in Council, to have the judgment reversed, before the party can apply to be discharged. In the case of an improper committal by magistrates, the remedy is to bring up the warrant of commitment by certiorari, for the purpose of quashing it. not state that the order was by the Court; but I think it appears sufficiently that the act of commitment was the act of the Court, for it appears to have been at a court, and all took place on the same day. It does not appear that the verbal commitment which was made in the first instance was until further order; but the warrant embodies the former order. It is impossible not to see that this was a commitment, by the Court of Chancery, of the author of a writing which that Court adjudged to be a libel. Then it is said that the Court of Chancery in the Isle of Man has no power to commit for a libel published not in the face of the Court, and there is no express decision upon the point. The case of Van Sandau (Phill. 445) appears to have been a case of that sort. Whether the libel was in print, or not, makes no difference. In the case of Retv Almon (Wilm. 243) there is an opinion of Wilmot, J., in which there is great learning; though, the prosecution. having been dropped, judgment was never delivered. It is shewn in the course of that opinion that a Court has power to punish by process of contempt for a libel upon it published while the Court is not sitting. But it is only necessary for us to be satisfied that the Court of Chancery in the Isle of Man has the power of commit ting for a contempt, and I think that by law it clearly has; whether the document was a libel or a contempt of the Court, it was for the Court itself to determine. It has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdic tion to be a contempt, and we cannot review that adju dication. If there is nothing wrong in the form and manner of the warrant, we cannot interfere. Archbold, contra, on the second point.-There is no difference between a commitment for contempt by magistrates and a commitment for contempt by the Court of Chancery in the Isle of Man. Even this Court cannot imprison until further order; though, if a party is guilty of a contempt in the face of the Court, he is sometimes committed for safe custody until he is brought up to be sentenced. If the contempt, as in this case, was not committed in the face of the Court, there is a trial before the Master upon interrogatories exhibited by him, and, upon a certificate of the matter, sentence is passed for fine and imprisonment, as for a common-law offence. The only exception is where the party is imprisoned for nonpayment of costs, which is considered in the nature of a ca. sa. [Coleridge, J.-Where a party was brought before me, when sitting at Nisi Prius, for a contempt of Court not committed in the face of it, I examined a witness, and sentenced the party to imprisonment for several days, with the advice of Lord Denman. Erle, J.-Is it not common to commit indefinitely in the first instance, after the party has been called upon to answer for the contempt, and on the following morning he is brought up for a final adjudication?] A party must be committed for a definite time in the first instance; he might be committed until the following morning. In Carus Wilson's case (7 Q. B. 984; 9 The question as to the form of the warrant is, whether Jur. 394) the commitment was until the party should a commitment of the party" until further order" is good. make an apology and pay a fine. In Brenan's case I think this must be deemed to be a commitment by (10 Q. B. 492; 11 Jur. 775) a perfect judgment had way of punishment, and not for the purpose of preventbeen given by the Court in Jersey. There is no writing a disturbance of the Court, which is in its nature of error upon process for a contempt of Court. No rather process than punishment, and therefore it reCourt has a right to commit for contempt, unless the quires as much certainty as a sentence, and would be offence amounts to an obstruction of the proceed- vitiated by the want of it; as in Rex v. James, (5 B. ings, or unless the contempt be in the face of the & A. 894), where a warrant of two justices, by which Court. (Rex v. Revel, 1 Str. 420; Rex v. Pocock, a party was committed until he should be discharged Id. 1157). The only case in which a Court has com- by due course of law, was held bad, because there was mitted, by attachment for a libel published out of no due course of law applicable to the case. It is said court, is Rex v. Wiatt, (8 Mod. 123), in which the that that doctrine does not apply to superior courts, party appeared and confessed in court that he was because a commitment by order of justices may be the author of the libel, whereupon the rule was brought up by certiorari, and quashed. How far that discharged against the printer and publisher, and the consideration may make a distinction between the two author was committed until further consideration of cases, I am not prepared to say; but I think that no the matter, and within a few days afterwards he was court in this country can commit for a contempt, by brought into court and fined. In the book of Ordi- way of punishment, except for a certain time. In nances and Statutes of the Isle of Man, A. D. 1736, there Van Sandau's case (as reported in Phill. 