Sect. 31. deemed to have been served at the time when it would be delivered in the ordinary course of the post. As to procedure on appeals, see Archbold's Quarter Sessions (5th ed.), by Sir Sherston Baker; Appeals from the Convictions and Orders of Justices, by Trotter; and Appeals from Justices of the Peace, by Scholefield and Hill. Uniformity of Procedure on Appeal.—By s. 6 of the S. J. Act, 1884, all appeals against the convictions or orders of a court of summary jurisdiction authorised by any Act passed before 1st January, 1880, shall be subject to the conditions and regulations of the S. J. Act, 1879. In sub-ss. 2 and 3 of this section the words "within the prescribed time or if no time is prescribed" appear to be impliedly repealed by the S. J. Act, 1884, s. 6, post (R. v. Glamorganshire JJ. (1889), L. R. 22 Q. B. D. 628, post). The Interpretation Act, 1889, s. 13 (11), post, defines the meaning of the expression "court of summary jurisdiction." Effect of S. J. Act, 1884.—As to the effect of the S. J. Act, 1884, the judgment of DENMAN, J., in Shingler v. Smith, 51 J. P. 152; 54 L. T. 759; 55 L. J. M. C. 147; 17 Q. B. D. 49, may be quoted: "It having been decided, as I have already said, in R. v. Montgomeryshire JJ. (46 J. P. 517; 51 L. J. M. Č. 95), that on the construction of the existing statutes this option was allowable, the legislature in the S. J. Act, 1884, deliberately repealed the 32nd section of the previous Act, which had given the optional appeal proceedings. Nothing could have been more reasonable than that the legislature should put a stop to these optional proceedings, and hence in the schedule the very clause which had given the double proceeding is repealed. The result of this Act was to do away with different modes of procedure and to bring everything into a state of uniformity. That the Act intended to do this is perfectly clear from the preamble, 'expedient to provide for uniformity of procedure in all such cases,' that is, on appeals from courts of summary jurisdiction to courts of quarter sessions. What would become of uniformity if it were competent to an appellant to maintain that he still retained an optional mode of proceeding under the earlier Act? I do not think such a contention is open to any one after this lastmentioned Act of Parliament. If the previous procedure is not actually repealed, it certainly is impliedly repealed." Appeals generally.-In R. v. Montgomeryshire JJ., supra, it was held that on the construction of s. 32 of 42 & 43 Vict. c. 49, post, and the Poor Law Amendment Act, 1844 (7 & 8 Vict. c. 101). s. 4, the putative father had an opticn to comply with the procedure under the S. J. Acts, or the Bastardy Acts. The first part of s. 32, post, giving that option was repealed by the S. J. Act, 1884, post, and after such repeal the case of Shingler v. Smith, supra, came before the Queen's Bench Division, and that NOTE. last-mentioned case decided that in an appeal from an order of Sect. 31. bastardy made by a court of summary jurisdiction the appellant's notice of appeal must state the grounds of such appeal under the 31st section of 42 & 43 Vict. c. 49, the repeal of part of the 32nd section of that Act by the 4th section of the S. J. Act, 1884, having taken away the alternative mode of procedure under 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101, s. 4. An appeal from an order of a court of summary jurisdiction made under the Distress for Rent Act, 1737 (11 Geo. 2, c. 19, ss. 4 and 5), by a person adjudged guilty of fraudulently removing goods to prevent distress must be made in conformity with the procedure under this section (Reg. v. Shropshire JJ., 6 Q. B. D. 669 45 J. P. 236 n.; 46 J. P. 196; 50 L. J. M. C. 72; 29 W. R. 567). At the hearing of an appeal under the Licensing Act, 1872 (35 & 36 Vict. c. 94, s. 52), it appeared that notice of appeal was given on Monday, the 10th March, and the recognizance entered into on Friday, the 14th of the same month, and the quarter sessions, no explanation of the delay being offered, dismissed the appeal :Held, upon an application for a mandamus for the sessions to hear the appeal, that affidavits accounting for the delay ought not to be considered, and that the sessions upon the evidence before them were warranted in finding that the recognizance had not been entered into "immediately" after the notice (Reg. v. Berkshire JJ., L. R. 4 Q. B. D. 469; 48 L. J. M. C. 137; 27 W. R. 798). In R. v. Glamorganshire JJ. (1889), 22 Q. B. D. 628; 53 J. P. 228, 296; 58 L. J. M. C. 93; 60 L. T. 536; 16 Cox C. C. 593, the appellant was convicted of selling beer without a licence under the Beerhouse Act, 1834 (4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 85), s. 17:Held, that the S. J. Acts, 1879 and 1884, impliedly repeal the provisions of the Excise Management Act, 1827 (7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 53), s. 82, as to the time at which notice of appeal should be given, and substitute the provisions of the S. J. Act, 1879. Lord COLERIDGE said: "My conclusion is that on the whole the true effect and meaning of the