Sect. 1. Where a Summons can be Served-Service in Scotland— 44 & 45 Vict. c. 24.—A summons issued by a magistrate in his own jurisdiction may be served anywhere outside that justice's jurisdiction in any other jurisdiction in England. As to service of a summons issued in England on a defendant in Scotland, see S. J. (Process) Act, 1881 (44 & 45 Vict. c. 24), post, s. 6 of which Act provides that a court of summary jurisdiction in England may adjudge a person within the jurisdiction of the court to pay for the maintenance of a bastard child notwithstanding that such person ordinarily resides, or the child has been born, or the mother ordinarily resides, where the court is English in Scotland in like manner as the court has jurisdiction in any other case. was held in R. v. Thompson, 12 Q. B. D. 261; 48 J. P. 324 ; 53 L. J. M. C. 65; 50 L. T. 187; 32 W. R. 398; and affirmed in 10 App. Cas. 45; 49 J. P. 276; 54 L. J. M. C. 57; 52 L. T. 1 ; 33 W. R. 525 (sub nom. Berkeley v. Thompson), that the S. J. (Process) Act, 1881, does not enable a bastardy summons to be issued by justices in England and served in Scotland upon the putative father domiciled and resident in Scotland; and if a summons is so served, and the putative father does not appear before the justices, they have no jurisdiction to make an order against him. It Statutory Service.-As to the service of process on friendly societies, see s. 94 of 59 & 60 Vict. c. 25 (The Friendly Societies Act, 1896). As to the service under the Public Health (London) Act, 1891 (54 & 55 Vict. c. 76), s. 6, see R. v. Mead, 58 J. P. 448 ; 10 T. L. R. 413. The following are other instances where a particular mode of service of process is provided: Service of summons for non-payment of poor rate. 12 & 13 Vict. c. 14, s. 5 (The Distress for Rates Act, 1849); and 31 & 32 Vict. c. 122, s. 39. In bastardy cases. 35 & 36 Vict. c. 65, s. 4, and see R. v. De Winton, 53 J. P. 292; 59 L. T. 382; and R. v. Webb and Others, 60 J. P. 280; 12 T. L. R. 293; 63 L. J. M. C. 128; 65 L. J. M. C. 98. Employers and Workmen Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 90). Rule II. of 1886, post. Army Act (44 & 45 Vict. c. 58), s. 145. Sale of Food and Drugs Acts, 1875 to 1899 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 63, s. 10; 42 & 43 Vict. c. 30; 50 & 51 Vict. c. 29, and 62 & 63 Vict. c. 51). As to service under s. 19 of the last Act, see McQueen v. Jackson, [1903] 2 K. B. 163; 67 J. P. 353; 72 L. J. K. B. 606, where it was held there must be fourteen clear days between the day on which a summons is served and the day on which it is returnable. As to service under the London Building Act (57 & 58 Vict. c. ccxiii.), see R. v. Mead, [1898] 1 Q. B. 110; 61 J. P. 759; 66 L. J. Q. B. 874; 14 T. L. R. 14. On Joint Stock Companies.-With regard to the service of a summons on a joint stock company, the Companies Act, 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 89), s. 62, provides that any summons, notice, order or other document required to be served upon the company may be served by leaving the same or sending it through the post in a prepaid letter, addressed to the company at their registered office. See Pearks, Gunston and Tee, Limited v. Richardson, [1902] 1 K. B. 91; 66 J. P. 119; 71 L. J. K. B. 18; 18 T. L. R. 78 ; 20 Cox, 96. By s. 63 of the same Act, any document to be served by post on the company shall be posted in such time as to admit of its being delivered in the due course of delivery within the period (if any) prescribed for the service thereof; and in proving service of such document it shall be sufficient to prove that such document was properly directed, and that it was put as a prepaid letter into the post office. By s. 65 recovery of penalties under the Act may be enforced in manner provided by 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43. By the Companies Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845 (8 & 9 Vict. c. 16), s. 135, and by the Railways Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845 (3 & 9 Vict. c. 20), s. 138, any summons or notice requiring to be served upon the company may be served by the same being left at, or transmitted through the post directed to the principal office of the company, or one of the principal offices, where there shall be more than one, or being given personally to the secretary, or in case there be no secretary, then by being given to any one director of the company. As to the meaning of the principal office of a railway company under the last-mentioned enactment, see Garton v. Great Western Rail. Co., E. B. & E. 837, 846. For service of summons and other documents under the Factory Acts, see 1 Edw. 7, c. 22, s. 148. Service by Post.-As to meaning of service by post, see 52 & 53 Vict. c. 63, s. 26, post. Service under S. J. Act, 1848, Sufficient.