ment-and that is the only thing I can rely upon, because the other statement is so vague that I cannot rely upon it at all-the party swearing does not recollect the facts, or state what passed: I find he states, in answer to an affidavit swearing that he communicated to some officer of the Company that this assignment had taken place, of which there is an entry in the book by some officer of the Company, that the communication was made, not for the purpose of his becoming a shareholder in the concern-not for the purpose of standing in the place of the person who was really a shareholder-but simply for the purpose of cautioning the Company against the payment of the dividends to the party to whom they might otherwise have been paid. That is what he states was the object of the communication. The fact of this verbal communication was sworn to by one of the clerks of the concern, and he admits that he did make it for that purpose, and for that purpose only. From the period of the communication the dividends were received by him, and the shares were never transferred; they continued to stand in the name of the original owner, and Hall received the dividends; but there is nothing to shew he received them, or applied for them, or that they were paid to him in the character of assignee of the shares, or that he was entitled to the shares at all. Some of the receipts are on behalf of the personal representative, and some of them are by procuration, written in short, on behalf of the personal representative-some in terms at length, "for the personal representative"-not one in which he purports to receive the dividends in his character as assignee or as owner of the shares, except in one, in which, after the signature of his name, having no character affixed to it, there is written by some other person, not himself, "trustee" for the lady who is the party holding them. Now, he denies that he had any knowledge of that, or that it was done by him; and, upon the face of it, it does not appear that there is anything to lead to any suspicion that it was done by him, or with his knowledge; it is after his name, and inerely for the purpose of describing the character of the person who signed the receipt. Now, the evidence is, that it was done by a clerk of the Company; and, except those two facts, there is nothing whatever to connect him with the Company, or to shew that he ever intended to become a member of the Company, or that the Company ever looked upon him as being a person who became a member of the Banking Company. In both cases the act provides means by which that is to be done. If an assignment takes place, and the party having the assignment does not take proper steps subsequently to become a member of the Company, the deed of settlement provides, that after six months the shares are to be forfeited. So, again, if, being the assignee, he is desirous of becoming a member of the Company by virtue of the deed of assignment of the shares to him, he has the means of bringing it under the consideration of the directors, whether they will receive him as a member of the Company or not. Now, neither of those steps are taken by the Company, or by the individual to whom the shares were assigned; but the transaction I have now referred to is the whole that appears to have taken place. The Master says he is to be held a contributory, and you, by virtue of those two transactions, so proved, are liable, therefore, to contribute, in proportion to those shares, to all the debts and liabilities of the Company. Now, the Vice-Chancellor Knight Bruce has taken the same course. I want to know, if an action were tried, legally raising the question of liability to the debts and obligations, whether there is the least chance, independent of the technical difficulties which surround this act, of any jury coming to a conclusion that he was liable. I should not say so much as to the probable result of an action, but I am speaking of an action where this evidence, and this evidence only, would be presented to the jury. I understand that the opportunity of trying it is declined, and if I am to deal with it, I must deal with it upon the evidence, and I must make such observations as strike me to be proper to guide and regulate the conclusion to which I have come. If Mr. Bacon now wishes to have the opportunity of trying it, I will not bar him by the refusal he made before. Bacon. This case is of much greater importance than as concerns this individual. Will your Lordship give me an opportunity of considering this? My reason for asking it is this-it has been decided at law, in the cases which I mentioned to your Lordship, that, under the Joint-stock Banking Companies Act, 7 Geo. 4, c. 46, this gentleman cannot be held to be a member. It has been decided in other common-law cases, that no creditor has any recourse against a member of the partnership, except through the machinery of the same act. That embarrasses the case, and for that reason it was, that, when your Lordship first suggested the trial of an action at law, I did not feel myself at liberty to accept it. If your Lordship will give us leave to consider till to-morrow morning, whether in any other form that question could be raised, I shall be glad of having an opportunity of doing so. LORD CHANCELLOR.