After verdict all averments on the side of the successful party, which were involved in the issue tried, will be taken to have been duly proved, unless the contrary appear upon the record,' and thus, after verdict for plaintiff, if the language published may, in its ordinary acceptation and without the aid of extrinsic circumstances, be reasonably understood as having an actionable meaning, judgment will not be arrested upon the ground that the inducement and innuendoes do not sufficiently apply the language to the plaintiff, nor because the innuendoes, in so far as they apply the language to the plaintiff, are unwarranted. If the innuendoes are unwarranted in any other respect, it is a ground for arresting the judgment, of which hereafter.3 § 144. We will here give some few additional illustrations of the manner in which the courts have construed 509; Goodrich v. Woolcott, 3 Cow. 231; Walton v. Singleton, 7 Serg. & R. 451; and see Beers v. Strong, Kirby, 12.) One of the reports commenced, "Willful and corrupt perjury;" held that, after verdict for the defendant, this must be taken as a description of the nature of the charge, not as an imputation, by the publisher, of the perjury in fact. (Lewis v. Levy, 1 Ellis, B. & E. 537.) Publishing in writing that the plaintiff had realized the fable of the frozen snake; after verdict for plaintiff, the court refused to arrest the judgment, as the jury might have understood the words "frozen snake" to impute a charge of ingratitude to friends, although not so explained by innuendo. (Hoare v. Silverlock, 12 Ad. & Ell. N. S. 624.) 'Gates v. Bowker, 18 Vt. (3 Washb.) 23; Cass v. Anderson, 33 Vt. (4 Shaw), 182; Hoyle v. Young, 1 Wash. 150; Ramsey v. Elms, 3 Jur. 1189. But nothing more will be presumed after verdict than is necessary to support the allegations. (Sweetapple v. Jesse, 2 Nev. & M. 36; 5 B. & Adol. 27.) Where the words taken by themselves do not necessarily import a charge of crime, yet where it is alleged in the innuendo that the defendant meant by the words that the act was maliciously done, they will be taken, after verdict, to have been intended to import such a charge. (Tuttle v. Bishop, 30 Conn. 80; and see Kennedy v. Gifford, 19 Wend. 256; Beers v. Strong, Kirby, 12; Ramsey v. Elms, 3 Jurist. 1189.) What defects are cured by verdict, see Rushton v. Aspinwall, Doug. 679; and 1 Smith's Lead. Cas. 'Wakley v. Healey, 18 Law Jour. C. P. 241; 7 C. B., 591. Note to § 362, post. certain language; many more illustrations will be found in the next succeeding chapter: a. Adultery.—A charge of violating the seventh commandment, held not to import a charge of adultery.' b. And-For.-A distinction has been taken between saying, Thou art a thief, for thou has stolen such a thing, as a tree, which could not be felony, and the saying, Thou art a thief, and hast stolen such a thing, since in the former case the subsequent words show the reason of calling the plaintiff a thief, and that no felonious imputation was meant; but in the latter the action lies for calling him a thief, and the addition, Thou hast stolen, is another distinct sentence by itself, and not the reason of the former speech, nor any diminution thereof. To say one has been in jail for stealing, in some cases held not to imply that the party stole, and in others that it did. In the latter class of cases, it was said he could not be imprisoned for stealing if he did not steal.3 c. Arson. The words "Thou set fire to those buildings, and thou wilt never be easy till thou hast told of it," do not impute arson. So of the words, "he fired 1 Farnsworth v. Storrs, 5 Cush. 412. A count in slander alleged that defendant accused plaintiff of adultery, by words spoken of her, as follows: I [defendant] was speaking to a certain lady about Mrs. Y., or Mrs. Y.'s case, meaning the accusation that Mrs. Y. [plaintiff] had a loathsome disease, and had communicated it to a married man named C. W.; held, the count did not set forth circumstances showing an accusation by defendant that plaintiff had committed adultery, and the want of such averment was not cured by innuendo, and that the count was bad. (York v. Johnson, 116 Mass. 482.) Cro. Jac. 114; Bull. N. P. 5; Hob. 77, 106; Cro. Eliz. 857; Browl. 2; Godb. 241; Hard. 7; All. 31; Sty. 66; 1 Starkie on Slander, 99. This distinction was referred to, and its correctness questioned by Holt, Ch. J., Baker v. Pierce, 6 Mod. 23, where it is said and and for have the same meaning; and see Lewis v. Acton, Yelv. 34. 