LEGAL OBITUARY. Lieutenant-Colonel ARTHUR STONE, D.S.O., Lancashire Fasiliers, solicitor, of the firm of Messrs. Stones, Morris, and Stone, London, was killed on the 2nd ult. He was educated at Clifton and King's College, Cambridge, and was admitted ią 1903. He was a member of the Law Society, Lieutenant FRANK HUDSON, Manchester Regiment, solicitor, of the firm of Messrs. Roberts, Riley, Creeke, and Hudson, was killed on the 12th ult. He was the son of the late Mr. J. H. Hudson, and was admitted in 1907. Mr. HESKETH BOOTH, solicitor, of the firm of Messrs. H. Booth and Sons, Oldham, and clerk to the Oldham Borough Justices, died at Hale on the 23rd ult., aged seventy-eight. Mr. Booth, who was admitted in 1872, came to Oldham from Hyde in 1873 on appointment as town clerk, which position he held thirteen years, and about the same time he was appointed clerk to the borough justices. Another public position which he held for thirty years was that of Official Receiver in Bankruptcy for the Oldham and Rochdale districts. Mr. Booth was a member of the Law Society and of the Justices' Clerks' Society. Mr. FRANCIS CROWDER HETT, senior partner in the firm of Messrs. Hett, Hett, and Davy, of Brigg and Scunthorpe, died at Brigg on the 26th ult., aged seventy. Mr. Hett, who was admitted in 1869, was clerk to the Brigg Justices, the Brigg Board of Guardians and Rural Council, the Ancholme Commissioners of Sewers, the Ancholme Drainage and Navigation, the Governors of the Brigg Grammar School, the rural tribunal, steward of the manor of Winteringham, and superintendent registrar of marriages and deaths. Mr. Hett was a member of the Law Society and the Solicitors' Benevolent Association. Sir PHILIP SPENCER GREGORY died on Monday, aged seventy-seven. Sir Philip was the youngest son of Mr. John Gregory, who was Governor of the Bahamas, and was educated at Eton and at King's College, where he was tenth Wrangler in 1873. He was called by Lincoln's-inn in 1875. He was appointed conveyancing counsel of the Chancery Division in 1902, and since January last has been second in seniority. He was a member of the Royal Commission for drafting the Land Transfer Acts in 1908, and afterwards he became a member of the Rule Committee under those Acts. Sir Philip was elected Bencher of his Inn in 1907, and received the honour of knighthood in 1913. Mr. CHARLES WHITBREAD FARWELL, barrister-at-law, died of pneamonia on the 26th ult. at Chorley Wood, aged thirty-eight. Mr. Farwell, who was a nephew of the late Lord Justice Farwell, was a member of the staff of the Land Registry. He was at one time a useful long distance runner, and in 1908 held both the long distance and short distance challenge cups of the Thames Hare and Hounds. He was successively a member of the Artists Rifles and the R.N.V.R. Shortly after the outbreak of war he applied for a commission, and was promised one in the Devon Regiment, but failed to pass the medical examination. He accordingly devoted his military experience to the assis tance of the local volunteers. He leaves a widow and one son. HALLEWELL, JANE BEATRICE, Scarborough, dressmaker. Ct. Scarborough. Oct. 24. NEWMAN, MAX, Broadstairs. Ct. Canterbury. Oct. 26. SMITH, JOHN EDWIN GEORGE INGLE (trading as J. E. Smith), Birming- BARLOW, LEWIS, Swansea, metal broker. Ct. Swansea. Oct. 21. GAZETTE, OCT. 29. BEILIN, REUBEN, Liverpool, margarine commission agent. Ct. Liverpool. SEELENFREUND, HERMAN (trading as Seelenfreund and Co.), Edmund-pl, BIRTHS, MARRIAGES, AND DEATHS. DEATHS. BOYCE. On the 16th ult., Kate Augusta, wife of Arthur Thomas CLULOW-On the 22nd ult., Charles Arthur Clulow, of Billiter-av, E.C., in his 71st year. FRY. On the 18th ult., at Failand House, near Bristol, in the 91st year of his age, the Right Hon. Sir Edward Fry, G.C.B., F.R.S., late Lord Justice of Appeal. Born Nov. 4, 1827. MANLEY. On the 17th ult.. at Raven Dene, Northwood. Middlesex, Frederick Augustus Manley, Official Solicitor to the Ecclesiastical Commissioners, aged 64. TAYLOR-On the 21st ult., at 3. Carill-drive, Fallowfield. Henry Taylor, of 8. John Dalton-street, Manchester, Solicitor, aged 84 years. THE LICENSES AND GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD., CONDUCTING THE INSURANCE POOL for selected risks. FIRE, BURGLARY, LOSS OF PROFIT, which are distributed annually to the THE POOL COMPREHENSIVE FAMILY POLICY At 4/6 % is the most complete Policy ever offered to householders. THE POOL COMPREHENSIVE SHOPKEEPERS' POLICY Covers all Bisks under One Document for One Inclusive Premium, LICENSE INSURANCE. SPECIALISTS IN ALL LICENSING MATTERS. 24, MOORGATE STREET, E.C. 2. 