-I think it right that you should have the opportunity of doing so. The question I have to try is, is the party a contributory? He is at present entered in the list of contributories, which, after a certain period, is not to be questioned; and, therefore, if I affirm the order which has been pronounced, he is fixed as a contributory to all the liabilities of this Company. Now, I have my instructions from the act of Parliament, which I cannot go out of, which says, "The word 'contributory' shall include every member of a company"-which he clearly is not-"and also every other person liable to contribute to the payment of any of the debts, liabilities, or losses thereof, whether as heir, devisee, executor, or administrator of a deceased member, or as a former member of the same, or as heir, devisee, executor, or administrator of a former member of the same, deceased, or otherwise howsoever." The question I have to inquire into, therefore, is, whether this party is proved before me to be liable in any character to contribute to the loss of the concern-that is to say, liable independent of this act. A party cannot complain when such a definition is referred to by the act, as to the party who is to be the contributor. It gives him the opportunity of shewing that the individual sought to be fixed as a contributory is liable. I find from the evidence before me, that it does not shew a liability. I am only adopting the ordinary course in saying, that, though it is not proved here, I will give you an opportunity of proving at law the legal liability. How it is to be done is for the party to consider who makes the affirmance. If Mr. Bacon wishes to have an opportunity of considering it, I will not conclude it now; but I must now reverse the order of the Master and the Vice-Chancellor, by striking him out as a contributory, as it now stands. Whether it shall be finally so, or I shall give the party an opportunity of trying it at law, will be according to Mr. Bacon's judgment of his client's case. At present I strike him out as a contributory; and I do not make a final order until I know what Mr. Bacon says. Nov. 10.-At the sitting of the Court, Bacon mentioned this case, and asked that it might be sent to law in the shape of an issue. The LORD CHANCELLOR said that it was contrary to the practice of the Court to direct an issue in such a case as the present, where an action could be brought.. Bacon then accepted the leave to bring an action. LORD CHANCELLOR.-It occurs to me that it will be better not to strike Hall off the list of contributories until the question at law be decided; but no step must be taken against him as a contributory in the mean time.-Motion to stand over, with liberty for the official manager to take such steps at law as he may be advised. ROLLS COURT. WOOD v. TAUNTON.-Feb. 28, March 29, and April 4. Where all Matters in Dispute in the Cause are referred In this case, all matters in dispute in the cause had been, by consent, referred to arbitration, by an order of the Court dated the 25th June, 1846, and a sum of 8561, together with other monies, had been paid into the Bank of England, in the names of E. Futvoye and W. G. Bateson, under an order of the arbitrator dated the 5th July, 1847, to abide his decision. On the 19th August, 1848, the arbitrator made his award, directing the sum of 8561. to be paid to the plaintiff, and a cheque for payment to the plaintiff was accordingly prepared, and signed by Bateson, but Futvoye refused to sign it; and, in consequence of such refusal, a motion was now made by Messrs. Turner & Prior, on behalf of the plaintiff, that Futvoye might be ordered to sign, and hand over to the plaintiff, a cheque for the 8567. Daniel, for the defendant Taunton, objected that the award had not been made a rule of Court, and that no application to enforce it could be maintained until it was made a rule of Court. Turner contended, that it was not necessary to make the award a rule of Court, where it was made in pursuance of an order, taken by consent, for referring all matters in dispute to arbitration; and in support of this he cited The Marquis of Ormonde v. Kinnersley, (2 Sim. & S. 15); Sibley v. Saffel, (Ib.); Haggett v. Welsh, (1 Sim. 134); and Turner v. Turner, (3 Russ. 494). The order directed the agreement between the parties to be carried out, and the reference was merely for the purpose of ascertaining the agreement. When, therefore, the award was made, it became part of the order of the Court, and there was no necessity for any further step for that purpose. Daniel referred to Wilkinson v. Page, (1 Hare, 276); Salmon v. Osborn, (3 My. & K. 429); and Harney v. Shelton, (7 Beav. 455). April 4.