APPENDIX TO STATUTES AND PARTS OF STATUTES RELATING TO JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE OF COURTS OF SUMMARY JURISDICTION. (WHERE A STATUTE DEALS WITH MORE THAN ONE SUBJECT, ITS VARIOUS SECTIONS ARE ARRANGED ACCORDING TO THE SUBJECT-MATTER). 12 & 13 Vict. c. 45. (The Quarter Sessions Act, 1849, com 14 & 15 Vict. c. 55. (The Criminal Justice Administration 40 & 41 Vict. c. 43. 45 & 46 Vict. c. 50. 7 Geo. 4, c. 64. 22 & 23 Vict. c. 17. 30 & 31 Vict. c. 35. ... ... 441 443 ... ... 448 the oath of C. D., of , farmer, and others for that [etc., stating shortly the offence]: These are therefore to command you, the said constable of to take the said A. B., and him safely to convey to the [house of correction] at aforesaid, and there to deliver him to the keeper thereof, together with this precept; and I do hereby command you, the said keeper of the said [house of correction], to receive the said A. B. into your custody in the said [house of correction], and there safely to keep him until he shall be thence delivered by due course of law. Given under my hand and seal, this our Lord day of in the [county] aforesaid. (T. 2.) SECT. 26. in the year of J. S. (L.S.) Gaoler's Receipt to the Constable for the Prisoner, and Justice's Order thereon for Payment of the Constable's Expenses in executing the Commitment. I hereby certify, that I have received from W. T., constable of the body of A. B., together with a warrant under the hand and seal of J. S., Esquire, one of her Majesty's justices of the peace for the [county] of and that the said A. B. was [sober, or as the case may be] at the time he was so delivered into my custody. in the county of hath To R. W., Esquire, treasurer of the said [county] of Whereas W. T., constable of produced unto me, J. P., one of her Majesty's justices of the peace in and for the said county of (wherein the offence hereinafter mentioned is alleged to have been committed), the above receipt of P. K., keeper of the [house of correction] at : And whereas, in pursuance of the statute in such case made and provided, I have ascertained that the sum which ought to be paid to the said W. T. for conveying the said A. B. from in the said county of to the said [house of correction] is and that the reasonable expenses of the said W. T. in returning will amount to the further sum of making together the sum of These are therefore to order you, as such treasurer of the said county of to pay unto the said W. T. the said sum of according to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, for which payment this order shall be your sufficient voucher and authority. Given under my hand, this of day of 18. Sched. THE INDICTABLE OFFENCES ACT (31 & 32 VICT. c. 107). An Act to amend the Law relating to the indorsing of 1. [Repealed by Statute Law Revision Act, 1893.] 2. Short title.] This Act may be cited for all purposes as "The Indictable Offences Act Amendment Act, 1868." 3. Construction.] This Act, so far as is consistent with the tenor thereof, shall be construed as one with the Indictable Offences Act, 1848 (11 & 12 Vict. c. 42), and any Act amending the same. 4. Warrants issued in Scotland or Ireland may be backed in the Channel Islands, and vice versâ-Effect of warrants so backed. In the following cases, that is to say, Where a warrant is issued against any person by any competent magistrate in Scotland or Ireland, and such person goes or is supposed to have gone into any of the Channel Islands ; or Where a warrant is issued against any person by any competent magistrate in any of the Channel Islands, and such person goes or is supposed to have gone into Scotland or Ireland; any competent magistrate having jurisdiction over the place where such person is or is supposed to be may indorse such warrant in manner provided by the Indictable Offences Act, 1848, or as near thereto as circumstances admit. Any such warrant when so indorsed shall be a sufficient authority to the person or persons bringing the same, and to all persons to whom the same was originally directed, and also to all constables within the limits of the jurisdiction of the magistrate who indorsed the same, to execute such warrant within such last-mentioned limits, and to convey APPENDIX. THE JUSTICES PROTECTION ACT, 1848. (11 & 12 VICT. c. 44.) An Act to protect Justices of the Peace from vexatious Actions for Acts done by them in execution of their Office. [14th August 1848.] 1. An action against a justice for an act within his jurisdiction, shall be on the case as for a tort.] Every action hereafter to be brought against any justice of the peace for any act done by him in the execution of his duty as such justice, with respect to any matter within his jurisdiction as such justice, shall be an action on the case as for a tort; and in the declaration it shall be expressly alleged that such act was done maliciously, and without reasonable and probable cause; and if at the trial of any such action, upon the general issue being pleaded, the plaintiff shall fail to prove such allegation, he shall be non-suited, or a verdict shall be given for the defendant. By the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 61), justices are no longer entitled to plead the general issue. See note to s. 