Sect. 16. NOTE. a similar offence. See Vinters v. Freedman, 66 J. P. 135; 71 L.J. K. B. 48; 18 T. L. R. 77. A prisoner had been found guilty by a jury, and instead of being sentenced was put under recognizances to come up to receive sentence when called upon :-Held, that upon proof of the above facts a previous conviction was proved (R. v. Blaby, [1894] 2 Q. B. 170 ; 58 J. P. 576 ; 63 L. J. M. C. 133; 10 T. L. R. 431; 70 L. T. 879; 18 Cox C. C. 5). and 17. Right to claim trial by jury in case of offences otherwise triable summarily.]-(1) A person when charged before a court of summary jurisdiction with an offence, in respect of the commission of which an offender is liable on summary conviction to be imprisoned for a term exceeding three months, and which is not an assault, may, on appearing before the court and before the charge is gone into, but not afterwards, claim to be tried by a jury, thereupon the court of summary jurisdiction shall deal with the case in all respects as if the accused were charged with an indictable offence and not with an offence punishable on summary conviction, and the offence shall as respects the person so charged be deemed to be an indictable offence, and if the person so charged is committed for trial, or bailed to appear for trial, shall be prosecuted accordingly, and the expenses of the prosecution shall be payable as in cases of felony. (2) A court of summary jurisdiction, before the charge is gone into in respect of an offence to which this section applies, for the purpose of informing the defendant of his right to be tried by a jury in pursuance of this section, shall address him to the following effect: "You are charged with an offence in respect of the commission of which you are entitled, if you desire it, instead of being dealt with summarily, to be tried by a jury; Do you desire to be tried by a jury?"-with a statement, if the court think such statement desirable for the information of the person to whom the question is addressed, of the meaning of being dealt with summarily, and of the assizes or sessions (as the case may be) at which such person will be tried if tried by a jury. (3) This section shall not apply to the case of a child unless the parent or guardian of the child is present; but the court shall ascertain whether the parent or guardian of the child is present, and, if he is, shall address the above question to such parent or guardian, and the claim under Sect. 17. this section may be made by such parent or guardian. In the places contemplated in this section, the court must address the defendant to the effect mentioned in sub-s. (2), with a statement if they think it desirable, of the meaning of being dealt with summarily, and of the assizes or sessions at which the defendant will be tried if tried by a jury; this caution should be addressed to the defendant as soon as he appears before the court and before the case for the prosecution is opened. The Indictable Offences Act, 1848, s. 25, post, and note thereon, deals with the particular sessions or assizes to which the committal for trial is to take place. A conviction under the Betting Act, 1853 (16 & 17 Vict. c. 119) (one of the cases contemplated by this section), was quashed on the ground that the justices had not, before going into the charge, informed the defendant that, if he desired it, he had a right to be tried by a jury (R. v. Cockshott and Others, Ex parte Rickaby, [1898] 1 Q. B. 582; 62 J. P. 325; 14 T. L. R. 264; 67 L. J. Q. B. 467; 78 L. T. 168). This section only applies to offences punishable in the first instance by a term exceeding three months, and not to those punishable by a fine, which, in the event of non-payment, would render the defendant liable to the said term (Carle v. Elkington, 56 J. P. 359; 67 L. T. 374). In Williams v. Wynne, 52 J. P. 344 ; 57 L. J. M. C. 30; 58 L. T. 283, GRANTHAM, J., said: "The clear meaning of the section is that it is not to apply to a case where the sentence in the first place could not be more than three months; the words only refer to the commission of the offence." See, however, the following case : By s. 680 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 60), an offence under that Act punishable with imprisonment for any term not exceeding six months "shall be prosecuted summarily in manner provided by the S. J. Acts." By s. 218, a person going, without permission of the master, on board a ship about to arrive, arriving, or arrived at the end of her voyage before the