Sect. 21.

term, instead of for the term originally mentioned in the conviction or order.

In sub-s. (2) "bedding" includes "bedstead." See Davis v. Harris, [1900] 1 Q. B. 729; 64 J. P. 136; 16 T. L. R. 140; 69 L. J. Q. B. 232.

Sub-section (3) applies only to offences punishable by fine, or in default of payment, by imprisonment, not to offences for which the alternative punishments are fine or imprisonment. See In re Clew (1881), 8 Q. B. D. 511; 46 J. P. 534; 51 L. J. M. C. 140; 46 L. T. 482.

For

procedure on the execution of distress warrants, see

s. 43, post.

This section partially supersedes ss. 19, 21, and 22 of the S. J. Act of 1848, ante, and provides a more convenient procedure.

As to the discretion of justices to issue distress warrants, see R. v. German, 56 J. P. 358; 66 L. T. 264; 61 L. J. M. C. 43; 8 T. L. R. 26, where it was held that the justices were in their discretion entitled to receive affirmative evidence that the defendants possessed goods primâ facie distrainable, and in the absence of it, could not as of right be called upon by the prosecutor to issue distress warrants.

See Forms [18, 24, 25, 29, 31, and 32] of the Consolidated Forms, 1886, post.

In reference to this section, see also S. J. Act, 1884, s. 5, post, and the extracts from the Home Office Circular of June 14th, 1905, set out in the notes to s. 7 of this Act, ante, p. 128.

SUPPLEMENTAL PROVISIONS.

22. Register of court of summary jurisdiction.]— (1) The clerk of every court of summary jurisdiction shall keep a register of the minutes or memorandums of all the convictions and orders of such court, and of such other proceedings as are directed by a rule under this Act to be registered, and shall keep the same with such particulars and in such form as may be from time to time directed by

a rule under this Act.

(2) Such register, and also any extract from such register certified by the clerk of the court keeping the same to be a true extract, shall be primâ facie evidence of the matters entered therein for the purpose of informing a court of summary jurisdiction acting for the same county borough or place as the court whose convictions orders and proceedings are entered in the register; but nothing in this section shall dispense with the legal proof of a previous conviction for an offence when required to be proved against a person charged with another offence.

(3) The register kept by any particular clerk, in Sect. 22. pursuance of this section, may be distinguished by the name of his petty sessional division, or by such name or description as may be directed by a rule under this Act. (4) The entries relating to each minute, memorandum, or proceeding shall be either entered or signed by the justice or one of the justices constituting the court by or before whom the conviction or order or proceeding referred to in the minute or memorandum was made or had, except that when a court of summary jurisdiction is not a petty sessional court a return signed as aforesaid, and made and entered in the register in manner provided by a rule under this Act, shall suffice.

(5) Every sum paid to the clerk of a court of summary jurisdiction in accordance with the Summary Jurisdiction Acts, and the appropriation of such sum, shall be entered and authenticated in such manner as may be from time to time directed by a rule under this Act.

(6) Every such register shall be open for inspection, without fee or reward, by any justice of the peace, or by any person authorised in that behalf by a justice of the peace or by a Secretary of State.

Proof is required in all cases of a second offence (Giles v. Siney, 28 J. P. 756; 11 L. T. 310; 13 W. R. 92).

Sub-section (2) may possibly be applied to cases such as repeated convictions, by the same court, of persons found drunk. See London School Board v. Harvey (1879), 4 Q. B. D. 451; 43 J. P. 316; 48 L. J. M. C. 130. And see note to s. 14, ante, p. 143.

See S. J. Rules, 1886, Nos. 3-12, post.

This section applies to proceedings taken under s. 256 of the Public Health Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55), for the recovery of a general district rate made by an urban authority under that Act. See Southwark and Vauxhall Water Co. v. Hampton Urban Council, [1899] 1 Q. B. 273; 63 J. P. 100; 15 T. L. R. 95; 68 L. J. Q. B. 207.

A magistrate sitting in his own court is entitled to act on the information contained in the register of that court kept under this section, and the minute and memorandum directed by s. 14 of the S. J. Act, 1848, ante. See Commissioner of Police v. Donovan, 67 J. P. 47; 72 L. J. K. B. 545; 19 T. L. R. 392.

23. Regulations as to securities taken in pursuance of Act.]-(1) A person shall give security under this Act, whether as principal or surety, either by the deposit of money with the clerk of the court, or by an oral or written acknowledgment of the undertaking or condition. by which and of the sum for which he is bound, in such

Sect. 23.

manner and form as may be for the time being directed by any rule made in pursuance of this Act, and evidence of such security may be provided by entry thereof in the register under this Act of proceedings of a court of summary jurisdiction or otherwise as may be directed by such rule.

(2) Any sum which may become due in pursuance of a security under this Act from a surety shall be recoverable summarily, in manner directed by this Act with respect to a civil debt, on complaint by a constable or by the clerk of the court directing such security to be given, or by some other person authorised for the purpose by that court or any other court of summary jurisdiction for the same county borough or place.