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All communications intended for the Editorial Department should, in order to prevent delay, be addressed to the "EDITOR OF THE LAW Any contributions that may be sent on approval will be carefully con- sidered by the Editor; but no responsibility whatever can be accepted in respect thereof, although, if unsuitable, every effort will be made to return them, provided that a stamped addressed wrapper is inclosed The copyright of all contributions (including reports paid for) shall belong to the proprietors of the LAW TIMES, together with the right of republication in any form they may think desirable. Apart from any, express agreement that may be made, contributions are only Advertisements, orders for papers, &c., should be kept distinct, and addressed to the Publisher, Law Times" Office, Windsor House, THE Profession will feel no surprise at the selection of Mr. P. O. LAWRENCE, K.C., to fill the vacancy in the Chancery Division created by the death of Mr. Justice NEVILLE. For some years past the new judge has occupied a leading position at the Bar, and was chairman of the General Council of the Bar. We have good grounds for believing that Sir GEORGE CAVE will shortly become a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary, and we sincerely trust that our surmise may be true. A lawyer of great CONSIDERABLE arrears are growing in this division owing to the lack of judges to deal with the business. The Probate and Divorce Division and extra-judicial duties have depleted the Bench for the time being, and the circuits have also withdrawn judges from London work. It is to be hoped that in the near future an effort will be made to dispose effectively of the non-jury list, STATEMENTS made in the House of Commons last week indicate that the Government are determined to guilty of or have encouraged the atrocities towards prisoners wounded and unwounded, and the fullest penalties must be exacted in the future. Defence of the Realm Losses. THE important and excellent work done by the commission presided over by Lord TERRINGTON is again evidenced by the third report which has just been issued, dealing with the period Sept. 1917 to Aug. 1918. During that year they have held 206 sittings (of which eight have been in Edinburgh) for the hearing of contested claims; and, including schedule cases, i.e., claims provisionally agreed and either after examination in chambers approved by them or referred for public hearing, they have determined and reported in respect of 1232 applications. They have awarded lump sum payments amounting in the aggregate to £2,038,288 against claims for approximately £2,707,460, and periodical payments at the rate of £213,341 against claims for approximately £336,107 a year. Their total number of sittings amounts to 478, and they have determined and reported in respect of 3454 applications; they have in all awarded lump sum payments amounting in the aggregate to £2,754,430 against claims for approximately £4,371,635, and periodical payments at the rate of £562,412 against claims for approximately £965,308. One hundred and sixty-three applications have been withdrawn. Corn Production and Compensation. SOME interesting criticism is passed by the report upon the procedure provided under the Corn Production (Amendment) Act 1918, for which there is good foundation in fact. The commissioners state :— We feel strongly, however, that the provisions in the Corn Production (Amendment) Act recently passed, substituting for a single public authority acting upon clearly defined principles a large number of scattered and unconnected paid arbitrators without any definite or clear basis upon which to assess compensation, are inimical to the public interests and to the economy of public funds. The Act introduces in favour of a particular class of applicants a principle different from that embodied in your warrant of ascertaining compensation out of public funds for loss or damage sustained by the enforcement under the Defence of the Realm Regulations of orders made by one particular department of State. We have found that the problems arising in cases of interference under the powers given to the Food Production Department of the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries, to which we have given our close attention during the greater part of the period under review, have been almost the most complex and difficult of any which have come before us in the course of our labours. They are, in our opinion, of such a character as essentially to demand the formulation of clearly defined principles and their application by or under the direct supervision of the formulating body. We fear that the inconsistency and confusion which must almost inevitably arise from the individual judgments of numerous isolated arbitrators who are not in constant touch with each other must lead either to extravagant expenditure