found for the defendant. But, in fact, the order produced at the trial was in the very terms of the warrant, which this Court has already decided, in Ex parte Kinning, (4 C. B. 507), on the occasion of the plaintiff applying for his discharge under a habeas corpus, to be invalid on the face of it, on the same ground of objection as that taken in the present case against the validity of the order on which the warrant was founded; and it appears to us, on the principle of that decision, that we must construe the order to be invalid; and therefore, the defendant having failed to maintain the issue, the judge ought to have directed the jury to find for the plaintiff: and, for these reasons, we think the rule must be absolute for a new trial.— Rule absolute.

PREROGATIVE COURT.

THOMSON and BAXTER v. HEMPENSTALL.-July 19. Will-Description by Date and Contents-Construction. G. D., by his last Will, "revoked all former Wills, Codicils, and testamentary Dispositions, except a Will bearing Date the 13th December, 1831, which Will relates exclusively to the Reversion in Fee of the Tong Castle Estate." One of his former Wills bore Date the 13th December, 1831, but did not relate exclusively to the Reversion of the Tong Castle Estate. Another former Will bore Date the 22nd May, 1839, and did relate exclusively to that Reversion in Fee:-Held, that the Reference, taken with the whole Context of the Three Wills and with the Evidence of the State of the Testator's Family, clearly designated the Will of the 22nd May, 1839; and that the Will of the 13th December, 1831, was not entitled to Probate.

The question in this case arose upon the construction of the concluding words of the last will of George Durant, dated the 7th February, 1844. These words and the facts are fully stated in the judgment below.

Harding and Bayford, for Mr. Hempenstall.-The first point is, that parol evidence is inadmissible to control or explain a will. The origin of that principle is stated in 1 Jarman on Wills, p. 349; and Walpole v. Cholmondeley (7 D. & E. 138; 3 Ves. 402) is an authority for us. The description is inaccurate, and as such must be rejected. So, Miller v. Travers, (8 Bing. 244), and observations on that case in Wigram on Ex