-Lord LANGDALE, M. R., said, this was a motion to have a sum of money paid to the plaintiff, in pursuance of an award. The questions in dispute in the suit were referred to arbitration by an order of the Court, and an award was made; and, on a motion to enforce a compliance with the award, a preliminary objection was taken, that it had not been made an order of Court. The plaintiff contended that this was not necessary, and four cases were referred to, in which the Court had decided that it was not necessary to make such an award an order of Court. In Sibley v. Saffel, Lord Eldon enforced an award made on an order taken by consent for a reference, without the award being made a rule of Court. In Haggett v. Welsh, Hart, V. C., said, that, where an order of reference was made by any Court, it was not necessary to give the Court authority, under the award, either that the submission should be made a rule of Court, or that the award should be made a rule of Court. In The Marquis of Ormonde v. Kinnersley, Sir John Leach recognised Sibley v. Saffel as an express authority that the Court would enforce an award made under an order of Court, without requiring that the award should first be made a rule of Court. And in Turner v. Turner, where the award was made, under an order by consent, referring all matters in difference to arbitration, Lord Lyndhurst, on a question being raised as to the necessity of making the award an order of Court, considered that it was not necessary. Now, in Sibley v. Saffel and Turner v. Turner the reference directed was of all matters in difference between the parties in the cause, and not a reference to arbitration by the parties out of court, In Haggett v. Welsh it was only stated that the cause was referred to arbitration, and the opinion of Hart, Leach, in The Marquis of Ormonde v. Kinnersley, said V. C., was expressed in general terms; but Sir John that Sibley v. Saffel was an express authority that it was not necessary to make such an award an order of Court; and though, in Salmon v. Osborn, there was a reference of all matters in dispute in the cause, yet the motion was for payment of money out of court, and this may have induced Sir John Leach, in that case, to decide that the award should be made an order of Court. No other cases bearing on the point had been found. It was, therefore, his opinion, that the motion for enforcing the award could be sustained, though the award had not been made an order of Court. VICE-CHANCELLOR KNIGHT BRUCE'S COURT. Joint-stock Companies Winding-up Act, 1848-Contri- H., a Shareholder, entered into a Negotiation for the Sale of his Shares to the Company, but afterwards abandoned it. B., an influential Member of the Company, proposed to buy the Shares, and the Sale was completed. The Purchase-money was paid by Debentures of the Company, which passed from the Office of the Secretary direc to the Hands of H. At the same Time that H. sold the Shares to B., it was agreed that H. should advance a Sum, over and above the Purchase-money, to the Com pany, and Debentures of the Company for the Amount lent were handed over to him at the Time of the Share Transaction. The Master held the Sale to have been illusory, and put H. upon the List of Contributories; but, on Appeal, the Court held, that H. might conclude that B. purchased on his own Account, and therefore directed the Master to review his Report. This was a motion, on behalf of Mr. William Hollwey, that the decision of Master Brougham, who was charged with the winding-up of the affairs of the Vale of Neath and South Wales Brewery Joint-stock Company, made on the 23rd July, whereby the name of the said William Hollwey had been included in the list of contributories of the said Company as a contributory in respect of twenty-five shares, without qualification, might be reversed, and that the name of the said William Hollwey might be included in the said list of contributories of the said Company only in respect of the debts, liabi lities, and losses, if any, up to the 27th June, 1842. A similar motion was also made on behalf of Charles