out of public funds or to cases of genuine hardship, and not improbably both consequences may be found to flow from the procedure now established by the Corn Production (Amendment) Act. DOMICIL AND EXTERRITORIALITY. THE House of Lords has now authoritatively declared that it is juridically possible for a British subject to acquire a domicil in Egypt so as to oust the jurisdiction of the High Court of Justice in England to entertain a petition for dissolution of his marriage : (Casdagli v. Casdagli, Oct. 28, 1918, reported in the courts below, 18 L. T. Rep. 404; (1918) P. 89). The decision of the court of first instance (Mr. Justice Horridge) and the Court of Appeal were reversed, and the law as now finally settled by the result of the appeal will have far-reaching and important consequences both from a practical and a theoretical point of view. The actual status of British subjects in Egypt and other Eastern countries will be placed on a different footing, and the theory underlying what are known as exterritorial rights will be better understood. The whole question of the possibility of acquiring a legal domicil in a country where British subjects enjoy exterritorial privileges, and are governed more or less by the law of their own country in lieu of the ordinary law of the place of their residence, has been a subject of great difficulty, and has given rise to considerable discussion among jurists since 1883, the date of the decision of Mr. Justice Chitty in Re Tootal's Trusts (48 L. T. Rep. 816; 23 Ch. Div. 532). That case related to a claim for legacy duty upon the estate of a British subject who had resided in China at the time of his death. It was contended that no legacy duty was payable, on the ground that the deceased was domiciled at Shanghai, and the question to be decided was whether deceased was domiciled in Great Britain or out of Great Britain at the time of his death. The decision arrived at was that the place of deceased's domicil was Great Britain, and that legacy duty was therefore payable. It was not disputed that deceased had been permanently resident at Shanghai, but the ground of the decision was that under the circumstances a domicil of choice could not be acquired at Shanghai and so the domicil of origin remained unaltered. In order to arrive at this decision it was necessary to examine the circumstances under which deceased did reside in China. The British community at Shanghai had exterritorial privileges under treaties between Great Britain and the Emperor of China: "The treaties do not contain any cession of territory so far as relates to Shanghai, and the effect of them is to confer in favour of British subjects special exemptions from the ordinary territorial jurisdiction of the Emperor of China, and to permit them to enjoy their own laws at the specified places." This is Mr. Justice Chitty's description of rights under exterritoriality, and he added further on: "In the case before me the contention is for a domicil which may not improperly be termed extra-territorial "-otherwise referred to as an Anglo-Chinese domicil." The result was that "there is no such thing known to the law as an Anglo-Chinese domicil," and "the testator's domicil remained English." Four years after Re Tootal's Trusts had been decided it was approved of by the Privy Council in Abd-ul-Messih v. Farra (59 L. T. Rep. 106; 13 App. Cas. 431). This was an appeal from the Consular Court at Constantinople, the question being whether Turkish or English law should govern the succession to personalty of a deceased person who had died at Cairo. The deceased in this case was not a British subject, but an Ottoman subject who had lived at Cairo under the de facto protection of the British Government. Here again it was contended that the deceased's " permanent abode in Cairo under British protection attracted to him an English or, as it was termed, an AngloEgyptian domicil." But the Privy Council rejected this contention, and Lord Watson in delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee said, in referring to the treaty privileges of foreign residents in Egypt: They constitute a privileged society, living under English law on Egyptian soil, and independent of Egyptian courts and tax-gatherers. The idea of a domicil, independent 66 of locality and arising simply from membership of a privileged society, is not reconcilable with any of the numerous definitions of domicil," and Re Tootal's Trusts was cited and approved of. Notwithstanding that deceased had attached himself to this privileged society, his domicil was held to have remained Turkish, and Turkish law governed the succession to his personalty. Lord Watson also expressly said that "residence in a foreign State as a privileged member of an exterritorial