-An opinion is expressed in 16 J. P. 445, that justices may proceed ex parte upon proof of service in the mode pointed out in this section. The section applies in all cases where an information is laid or complaint made that any person has committed any offence or act within such justices' jurisdiction, irrespective of whether any special provision is made as to a particular mode of service of the summons in the Act under the provisions of which such information has been laid. Proceedings "ex parte."-If the defendant appears and makes defence to the summons all defects therein (except such as in the opinion of the justices who hear the case are misleading or deceptive) are cured. See s. 9 and the case of Bessell v. Wilson, 17 J. P. 567; 22 L. J. M. C. 94; 17 Jur. 664; 1 E. & B. 489, where a conviction under the repealed statute, 6 & 7 Vict. c. 65, awarded a penalty, and defendant, making default in payment thereof, and being summoned to show cause why he should not be committed, Sect. 1. NOTE. Sect. 1. NOTE. appeared by his counsel and attorney, but the sitting magistrate refused to hear the case in his absence, and granted a warrant for his apprehension in order to answer the matter. He was apprehended and imprisoned, and it was held (the conviction being quashed) that the magistrate was liable for an action of trespass, as the warrant was illegally issued, and the appearance of his counsel and attorney were equivalent to the defendant's own appearance. No order of magistrates can be made in the absence of the person to be affected by it, except under the provisions of s. 2, post; but before it is made a summons should be issued, Lord DENMAN saying: "This principle has been adopted in other cases; and I think a summons was necessary though it may not be in terms required by the particular Act of Parliament on which the order is founded " (R. v. Totnes, 9 J. P. 584; 14 L. J. M. C. 148). In Painter v. Liverpool Gas Co., 3 A. & E. 433, it was held that a warrant of distress issued by a justice without previously summoning and hearing the party to be distrained upon is illegal, though a summons and hearing be not required by the terms of the Act under which the proceeding is taken; for a magistrate who grants a warrant in the nature of execution is bound first to summon and hear the parties, unless the statute under which he acts clearly renders the discharge of that function ministerial only, or in some other manner dispenses with the summons and hearing. As to ex parte proceedings (as in R. v. Staffordshire JJ., 5 N. & M. 94; 3 A. & E. 425, referred to, post, p. 20) judgment of FORTESCUE, J., in R. v. Chancellor, Masters, and Scholars of Cambridge University, 1 Str. 557, at p. 567 (which was cited with approval by BYLES, J., in Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works, 14 C. B. (N.s.) 194), may be referred to: "The laws of God and man both give a party an opportunity to make his defence, if he has any. I remember to have heard it observed by a very learned man on one occasion that even God himself did not pass sentence upon Adam before he was called upon to make his defence." See Lord DENMAN'S observations in R. v. Smith, 9 J. P. 7, as to calling upon defendant for a defence. Under s. 2, post, it will be seen that if the defendant do not appear to the summons at the time and place therein mentioned, and if it be proved that such summons was "duly served" a "reasonable time" before such appointed time for hearing, they may proceed to hear the evidence in support of such information or complaint ex parte, in the absence of the defendant. As to the meaning of "reasonable time," see the notes to s. 2, post, and cases there cited. Conviction on View.-Power to justices to convict "on view is given by 8 Hen. 6, c. 9, which relates to forcible detainer; by 5 Geo. 4, c. 83, s. 3 (The Vagrancy Act, 1824), for certain offences thereunder; by 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 50, s. 78 (The Highway Act, 1835), for certain offences thereunder; and under 26 & 27 Vict. c. 93, s. 3 (The Waterworks Clauses Act, 1863), justices" on their own view' may proceed to make orders under that statute as if a complaint had been made to them thereunder. "Conviction on view" is nowadays practically non-existent. For old cases on the point, see Jones v. Owen, 2 D. & R. 600; R. v. Jones, 12 A. & E. 684; Nixon v. Nanney, 1 Q. B. 747. In a civil case, London General Omnibus Co., Limited v. Lovell, 17 T. L. R. 61, it was held that in the absence of evidence that the defendant's omnibus was calculated to deceive the action could not be maintained upon the mere inspection of the omnibuses by the judge. "Ex parte" Proceedings without Previous Summons.