Hollwey, and the two motions were by arrangement considered as coming on together. In February, 1841, William and Charles Hollwey became shareholders in the Company, and had twenty 201. shares issued to each of them, and they paid in respect of each such share 201 In February, 1842, it was resolved to issue new shares in the Company, to rate as 207. per share, but upon each of the new shares only 157, was to be paid; and each of them, the said William and Charles Hollwey, took five of such new shares, and paid 157. in respect of each of such shares. Shortly afterwards, William and Charles Hollwey, being desirous of relieving themselves from their liabilities in respect of their shares, intimated to Mr. Lowther, the secretary of the Company, their desire of disposing of their shares, and the directors proposed to purchase the same on behalf of the Company; but William and Charles Hollwey, being advised that the Company, not having a surplus fund, could not legally purchase the shares, declined to sell to the Company or the directors. Some few weeks afterwards, William Henry Buckland, a director of the Company, proposed to purchase the shares in his individual capacity, at par; and on the 27th June, 1842, the shares were duly transferred to him, and he gave debentures of the Company in payment of the purchase-money. At the time of the transfer, William and Charles Hollwey also advanced 5007. each, and received debentures of the Company to that amount. Mr. Lowther, the Company's secretary, acted in a great portion of these transactions with William and Charles Hollwey, but as Mr. Buckland's agent, according to the understanding of William and Charles Hollwey. Under these circumstances the Master included William and Charles Hollwey's names in the list of contributories in respect of the shares, without qualification.. Bacon and G. L. Russell, in support of the motion, contended that there was nothing to fix Mr. Hollwey with the knowledge that Mr. Buckland acted on behalf of the Company, if, in fact, Mr. Buckland did so act; and that the transfer put the opposite party to the proof that he was cognisant of the purchase being made on behalf of the Company. Russell and Terrell, for the official manager, in support of the Master's finding, argued that the facts led to the irresistible conclusion that Mr. Hollwey must have been aware, particularly from the fact of taking debentures for the price of the shares, that the sale was made to the Company, and that they were the real purchasers. Knight Bruce, V. C.-I assume the nature of the transaction, as between Mr. Lowther, Mr. Buckland, and the Company, to have been what the respondent alleges it to be. The first question then is, whether the circumstance that Mr. Hollwey held the shares, he not being a director, affects him with constructive notice, in that state of things, that Mr. Buckland purchased the shares in question as a trustee for the Company. I know of no decision that has gone that length. If I am to exercise my own judgment, I consider, as I have said, that the fact of Mr. Hollwey being a shareholder does not affect him with constructive notice that Mr. Buckland purchased the shares as a trustee for the Company. If Mr. Hollwey believed that Mr. Buckland was buying on his own account, no notice being given, there is nothing to shew that he is to be affected with notice that Mr. Buckland actually bought for the Company. It is insufficient to allege that he, as a reasonable man, might believe that Mr. Buckland had an interest as an individual to purchase the shares, and that the Company were to have the benefit of borrowing the purchase-money, and thereupon that Mr. Lowther proposed to Mr. Hollwey to purchase, if he would take debentures. I am of opinion that a reasonable man might believe so. On the evidence before the Court, I cannot come to the conclusion that Mr. Hollwey did not believe what a reasonable man might have believed of the transaction. The question is a mixed one of fact and of law, and I am obliged to come to the best conclusion I can; and being so obliged, I am not able to arrive at the same conclusion as the Master, and he must review his report. The same order will be made on the other motion. I make no order for varying the finding of the Master, but only that he review his report. VICE-CHANCELLOR WIGRAM'S COURT. Practice as to Co-plaintiff withdrawing from Suit. One of several Co-plaintiffs concurred in the Prosecution of the Suit up to a particular Period, and then instructed the Solicitor of the Plaintiffs not to take any further Proceedings in the Cause. On Proceedings being, nevertheless, taken, the dissentient Co-plaintiff moved that the Solicitor for the