community, although it may be effectual to destroy a residential domicil acquired elsewhere, is ineffectual to create a new domicil of choice." This passage, though under the circumstances a dictum only, is a statement of the law on the subject which has had some influence on subsequent judicial opinions. In The Derffinger (No. 1) (1916, 1 Br. & Col. P. C. 386) it was said, with reference to the British community in Egypt: It has been settled that no British subject can change his legal domicil by residence in any place where the 66 This was the state of the case law on the subject of domicil in China, Egypt, &c., when Casdagli v. Casdagli (sup.) came before the courts. The wife petitioned for dissolution of the marriage. The husband by an act on petition challenged the jurisdiction of the English court on the ground that he was not domiciled in England. The husband's domicil of origin was, however, English, and the wife contended that he had never abandoned this domicil of origin. It was found as a fact that the husband's permanent residence was in Egypt. The question was, therefore, whether the husband, being a British subject and residing permanently in Egypt with exterritorial rights, could acquire an Egyptian domicil so as to oust the English court's jurisdiction. Mr. Justice Horridge, feeling bound by the authority of Re Tootal's Trusts and Abd-ul-Messih v. Farra, held that domicil in Egypt could not be acquired by the husband, and that the act on petition failed. This decision was affirmed in the Court of Appeal, Lords Justices Swinfen Eady and Warrington constituting the majority, and Lord Justice Scrutton dissenting. This dissenting judgment was, on the appeal coming before the House of Lords, approved and the Court of Appeal's decision reversed. Both the conclusion at which Lord Justice Scrutton arrived, and the reasoning on which it was based, were substantially adopted in the House of Lords, and are thus of the highest authority. The principles involved were first dealt with, and the authorities on examination found not to be of such weight as to prevent those principles being applied. The present case, said Lord Justice Scrutton, "involves the question whether any rule of law prevents a man, who both resides and intends to reside permanently in an Eastern country where by treaty he is subject in all or some respects to exterritorial jurisdiction of his Sovereign, from acquiring a domicil of choice there, his lex domicilii being the law which the Sovereign of the country allows the foreign Sovereign to administer." This question has now been answered by the House of Lords in the negative. With respect to the difficulty alleged to exist in reconciling the possession of exterritorial privileges with a territorial law of domicil, Lord Justice Scrutton said: "The law of the domicil would appear to be the law which the sovereign of the domicil would administer in the case of the domiciled person. If so, can it make any difference whether the Sovereign of the domicil administers the law directly, or allows another Sovereign by grant to exercise part of his sovereignty by administering such law as he pleases in courts which the Sovereign of the domicil allows to exist in his territory? The law appears to be still the law of the domicil, allowed to be administered in the country of the domicil by the sovereign power of that country, whose consent is necessary for its administration." The conclusion arrived at, after examination of the authorities, is "that this Greco-Egyptian married couple have a domicil in Egypt, where they obviously have their permanent home, and that the English court has therefore no jurisdiction to dissolve their marriage." The Law Lords who heard the appeal and (approving and adopting the dissenting judgment) reversed the Court of Appeal's decision were the Lord Chancellor and Lords Haldane, Dunedin, Atkinson, and Phillimore. The judgments were unanimous in allowing the appeal, the leading judgment being delivered by the Lord Chancellor. Some difference of opinion was expressed as to the precise effect of the decision in Re Tootal's Trusts (sup.), but this is now unimportant. The Lord Chancellor referred to the fact that the Consular Courts in Egypt had no jurisdiction to decree a dissolution of marriage, so that, if the present proceedings could not be taken in the English courts, divorce in this particular instance could not be obtained in any court. This, however, made no difference as to whether the husband had acquired a matrimonial domicil in Egypt. The whole question depended on whether the husband had an Egyptian domicil. On the evidence, he had acquired an Egyptian domicil "unless as a matter of law it be impossible for a British subject in his position to acquire such