5 his house;" he burnt my barn; he set the store on fire, and none but him ;3 T. burned the mill himself;' but the words, He set fire to and burnt my factory, were construed to mean a willful burning; and the words, "Public opinion says you was the author of it [firing a stable], and what public opinion says I believe to be true," held to amount to a charge of arson; and so of the words, "I have every reason to believe he burnt the barn, and I believe he burnt the barn." "You set your house on fire; you are a bad character," thereby meaning that plaintiff had been guilty of willfully setting his house on fire, and was a person of bad character, and had subjected himself to the penalties of the law for setting his house on fire, there being no colloquium that the words were concerning a house insured by the plaintiff against fire, nor of a house situated in or contiguous to a populous neighborhood, held on motion in arrest of judgment after a verdict for plaintiff, that the words were not actionable. d. Bawdy-house. -Your house is no better than a bawdy-house, is equivalent to charging that the party kept a bawdy-house; but public house, or Anon. II Mod. 220. Barham v. Nethersoll, Yelv. 21. McNab v. McGrath, 5 Up. Can. Q. B. Rep. O. S. 516. 4 Tebbetts v. Goding, 9 Gray (Mass.) 254. 6 Tuttle v. Bishop, 30 Conn. 80. Gage v. Shelton, 3 Rich. 242. It is the general opinion of the people in J.'s [plaintiff's] neighborhood that he burnt C.'s gin-house, held actionable. (Waters v. Jones, 3 Port. 442.) Logan v. Steele, I Bibb, 593; I believe A. [plaintiff] burnt the camp-ground, held actionable. (Giddens v. Mirk, 4 Ga. 364.) My watch was stolen in Polly Miller's bar; I have reason to believe that Tina M. [plaintiff] took it, and Polly Miller, her mother, concealed it, actionable. (Miller v. Miller, 8 Johns. 60.) *Jackson v. Greer, 1 Law Reporter, 5 (London, 1821). 'Huckle v. Reynolds, 7 C. B. N. S. 114. house of ill-fame, cannot be so construed.' Whorehouse is equivalent to bawdy-house, or house of illfame.2 e. Bigamy. The words "he was married to a woman [naming her], and kept her till he got sick of her, and then sent her away, having all this time two wives," amount to a charge of bigamy.3 f. Blackleg.-The term blackleg does not necessarily mean a cheating gambler. g. Clipper.-Where the words were, Thou art a clipper, and shalt be hanged for it-it was held that the word clipper, taken in connection with the words which followed it, meant a clipping of money-a felony.5 h. Conspiracy.-A libel which was alleged to be concerning a false charge of felony, made through feelings of religious bigotry, by the plaintiff against one D. S., went on to allege that plaintiff was aided in making said charge by one C. R., who were stated to "have been for some time back employing every means to win the confidence of this young gentleman, their intended victim (meaning thereby that plaintiff and said C. R. had been contriving some plan to assail the character of said D. S.), as taking him on country visits, and inviting him to the continent, with the hope, it is alleged, of getting him altogether to 1 Dodge v. Lacey, 2 Carter (Ind.) 212. House of ill-fame, or bad house, means the house is one of bad reputation, not that it is a bawdy-house, unless there is an inducement that the defendant was in the habit of using the words "house of illfame," to convey the idea of "bawdy-house." (Id.; Peterson v. Sentman, 37 Md. 140.) Wright v. Paige, 36 Barb. 438; affi'd Ct. of Appeals, 3 Trans. App. 134. 4 Barnett v. Allen, 3 Hurl. & N. 376; 1 Fos. & F. 125. Walter v. Beaver, 3 Lev. 166. themselves, and destroying his prospects the more easily, by some foul charge, which he might not find means of contradicting, there being no one else of the company. They had met with a direct refusal, it seems, to their invitation to the continent, and therefore, rather prematurely, opened their present plot (meaning said charge of felony). Affidavits are, we understand, shortly to be laid before the law officers of the crown, charging the above facts, together with certain conversations between the pair of Romanists, who have trained this ingenious manœuvre (meaning the charge of felony aforesaid)." Held that the language did not amount to a charge of conspiracy.1 i. Convicted Felon.-Plaintiff having been convicted of selling liquor in violation of law, was termed in a printed circular a "convicted felon;" held that if these terms, taken in connection with the context and the evidence, were understood to mean only an offender against the license law, they were no cause of action." j. Embracery. Saying that A., on a certain trial, handed papers to one of the jury, and that he ran away, or the judge would have put him in prison for it-or that he handed papers to the jury to influence or bribe them-imputes embracery, and is actionable per se.3 k. Forgery. The term forgery does not necessarily mean 1 O'Connell v. Mansfield, 9 Irish Law R. 179. Perry v. Mann, 1 Rhode Island, 263. Convicted scoundrel, with an innuendo meaning plaintiff had been guilty of a crime and had been convicted of such crime, was on demurrer held actionable. (Wilson v. Lawson, Melbourne Argus Rep. 30 Nov. 1857.) Gibbs v. Dewey, 5 Cow. 503. |