Plaintiff's might be ordered to indemnify him in Respect of subsequent Costs of the Suit. The Motion was refused, with Costs. Wyche, a co-plaintiff in the suit, after concurring in its institution, and acquiescing in the proceedings therein till the 13th March, 1848, on that day requested that no further proceedings should be taken in his name as a co-plaintiff. Proceedings were, nevertheless, afterwards taken in the suit, Wyche being still named a coplaintiff; whereupon The Solicitor-General and Hetherington, on behalf of Wyche, moved that the solicitor to the plaintiffs in the suit might be ordered to indemnify Wyche in respect of the costs incurred in the suit since the 13th March, 1848, and for the costs thereafter to be incurred. They submitted, that, where it could be done without injury plaintiff from responsibility as to future costs, where he to the other plaintiffs, the Court would relieve a coadmitted his liability up to a particular period, and was desirous of retiring thenceforth from the prosecution of the suit. For this purpose the Court would adopt a course similar to that pursued where an infant plaintiff' repudiates a suit on his coming of age. The solicitor, on being instructed to proceed by another plaintiff, might apply to strike out the name of the dissenting plaintiff, and make him a defendant, in case he was a necessary party, by amendment or supplemental bill. (Langdale Langdale, 13 Ves. 67). They cited also Dundas v. Dutens, (2 Cox, 240; 1 Ves. jun. 200; 1 J. & W. 459, note (u)), and Tarbuck v. Woodcock, (6 Beav. 581). v. Sir JAMES WIGRAM, V. C., refused the motion, with costs, observing that Langdale v. Langdale was not in conformity with modern practice. Sir John Leach, in Holkirk v. Holkirk, (4 Madd. 51), had refused, though Langdale v. Langdale was cited, to dismiss a bill at the instance of a co-plaintiff, unless upon terms framed so as to protect the other plaintiffs from injury. Bacon, Elderton, and W. W. Cooper, for the solicitor and other parties in the cause, were not called upon. COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH.-EASTER TERM. In re JOHN CRAWFORD, April 30. A Writ of Habeas Corpus ad Subjiciendum runs into the Isle of Man. The Publisher of a Newspaper in the Isle of Man was ordered to attend at a Chancery Court of the Island, for publishing an Article tending to defame the Court; he attended accordingly, and tendered an Apology, which the Court did not accept, but committed him for Contempt. Thereupon J. C. avowed himself to be the Author of the Article, and the Court committed him also to Gaol, without a Warrant. After some Hours the Gaoler was furnished with the following Warrant, signed by the Lieutenant-Governor:-" At a Chancery Court, holden &c. Whereas J. C. voluntarily appeared before this Court, and avowed himself to be the Author of an Article &c.; and whereas the writing and publishing the said Article is a Contempt of this Court: it is ordered, that J. C. be, for such his Contempt, committed a Prisoner to the Gaol of C. R., there to remain until further Order." A Writ of Habeas Corpus ad Subjiciendum having been obtained by J. C., a Rule was granted for quashing it, upon Affidavits which stated that the Lieutenant-Governor of the Isle of Man presided in the Chancery Court, which was a Court of Record, having Power to punish for Contempt, und that the Warrant was in the Form usually adopted by that Court:-Held, First, that it sufficiently appeared that the Warrant of Commitment was an Act of the Chancery Court. Secondly, that the Chancery Court having Authority to commit for Contempt, and having adjudged the Publication to be a Contempt, this Court could not review that Adjudication. Thirdly, that the Warrant, being in the Form used by the Chancery Court of the Isle of Man, was lawful, though the Commitment was not for a certain Time. By Patteson, J.-By the Law of England, no Court can commit for Contempt, by Way of Punishment, except for a certain Time. A Libel upon a Court, published when the Court is not sitting, may be punished by Process of Contempt. A writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum had been issued, directed to the keeper of her Majesty's gaol at Castle Rushen, in the Isle of Man, and his deputy, commanding them to have the body of John Crawford before this Court. The affidavit of John Crawford stated, that at a Chancery Court, holden at Castle Rushen, on the 27th January, 1849, it was ordered that Robert Fargher, the printer and publisher of the Mona's Herald newspaper, should attend the said Chancery Court, to answer for unlawfully and contemptuously printing and publishing, in the said newspaper, an article tending to scandalise