445*) the is a prohibition of imprisonment, except on cause shewn, warrant of commitment was not for a certain time; &c. Further, it does not sufficiently appear that the there does not, however, appear to have been any discommitment was by order of the Court of Chancery. cussion upon the validity of the order in the Court of PATTESON, J.-I am of opinion that this writ of ha- Chancery, or in this court. (Van Sandau v. Turner, beas corpus will run into the Isle of Man at common 6 Q. B. 773; 9 Jur. 296). But then it is stated by the law. All the cases cited on this point, on behalf of the affidavit of a person conversant with the proceedings of gaoler, were before stat. 5 Geo. 3, c. 26, by which the the Court of Chancery in the Isle of Man, that this Isle of Man and the islands thereunto appertaining is the ordinary form of commitment, according to the were vested unalienably in the Crown. In The Bishop course of practice of that Court; and we know that the of Sodor and Man v. The Earl of Derby (2 Ves. 337, law of that island differs in some respects from the 351) it was said, that the isle was part of the do- law of England. We must, therefore, take it to be the minions of the Kings of England, and its rights were law of that island, and we are bound by it, as we were discussed in the Court of Chancery; though in the time in Carus Wilson's case, (7 Q. B. 984; 9 Jur. 394). We of Charles II it was otherwise. cannot, therefore, say that this warrant is bad, according to the law of that island. Whether it is erroneous, or not, is another question. In order to grant a writ of habeas corpus, we must see that the warrant is void. Then, does the commitment appear, upon the affidavits, to be in such a case that the Court ought to issue the writ? The first objection is, that this is not a warrant of commitment by the Court of Chancery in the Isle of Man. But I think it can be collected, from the narrative of facts in the affidavits, that the Deputy-Governor formed a constituent part of the Court of Chancery, before which the applicant appeared; and it is clear that the applicant himself treated the tribunal before which he appeared as the Court of Chancery. The warrant does ERLE, J.-As at present advised, I am of opinion with my Brother Patteson, that this writ runs into * In Ex parte Sandau (9 Jur. 193) and Van Sandau 1, Turner (6 Q. B. 773, 775; 9 Jur. 296, 297) the order is stated to have been, that the party should be committed "until the further order of this Court." † Coleridge, J., had left the court to attend at Chambers. 1 the Isle of Man; and, on this point, I will only add, that, upon referring to Rex v. Cowle, (2 Burr. 834), I find Lord Mansfield says, (p. 856), "There is no doubt as to the power of this Court where the place is under the subjection of the Crown of England; the only question is as to the propriety. We cannot send a habeas corpus to Scotland, or to the Electorate; but to Ireland, the Isle of Man, the plantations, and (as, since the loss of the Duchy of Normandy, they have been considered as annexed to the Crown in some respects) to Guernsey and Jersey we may; and formerly it lay to Calais, which was a conquest.' Then, taking it as the ordinary case of a writ of habeas corpus, we have to see whether the party has been committed by a lawful order of a court of competent authority. We have nothing to do with the propriety of the decision; we have only to see whether the authority exists, and whether it has been exercised lawfully. I have no doubt that the Court of Chancery in the Isle of Man had competent authority to commit, the substantial ground of the commitment being a contempt of Court. Every tribunal has the power of committing for a contempt any person who does an act, in the opinion of that Court, interfering with its authority. This party was committed for a libel published not in the face of the Court; and according to the elaborate opinion of Wilmot, J., referred to by my Brother Patson, a libel upon a court, although published out of court, may be a contempt; and it is evident, that, although not published while the Court is sitting, it may have a strong tendency to paralyse the authority of the Court. The Court of Chancery in the Isle of Man has determined that it was its duty to commit the party, and we cannot review the decision of that Court. Then, does it appear that the power has been exercised in a form clearly void? In Howard v. Gossett, in error, (10 Q. B. 411; 11 Jur. 750), the doctrine was laid down, that superior tribunals have the power to settle their own forms; but, without laying down that doctrine on the present occasion, it is enough that the affidavit states that the form of the warrant in question is the form usually adopted by the Court of Chancery in the Isle of Man; and we have to determine whether it is necessary that the party should be discharged. The consideration of this order is the same as that of the form of a sentence for contempt, whether it should be until further order, or whether, on the first occasion on which the party is brought he fore the Court, he ought to be committed for a definite time. I am of opinion that the form of this warrant is a lawful form; and if this had been an application to us to issue the writ of habeas corpus, we should have answered the application in the negative; and this being, in effect, the same application, we ought to make the rule absolute. PATTESON, J.