Cruelty to Animals Act, 1849 (12 & 13 Vict. c. 92)) sum adjudged to be paid " did not include the sum to be paid for costs. In Rex v. Noris, 69 J. P. 288; 21 T. L. R. 517; 74 L. J. K. B. 633, it was held that a person who is adjudged to pay a fine under the Motor Car Act, 1903 (3 Edw. 7, c. 36), has, under s. 11 (2) of that Act, the right to appeal where the fine, taken by itself, exceds 208., but any costs which he may be ordered to pay cannot be taken into consideration in calculating the amount of the fine for the purpose of ascertaining whether he has the right to appeal.

See the table of appeals from decisions of magistrates not under the provisions of this Act, Archbold's Quarter Sessions, pp. 585 -609 (5th ed.).

Prior to the passing of this Act an appeal lay only when the statute on which the conviction was founded authorised it. For remarks and procedure on appeal, see s. 31, post.

20. Court of summary jurisdiction to sit at a petty sessional or occasional court-house, etc.]--(1) A case arising under this Act, or under any other Act, whether past or future, shall not be heard, tried, determined, or adjudged by a court of summary jurisdiction, except when sitting in open court.

(2) Open court means a petty sessional court-house or an occasional court-house.

[(3) (Repealed by 52 & 53 Vict. c. 63.)]

(4) An occasional court-house means such police station or other place as is appointed (as hereinafter provided) to be used as an occasional court-house.

(5) The justices of a petty sessional division of a county shall from time to time, at a sessions of which notice has been given to every justice of such division, appoint police stations or other places other than the petty sessional court-house, to be used as occasional courthouses, at which cases may be heard, tried, determined, and adjudged, and they may from time to time at such a sessions as aforesaid vary any police station or place so appointed, and shall cause public notice to be given in such manner as they think expedient of every police station or place for the time being appointed to be used as an occasional court-house.

[(6) (Repealed by 52 & 53 Vict. c. 63, post.)]

(7) Where a case arising under this Act, or under any other Act, whether past or future, is heard tried determined and adjudged by a court of summary jurisdiction sitting in an occasional court-house, the period of imprisonment imposed by the conviction or order of such

Sect. 19.

NOTE.

Sect. 20. court shall not exceed fourteen days, and the sum adjudged to be paid by the conviction or order of such court shall not exceed twenty shillings; and a justice of the peace when sitting alone in a petty sessional courthouse shall not have power to impose any greater term of imprisonment or adjudge any larger sum to be paid than is above mentioned.

(8) An indictable offence dealt with summarily in pursuance of this Act shall not be heard, tried, determined, or adjudged except by a petty sessional court sitting on some day appointed for hearing indictable offences, of which public notice has been given in such manner as to the justices of the petty sessional division seem expedient, or at some adjournment of such court.

(9) Any case arising under this Act, other than such indictable offence as aforesaid, and any case arising under any future Act which is triable by a court of summary jurisdiction, shall, unless it is otherwise prescribed, be heard tried determined and adjudged by a court of summary jurisdiction consisting of two or more justices.

(10) The Lord Mayor of the City of London, and any alderman of the said city, and any metropolitan or borough police magistrate or other stipendiary magistrate, when sitting in a court-house or place at which he is authorised by law to do alone any act authorised to be done by more than one justice of the peace, shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to be a court of summary jurisdiction consisting of two or more justices, and also to be a court of summary jurisdiction sitting in a petty sessional courthouse, and is in this Act included in the expression "petty sessional court."

(11) A court of summary jurisdiction, when not a petty sessional court, may, without prejudice to any other power of adjournment which the court may possess, adjourn the hearing of any case to the next practicable sitting of a petty sessional court in the same manner in all respects as a justice is authorised to adjourn the hearing of a case under section sixteen of the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1848.

Court of Summary Jurisdiction. For definition of "court of summary jurisdiction now see the Interpretation Act, 1889 (52 & 53 Vict. c. 63), s. 13 (11), post, in the Appendix, and for "petty sessional court," as above, sub-s. (12), and for "petty sessional court-house," as above, sub-s. (13). The effect of these

NOTE.

seems to be that whenever a "judicial" act or one within the Sect. 20. meaning of the words "heard, tried, determined, or adjudged," is required to be done under any Act of Parliament whatever by a justice or justices, such justice or justices form a court of summary jurisdiction, and must sit in open court.

Petty Sessional Court-house.-In a borough which had a separate commission of the peace the mayor and a county justice used to sit at the town hall where they held petty and special sessions. Since this Act (s. 20) the petty sessions had been held at the county hall only, but latterly, since 47 & 48 Vict. c. 43, the justices again sat in the town hall :-Held, the town hall was a petty sessional court-house within the meaning of this section, being a place where justices were accustomed to assemble (Jones v. Jones, 51 J. P. 198).

For further definitions of the expression "court of summary jurisdiction," see R. v. Glamorganshire JJ., [1892] 1 Q. B. 621 ; 56 J. P. 437; 61 L. J. M. C. 169; and Deputies of Freemen of Borough of Leicester v. Lewitt, 57 J. P. 344; 62 L. J. M. C. 51; 68 L. T. 201, in which latter case justices acting under a private Act were held to be a court of summary jurisdiction. In the case of R. v. Glamorganshire JJ., above cited, Lord Justice FRY said in reference to the definition of court of summary jurisdiction, in s. 13 (11) of the Interpretation Act, 1889, post: "I cannot imagine a more exhaustive definition. It appears to me to include a justice of the peace doing anything, for it applies whether he is acting under a statute, or at common law, or by virtue of his commission. I cannot conceive how any person ever can act as a justice except under one of these heads. The effect seems to be that a court of summary jurisdiction means a justice or justices of the peace acting as such." This case decided that justices when acting as licensing justices were a "court of summary jurisdiction." It has been overruled by the House of Lords in Boulter v. Kent JJ. and Others, 61 J. P. 532; 13 T. L. R. 538; 66 L. J. Q. B. 787; 77 L. T. 288, which case decides that a licensing meeting of justices is not a court of summary jurisdiction within the meaning of the S. J. Acts. See further as to this case, the note to s. 6 of the S. J. Act, 1884, post.