and defame the said Court: that the said Robert Fargher accordingly attended the Court on the 15th February, and, being called on to answer the said order, he admitted he was the printer and publisher of the said newspaper containing the article, and he expressed his regret, that, in consequence of bad health, he had not given the article the consideration it ought to have received, and that its publication should have given offence to the Court; and he then tendered an apology, which he offered to publish in all the insular newspapers: that the Court did not accept the apology, but forthwith committed him for contempt of Court: that deponent thereupon arose, and begged permission of the Court to state that he was the author of the said article, and was willing to undertake the whole legal responsibility, provided the Court relieved the said Robert Fargher; but, at the same time, he declined to acknowledge the right of the Court to act in the vague, informal, and summary way they were doing, and objected to be tried on such a charge as that preferred against Robert Fargher: that, disregarding this objection, the Court forthwith committed the deponent, and he and Robert Fargher were immediately removed from court in custody of an officer, and taken to Castle Rushen: that, after remaining in custody for three hours, the deponent requested to see the warrant by which they were detained, but the officer and gaoler admitted that they had no warrant, and deponent thereupon addressed the following letter to the Lieutenant-Governor : "Castle Rushen, Thursday, Feb. 15, 1849. "May it please your Excellency, Mr. Fargher and I have been detained here now three hours by the officers of court and gaoler, and, on applying to them to know by what warrant or authority we are so detained, we are told there is no other than the verbal order of your Excellency, and that the gaoler, Mr. Cayley, on having asked an explanation of this from his Honor Deemster Haywood, was told he was just to keep us in custody. Now, I beg, with all respect to your Excellency, to say, that such detention is most illegal, and that there is no legal warrant whatever for our detention. I most respectfully request that you will either see that we are detained legally, or that you will forthwith order our liberation. There being no legal warrant against me, I consider I would not be guilty of a deforcement of the law if I walked out of gaol. It is my decided intention to complain of the arbitrary and illegal proceedings in this case, which are wholly unconstitutional and unwarrantable, even on the supposition that the article was a libel, as your Excellency described or allowed it to be, assuring your Excellency, that, in writing the article in question, and now, I was and am animated with no other than the sincerest desire to uphold the law, and the utmost respect for the dignity and authority of our courts of justice. I have the honour to be, with the greatest respect, may it please your Excellency, your most obedient humble servant, "JOHN CRAWFORD, Solicitor, Douglas." That at the end of seven hours the gaoler appeared with warrants, or written orders, for the committal of Robert Fargher and the deponent to prison, and they were thereupon incarcerated in one of the debtors rooms on the civil side of Castle Rushen. The affidavit then set out a copy of the order, as follows:"At a Chancery Court, holden at Castle Rushen, by adjournment, the 15th February, 1849. "Whereas, John Crawford, of the town of Douglas, voluntarily appeared before this Court, and avowed himself to be the author of an article published in a Isle of Man Advertiser,' on the 24th January last, certain newspaper, called 'Mona's Herald and Fargher's headed The Chancery Court," and to be responsible for the publication thereof; and whereas the writing and publishing the said article is a contempt of this Court: it is therefore hereby ordered, that the said John Crawford be, for such his contempt, committed a prisoner to the gaol of Castle Rushen, there to remain until further order. 