seamen lawfully leave the ship is liable to imprisonment for not exceeding six months :-Held, that a person charged with an offence under this section is entitled to demand trial by jury under s. 17 of the S. J. Act, 1879 (Rex v. Goldberg, 68 J. P. 554; 73 L. J. K. B. 970; 20 T. L. R. 684). In In re Lake, 46 J. P. 88, Lake was indicted before BOWEN, J., for night poaching, armed with a pistol. It appeared in the course of the case that the accused claimed before the justices the option of being sent for trial under s. 17 of the S. J. Act, 1879. The Act under which the offence in question was charged provides that the offender shall be liable to three months' imprisonment, and then, in default of finding sureties, to an additional six months, and the justices read that to mean that he might be liable on the charge to nine months' imprisonment, and therefore gave him the option. His lordship, after consulting the Lord Chief Justice on the point, held that that was not the meaning of the section, and Sect. 17. that, as the imprisonment in the first instance, irrespective of imprisonment for default of sureties, was for three months only, it was not within the section, and the case ought, therefore, to have been dealt with summarily. NOTE. It is the practice of the Central Criminal Court to pay the expenses of the witnesses attending before the examining magistrate on production of the usual certificate of expenses. In the (now annulled) Rules of 1880, there was a form given (No. 32) for commitment of defendant who claims to be tried by a jury. The Consolidated Forms, 1886, do not contain such a form. The following is a list of statutes in general use relating to cases in which the caution in this section will be required: The Army Act, 1881. 44 & 45 Vict. c. 58, s. 153. Chimney Sweepers (second offence). 38 & 39 Vict. c. 70, s. 19. The Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885 (second offence). 48 & 49 Vict. c. 69, s. 13. Destroying Fences (second offence). 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s. 25 (The Malicious Damage Act, 1861). Destroying Vegetable Productions in Gardens. 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s. 23 (The Malicious Damage Act, 1861). Embezzlement of Woollen Materials, etc. (second offence). 17 Geo. 3, c. 56, s. 1 (The Frauds by Workmen Act, 1777). The Explosives Act, 1875. 38 & 39 Vict. c. 17, ss. 79 and 91. Forging Pawnbroker's Certificate. 35 & 36 Vict. c. 93, s. 44. Forging Pedlar's Certificate (second offence). 34 & 35 Vict. c. 96, s. 12. The Gaming Act, 1845. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 4. The Infant Life Protection Act, 1872. 35 & 36 Vict. c. 38, s. 9. Malicious Damage Act, 1861). The Licensing Act, 1872. 35 & 36 Vict. c. 94, s. 3 (3) (third offence). Lotteries. 4 Geo. 4, c. 60, s. 67 (The Lotteries Act, 1823). The Merchandise Marks Act, 1887. 50 & 51 Vict. c. 28, s. 2 (sub-s. (6) of this section provides for a similar caution). The Merchant Shipping Act, 1894. 57 & 58 Vict. c. 60 (see s. 680). Poaching (second offence). 9 Geo. 4, c. 69, s. 1 (The Night Poaching Act, 1828), (but not first offence, see Williams v. Wynne, ante, p. 147). The Prevention of Crime Act, 1871. 34 & 35 Vict. c. 112, s. 7. (Certain cases under s. 5 of this Act may require a caution under this section.) Prevention of Cruelty to Children. 4 Edw. 7, c. 15, s. 1. Salmon Fisheries (third offence). 24 & 25 Vict. c. 109, ss. 8, 9, Stealing Animals. 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 21 (The Larceny Act, Sect. 17. 1861). Stealing Dogs. 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 18 (The Larceny Act, 1861). NOTE. Stealing Fences (second offence). 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 34 (The Larceny Act, 1861). Stealing Growing Trees (second offence). 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 33 (The Larceny Act, 1861). Under 38 & 39 Vict. c. 86, s. 9 (The Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875), a person accused before a court of summary jurisdiction of any offence made punishable thereby and for which a penalty amounting to £20, or imprisonment, is imposed, may, on appearing before the court, declare that he objects to be tried for such offence before a court of summary jurisdiction, when he is to be dealt with in all respects as if he were charged with an indictable offence. A defendant, if charged with an offence within this section, must be informed by the court of summary jurisdiction of his right to be tried