Acts (i.e., S. J. Acts, 1879 and 1884). . . is to get rid of all other procedure (i.e., on appeals from summary convictions) except that provided by the S. J. Acts." See also R. v. Yorkshire (West Riding) JJ., 64 L. J. M. C. 192. But in R. v. Somerset JJ., L. R. 22 Q. B. D. 625; 53 J. P. 470, which was an appeal against poor law orders of removal, it was held that the justices must hear and determine the appeal under the old practice. Must not this case be deemed to be overruled by the Court of Appeal in Reg. v. Glamorganshire JJ. (1892), infra, in consequence of the definition of a court of summary jurisdiction in the Interpretation Act, 1889, s. 13 (11)? The Quarter Sessions Act, 1849 (12 & 13 Vict. c. 45), s. 1, post (Appendix), commonly called "Baines' Act," enacted that in every case of appeal (except appeals against orders of removal, etc.) to any court of general or quarter sessions of the peace fourteen clear days' notice of appeal shall be given, and such shall be sufficient notice, and shall be in writing signed by the person or persons Sect. 31. NOTE. giving the same, or by his, her, or their attorney on his, her, or their behalf, and the grounds of appeal shall be specified in every such notice; and it shall not be lawful for the appellant or appellants, on the trial of any such appeal, to go into or give evidence of any other ground of appeal besides those set forth in the notice. The S. J. Act, 1884, repeals this section so far as relates to any appeal against an order of a court of summary jurisdiction. But this section never applied to appeals from summary convictions (12 & 13 Vict. c. 45, s. 2), post. Having regard, therefore, to the extensive use of the term, order of "a court of summary jurisdiction" [52 & 53 Vict. c. 63, s. 13 (11), post, (Appendix)], s. 1 of Baines' Act appears to be now nugatory. According to the literal reading of the S. J. Act, 1884, s. 6, post, the obligation to follow the procedure of the S. J. Act, 1879, s. 31, in appeals from convictions or orders of courts of summary jurisdiction only applies when such convictions or orders are "made in pursuance of the S. J. Acts" (see as to the meaning of the "S. J. Acts," s. 13 of Interpretation Act, 1889, post). The test whether a conviction or order is "made in pursuance of the S. J. Acts' may be applied by considering whether the proceeding was commenced by an information or complaint within the S. J. Act, 1848. But in Shingler v. Smith, supra, the words "made in pursuance of the S. J. Acts," were disregarded. A statutory exception to the principle laid down in the last case occurs, however, in the Lunacy Act, 1890 (53 Vict. c. 5, s. 313), which provides that the procedure in the S. J. Act, 1879, shall not be applicable to appeals under Part 10 of that Act, relating to the expenses of pauper lunatics, and special procedure is provided by ss. 301-311. An appeal does not lie to quarter sessions against an order of petty sessions for the maintenance of a pauper (R. v. London JJ., [1900] 1 Q. B. 438; 64 J. P. 357; 69 L. J. Q. B. 364). No Appeal by Informant.-There is no appeal generally against an acquittal or dismissal in a criminal proceeding unless expressly authorised by statute, for example, the Excise Management Act, 1827 (7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 53), s. 82, which allows an appeal to an officer who exhibits an information. In Payne v. Uxbridge JJ., 45 J. P. 327, 420, where a charge has been heard and dismissed by a court of summary jurisdiction, the party laying the information or making the complaint has no right of appeal to quarter sessions, the only exception to the rule laid down in this case being that of an information under the Excise Management Acts (7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 53, s. 82, and 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 51, s. 23). In Reg. v. JJ. of London, Ex parte The Fulham Vestry, 25 Q. B. D. 357; 55 J. P. 56; 59 L. J. M. C. 146; 34 S. J. 586, a vestry summoned C. under s. 72 of the Highway Act, 1835 (5 & 6 Will 4, c. 50), for unlawfully and wilfully obstructing the free passage of a highway by erecting a fence across it. The charge was dismissed by the justices who heard it. Section 105 of the same Act provides that "if any person shall think himself aggrieved by any by Sect. 31. The order, conviction, judgment, or determination made When a party applies for a case to be stated under 20 & 21 Vict. e. 43, he is (by s. 14 of that Act) to be deemed to have abandoned his right to appeal to quarter sessions; and see Shackell v. West, 24 J. P. 22; 29 L. J. M. C. 45 ; 45 Jur. 95; 1 L. T. 28; 2 E. & F. 326. Where facts are alone in dispute the proper course is to appeal to quarter sessions. See R. v. Yeomans, 24 J. P. 149; 1 L. T. 369; but where there is a right of appeal to quarter sessions, this fact does not take away the power of the justices to state a case (Muir v. Hore, 41 J. P. 471; 47 L. J. M. C. 17; 13 L. T. 315). There is no appeal under the Metropolis Management Act, 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 120), s. 231, against orders