§ 178. It is not actionable to charge one in writing with a breach of conventional etiquette,' or with an intention to put money into Wall street for shaving purposes, or of having brought suit against one's mother-inlaw, or that plaintiff's outward appearance is more like an assassin than an honest man." So the words, "the Rev. John Robinson and Mr. James Robinson, inhabitants of this town, not being persons that the proprietors and annual subscribers think it proper to associate with, are excluded this room," published by posting a paper on which they were written, purporting to be a regulation of a particular society, held not to be actionable. It was held that to publish B. O., “game and rabbit destroyer, and his wife the seller of the same," was not libelous without innuendoes and colloquium showing the words charged an indictable offense, or affected plaintiff in his trade. So to publish of plaintiff, He is the ringleader of the nine hours' system, he ruined the place by bringing about that system; not actionable, even with special damage alleged. Where the language complained of 1 Clay v. Roberts, 8 Law Times, N. S. 397; 9 Jur. N. S. 580. The charge was that plaintiff, an allopathic physician, met homoeopathists in consultation, and that, in the opinion of the profession, it was improper so to do, and against etiquette; and further, that in the opinion of the profession, it was disgraceful for an allopath to meet a homoeopath in consultation. 2 Stone v. Cooper, 2 Denio, 293. 3 Cox v. Cooper, 9 Law Times, N. S. 329. Defendant published in a newspaper as a report of a proceeding in court: "C. v. G. When this cause was called, the plaintiff was not in court, upon which A., who appeared for the defendant (the plaintiff's mother-in-law), applied for costs, which were allowed, and the case struck out." The declaration alleged that it did not appear by the proceedings in court that the defendant was plaintiff's mother-in-law, and that that fact was maliciously stated to create an unfavorable impression against plaintiff, and a suspicion of him, and that he ought to be regarded with suspicion of being guilty of something wrong in suing his mother-in-law, but held no cause of action disclosed. was, "We are requested to state that the honorary secretary of the Titchbourne defense fund is not, and never was, a captain in the Royal Artillery; innuendo that plaintiff was an impostor, and fraudulently represented himself as a captain-held that the innuendoes were not warranted, and the language was not actionable.' So this language published of the plaintiff was, on demurrer, held not actionable: "Otherwise he would never have had a Mawe [plaintiff] as his chairman, and heard him declare that men who gave up all-life, liberty, and home-for what they deemed the sacred cause of old Ireland, were guilty of infamous conduct; otherwise he never would have sat in silent approval while his chairman declared, I will watch them, and will denounce them to the tender mercies of the Corydons, the Talbots, and the Barrys.'": "This company, for good and sufficient reasons, has resolved to dismiss M." [plaintiff], entered on the books of a corporation-held not actionable, in absence of any colloquium to give the language an injurious meaning.3 2 The declaration alleged that the defendant published in a newspaper a notice, as follows: "Walsall Science Institute. The public are informed that Mr. M.'s [the plaintiff's] connection with the institute has closed, and that he is not authorized to receive subscriptions on its behalf." Innuendo, that plaintiff falsely pretended to be authorized to receive subscriptions on behalf of the institute. At the trial it appeared that plaintiff was a certificated art master, and had been master at the institute. His engagement with defendants ceased in June, 1874, and he got up and became master of another school, which was called "The Walsall Government School of 1 Hunt v. Goodlake, 29 Law Times, N. S. 472. 3 Maynard v. Farmers' Fund Ins. Co. 47 Cal. 207. Art," and was opened in August, 1874; in September following, the notice complained of appeared-held that plaintiff was properly nonsuited, that the notice was not capable of the defamatory meaning attributed to it by the innuendo.' Where the declaration, after stating that plaintiffs, as share brokers, had bought on account of the defendant certain shares in a certain railway company, set out the alleged libel, and which, after commencing with the word "warning," proceeded to inform the plaintiffs that the shares so bought, "under false representations of the market value," and "sanctioned" by defendant, were being sent to the committee of the railway company, with instructions to return deposit balance to defendant; and that, unless plaintiffs arranged to re turn such deposit money to defendant, with certain expenses, the defendant would adopt legal measures. "The amount will be taken by installments, on security being deposited with any bankers but those who recommended plaintiffs:" Held, that in the absence of any colloquium or innuendo explaining the meaning to be attached to the words, the publication was not libelous. It was held not libelous to publish of one who was a druggist, "The above druggist refusing to contribute his mite with his fellow merchants for watering Jefferson avenue, I have concluded to water the avenue in front of his store for one week gratis."3 And held not actionable to publish of one that he was engaged in a“ gambling fracas " arising out of a dispute at play, there being no averment that illegal play was intended. Where a paragraph in a newspaper merely stated that a bill had been drawn, and 1 Mulligan v. Cole, Law Rep. 10 Q. B. 550. Perhaps the publication was a privileged one. (See Hatch v. Lane, 105 Mass. 394; Halliday v. Ontario Farmers" Mut. Ins. Co. 33 Up. Can. Q. B. Rep. 558.) 