6 "CHARLES HOPE." That, on the 16th February, Robert Fargher presented a petition to the said Court of Chancery, in which he repeated his apology, and he was liberated on condition of his finding bail, himself in 50%., and two securities in 257. each, that he would demean himself with decorum and respect to the several courts of justice in the isle for the space of twelve calendar months. In this term, (April 16), Peacock moved for a rule calling upon the prosecutor of the above writ to shew cause why the said writ should not be quashed, on the ground that it had issued improvidently. The affidavit of Mr. Christian, the clerk of the council in the Isle of Man, stated that he was an advocate, and well acquainted with the common law of that island: that the Court of Chancery of the Isle of Man was a court of record, having jurisdiction throughout the whole of the island: that, by the common law of the island, the said Court had power to punish parties for contempt of its authority, and for contemptuous behaviour towards it: that the usual mode of proceeding in such cases was to make a rule or judgment declaring the party to be in contempt, and a warding such punishment as the Court might deem proper, which rule or judgment was entered in a book in the Rolls-office of the said island, called "The Chancery Book:" that no warrant was granted by the Court for the apprehension or imprisonment of the party; but if the party was not present, and ordered by the Court, when pronouncing sentence, to be taken into custody of the officers of the Court or of the gaoler of Castle Rushen, a copy of the rule or judgment was made out and certified by the clerk of the Rolls, which was a sufficient authority to the proper officer to apprehend and imprison the party: that, by the common law of the said island, parties in contempt of any of the Courts were committed to the gaol of Castle Rushen, and no period was, in general, fixed for their release; but they obtained such release upon applying to the Court, and shewing that they had complied with the judgment of which they had acted in contempt, H 1 and paying the fine imposed upon them; or, in cases of contemptuous behaviour to the Court, upon their paying the fine imposed, or upon making such apology, or complying with such terms, as the Court might deem satisfactory. First, the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum does not run into the Isle of Man. condly, the matters stated in the affidavit shew that this is a case in which the judge would not have issued the writ if cause had been shewn against it*. THE COURT granted a rule to shew cause. Archbold now shewed cause. First, the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum lies to the Isle of Man. It is said, that, though sect. 1 of stat. 56 Geo. 3, c. 100, mentions the Isle of Man, it does not extend to this particular case. But the writ is not given by any statute -the statutes regulate the return only. It is a high remedial writ, running into all parts of the King's dominions, (3 Bl. Com. 131), and therefore it runs into the Isle of Man, which, before stat. 5 Geo. 3, c. 26, was part of the King's dominions, though not part of the realm; (Lord Hardwicke, in The Bishop of Sodor and Man v. The Earl of Derby, 2 Ves. sen. 337, 351); and now, by stat. 5 Geo. 3, c. 26, all the royalties, &c. of the Isle of Man have been vested in the Crown of England. There are instances of the writ going to Calais. (14 Vin. Abr., " Habeas Corpus," E. 2, pl. 2, 3, p. 217; Anonymous, 1 Vent. 367; Montague, C. J., in Richard Bourn's case, Cro. Jac. 543). In Bac. Abr., "Habeas Corpus," B. 2, it is said, "It hath been al ready observed, that the writ of habeas corpus is a prerogative writ, and that therefore, by the common law, it lies to any part of the King's dominions, for the King ought to have an account why any of his subjects are imprisoned. . . . . Hence it was holden that this writ lay to Calais, at the time it was subject to the King of England." [He also cited note (a) Ibid., in the margin.] The act for which the party is imprisoned is not shewn to be a contempt, for which an indictment or information would lie, and therefore it is not within the exception in sect. 1 of stat. 56 Geo. 3, c. 100; at all events, the party must be brought before the Court. (Ex parte Martins, 9 Dowl. 194). [Eric, J.-Upon the second point, it will be better that Mr. Peacock should begin as if he was shewing cause against the issuing of the writ.] .66 66 appears, from the affidavit of the party, that Charles Hope is Governor of the Isle of Man; and though the order of commitment is signed only "Charles Hope," it is headed, "At a Chancery Court, holden at Castle Rushen." The affidavit treats his ExcelSe-lency as judge of the Court, and shews that the party was committed by his Excellency by order of the Court of Chancery. The order of the Court is good, though not signed by the judge of the Court. (Ex parte Van Sandau, Phill. 445, 446; 9 Jur. 193). This Court will take judicial notice of the laws of the Isle of Man. [He cited Johnson's View of the Jurisprudence of the Isle of Man.] [Patteson, J.