-My Brother Coleridge, who is gone to Chambers, agrees with us in the opinion we have expressed.-Rule absolute for quashing the writ. SITTINGS IN BANC AFTER TRINITY TERM. DARCH v. TOSER.-July 5. Debt for Timber sold and delivered. Plaintiff proved that the Timber was supplied by him, upon the Order of Defendant, for finishing certain Houses; and the Defence was, that the Houses belonged to F., and that Plaintiff had contracted with Defendant as Agent of F.:-Held, that Plaintiff could not give, in Reply, Evidence of Declarations by Defendant that the Houses were his, because such Evidence went to the very Point in Question between the Parties. The Admission of Evidence, which turns out to be irrelevant, affords no Ground for a new Trial, where the Judge has told the Jury that it had no bearing upon the Case. Debt for timber sold and delivered, and upon an account stated. Plea, never indebted. On the trial, before Wightman, J., at the Sittings at Westminster during Trinity Term, evidence was given on the part of the plaintiff that the defendant had ordered the timber to be sent to certain houses in Clarendon-road, which were then being built, and that the timber was delivered there on the 12th, 15th, and 18th of July. For the defendant evidence was given that the houses belonged to one Finlayson, not to the defendant, and that the plaintiff contracted with the defendant as agent for Finlayson; and evidence was offered of the payment of two sums of 2001. and 300l. to Finlayson by one Moberley, who was a solicitor for certain persons at Southampton, on account of a mortgage. It was objected that the evidence of Moberley, as to what took place between him and Finlayson, was inadmissible. The learned judge received the evidence conditionally, but, at the close of the defendant's case, told the jury that the fact of the payment had no bearing upon the case, as the defendant had failed to connect it by other evidence with the matter in question. The trial having been adjourned, on the following day evidence of declarations made by the defendant, that the houses were his, was offered in reply on the part of the plaintiff, but the learned judge refused to receive the evidence; and a verdict was given for the defendant. quent day*, On a subse Udall moved for a rule nisi for a new trial, on the ground of the improper reception of evidence for the defendant, and the improper rejection of evidence for the plaintiff. He cited, on the second point, Briggs v. Aynsworth (2 M. & Rob. 168) and Doe d. Gosley v. Gosley, (Id. 243). Cur. adv. vult. the Court.-This action was brought to recover the Lord DENMAN, C. J., now delivered the judgment of value of timber supplied by the plaintiff to finish certain houses in Clarendon-road, and the question was, whether the plaintiff dealt with the defendant, who gave the order for the timber, as principal, or as the agent of one Finlayson. Evidence was given on both sides, and the defendant had a verdict. dence for the defendant was received which was inadA new trial was moved for, on the ground that eviacta; and also on the ground that material evidence for missible, because it was irrelevant, and res inter alios the plaintiff was rejected. With respect to the first objection, the evidence received was proof of the fact that Finlayson had been paid two sums of money by the solicitor of certain persons at Southampton: this fact alone was certainly irrelevant, but might become relevant if connected with other evidence, as it was proposed to do, in order to shew the interest which Finlayson really had in the premises. It was, therefore, received; but, the expected connecting link not having been supplied, in summing up the jury were told that it had no bearing upon the case; and the mere circumstance of a fact turning out to be irrelevant is not a ground for a new trial. As to the rejection of evidence tendered by the plaintiff, it appears that when the defendant's case was closed the plaintiff's counsel proposed to call witnesses, not to contradict the defendant's witnesses, but to prove declarations by the defendant that the premises were his. This was refused, and we think rightly, on the ground that such evidence should have been given in the first instance, and not in reply, it being to the very point in question between the parties. We may add, that my Brother Wightman is quite satisfied with the verdict upon the merits. There will, therefore, be no rule.-Rule refused. * June 4, before Lord Denman, C. J., Patteson, Coleridge, and Erle, JJ. MICHAELMAS TERM. COLERIDGE, J.