of justices for demolition of buildings under the Metropolis Management Amendment Act, 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 102), s. 75, which section is now repealed. See R. v. Middlesex JJ., 9 Q. B. D. 41; 46 J. P. 551; 51 L. J. M. C. 94; 30 W. R. 657. These orders are now made under the London Building Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. ccxiii.), s. 170, but the ruling in this case will apparently apply to such orders. Where a party having a ground of appeal fails to avail himself of it within the time limited, he cannot afterwards have advantage of it by application, action, or otherwise (Ex parte Overseers of Birmingham, 10 Q. B. 868; 18 L. J. M. C. 89; Luton Local Board v. Davis, 24 J. P. 677; 29 L. J. M. C. 173; 6 Jur. (N.S.) 580; 8 W. R. 411; 2 L. T. 172; Wilson v. Sunderland, 34 L. J. M. C. 90; and Ex parte May, 26 J. P. 340; 31 L. J. M. C. 161 ; 2 B. & S. 426). To what Sessions.-The appeal is to be to the prescribed court of general or quarter sessions, or the next practicable court of general or quarter sessions, for the county, borough, or place within which, or by the justices of which, the act complained of was done. See 28 & 29 Vict. c. 37, as to quarter sessions in Sussex, and 37 & 38 Vict. c. 45, as to those in Hertfordshire; and see R. v. Sussex JJ., 29 J. P. 180; 34 L. J. M. C. 69; 4 B. & S. 966 ; 11 Jur. 300; 11 L. T. 740; 13 W. R. 471, where it was held that, though the time for giving notice of appeal must be calculated with reference to the first day of the session, yet when, for practical convenience, the county is divided into distinct divisions, and a distinct court is held in each division by adjournment from one to the other, and the rules of practice made by the court in each division assume that the day when the court for that division begins its sittings is the first day of the session, it is sufficient if the grounds of appeal are delivered (under the Poor Law Procedure Act, 1848 (11 & 12 Vict. c. 31), s. 9), fourteen clear days NOTE. Sect. 31. NOTE. before the first day of the sitting of the court for the division in which the appeal, according to the practice, is to be tried. And see also R. v. London JJ., 15 East, 632. Meaning of "Practicable." -As to the meaning of "practicable," see R. v. Surrey JJ., 6 Q. B. D. 100; 45 J. P. 93; 50 L. J. M. C. 10; 43 L. T. 500; 29 W. R. 260, which was an appeal against a poor rate. The rate was made and allowed on March 20th (Saturday), and published on following day. The quarter sessions next after such publication were held on April 6th. A party, therefore, if bound to bring his appeal to the April sessions would have had to give notice thereof on March 22nd, in accordance with 12 & 13 Vict. c. 45, s. 1. S. and Son, appellants, gave notice on June 7th for the next sessions holden July 5th :Held, that under the circumstances the notice was in time, and they were not even bound to enter at and respite their appeal from the April sessions, Notice of Appeal. The notice of appeal must be in writing, and when it is given by an agent on behalf of the appellant the agent should state himself in the notice to be such agent. Service upon the justices is not now required. In Reg. v. Justices of Essex, Ex parte Stark, [1892] 1 Q. B. 490; 56 J. P. 375; 61 L.J. M. C. 120; 66 L. T. 676; 17 Cox C. C. 521, it was held that the addressing of a notice of appeal under this section to the clerk to the justices instead of to the justices personally from whose decision the appeal is laid is a sufficient and valid form for the notice. With regard to serving notice of appeal on the other party, see R. v. Oxfordshire JJ., [1893] 2 Q. B. 149; 57 J. P. 409; 9 T. L. R. 520; 62 L. J. M. C. 157, where notice of appeal against an affiliation order was served on the solicitor who had represented the respondent before the justices; the respondent subsequently changed her solicitor, and on the hearing of the appeal objection was taken that the notice of appeal had not been properly served: -Held, that no notice of appeal had been given to the respondent Where the notice of appeal is sent to the wrong address the refusal of the quarter sessions to entertain the appeal was upheld in R. v. Essex JJ., Ex parte Holmes, 11 T. L. R. 187. Personal service of a notice of appeal to quarter sessions from a conviction under the Licensing Acts is not necessary. See Reg. v. Somerset JJ., 64 J. P. 341; 69 L. J. Q. B. 311; 16 T. L. R. 166. The notice is also to state the general grounds of appeal. See, as to this, R. v. Oxfordshire JJ., 1 B. & C. 279; 2 Dowl. & R. 426, and R. v. Newcastle-on-Tyne JJ., 1 B. & Ad. 933, where a man, convicted under the Vagrancy Act, 1824, for indecent exposure, appealed against the conviction, and stated as the ground of appeal that he was "not guilty of the said offence." This was, by the Queen's Bench, held sufficient. Three persons were convicted of an offence, and gave joint notice of appeal; at the sessions a separate conviction of one of them was produced, and the justices dismissed the appeal on the ground that the notices should have been |