-If the party was to go into court and make an apology, the Court might say, "That is nothing to us; you are committed until further order." The committal by magistrates is until the party is discharged by due course of law.] The Court will not assume that the judge of the Court of Chancery in the Isle of Man will act contrary to law or to its own practice. Suppose the Court of Chancery here committed a party until further order, this Court would not sit by way of appeal upon it. (Brenan's case, 10Q.B. 492; 11 Jur. 775). In Re Clarke (2 Q. B. 619; 6 Jur. 757) the commitment of the party was "until he hath answered and cleared his contempt, and the Court make further order." [He also cited the case of The Sheriff of Middlesex, 11 Adol. & Ell. 273; 4 Jur. 70). Writs and mandates issued out of the superior courts, acting by the authority of the common law, need not shew their authority on the face of them. (Gossett v. Howard, in error, 10 Q. B. 411, 453; 11 Jur. 750, 756). In that case the commitment was general for contempt. [He cited Holroyd, J., in Rex v. Clement, (4 B. & A. 218, 232, 233).] To publish a libel of one of the superior courts at Westminster, not in its presence, is a contempt. Nothing is more incumbent upon courts of justice than to preserve their proceedings from being misrepresented." (Lord Hardwicke, in Case 291, 2 Atk. 469). [Patteson, J.-This is not like a commitment for not answering, because that is in the nature of civil process, and the party is committed until he shall do what he is required to do. But, in the case of punishment, is it not necessary that the commitment should be for a certain time, as in Rex v. James, (5 B & A. 894)? In Re Clarke (2 Q. B. 619; 6 Jur. 757) the commitment was not by way of punishment merely, but to enforce an answer. An attachment is in force until the contempt is purged.] A court of competent jurisdiction has power to commit until further order." In Van Sandau's case (Phill. 445) the warrant was, that the party "do stand committed for his contempt" generally. [Patteson, J.-Was the point taken in that case? Erle, J.-Magistrates, having a special authority contrary to the common law, must shew that they do not contravene that authority. If a magistrate commits for contempt of a jurisdiction which he is exercising, does he not commit by virtue of a power given by the common law? Coleridge, J.-In Rex v. James (5 B. & A. 894) the justices were not sitting under an act of Parliament, but under a commission of the peace, and they committed the party for insulting the Court. Suppose an indictment against this party, with a count treating the offence as a libel upon the Court and the administration of justice, could the commitment in question be pleaded as an answer?] The power of commitment is intrusted to the Court for the purpose of maintaining its own authority. [Erle, J.-The imprisonment of the party might be resorted to as a protection of the Court from being disturbed by him. In Rex v. Davison (4 B. & A. 329) the defendant was fined for contempt.] The affidavit of Christian states that this commitment is in accordance with the constant practice of the Court of Chancery in the Isle of Man : and, if this sentence is not warranted by the law, the remedy is by appeal to her Majesty Peacock, contra. First, the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum will not run into the Isle of Man. There is a distinction between the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands. "The Isle of Man is a distinct territory from England, and is not governed by our laws; neither doth any act of Parliament extend to it, unless it be particularly named therein." (1 Bl. Com. 105, and note). The Isle of Man is not part of the realm of England." (Lord Hardwicke, in The Bishop of Sodor and Man v. The Earl of Derby, 2 Ves. sen. 337, 350). The Isle of Man is not named in stat. 31 Car. 2, c. 2. Jersey is mentioned in sect. 10 of stat. 31 Car. 2, c. 2, and in sects. 1 and 5 of stat. 56 Geo. 3, c. 100. In Carus Wilson's case (7 Q. B. 984; 9 Jur. 393, 394) the impression of the Court was, that the writ issued to Jersey, at conmmon law. Where a party has been committed for a contempt of Court, the writ only runs at common law, and therefore not into the Isle of Man. "So, breve domini regis does not run there." (Com. Dig., "Navigation," F.2). [He referred to stats. 5 Geo. 3, c. 26, and 45 Geo. 3, c. 123.] Secondly, the party is lawfully imprisoned, having been committed for a contempt by the sentence of a court of competent jurisdiction. (Carus Wilson's case, 7 Q. B. 984; 9 Jur. 394). It * A summons was taken out on the 15th February, returnable on the 22nd March, but was not served on the Lieutenant-Governor and the keeper of the gaol until the 10th March. The summons was not attended, nor was any reason assigned for the non-attendance, and the writ issued on the 24th March. |