(3) A court of summary jurisdiction may enforce payment of any sum due by a principal in pursuance of a security under this Act which appears to such court to be forfeited, in like manner as if that sum were adjudged by a court of summary jurisdiction to be paid as a fine which the statute provides no mode of enforcing, if the security was given for a sum adjudged by a conviction, and in any other case in like manner as if it were a sum adjudged by a court of summary jurisdiction to be paid as a civil debt; provided that before a warrant of distress for the sum is issued, such notice of the forfeiture shall be served on the said principal, and in such manner as may be directed for the time being by rules under this Act, and subject thereto by the court authorising the security, or by any court to whom application is made for the issue of the warrant.

(4) Any sum paid by a surety on behalf of his principal in respect of a security under this Act, together with all costs charges and expenses incurred by such surety in respect of that security, shall be deemed a civil debt due to him from the principal, and may be recovered before a court of summary jurisdiction in manner directed by this Act with respect to the recovery of a civil debt which is recoverable summarily.

(5) Where security is given under this Act for payment of a sum of money, the payment of such sum shall be enforced by means of such security in substitution for other means of enforcing such payment.

This section furnishes regulations for securities taken under this Act. These securities are those mentioned in s. 7, the proviso to ss. 9, 16, and 31 (3) and (4).

The distinction between securities taken under this Act and recognizances must be borne in mind; bail for a person committed for trial cannot be said to be a security under this Act. See 49 J. P. 347.

The rules relating to this section are the S. J. Rules, 1886, post, 14, 15, and 16.

See Forms [26, 40, 41, and 42] of Consolidated Forms, 1886, post. And as to civil debt procedure, s. 35, post.

As to securities by married women, see s. 21 of 11 & 12 Vict. c. 42, post.

24. Power of court of summary jurisdiction to remand for indictable offences.]-(1) Where a person is charged before a court of summary jurisdiction with an indictable offence, with which a court of summary jurisdiction has or may have under the circumstances in this Act mentioned power to deal summarily, the court before whom such person is charged, without prejudice to any other power that it may possess,―

(a) may, for the purpose of ascertaining whether it is expedient to deal with the case summarily, either before or during the hearing of the case, from time to time adjourn the case and remand the person accused and

(b) if such court is not at the time of the charge a petty sessional court, and the court think the case proper to be dealt with summarily, may adjourn the case and remand the person accused until the next practicable sitting of a petty sessional court.

(2) A person may be remanded under this section in like manner in all respects as a person accused of an indictable offence may be remanded under section twentyone of the Indictable Offences Act, 1848 (11 & 12 Vict. c. 42), with this addition, that where he is remanded to the next practicable sitting of a petty sessional court he may be remanded for more than eight days.

See s. 21 of 11 & 12 Vict. c. 42, post.

The power of remanding for more than eight days to the next practicable sitting of a petty sessional court is only to apply to those indictable cases with which a court of summary jurisdiction has or may have under the circumstances in this Act mentioned power to deal summarily. As, however, by s. 27 (1), post, the procedure shall, until the court assume the power to deal with the indictable offence summarily, be the same in all respects as if the offence were to be dealt with throughout as an indictable

Sect. 23.

NOTE.

Sect. 24.

NOTE

offence, it is difficult to see how this power of remanding for more than eight days can be exercised until the accused person by his own action (or by that of his parent or guardian in the case of a child) has given the court jurisdiction to deal summarily with the case. It certainly appears the safer course to remand for a period "not exceeding eight clear days."

But under sub-s. (1) (b) a remand until the "next practicable sitting of a petty sessional court" may be for a longer period than eight clear days.

For powers to remand for more than seven days under the Reformatory Schools Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 48), see note to s. 11 of this Act, ante, p. 138.

As to remand under the Youthful Offenders Act, 1901, see 1 Edw. 7, c. 20, s. 4, post, in the Appendix.

See Forms [36, 37, and 38] of Consolidated Forms, 1886, post; and as the procedure (by s. 27 (1), post) is to be (until the court decides to deal summarily) as if dealing with an indictable offence, and as by sub-s. (2) of this section a person is to be remanded as if charged with an indictable offence, it seems that the forms of recognizance mentioned in s. 21 of 11 & 12 Vict. c. 42, post, may be used as alternative forms with those above quoted.

25. Procedure before court of summary jurisdiction in case of sureties to keep the peace.] The power of a court of summary jurisdiction, upon complaint of any person, to adjudge a person to enter into a recognizance and find sureties to keep the peace or to be of good behaviour towards such first-mentioned person, shall be exercised by an order upon complaint, and the Summary Jurisdiction Acts shall apply accordingly, and the complainant and defendant and witnesses may be called and examined and cross-examined, and the complainant and defendant shall be subject to costs, as in the case of any other complaint.

The court may order the defendant, in default of compliance with the order, to be imprisoned for a period not exceeding, if the court be a petty sessional court, six months, and if the court be a court of summary jurisdiction other than a petty sessional court, fourteen days.

Sureties of the Peace. The procedure in case of sureties to keep the peace is materially altered by this section. Previous to the passing of this Act, sureties to keep the peace or be of good behaviour were granted on the oath of the informant only, the justices being satisfied that there had been a threat; and the person against whom articles of the peace were exhibited could not give evidence in contradiction of the facts stated in the articles (Lort v. Hutton, 40 J. P. 677; 45 L. J. M. C. 95; 33 L. T. 730). But when the justices thought that what was said did not