agents, e.g., infants or married women, for they are exercising not their own, but another person's power (m). The powers of an agent vary according to the authority he is invested with, and from these powers there are said to be three kinds of agencies:- 1. Universal agency, which is the largest and widest Three kinds kind, being a general authority to do any acts without of agencies. reference to their character, and this is not of constant Occurrence. 2. General agency, which is the next largest, signifying a power to do all acts in some particular trade, business, or employment, e.g., the authority that is vested in a wife to bind her husband for necessaries without any particular sanction on each occasion from him. 3. Special agency, which is the most limited and most usual case of agency, being where a person has simply an authority to do some particular act for the principal (n). between agencies on There is a very important difference to be noted Differences between universal and general agencies on the one hand, universal and special agencies on the other hand, with regard and general to the power to bind the principal. In the former, on the one even although the act exceeds the agent's authority in hand, and special agencies the particular instance, yet if it comes within the scope on the other. of his ordinary authority the principal is liable (o); thus, for instance, supposing a servant to have a general authority to order goods for his master, and the master one day withdraws this authority, yet if the servant (m) See Story on Agency, p. 6; Co. Litt. 52 a. (n) Ibid., p. 23, et seq. (0) Smethurst v. Taylor, 12 M. & W. 545. orders goods as theretofore, the tradesman not knowing of it, the master will be liable, because the act comes within the scope of the agent's ordinary authority. In the case of special agency this will not be so; it is the duty of the party contracting with such an agent to inquire and see as to the extent of his authority, and if he exceeds it the principal cannot be liable (p). But although an act may be done without any authoretrotrahitur rity from the principal, and therefore not bind him, yet if at the time of doing the act the agent professed that he was acting for the principal (q) it may be subsequently ratified by the principal, and become his act just as much as if he had authorized it beforehand, for the maxim is, omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur et mandato priori æquiparatur (r). Omnis ratihabitio et mandato priori æquiparatur. As to the effect to an agent. An important point on the law of principal and of giving credit agent is as to the effect of a person contracting with an agent giving credit to the agent; of course, generally speaking, an agent incurs no personal liability, and the person contracting with him will charge his principal, but it may be that it is not known that he is an agent or who his principal is, or, though both the above facts are known, the agent not contracting as agent it may be preferred to charge him to his principal. The law upon this point is that if the fact of the person being an agent is not known, or though the agency is known the name of the principal is not, though credit is first given to the agent, the principal on being discovered may be sued (s); but that if the principal is known, and credit has yet been given to the agent, the principal cannot afterwards be charged, for the person has made his election (t). The leading (p) East India Co. v. Hensley, 1 Esp. 111. (4) Per Parker, J., Vere v. Ashby, 10 B. & C. 288. (r) Maclean v. Dunn, 4 Bing. 722. (s) Paterson v. Gandesequi, 2 S. L. C. 347; 15 East, 62; Addison v. Gandesequi, 2 S. L. C. 356; 4 Taunt. 574. (t) Thomson v. Davenport, 2 S. L. C. 364; 9 B. & C. 78. cases referred to below of Paterson v. Gandesequi, Paterson v. Addison v. Gandesequi, and Thomson v. Davenport, are usually quoted together upon this subject. Gandesequi; The cases in which, contrary to the general rule, the Cases in which agent incurs personal liability, may be stated to be as agent perfollows: 1. Where the agent conceals his principal. Here we have just seen that though the agent is liable, it is in the option of the other contracting party to sue either principal or agent. 2. Where he acts without authority, or after his authority has determined. But if he could not have known of the determination of his authority this would not be so; thus, an action was brought for necessaries supplied to a woman after her husband's death whilst on a foreign voyage, but before she knew of his decease. By his death her authority to bind him for necessaries was of course revoked, and his estate therefore could not be liable for them, and it was decided that she was not liable either on the before-stated ground (u). 3. Where, though having authority, he exceeds that authority, or fraudulently misrepresents its extent. 4. Where he specially pledges his own credit. 5. Where though contracting as agent, he uses words to bind himself, e. g., if he covenants personally for himself and his heirs (x). It was formerly a rule that where a British agent (u) Smont v. Ilberry, 10 M. & W. 1. (x) See hereon, Thomas v. Edwards, 2 M. & W. 216, and cases there quoted. sonally liable. The different contracted for a foreign principal, the British agent might be sued, because it was said there was no responsible employer; but this is not now so, the rule being that in all cases of this kind it is entirely a question of intention whether under the particular circumstances the credit was intended to be given to the agent or the principal (y). An agent's authority may be determined in any of ways in which the following ways, i. e. :— an agent's authority may be determined. An agent's authority includes all incidental acts. 1. By the principal's revocation of it, and death will operate as a revocation. If by the act of the principal the agency is revoked, in the case of a special agency nothing further done by the agent will bind the principal, but in the case of a general or universal agency, the revocation will not bind third persons until made known to them (z); for as we have seen in these agencies, the principal may be bound if the act comes within the scope of the agent's ordinary authority (a). 2. By the agent's renunciation with the principal's consent. 3. By the principal's bankruptcy. 4. By the object of the agency being accomplished. 5. By the effluxion of time; and 6. By the marriage of a feme sole agent (b). Unless a contrary intention appears, the authority (y) Green v. Kopke, 25 L. J. (C.P.) 297. Monk v. Clayton, Moll. 270; cited in Nickson v. Brohan, 10 Mod. 110. (a) Ante, p. 101. (b) See hereon, Story on Agency, p. 481. given to an agent must be taken to include all incidental acts necessary for accomplishing the principal object; for instance, a person sending another to a shop to buy goods without giving him money, gives to him the necessary incidental power of pledging his credit (c). should The proper person to sue on a contract is generally The principal, speaking, the principal and not the agent, unless he not the agent, has some special property or interest in the subject- generally sue matter of the contract by way of commission or other- on contracts. wise, e.g., a carrier or an auctioneer (d). If an agent His liability is remunerated, he is bound to use ordinary diligence; and duty. if unremunerated, then, by analogy to the case of a voluntary bailee (e), he is only liable for gross negligence, unless he is possessed of any special skill or knowledge, when an omission to use such skill, or negligence, will be imputable to him for gross negligence (f); his duty is always to act fairly and honestly, and keep proper accounts and vouchers, and he may lose his right. to any commission he might otherwise be entitled to by not doing so (g). A del credere agent is one who agrees with his prin- Del credere cipal, in consideration of some additional compensation, agent. to guarantee to him the payment of debts to become due from buyers. Although the undertaking of a del credere agent is certainly a collateral promise to answer for the debt of others, yet it has been decided that his engagement need not be in writing (h) as is necessary, as we have seen, in the case of guarantees (i). (c) Story on Agency, p. 77. (d) Robinson v. Rutter, 4 E. & B. 954. (e) As to which see ante, pp. 86, 87. (f) See Coggs v. Bernard, 1 S. L. C. 188; Lord Raymond, 909; Wilson v. Brett, 11 M. & W. 113. (g) See hereon, Stainton v. The Carron Co., 24 Beav. 353. (h) Coutourier v. Hastie, 8 Ex. 40. (1) Ante, p. 40. |