10, post. Before the passing of this statute if a conviction had actually been quashed, then by the Justices Protection Act, 1803 (43 Geo. 3, c. 141), s. 1, in any action brought against a justice on account of any act, matter, or thing done by him in respect of such conviction, the plaintiff could only recover nominal damages and the amount of the penalty (if one had been imposed and levied), and costs of suit only when the action was an action on the case, and the acts alleged to be done by the justice were expressly alleged in the declaration to be done maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause. And this Act was construed to extend only to cases in which something had been irregularly done by the justice in the matter within his jurisdiction. In the present section, however, there is no distinction between cases in which the conviction or proceeding has been quashed and where it has not. In both cases, if the matter complained of were done by the justice in a matter of which he had jurisdiction, the action must be an action on the case, and the declaration must allege the act to have been done maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause, and the allegation must be proved as laid. Protection of Justices acting as such.-A judgment of KELLY, C.B., in Scott v. Stansfield, L. R. 3 Exch. 220; 37 L. J. Ex. 155; 16 W. R. 911; 18 L. T. 572 (which was an action for defamation against a county court judge), may be usefully quoted in reference to the protection given NOTE. Appendix. to justices by this Act :-"It is essential in all courts that the judges who are appointed to administer the law should be permitted to administer it under the protection of the law independently and freely, without favour and without fear. This provision of the law is not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or a corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences. How could a judge so exercise his office if he were in daily and hourly fear of an action being brought against him?" See also the judgments in Garnett v. Ferrand, 6 B. & C. 626, and Kendillon v. Maltby, Car. & Mar. 402; 2 M. & R. 438, where it was held that an action will not lie against a justice for words spoken in giving judgment in a case reflecting on conduct of witnesses in such case. Whether Action Lies against a Justice for a Judicial Act.-It seems that the first section of this Act is wide enough in its language to imply that actions against justices acting judicially in a matter within their jurisdiction are maintainable; but it may well be doubted whether such is the true meaning of the section. And from the principles in the above quoted judgment of KELLY, C.B., and the decisions in Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby, L. R. 8 Q. B. 255; 7 H. L. 744; 45 L. J. Q. B. 8; 33 L. T. 196 ; 23 W. R. 931; and Gelan v. Hall, 21 J. P. 710; 27 L. J. M. C. 78; 2 H. & N. 379, it would seem that no action is maintainable against a justice acting judicially in a matter within his jurisdiction for a malicious act done by him in that capacity. In Gelan v. Hall the declaration alleged that the defendant unlawfully, maliciously, and without reasonable and probable cause convicted the plaintiff. The court, in a considered judgment, said: "A rule was obtained on behalf of the defendant to set aside the verdict as being against the evidence, and also to arrest judgment, on the ground that the court above mentioned disclosed no legal cause of action. Upon the latter point we have bestowed much careful consideration, and we are not at present prepared to hold the count bad." Judicial and Ministerial Acts.-Should it be correct to say that no action lies against a justice for a judicial act, it will be necessary to distinguish between judicial acts and those merely ministerial. In Paley on Summary Convictions, 8th ed., p. 21, a number of ministerial and judicial acts are mentioned, to which it will be useful to refer. Declaration. The term "declaration" will now apply to the statement of claim in proceedings in the High Court; or by s. 14 of this statute, post, to the summons in proceedings in a county court as stating the substance of the action. A declaration against justices, where it sufficiently appeared that they had acted without jurisdiction, was held to be good, although it contained no allegation that they had acted maliciously, and without reasonable and probable cause (Pease v. Chaytor, 27 J. P. 309; 31 L. J. M. C. 1; 8 Jur. 482; 1 B. & S. 658; 5 L. T. 280; 3 B. & S. 620; 32 L. J. M. C. 121; 9 Jur. 664; 8 L. T. 613; and 11 W. R. 563). In an action against a magistrate for a malicious conviction the question is not whether there is any actual ground for imputing the crime to the plaintiff, but whether upon the hearing there appeared to be none. The plaintiff must prove a want of probable cause for the conviction, which he only can do by proving what passed upon the hearing before the magis trate when the conviction took place. The magistrate has nothing to do with the guilt or innocence of the offender except as they appear from the evidence laid before him (per GIBBS, C.J.: Burley v. Bethune, 5 Taunt. 583; and see Rogers v. Jones, 5 D. & R. 268; 3 B. & C. 409; R. & M. 129). |