by a jury. It was held by the learned chairman of the South London Sessions that it is not sufficient that he has heard a defendant in a previous case, charged with a similar offence arising out of the same subject-matter, informed of his right to be so tried, and he cannot, under these circumstances, be held to have waived his right to be informed by the court, when his case comes on, of his right to be tried by a jury (Harker v. Hopkins, 67 J. P. 428) When a defendant elects to be indicted before a jury instead of being summarily dealt with, the indictment may contain any charge which is covered by the evidence in the depositions (Reg. v. Brown, 11 T. L. R. 54; 64 L. J. M. C. 1). See also R. v. Fowler and Others, Ex parte Walters, 64 L. J. M. C. 9. The personal attendance of the defendant before the court of summary jurisdiction would seem to be necessary, otherwise the court cannot proceed to deal with a case under this section; it is only the " person charged" who may "claim to be tried by a jury." See an article on the general requirements of this section at 69 J. P. 507. 18. Imprisonment in cases of cumulative sentences not to exceed six months.] A court of summary jurisdiction shall not, by cumulative sentences of imprisonment (other than for default of finding sureties) to take effect in succession in respect of several assaults committed on the same occasion, impose on any person imprisonment for the whole exceeding six months. This section appears to apply to all assaults, whether common or aggravated assaults, and to assaults on constables or peace officers. The words "on the same occasion" would appear to apply only to assaults committed at the same time and place. Sect. 19. 19. Appeal from summary conviction to general_or quarter sessions.] Where, in pursuance of any Act, whether past or future, any person is adjudged by a conviction or order of a court of summary jurisdiction to be imprisoned without the option of a fine, either as a punishment for an offence, or, save as hereinafter mentioned, for failing to do or to abstain from doing any act or thing required to be done or left undone, and such person is not otherwise authorised to appeal to a court of general or quarter sessions, and did not plead guilty, or admit the truth of the information or complaint, he may, notwithstanding anything in the said Act, appeal to a court of general or quarter sessions against such conviction or order : Provided that this section shall not apply where the imprisonment is adjudged for failure to comply with an order for the payment of money, for the finding of sureties, for the entering into any recognizance, or for the giving of any security. The procedure on appeal is provided for by s. 31, post. By s. 32 (now in part repealed by the S. J. Act, 1884), where an appeal is given by any prior Act, the appellant could follow the procedure under that Act or the present Act (s. 31). But in consequence of the repeal of a portion of s. 32, and the repeals in the Schedule of the S. J. Act, 1884, all appeals against magistrates' decisions (with certain exceptions, such as orders of removal, rating, appeals, etc.) will be under s. 31, post. See Shingler v. Smith there quoted. This section does not apply to cases dealt with under s. 12 of this Act, see R. v. London JJ., ante, p. 141, and it is assumed that the decision in that case will also apply to cases under ss. 10 and 11. The fact that the appellant when charged admitted an act of assault, but asked for the charge to be heard on the ground of mitigating circumstances, is not a simple plea of guilty debarring him from the right of appeal given under this section (Reg. v. Essex JJ., Ex parte Stark, 61 L. J. M. C. 120). In the metropolitan police courts there is an appeal in every case of summary order or conviction before any of the said magistrates in which the sum or penalty adjudged to be paid shall be more than £3 (exclusive of costs); see The Metropolitan Police Courts Act, 1839 (2 & 3 Vict. c. 71, s. 50); but an order of a magistrate adjudging payment of 2s. 6d. a week towards the maintenance of an adult female pauper is not an order in which the sum adjudged to be paid is more than £3 within the meaning of that section, and consequently no appeal lies to quarter sessions under that section against such an order (Reg. v. London JJ., 64 J. P. 357; 69 L. J. Q. B. 364). In R. v. Warwickshire JJ., 20 J. P. 693; 25 L. J. M. C. 119; 27 L. T. 235, it was held that the expression (in s. 25 of the |