2 Capel v. Jones, 11 Jur. 396; 4 C. B. 259. 3 The People v. Jerome, 1 Manning's Mich. R. 142. 4 Forbes v. King, I Dowl. 672. that the acceptance had been forged or obtained by fraud, but threw no imputation on the drawer [the plaintiff], nor insinuated that the plaintiff had practiced the fraud or committed the forgery, it was held not to amount to a libel on the plaintiff. And where it was stated that the plaintiff purchased a newspaper and gave his note for it that he was unable to pay the note, and begged for delay; and that subsequently, when sued upon it, he pleaded the statute of limitations successfully; held that, there being no charge of dishonesty, the publication was not libelous. So where the defendant published of the plaintiff that he was a "purse-proud aristocrat;" that he desired. to put down the United States Bank to make stock held by him in other banks more valuable; that he was an office-holder, and that he wanted to increase his means by oppressing the farmer and mechanic; that he attacked Mr. Webster to gratify his propensity for misrepresentation, with other charges-on demurrer to the declaration, the court held that there was nothing in this language 1 Stockley v. Clement, 4 Bing. 162. * Bennett v. Williamson, 4 Sandf. 60. The author was of counsel with the plaintiff in this case, and believes the decision has never been regarded as authoritative. The case was reversed in the Court of Appeals on another point. In Homer v. Englehardt (117 Mass. 539), it was held not actionable to publish that plaintiff, to get rid of a just claim, set up the prohibitory liquor law. In Cox v. Lee (Law Rep. 4, Ex. 284), the charge was somewhat similar to that in Bennett v. Williamson, and a verdict for the plaintiff was upheld. In that case it was held that a statement that a person was at a past time in pecuniary difficulties may be actionable, although it is also stated that these difficulties have been surmounted. In this case it was also held that to charge a man with ingratitude is actionable, and such a charge may be actionable notwithstanding the facts upon which the charge is founded are stated and they do not support the charge. So a newspaper article, the tenor of which was to make plaintiffs objects of pity, and which represented plaintiffs as the relatives of rich persons, but living in abject poverty, was held actionable. (Moffatt v. Caldwell, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. [T. & C.] 256; 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. [3 Hun], 26.) Where the charge This Major Noah, the knight of the broken seal, who converted to his own use property known to be stolen," meaning he obtained possession of a political letter addressed to another person, which he had published, the jury failed to agree. (Noah's Case, 3 City Hall Recorder, 18.) Opening a letter and detaining it merely from curiosity or political motives, held to be a trespass only, and not a felony. (Rex v. Godfrey, 8 C. & P. 563.) was, "calculated seriously to degrade" plaintiff, and allowed the demurrer. Defendant wrote of plaintiff, an attorney: "I will give you an anecdote of R. [plaintiff ], as told to me. W., who was considered an opulent farmer, and thought himself such, sent for R. to make his will, which he did, and bequeathed to his wife and family £7,500. R. attended the opening of the will. The family were pleased, when lo, and behold! and now comes the tale. R. produces a bill for £7,500 for business done for the last fifteen years, pounces on the property, and possesses every shilling to this day. So the story has been told to me." On demurrer to the declaration, held by the majority of the court that the language was not libelous.' $179. There is a distinction as to its actionable quality between language concerning an individual as such, and language concerning one in certain capacities or special characters. Heretofore in this chapter the attention has been solely directed to language concerning an individual as such; we have now to consider what language concerning one in certain acquired capacities or special characters is actionable per se. Language which is actionable, if published of an individual as such, does not cease to be actionable because published of one in a special character; and all language which is actionable as concerning an individual as such, must also be actionable when it concerns him in any special character of the kind presently to be mentioned. Our present inquiry is limited to that language which, not being actionable when published of an individual as such, becomes actionable when published, and because it is published, of him in some special character or relation. The effect of the special character of the publisher, and of the 1 Tapham v. Wilson, 7 Ham. (Ohio), 190. This case cannot be regarded as an authority. 2 Reeves v. Templar, 2 Jur. 137. This case commented on in Mawe 7. Pigott, 4 Ir. Rep. Com. Law, 54. |