a domicil." In coming to the conclusion that there was no impossibility in acquiring a domicil in a country where "exterritoriality" is enjoyed, it being a matter of presumption and fact in every case, the Lord Chancellor observed that the argument rested “ upon a misconception as to the position of a British subject in Egypt. His position is in no respect analogous to that of an ambassador and his staff in a foreign country. He is subject to the law of Egypt as administered by the Mixed Tribunals and pays taxes. The jurisdiction exercised by His Majesty in Egypt is, indeed, extra-territorial, but it is exercised with the consent of the Egyptian Government, and this jurisdiction is therefore for this purpose really part of the law of Egypt affecting foreigners there resident. The position of a British subject in Egypt is not extra-territorial; if resident there, he is subject to the law applicable to persons of his nationality. Whether that law owes its existence simply to the decree of the Government of Egypt or to the exercise by His Majesty of the powers conferred on him by treaty is immaterial." The references to "taxes " is due to the observations on Lord Watson's dictum, explained by the difference between Egypt in 1888 and Egypt in 1918. The statement that "the position of a British subject in Egypt is not extra-territorial" may cause some difficulty, but its meaning is clear; it is merely a protest against the extreme view referred to later on in the judgment, according to which "the doctrine of exterritoriality applies to all British subjects, so that, though actually in Egypt, they are in contemplation of law still in their own country.' This appears also from the Lord Chancellor's observations in Re Tootal's Trusts (sup.), where the foreign country was China: "The view of Mr. Justice Chitty was that the domicil alleged is in its nature extra-territorial. I cannot agree. The position of British subjects in such a country is not extra-territorial." Mr. Justice Chitty had held that there was no such thing as an Anglo-Chinese domicil," but the Lord Chancellor thought the expression an apt one for denoting compendiously a domicil in China acquired by a British subject and carrying with it the privileges conferred by treaty upon British subjects there residing." The Lord Chancellor also thought that Re Tootal's Trusts did decide (and wrongly) that domicil could not be acquired at all by In thus disagreeing a British subject in a country like China. with the decision in Re Tootal's Trusts, the Lord Chancellor expressed his concurrence with an American case in which the decision had been opposed to the decision of Mr. Justice Chitty, and had in fact forestalled the views taken by Lord Justice Scrutton and the House of Lords in the present case. This American case is Mather v. Cunningham (1909, 105 Maine Reports, 326; 74 Atlantic Reporter, 809). Apparently only the latter report is available in this country. There a deceased American had resided in Shanghai under treaty rights, and the American court held that he bad acquired a domicil at Shanghai. It is satisfactory that the English and American law on this point should now be discovered to be uniform. The final words of the Lord Chancellor's judgment are: "I entirely agree with the conclusion arrived at by Lord Justice Scrutton in his admirably reasoned judgment, and for those reasons I think the appeal should be allowed." 66 Lord Haldane thought that Re Tootal's Trusts did not decide that domicil could not be acquired in China. He held that that case and Abd-ul-Messih v. Farra merely decided that "membership of a protected British society in a foreign country is not enough to establish a domicil which would attract the British municipal law governing succession." With respect to abandonment of domicil of origin he said: "A man who has shaken the dust of England from off his shoes, and has gone to reside in a civilised foreign country with the intention of making a new and permanent home there, gets rid of his English domicil of origin." Lord Dunedin thought Re Tootal's Trusts had not really (as stated in the headnote to Abd-ul-Messih v. Farra) been approved by the Privy Council, and that these cases only decided that mere membership of a privileged community will not per se constitute domicil. He criticised the dictum of Lord Watson as to residence in a foreign country as a member of an extra-territorial community (sup.), and described it as "the sheet anchor" of Lord the argument on behalf of the wife in the present case. Dunedin continued: Can there be any inconsistency in the fact of an Egyptian domicil with the existence of a privilege given by Egyptian law to a certain class of persons, simply because that privilege sometimes consists in a law