1847.]

Certainty does not preclude free Agency.

told in the Bible.

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The certainty of the occurrence of an event is then no objection to the divine decrees. It lies no more heavily against God's decrees than against his prophetic announcements. If it disproves the doctrine of decrees, it also disproves the fact of prophecy. If it destroys the free agency of moral beings in one case, it does so in the other also. But in truth it does so in neither case. The fact that events are certain, that they are foreknown and really to be, leaves the question how they are to be brought into existence, whether by free agency or by necessitating causes, wholly undetermined. They are certain whether produced in one way or the other. If they are voluntary acts, then they are certain, i. e. foreknown and really to be, as FREE acts. And if their certainty, i. e. their being foreknown and really to be, necessitates their existence (which it does not), it also necessi tates their existence as free acts, or it in other words necessitates their freedom. The certainty of an event then is not inconsistent with its freedom. It may be certain and yet be brought to pass by the perfectly free action of perfectly free agents.

Again, if certainty does destroy human freedom, then human freedom would be destroyed whether God has formed any pur poses or not. If he has formed no purposes, still he either foresees all that actually takes place or he does not foresee it. If he does foresee it, then it is all certain. Whatever he foresees, will certainly come to pass. So then the objection does not lie against the doctrine of the divine decrees. It exists whether that doctrine be true or not. Its whole weight bears rather on the prescience than on the purposes of God.

But if to escape this horn of the dilemma it should be maintained, that God would not foresee future events unless he first decreed them, still the events that were to be, would as truly be, as if he had decreed and foreseen them. They would as really be, they would as truly come to pass, as when decreed and foreseen; they would certainly take place. In the one case they would certainly, in the other they would really or truly come to pass. The difference between the two cases surely cannot be great. It cannot be so great but that if the certainty in the one case would necessitate the events and destroy the agency, the fact that particular events were future and would really come to pass, would necessitate their occurrence and destroy free agency in the other case. And as there was a point in eternity when all events were future, as, in fact, they are all future till they actually occur, it follows, on this supposition that all events are ne-,

cessary, and there is no freedom in the universe and can be none. In short, if certainty implies necessity, then it follows, first, that no free agents can possibly be created; for God foresees all events and so they are all certain, or at least all future events will truly and really come to pass. And these events which are really to occur, might be seen to be future before they occur, as well as they can be known to be past after they have occurred, i. e. they might be foreseen and therefore certain, if any being only had the means of foreseeing them. But it can in no way be shown that the non-existence of these means secures a freedom of choice to men, which would be destroyed if these means were in being. The fact that these events are really to come to pass, that they truly will be, it is this fact (if anything) which destroys human freedom. And if certainty precludes free agency, this fact precludes it too. But it is a fact that all future events will really and truly occur; it always has been a fact; it always will be a fact. And if this fact precludes free agency, then free agency is in the nature of things impossible. A free agent is necessarily excluded from the catalogue of beings that Omnipotence can create. And if certainty implies necessity, it follows, secondly, that God himself is not a free agent, for he foresees all his own future actions and so they are certain; or, if he does not foresee them, still they will really be just as they will be, and this fact, it must be allowed, as much destroys his freedom as his foreseeing his future actions would do it. So then there is, on this supposition, no such thing as freedom for men, angels, or God; there can be none, but relentless iron fate reigns triumphant throughout the universe. Such are some of the formidable consequences of supposing that the certainty of future actions is inconsistent with free agency in performing them. Who would willingly, and who could reasonably admit these consequences for a moment? If none, then all must allow that the certainty of events and the free agency of men in producing them, are perfectly compatible with each other.

men.

We have thus endeavored to exhaust the methods in which the divine decrees may be supposed to destroy the free agency of We have seen, that in neither of the four ways contemplated, (and we know of no others supposable,) can they be shown to accomplish this bad work. We cannot then believe that they do it. We see no conceivable way in which they can do it. Mankind then must be regarded as free and treated as free, notwithstanding their conduct is all included in the purposes

1847.] The Distinction between Certainty and Necessity.

