Disadvantages of satisfied terms.

Thus a purchaser from a reversioner, if he neglected to get an assignment of the term, was liable to find himself at any time postponed to a subsequent purchaser of the same estate, who had bought without notice of such first purchase, and had got an assignment of the term (p). This was the case even though the subsequent purchaser, at the time of getting the assignment, had become aware of the first purchase, since he had now acquired a prior legal title, and a Court of Equity would not interfere in such a case between two innocent parties, for it was said, "Where the Equities are equal the Law shall prevail."

Moreover the doctrine of Equity as to notice rendered the position of a purchaser precarious, even when he had got in the term; and since, in order to guard against the difficulties which frequently arose in establishing terms at law, it became customary to keep several terms on foot, it was often difficult for a purchaser to be sure that he had got the oldest term, and the system had thus a tendency in some cases to promote fraud.

The expense also of every conveyance was necessarily greater, for in every case where there was an outstanding term the title to the term had to be shown in the same manner as that to the freehold, and if there was more than one term the title to each had to be shown. If the term and the inheritance were assigned by one deed, the deed was necessarily longer and more expensive. If separate deeds were used the expense was still greater. Moreover expense was incurred in ascertaining the trustees of terms, and the terms themselves were occasionally found to have been lost by the trustees having subsequently acquired the reversion (q).

(p) Goodtitle v. Morgan, 1 T. R. 755.

(q) The remarks in this and the two preceding paragraphs are taken, in substance, from the Second Report of the Real Property Commis. sioners, pp. 7-14.

Vict. c.

For these reasons it was enacted by the 8 & 9 Vict., c. 112 (r), that every satisfied term of years which, whether by declaration or by construction of law, should upon the 31st day of December 1845 be attendant upon the inheritance or reversion of any lands, should on that day absolutely cease and determine, as to the land upon the inheritance or reversion whereof such term should be attendant as aforesaid; except that every such term of years which should be so attendant by express declaration, although thereby made to cease and determine, should afford to every person the same protection against every incumbrance, charge, estate, right, action, suit, claim, and demand, as it would have afforded to him had it continued to subsist, but had not been assigned or dealt with after the 31st of December 1845; and should, for the purpose of such protection, be considered in every Court of Law and Equity as a subsisting term: it was also enacted (s) that every satisfied (t) term then subsisting or thereafter to be created, and which, either by express declaration or by construction of law, should after that day become attendant upon the inheritance or reversion of any lands, should, immediately upon the same becoming so attendant, cease and determine as to the land upon the inheritance or reversion whereof such term should become attendant as aforesaid.

It results from this Act (which does not extend to copyholds, customary freeholds, or leaseholds (u),) (1) that a satisfied term created before the 31st of December 1845, and not attendant upon the inheritance by express declaration, is altogether put an end to on that day; (2) that a satisfied term created before the 31st of December 1845, and attendant on

(r) S. 1.

(8) S. 2.

(t) As to the meaning of the word "satisfied," see Anderson v. Pignet, L. R. 8 Ch. 180.

(u) Dart, V. & P. 289.

*

F

the inheritance by express declaration, can no longer be assigned after that date, but affords, both to the person entitled to the inheritance and to any subsequent purchaser from him, the same protection as if it remained for ever vested in the then trustee on the trusts on which he held it on the day when the Act came into operation; that is, will render such a purchaser safe against subsequent purchasers from the reversioner, but not against prior purchasers, although he had no notice of their claims; and (3) that no term created after the 31st of December 1845 can be made, by any means, attendant on the inheritance.

It only remains to add, that a satisfied term created before the 31st of December 1845, and attendant upon the inheritance by express declaration, will be considered as subsisting, unless a Court of Equity would, before the passing of the Act, have restrained the person interested in it from setting it up in a Court of Law (v).

(v) Cottrell v. Hughes, 15 C. B. 532.

CHAPTER IV.

OF AN ESTATE FOR LIFE.

HAVING thus discussed estates less than freehold, we will now ascend to the next stage, and consider those estates which are of a freehold nature, first pausing to remind the reader that there is a distinction between freehold estates and estates in land of freehold tenure. For there may be a freehold estate (i.e., one for life or in fee) in copyholds, which are estates of a base, and not of a freehold, tenure. Freehold estates may be classed under the two principal headings of 1st, Freeholds of inheritance, or estates in fee-simple and in fee-tail; and 2nd, Freeholds not of inheritance, or estates for life. It is proposed in this chapter to notice the chief points relating to estates for life.

These are of two kinds, namely, those which are Estate for life conventional, or expressly created by act of parties; and those which are legal, or created only by construction and operation of law (a). The former are the more usual, and exist when a man has an estate in land which is to last for the term of his own life, or for that of another, or for the lives of two or more persons, of whom he may or may not be one.

Such an estate may be created by any person, not By whom it may be created. under disability, who has an estate of freehold. But a tenant for years, however long his term may be, cannot create an estate for life; because, having only a chattel interest, he cannot out of it create that which the law considers a greater interest than his

(a) 2 Bl. Com. 120.

Corporations. own. We have already seen that corporations may,

Infants.

18 & 19 Vict. c. 43.

Mode of creat

ing an estate

to a certain extent, create estates for life (b), and we have to add that an infant may also create such an estate under special circumstances.

For it is enacted by the 18 & 19 Vict., c. 43, that from and after the passing of the Act (c), it shall be lawful for every male infant not under the age of twenty years, and for every female infant not under the age of seventeen years (d), upon or in contemplation of his or her marriage, to make (e), with the sanction of the Court of Chancery, a valid settlement of all or any part of his or her property, or of property over which he or she has any power of appointment. By means of such a settlement, then, an infant may create an estate for life, but the Act goes on to provide (f) that any appointment or disentailing assurance executed under the provisions of the Act by an infant who is a tenant in tail, shall be void if the infant afterwards dies before attaining the age of twenty-one years.

An estate for life may be created (1) by operation of law, (2) by deed, or (3) by will. The estates for By operation life which are created by the first-named process are—

for life.

of law.

Estate in
Dower.

Ist, Estates in Dower; 2nd, Estates by Curtesy; and 3rd, Tenancy in tail after possibility of issue extinct. An Estate in Dower is that which a widow may have, during her lifetime, in hereditaments of which her husband was tenant for an estate of inheritance. It will be necessary to explain this subject somewhat fully, and since the former law relating to dower was materially altered by the Dower Act (g) now in force,

(b) 32 Hen. VIII. c. 28; 5 Geo. III. c. 17; 5 & 6 Vict. c. 108; 45 & 46 Vict. c. 50.

(c) 2nd July 1855.

(d) S. 4.

(e) S. 1.

(f) S. 2.

(g) 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 105.