being applied which is not Egyptian law?" • Lord Atkinson referred to Lord Justice Scrutton's most able judgment." His observations were principally addressed to the subject of domicil and its various methods of acquisition. He thought that there is no test which must be satisfied for the acquisition of a domicil of choice in Egypt other than, or in addition to, those by which a similar domicil is acquired in a European country-namely, voluntary residence there plus a deliberate intention to make that residence a permanent home for an unlimited period." Lord Phillimore thought that the position of Europeans in the Ottoman dominions and in Egypt could not be rightly described as extra-territorial, even though this expression might have been applied to the old Dutch and English factories in the East Indies, and that the creation of "separate little national, communities was "immaterial on the question of domicil." The practical question in Casdagli v. Casdagli was, of course, the question of domicil. It is now settled law that domicil can be acquired in China, Egypt, and in fact anywhere on the globe, in the same manner as it can be acquired in a European country. In cases of doubt the question becomes one of fact. The inconvenience of not being able to acquire a local domicil will no longer be experienced by the members of British communities in China, Egypt, &c. That is the practical benefit gained by persons who tive abroad as the result of the recent decision in the House of Lords. The theoretical interest of the decision is also considerable. It seems as though some other words than exterritorial" or extraterritorial" will have to be found to describe the kind of rights now summed up in the word "exterritoriality." Throughout the judgments of the Law Lords there is a marked disposition to avoid the use of these words. The thing itself continues, however, to exist, though the legal conception which it embodies has now been made much clearer and more precise. The present case really follows up and confirms the view of exterritoriality which was first definitely and precisely laid down by the Privy Council in Secretary of State v. Charlesworth, Pilling, and Co. (84 L. T. Rep. 212; (1901) A. C. 373). In that case it was held that, where under treaty rights courts had been set up in Zanzibar by the British Government for the purpose of trying disputes between British subjects, these courts were Zanzibar courts, administering Zanzibar law, notwithstanding that in fact some of the law thus administered was actually English or Indian law. So in the present case of Casdagli v. Casdagli it was pointed out that it is not correct to say that a resident in a foreign country with exterritorial rights is entirely independent of the law of the foreign country, for the law of the resident's own country in fact forms part of the law of the foreign country, being administered by courts which have had authority granted to them by the Government of the foreign country. The basis of the decision in Re Tootal's Trusts and the dicta in Abd-ul-Messih v. Farra was that there could be no lex domicilii applicable to the resident in the foreign country other than that of his own country, and therefore he could acquire no domicil in the foreign country. Had the principle definitely laid down in Secretary of State v. Charlesworth, Pilling, and Co. (sup.) 'been understood and acepted when Re Tootal's Trusts was decided in 1883, the decision in that case would have been different. The view hitherto prevalent that " exterritoriality" implies such a complete separation from the law of the foreign country as is enjoyed by an ambassador and his staff must now be considered to be exploded. The word itself may remain, its use being sanctioned by occurring both in judicial utterances and in treaties (see art. 16 of Zanzibar treaty of the 30th April 1886). The metaphor embodied in it has been carried too far, just as the metaphor embodied in Lord Stowell's expression "immiscible' was carried too far. Both "exterritorial (as used until recently) and "immiscible" do in fact represent the same notion of complete separation from the foreign country which it was once thought that rights of exterritoriality stood for. In a famous passage Lord Stowell described foreign merchants in Eastern countries as strangers and sojourners as all their fathers were-Doris amara suam non intermiscuit undam" (The Indian Chief, 1800, 3 Ch. Rob. 12, 29). 