-We think that there should be a rule nisi on the first point, but that there should be no rule on the second point. No doubt any case which The Holder of a Promissory-note sent to the Indorser, falls expressly within Solarte v. Palmer (in the House who was the Father of the Maker, and inquired where of Lords, 1 Bing. N. C. 194; 8 Bligh, N. S., 874) must the Son resided, (the Son having changed his Resi-be governed by it. At the same time, we all know that dence since the making of the Note), and told him that the Note had been presented and dishonoured:-Held sufficient Notice of Dishonour. Declaration by indorsee against indorser of a promissory-note, with the ordinary allegation of presentment. There were pleas denying the presentment and notice of dishonour. On the trial, before Lord Denman, C. J., at the Middlesex Sittings after last Trinity Term, it appeared that the note was payable two years after date, and there was no residence or address of the maker mentioned in it. Fifteen months before the note became due, the maker altogether left the house in which he was residing at the time of the making of the note, and went to reside at Oswestry. The presentment was made at that house, which was then being repaired by the landlord, and it was received by one of the workmen. On the day after the note became due, the clerk of the plaintiff's attorney went to the house of the defendant, who was the father of the maker of the note, and inquired where the son resided, and told the defendant that the note had been presented and dishonoured. The jury, under the direction of the Lord Chief Justice, found a verdict for the plaintiff. Gurney now moved for a rule nisi for a new trial, on the ground of misdirection.-First, there was no sufficient presentment. Presentment at the house formerly occupied by the maker of the note is not sufficient, (Collins v. Butler, 2 Str. 1087), though it does not appear there what the pleadings were. Under an allegation that the bill was presented, evidence that the maker could not be found is inadmissible. (Bayley on Bills, 401, citing Leeson v. Piggott, T., 1788). [He also cited Buxton v. Jones, (1 Man. & G. 83; 1 Scott's N. R. 19).] Secondly, there was not sufficient notice of dishonour: the clerk of the plaintiff's attorney did not apply to the defendant for payment. (Solarte v. Palmer, in the House of Lords, 1 Bing. N. C. 194; 8 Bligh, N. S., 874). [Erle, J.-In some cases it has been held, that an announcement that the bill or note has been dishonoured is a notice of dishonour, including all the requisites specified in Solarte v. Palmer". Coleridge, J.-Suppose what the clerk said had been communicated by letter; can the statement that the note had been presented and dishonoured be the worse for the inquiry about the residence of the maker? In Byles on Bills, 202, 5th ed., it is said, "An announcement of the dishonour will (at least, if it come from the holder) amount to a sufficient intimation to the indorser that he is held liable."] If there is a formal announcement of the dishonour, the person to whom it is given can only understand that he is the party looked to for payment. The circumstances under which the information is given are material. [Wightman, J.-In Phillips v. Gould (8 Car. & P. 355) there was nothing beyond telling the party the mere fact. There was no other reason for telling it to him except that he was indorser. [Wightman, J.-Can it neutralise the notice, that the person giving it adds, "And I should like to know where the maker is?"] The clerk of the plaintiff's attorney did not say, "The note which you have indorsed is dishonoured." If he had made the statement in question without the inquiry, it would have been sufficient; but here the object of his going to the defendant was to inquire where the maker resided, not to give the notice. [He cited East v. Smith, (11 Jur. 412).] " * See King v. Bickley (2 Q. B. 419; 6 Jur. 582) and Miers v. Brown, (11 Mee. & W. 372). some inconvenience has arisen from that decision, and the Courts have no disposition to extend it. In this case there is abundant evidence of notice of the dishonour of the note. A person duly authorised by the holder goes to the indorser, and inquires of him respecting the resi dence of the maker; if he had no intention to give him notice of dishonour, the conversation would have ended with that inquiry, but he goes on and tells him that the note had been presented and dishonoured. It is admitted, that, if he had said that the note had been presented and dishonoured, and no more, that would have been sufficient, because it would have intimated to the party that he was looked to for payment. And we are of opinion that the addition of the inquiry as to the residence of the maker does not alter the effect of the notice of dishonour. WIGHTMAN and ERLE, JJ., concurred.-Rule refused on the second point; rule nisi on the first point. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS.-HILARY TERM. Practice Uniformity of Process Act, ss. 3 and 10- mons. In this action the writ of summons issued on the 8th August, 1848, and a distringas on the 1st November. The defendant appeared on the 25th November. The writ of summons was not personally served, nor returned non est inventus and entered of record within a calendar month from the 7th December, the date of its expiration. The issue delivered stated that the action was commenced by the writ of summons issued on the 8th August, but it did not notice the issuing of the distringas. Between the issuing of the two writs the Statute of Limitations had run. A summons was taken out, calling upon the plaintiff to shew cause, before Coltman, J., at chambers, why the issue delivered should not be set aside, or amended by inserting the date of the writ of distringas as the date of the commencement of the action, instead of the date of the writ of summons, and why the entry of process on the roll should not be amended according to the truth, or set aside. The learned judge refused to make the order, leaving the defendant to apply to the full Court. J. Brown (Jan. 25) moved for a rule nisi accordingly. The 10th section of the Uniformity of Process Act, 2 Will. 4, c. 39, provides that no first writ shall be available to prevent the operation of any statute whereby the time for the commencement of the action may be limited, unless the defendant shall be arrested thereon or served therewith, or proceedings to or toward outlawry shall be had thereupon, or unless such writ, and every writ (if any) issued in continuation of a preceding writ, shall be returned non est inventus and entered of record within one calendar month after the expiration thereof. The writ of summons not having been personally served, nor entered of record within one calendar month after its expiration, the writ of distringas is, so far as the Statute of Limitations is concerned, the commencement of the suit. Pratt v. Hawkins (15 Mee. & W. 399) is in point, and it decides that the action is, for the purpose provided for in the 10th section, commenced by the writ with which the defendant is served. [Maule, J.-When it is said that the defendant was summoned, that must mean by a writ of summons. The distringas is directed to the sheriff, but the appearance is to the first writ.] The distringas is to be treated as if it were an alias or a pluries writ. Ray v. Dow (5 Dowl. P. C. 310) shews that a writ of summons may be continued by a distringas. Also the words of the 10th section, "every writ," include a distringas. MAULE, J.*—In this case it appears that a writ of summons was issued on a certain day, by which the action was commenced, according to the Uniformity of Process Act, which enacts that actions shall be commenced by writs of summons, Then, by the 10th section, no writ issued by the authority of this act shall be in force for more than four calendar months from the day of the date thereof; but every writ of summons may be continued by alias and pluries, as the case may require; provided always, that no first writ shall be available to prevent the operation of the Statute of Limitations, unless the defendant shall be arrested thereon or served therewith, &c. The question here is, whether, the writ of summons having commenced the action upon a day truly stated in the issue, that issue should be amended by inserting the date of the writ of distringas as the date of the commencement of the action. It appears to me that the action was commenced, for all purposes, by the writ of summons, and that that writ was served upon the defendant within the meaning of the 10th section. The plaintiff is bound to make due effort to serve the defendant personally within four months, but if he cannot succeed he may come to the Court and have an appearance entered for the defendant. That appearance supposes that the action has been commenced by a writ which has been served, which is the foundation for the distringas. The defendant may, if he pleases, appear to a writ which has not been personally served, and treat it as if it had; or the plaintiff may make it equivalent to a writ personally served, by obtaining a distringas. The present, therefore, is a clear case, and it would be strange and anomalous if the plaintiff, after having done all necessary to constitute service which the 10th section makes sufficient to save the Statute of Limitations, should be barred earlier than he would have been if the defendant had not kept out of the way to avoid personal service. In confirmation of this view, the words of the 10th section seem to me to be wholly inapplicable to a distringas. If not, then, in order to get a distringas, it is necessary to sue it out within a calendar month after the expiration of the writ of summons, and to comply with the other requisitions of the 10th section, which would be a novel proceeding. CRESSWELL and WILLIAMS, JJ., concurred.-Rule refused. SITTINGS IN BANC AFTER TRINITY TERM. WILD. HARRIS.-April 24 and June 12. Promise of Marriage-Consideration. A Promise by A. to remain single, and to marry B. within a reasonable Time, is a good Consideration for *Coltman, J., was absent. a Promise by B. to marry A. within a reasonable Time, although B., at the Time of the Promise, (but unknown to A.), is married to another Person, then living. Assumpsit for breach of promise to marry the plaintiff, the declaration alleging, that, in consideration that the plaintiff, being sole and unmarried, had, at the request of the defendant, promised the defendant to marry the defendant within a reasonable time, the defendant promised &c. to marry the plaintiff within a reasonable time; and averring, that the plaintiff did continue single and unmarried, and ready to marry the defendant, until she discovered that the defendant was a married man at the time of the promise; and averring, that the plaintiff had not notice of that fact at the time of the making of the promise. Plea, non assumpsit. A verdict having been found for the plaintiff at the Middlesex Sittings in Easter Term last, damages 107., in the course of that term, "he Huddlestone moved for a rule to shew cause why the judgment should not be arrested.