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of God. His purposes in no supposable way contravene their freedom. The grand difficulty in regard to this whole matter is, that mankind too generally confound the meaning of the words "certainty" and "necessity." They will not distinguish between an event which is only certain and one which is necessary; in other words, between an event which will be or which it is known will be, and one which must be. The confusion which prevails in many minds on this one point is the ground of nearly all their mistakes and difficulties respecting human freedom. God's purposes imply only the certainty not the necessity of future events. There is a plain difference between what is necessary and what is only certain, and this difference ought to be seen and remembered. That is necessary which must be; that is certain which will be or rather which some being knows will be. Now there is a difference, as every one can easily see, between my saying that "I must do a thing," and saying that “I will do it" or that “it is known that I will do it." I must do it," implies that there may be some force compelling my action. I might say, "I must go," if I were dragged along by superior force. "I will do it," may imply great freedom, a consciousness of that freedom, and a use of that freedom, perhaps even in overcoming resistances which lie in the way of doing the thing purposed. I might say, "I will go, whatever may be said to the contrary." There is a difference between saying of an event, "it must be," and saying merely "it will be," or "it is known that it will be." "It must be," implies that there are causes at work which will necessarily and resistlessly bring the event to pass. "It will be" or "it is known that it will be," implies no such compulsion. It leaves the manner in which the future event is to be brought about wholly undetermined. It asserts simply and solely, that the event is future, is known to be so, and will take place. It may take place by the action of a necessitating cause, or it may take place by the free agency of God or of some of his creatures. Let this distinction between necessity and certainty, this distinction between what has sometimes been called natural and moral necessity, be clearly apprehended and always kept in sight, and the difficulties with which this subject has been embarrassed, would nearly all be removed. And let the heart cheerfully submit to the great truth, that God reigns throughout the universe according to his own good pleasure, and the remaining darkness would soon flee away. The illuminated mind would then see men not as trees walking, but walking and acting as men in the full, free, and unfettered use of all their bodily, mental and moral powers.

ARTICLE V.

POWER IN THE PULPIT.

By Edwards A. Park, Bartlet Professor in Andover Theol. Seminary.

THERE are some who dislike the phrase, 'power in the pulpit.' They think that it derogates from the honor of him who saith, "not by might, nor by power, but by my Spirit." The sacred Scriptures, however, attribute an efficacy to the whole word of God, and in a special degree to his gospel; why then may not we ascribe a like efficacy to this word, to this gospel, when preached, or which is the same thing, a kind of power to the pulpit? This is indeed a secondary power, one which worketh upon hearers while God worketh in them; but although subordinate to the influences of the Holy Ghost, although dependent upon them for all its success, it is still an energy, an effective instrument, or an instrumental efficiency. That absolute Sovereign who hath mercy on whom he will have mercy, hath chosen, (and who shall resist his will?) to bless such methods of preaching his word as are in themselves most wisely fitted to improve our moral nature. In the depth of our conviction that the renewal of the soul requires a direct agency of the great First Cause, we should not overlook the influence of those second causes which are also, under the Spirit's operation, and in a subordinate way, effective in elevating the character of men.

If then there is an instrumental power in certain methods of preaching the gospel, the question arises, what are these methods, or what are the elements of this power? When we call to mind the tens of thousands of ministers who are exerting an influence Sabbath after Sabbath on hundreds of thousands of laymen; when we consider that the effectiveness of the pulpit has, in comparison with other efficiences, declined among us to an alarming extent within the last fifty years, and that an extensive religious apathy is one result of this decline; when we see that our intellectual and moral growth, our social order and even our civil freedom are under God dependent on the preacher's instrumentality, and that the popular wants, if not the popular wish, demand a soul-reviving dispensation of the word, we feel constrained to say, that the question, what are the most efficient modes of preaching the gospel, is the great question of the present age.

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Argumentative Preaching.

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Various measures of moral reform have been proposed, but we have reason to believe that the chief and radical reformation of men will be the effect of the divine word orally delivered, and accompanied with the influences of divine grace. This is a question, therefore, which concerns not the minister only, but laymen also; for as a minister ought to preach, so ought his people to hear; they are bound to encourage him in the path which he is obligated to pursue, and they should never condemn but always defend that style of discourse which is, in its own nature, the most effective. By sustaining an efficient ministry they become the benefactors not of the church alone, but of the nation and world also. To specify a few of the elements of power in the pulpit, will be the design of the present essay; not those elements which are insisted on most frequently, but those which are mentioned more seldom, and of which at the present day there is the greatest need.

In the first place, then, preaching, in order to be powerful, must often be argumentative. It is thought by some that a minister should assume the correctness of what he declares, and should expend his energy in applying, not in proving the truth. They who attend the sanctuary, it is said, profess by their very attendance, that they believe the doctrines which are there advanced. But the mere fact of being present in the house of God, does not imply a faith in the teachings of the pulpit. Many will ostensibly unite in a worship which they deem unreasonable. They must be convinced by argument, that the minister's assertions are solemn verities, or they will remain merely ostensible worshippers. Nor is the argumentative discourse needful for the positive unbelievers alone. It is also requisite for that large class of men who yield a formal assent to the truth, but still have no vivid nor well defined conceptions of it; no strongly fortified confidence in it. Such men demand a new, a more distinct impression of religious doctrine upon their intellect. When they have worked their way through a process of argument, they begin to feel that the objects of their vague belief are momentous realities. Their previously dull assent is brightened up into a luminous conviction. Their cold and weak belief is warmed and strengthened into an energetic faith.

Nor is it merely for the purpose of freshening men's confidence in propositions which they had before idly believed, that argument is useful. It is also a means of moral excitement. It wakes up the intellect, and when the mind is enlivened, the heart is the more VOL. IV. No. 13.

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