A question was raised in the Justice of the Peace (49 J. P. 27), whether justices sitting to make an order of removal of a pauper should sit in open court as defined by the Summary Jurisdiction Acts, and the editors expressed an opinion that they should, notwithstanding the exceptions in s. 35 of 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, and that the S. J. Acts of 1879 and 1884 are to be read as one with the Act 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43. But in 50 J. P. 636, the editors qualified their previous opinion, and expressed some doubt as to its accuracy. See also 53 J. P. 187.

It may be here noticed that justices hearing indictable cases will now since the S. J. Act, 1884, have to sit for that purpose in open court. Section 19 of 11 & 12 Vict. c. 42 (see note thereon, post), provided that the room or building in which the justices should

Sect. 20.
NOTE.

take the examination in indictable cases should not be deemed to be an open court for that purpose.

The law officers of the Crown advised on December 1st, 1884, that a justice when acting in relation to indictable offences is a "court of summary jurisdiction." See 48 J. P. 831, and 78 L. T. Newsp. 140. At 58 J. P. 722, a letter from the Home Office is set out in which the Home Secretary states "that his opinion on a question of law is of no binding validity, but that he is advised that a magistrate or magistrates investigating a charge of an indictable offence under 11 & 12 Vict. c. 42, are not hearing. trying, determining, or adjudging a case within the meaning of s. 20 of the S. J. Act, 1879, and are, therefore, not bound to examine the witnesses in open court." It is, however, clear that as no objection can be taken by the examination taking place in open court, the practice followed in the metropolitan police courts and the justice rooms of the City of London is the safer one to adopt. The whole subject of sitting in " open court" or with closed doors is set out at 60 J. P. 131.

With regard to taking a dying deposition' not in "open court," see Rex v. Katz, 46 J. P. 807; 17 T. L. R. 67, set out in the notes to s. 17 of 11 & 12 Vict. c. 42, post.

Adjournment. With regard to the power of adjournment mentioned in sub-s. (11), it is to be observed that in summary cases there does not appear to be any such definite limit of time to which the adjournment can be made as is given in the case of a remand under 11 & 12 Vict. c. 42, s. 21, post, where a defendant may be remanded to prison for a period not exceeding eight clear days.

In the metropolitan and City of London police courts the rule is never to exceed the period of eight clear days in remanding a defendant in custody whether for an offence punishable on summary conviction or for an indictable offence.

As to the power of a court of summary jurisdiction to remand for indictable offences which it has or may have power to deal with summarily under the circumstances mentioned in this Act, see s. 24, post.

For remand under the Youthful Offenders Act, 1901, see 1 Edw. 7, c. 20, s. 4, post, in the Appendix.

21. Special provisions as to warrants of commitment for non-payment of sums of money, and as to warrants of distress.]-(1) A court of summary jurisdiction to whom application is made either to issue a warrant of distress for any sum adjudged to be paid by a conviction or order, or to issue a warrant for committing a person to prison for non-payment of a sum of money adjudged to be paid by a conviction, or in the case of a sum not a civil debt by an order, or for default of sufficient distress to satisfy any

such sum, may, if the court deem it expedient so to do, Sect. 21. postpone the issue of such warrant until such time, and on such conditions, if any, as to the court may seem just.

(2) The wearing apparel and bedding of a person and his family, and, to the value of five pounds, the tools and implements of his trade, shall not be taken under a distress issued by a court of summary jurisdiction.

(3) Where a person is adjudged by the conviction of a court of summary jurisdiction, or in the case of a sum not a civil debt by an order of such court, to pay any sum of money, and on default of payment of such sum a warrant of distress is authorised to be issued, and it appears to the court of summary jurisdiction to whom application is made to issue such warrant that such person has no goods whereon to levy the distress, or that in the event of a warrant of distress being issued his goods will be insufficient to satisfy the money payable by him, or that the levy of the distress will be more injurious to him or his family than imprisonment, such court, instead of issuing such warrant of distress, may, if it think fit, order the said person on non-payment of the said sum to be imprisoned for any period not exceeding the period for which he is liable under such conviction or order to be imprisoned in default of sufficient distress.

(4) Where on application to a court of summary jurisdiction to issue a warrant for committing a person to prison for non-payment of a sum adjudged to be paid by a conviction of any court of summary jurisdiction, or in the case of a sum not a civil debt by an order of such court, or for default of sufficient distress to satisfy any such sum, it appears to the court to whom the application is made that either by payment of part of the said sum, whether in the shape of instalments or otherwise, or by the net proceeds of the distress, the amount of the sum so adjudged has been reduced to such an extent that the unsatisfied balance, if it had constituted the original amount adjudged to be paid by the conviction or order, would have subjected the defendant to a maximum term of imprisonment less than the term of imprisonment to which he is liable under such conviction or order, the court shall, by its warrant of commitment, revoke the term of imprisonment, and order the defendant to be imprisoned for a term not exceeding such less maximum