-The declaration is bad, inasmuch as it discloses a void consideration. The consideration is to do an act which the plaintiff could not legally do, the defendant being a married man. In Chitty on Contracts, 58, 3rd ed., it is said, “A promise is not binding, if the consideration for making it be of such a nature that it was not, in fact or law, in the power of the promisee, from whom such consideration moved, to complete such consideration, and to confer the full benefit meant to be derived therefrom." In support of this, Mr. Chitty cites Harvey v. Gibbons, (2 Lev. 161), where the plaintiff, having declared, being bailiff to J. S., the defendant, in consideration that he would discharge him of 20%. due to J. S., promised to expend 407. in repairing a barge of the plaintiff's. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff upon non assumpsit were reversed, the consideration being illegal; for the plaintiff cannot discharge a debt due to his master." Nerot v. Wallace (3 T. R. 17) is to the same effect. There, Ashurst, J., states, that, "in order to found a consideration for a promise, it is necessary that the party by whom the promise is made should have the power of carrying it into effect; and, secondly, that the thing to be done should itself be legal." [Williams, J.— The promise was one which might have been performed, if, within a reasonable time after it was made, the defendant's wife had died.] That would be, it is submitted, rather a promise to marry when the law would permit, which is not the promise here alleged. Besides, as was said in Caines v. Smith, (15 Mee. & W. 190), by Alderson, B., "why should we presume that the wife will die before the lapse of a reasonable time, or in the lifetime of her husband?" Would it be legal to contract, in the lifetime of the first wife, to marry a second wife after the death of the first. If the promise is, at the time it is made, either impossible of being performed or illegal, it is void. In Com. Dig., tit. Condition," D. 2, it is said, "If a condition be to do a thing which by no means can be done, it shall be said to be an impossible condition-as to go from London to Rome in three hours." Comyn also goes on to say, "But if the condition be improbable, and out of his power to do, yet it shall not be said to be impossibleas if the condition be, that a married man shall marry such a woman; for it is possible that his present wife may die before him and the other woman." And for this he cites 1 Roll. 419, 1. 45. Rolle states it with a quære, and refers for his authority to 40 Ass. 13. There a woman, seised in fee, enfeoffed to one J., upon condition that he should marry her. The said J. had a wife living at that time, and he enfeoffed over to another, who also enfeoffed over. Upon the death of J., withtion broken; and it was adjudged she could do so, as out having married the feoffress, she entered for condithe land was all the time charged with the condition. But a quære is there also added, because it was said, "It appears the condition was void, as the feoffee had a wife at the time." So the case is not, it is submitted, an authority to be relied on in support of the proposi-housemen, that one A. C. H. was about to commence tion in Comyn. [Wilde, C. J.-Do not the books refer to cases where the performance of the contract was at the time impossible, to the knowledge of both parties?] In Chitty on Contracts, 60, 3rd ed., it is said, "The improbability of the performance does not render the promise void. It is the duty of the contracting party to provide against contingencies; and he is presumed to know whether the completion of the duty he undertakes be within his nell v. Constable, (7 Adol. & Ell. 798); but that does not He refers to Tuff support that proposition. [Cresswell, J.-The case in Rolle is to be found also in Bro. Abr., tit. "Condition," 119; and it is there mentioned without a quære, which he would have put had he thought there was any doubt as to its correctness. [Williams, J., referred to Fitz. N. B. 205 h, where the same case is also stated.] Cur. adv. vult. June 12.