66 : COMMENTS ON CASES. Animals and Flowers as Charitable Objects. THE case of Re Cheetham (Times, Oct. 18) raised an interesting question which Mr. Justice Peterson found it unnecessary to answer, but the decision is nevertheless grounded upon reasoning which will render it of considerable applicability. The devise was of woodland as a reserve for animals, birds, and flowers, which was supported as being a good charitable gift. In Re Wedgwood; Allen v. Wedgwood (112 L. T. Rep. 66; (1915) 1 Ch. 113) Lord Cozens-Hardy, M R. points out that there has been a tendency to enlarge the meaning of the word "charity and to support as good chari able gifts gifts which formerly would not have been so regarded. There a trust for the benefit and protection of animals was held to be a valid charitable trust, and the statement of Lord Justice FitzGibbon in Re Cranston (1898, 1 Ir. Rep. 446), that "any gift which proceeds from a philanthropic or benevolent motive, and which is intended to benefit an appreciably important class of our fellowcreatures (including, under decided cases, animals), will be charitable, was approved" (and see University of London v. Yarrow, 1 De G. & J. 72). In a later case before Mr. Justice Astbury, National Trust for Places of Historic Interest or Natural Beauty v. AttorneyGenera (113 L. T. Rep 1208; (1916) 1 Ch. 100) the plaintiff trust established for promoting the permanent preservation, for the benefit of the nation, of places of beauty or historic interest, and, as regards lands, for the preservation of their natural aspect and animal and p ant life, was held to have been established for charitable purposes and objects within the legal meaning of the word "charity." These decisions were brought to the notice of Mr. Justice Peterson in Re Cheetham, but the gift was held to be charitable on the ground similar to that taken by Mr. Justice Eve in Re Melody; Brandreth v. Haden (118 L. T. Rep. 155; (1918) 1 Ch. 228), that it was for the education of the public and the more scientific study of the fauna and flora of the district. Declaratory Judgments. THE decision of the Court of Appeal, consisting of Lords Justices Buckley, Pickford, and Bankes, in the important case of Guaranty Trust Company of New York v. Hannay and Co. (113 L. T. Rep. 98; (1915) 2 K. B. 536) is doubtless in the recollection of our readers. Their Lordships were not, it will perhaps be remembered, unanimous in the conclusion at which they arrived. The majority of the court-Lords Justices Pickford and Bankes-pronounced a decision in which Lord Justice Buckley could not see his way to concur. It was to this effect: The court has jurisdiction under rule 5 of Order XXV. to make a declaration at the instance of a plaintiff though he has no cause of action against the defendant; and the rule so construed is merely an extension of the practice and procedure of the court, and is not ultra vires. In the course of his considered judgment, Lord Justice Pickford gave some expressions of his opinion woich call for close attention. After stating that the rule is not limited to cases where the plaintiff has a cause of action apart from the rule, his Lordship went on to say "that its effect is to give a general power to make a declaration, whether there be a cause of action or not, and at the instance of any party who is interested in the subject-matter of the declaration.' At p. 564 the learned judge added that, he thought that a declaration that a person is not liable in an exis ing or possible action is one that will hardly ever be made, but that in practically every case the person asking it will be left to set up his defence in the action when it is brought: (see per the Master of the Rolls in Dyson v. Attorney-General (103 L. T. Rep. 707; (1911) 1 K. B. 410, at p. 417; and per Joyce, J. in North Estern Marine Engineering Company Limited v. Leeds Forge Comp ny Limited, 94 L. T. Rep. 56; (1906) 1 Ch. 324, at pp. 329, 330)." His concluding words (at p. 565 were relied upon in the recent case of Re Clay; Clay v. Clay (noted ante, p. 5) as an authority for what the beneficiaries did in order to establish their claim to be under no liability to recoup the defendant in the circumstances which are epitomised in our note: "I am not prepared to say that it is beyond the power of the court in a very exceptional case to make such a declaration, and that the fact of its being asked for a purpose which the court does not approve does not take away the power to make it, but only gives reason to refuse it." The beneficiaries, regarding their case apparently as coming within the category that the Lord Justice had in contemplation-" a very exceptional case," that is to say-sought to obtain the declaration which our note states that they desired. The learned judges of the Court of Appeal-the Master of the Rolls (Swinfen Eady), Lord Justice Duke, and Mr. Justice Eve-were, however, emphatic in the utterance of their unanimous opinion that Lord Justice Pickford's dicta in the Guaranty Trust Company case (ubi sup) were not capable of being applied in the manner in which the |