-A justice may, under the powers conferred on him by ss. 116, 117 of the Public Health Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55), condemn meat exposed for sale which is, in his opinion, unfit for human food without issuing any summons or notice to the owner of the meat of his intention to do so; and so where an inspector of nuisances acting under those sections seized meat in his opinion unfit for human food, and took it before a justice, who ordered its destruction, and the owner of the meat having been subsequently summoned for exposing such meat, and being convicted of such offence, the conviction was held good, although no summons or notice was issued to him by the justice previous to the destruction of the meat (White v. Redfern, 5 Q. B. D. 15; 44 J. P. 87; 49 L. J. M. C. 19; 41 L. T. 524 ; 28 W. R. 168). The above sections are now extended by 53 & 54 Vict. c. 59. This decision seems at first sight to overrule Gill v. Bright, 41 L. J. M. C. 22; 25 L. T. 591; 20 W. R. 248, where it was held that liquors kept for unlawful sale under 33 & 34 Vict. c. 29, s. 15 (now repealed), and which were seized, cannot be ordered by justices to be sold without first giving the person on whose premises they were seized an opportunity of showing cause why such sale should not take place, and that the seizure was wrong. See also R. v. Cheshire Lines, L. R. 8 Q. B. 344; 37 J. P. 373 ; 42 L. J. M. C. 100. But the distinction between the two cases is shown by the following extract from the judgment of FIELD, J., in White v. Redfern (in which case Gill v. Bright was cited), at p. 18 of L. R. 5 Q. B. D.: "It is contended that the inspector is bound to give such notice, by which, I suppose, is meant that he must take out a summons, as is usual in proceedings before justices. Ordinarily such proceeding would be necessary. The legislature generally cannot be considered to have intended that a man's property is to be destroyed without giving him an opportunity of being heard; but here the paramount object would appear to be the speedy destruction of a noisome and unwholesome thing. There is nothing in the words of s. 117 to lead one to the conclusion that the justice is to hear any one. The primary object is the prevention of an evil which in the nature of things presses for an immediate remedy. The Act goes on to provide that the person to whom the noisome thing belonged may be punished. It is conceded that in the case of a proceeding against the person a summons must be taken out in the ordinary way." See also Lord Sect. 1. NOTE. Sect. 1. NOTE. KENYON'S, C.J., judgment in R. v. Benn, 6 T. R. 198. A court of summary jurisdiction has no power under s. 2 of the Musical (Summary Proceedings) Copyright Act, 1902 (2 Edw. 7, c. 15), to make an order for the destruction of pirated copies of music which have been seized by a constable when they were being offered for sale unless a summons has been issued against the person from whom the copies were seized (Ex parte Francis and Others, [1903] 1 K. B. 275; 67 J. P. 153; 72 L. J. K. B. 120; 19 T. L. R. 146). Conclusiveness of such a Proceeding.-Although in cases under the Public Health Act the destruction of the meat may, for the reasons given by FIELD, J., supra, be ordered on an er parte hearing, yet, if further proccedings are taken against the person in whose possession the meat was at the time of its seizure, an information and summons must be laid and issued in the ordinary manner. In the case of Waye v. Thompson, 15 Q. B. D. 342 ; 49 J. P. 693; 54 L. J. M. C. 140; 53 L. T. 358; 33 W. R. 733, meat had been seized and condemned under ss. 116, 117 of the Public Health Act, 1875, and T., in whose possession the meat had been at the time of seizure, was summoned for the penalties under that Act. He tendered evidence that the meat was sound, but this was objected to on the ground that its soundness or otherwise had been already adjudicated upon. But the justices admitted the evidence and overruled the objection. On a case stated this decision was affirmed. Section 117 imposes a penaly of £20, or imprisonment for three months, on a person who has diseased meat on his premises. If the evidence were rejected, and the state of the meat treated as res judicata, the defendant would obviously be precluded from making any defence to the matter of the information, MATHEW, J., in his judgment saying, "When a court of summary jurisdiction comes to deal with the offence of the person to whom the meat belonged they must deal with that offence in the ordinary way in which they deal with other offences, and are bound to hear the evidence tendered to them. If, therefore, the enactment is to be construed in this way (so as to exclude the evidence tendered), a man may be sent to prison for three months for the misfortune of having in his shop meat which a sanitary inspector is mistaken in supposing to be unfit for human food, without having any opportunity for the production of evidence to prove that the meat was not unfit for human food"; and WILLS, J., said: "The proposition that he is not to be heard upon the question of his own imprisonment needs only to be stated to be its own emphatic condemnation." Discretion. As to discretion of justices in issuing a summons, see Rex v. Bros, 66 J. P. 54; 18 T. L. R. 39, where an application |