-The judgment of the Court was now delivered by power. furnished with the Particulars of Monies paid by the Debtor to the Plaintiff in Respect of those Goods. The declaration alleged that the plaintiffs were warebusiness as a draper, and applied to the plaintiffs and requested them to sell goods on credit to him in the way of their trade and business; and the plaintiffs being then unacquainted with the credit, circumstances, and ability of the said A. C. H. were then referred by him to the defendant for information respecting the same &c.; that the defendant knowing the premises &c. did falsely, fraudulently, and deceitfully make to fraudulent, and deceitful statement and representation the plaintiffs, in writing signed by him, a certain false, of and concerning the said A. C. H., and of and concerning the credit, circumstances, and ability of the said A. C. H., (setting it out); by means whereof the plaintiffs were induced to deliver in the way of their said trade and business to the said A. C. H., on credit, divers goods &c. The declaration contained various averments and also stated that A. C. H. became bankrupt and the falsifying the statements in the written representation, WILDE, C. J.-After stating the nature of the plead-goods supplied to A. C. H. having been furnished to the price of the goods remained unpaid. Particulars of the ings, his Lordship said, it was contended, on behalf of defendant under a judge's order, he applied for partithe defendant, that, inasmuch as it appeared that the culars of the various sums of money received from defendant was a married man at the time of the con- A. C. H. on account of his debt with the plaintiffs, totract, there was a want of consideration, because the gether with the dates when the same were received & plaintiff could not be regarded as bound by her promise The dealings between the plaintiffs and A. C. H. had to marry the defendant, he being a married man. That been very extensive, and the defendant stated in his was the ground of the objection. But the declaration affidavit that it was important for his defence to know discloses, that the promise alleged on the part of the what sums they had been paid by him. Talfourd, J plaintiff was to remain single for a reasonable time, however, refused an order, and referred the parties to and to marry the defendant- —a promise which, notwith- the Court. standing the defendant was then a married man, was capable of being performed, for the defendant's wife might have died within a reasonable time. events, the plaintiff continued unmarried for a reasonAt all able time, itself a sufficient consideration as a prejudice to her; and if the wife had died within a reasonable time, the plaintiff would have been bound to perform her promise. There does not, therefore, seem to be any ground for the objection. My Brother Cresswell referred to an authority also on the subject; it is in Bro. Abr., tit. "Condition," 119. There it appears that a woman enfeoffed a man upon the condition that he should marry her, he being a married man, within a reasonable time. The feoffee enfeoffed another person, and so through half a dozen different persons. The man died, being then a married man, whereupon the original feoffress entered as for a condition broken; and the Court held, that it was a lawful condition, for that the defendant's wife might have died within a reasonable time; therefore it was a lawful condition, and the party recovered-a judgment which recognises the principle applicable to the present case. The defendant certainly cannot be allowed to set up his fraudulent concealment of his marriage, in order to obtain a discharge from the responsibility arising on the promise so made by him, the plaintiff having executed the consideration, so far as concerned her, by waiting a reasonable time unmarried, until she discovered that the defendant was a married man. It seems, therefore, to the Court, that there is no ground for the rule.-Rule refused. not like the ordinary case of debtor and creditor, Lush moved accordingly; contending that this was statement of the defendant, in consequence of which and that the action being founded on a supposed false goods had been supplied to a third party, it was but just that the defendant should be made acquainted with all the circumstances of the transactions between them. tiffs to particularise the demand which they make in PARKE, B.-You are only entitled to ask the plaintheir declaration; if you want anything more you must file your bill of discovery. We never have exer cised our equitable jurisdiction further than to make a plaintiff state in his particulars that which is general in the declaration, and never have compelled him to state credits against himself. Your only equity here is to compel these parties to state in their particulars that which either is already in the declaration or you have got in the particulars already delivered-for the only claim in the declaration is for goods supplied, and with the nature and amount of them you have already been made acquainted. The rest of the Court concurring-Rule refused. CROWN CASES RESERVED. Before WILDE, C. J., POLLOCK, C. B., COLERIDGE, J 1. None but Aliens are entitled to be tried by a Jury de Medietate Lingua; a Person naturalised in this Country becomes to all Intents and Purposes a British Subject, and ceases to be an Alien; and, therefore, is By the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 66, it is enacted, that any Fonot entitled to be tried by a Jury de Medietate Lingum, natural-born Subject, or Person naturalised, shall be reign Woman married, or who shall be married, to a 2. |