v. Forster, 13 East, 405. Such evidence may be rebutted by shewing the period when the tenancy did in fact commence. Doe v. Copous, 4 T. R. 361. Where no specific time to quit was mentioned, but the notice was to quit "at the expiration of the current year," and a declaration in ejectment was served nearly a year afterwards, laying the demise half a-year after the notice, and the tenant, on being served with the declaration, made no objection to the notice to quit, nor set up any right to a longer possession, Lord Ellenborough held that it was a question for the jury whether the tenant must not be understood as having admitted that the tenancy was determined by the notice. Doe v. Woombwell, 2 Camp. 559. So where a notice was given to a weekly tenant to quit on Friday, provided his tenancy expired on Friday, or otherwise at the end of his tenancy next after one week from the date of this notice," upon an ejectment brought after a sufficient time had elapsed to cover a tenancy commencing on any day of the week, the notice was held sufficient. Doe v. Scott, 6 Bing. 362. If the tenant, upon application by his landlord, states his tenancy to have commenced on a particular day, he is concluded from disputing the accuracy of such statement. Doe v. Lambly, 2 Esp. 635. Receipt of rent, as a year's rent up to a particular day, is prima facie evidence of the commencement of the tenancy at that day. Doe v. Samuel, 5 Esp. 173.

Notice to quit, by whom to be given.] One of several joint-tenants may give notice, which will be good, at least for his share. Doe v. Chaplin, 3 Taunt. 120. And where it purports to be given on behalf of himself and the other joint-tenants, it is good for the whole. Doe v. Summersett, 1 B. & Ad. 135. And it seems a notice by one alone determines the whole where the tenant holds under the joint demise of all, although the co-tenants do not concur in the notice. S. C. ib. 140. See 2 M. & R. 434. (n). So where an agent gives the notice in the name of all, but by the authority of one only, it is good for all; for per Parke B., the lessee holds only so long as all agree. Doe v. Hughes, 7 M. & W. 139., accord. per Coleridge J., in Alford v. Vickery, Exeter Spr. As. 1842. But a notice, required to be " under the hands" of the lessors, is not good, if signed only by two out of three. Doe v. Cuthell, 5 East, 491. A notice signed by a stranger professing to be an agent for all the joint-tenants, ratified before ejectment brought, was held to be sufficient; Doe v. Woodward, 3 B. & A. 689; but the authority of this case has been questioned, and it has been held that a subsequent ratification is not sufficient unless given before the notice begins to run. Doe v. Walters, 10 B. & C. 626. Nor is the bringing an action a sufficient recognition. S. C. ib. For the notice must be one on which the lessee can safely act when given. Doe v. Goldwin, 2 Q. B. 143. Where the landlord is partner in a firm to which he has let the premises, he may eject upon a notice to himself and co-tenants. Per Patteson J. Doe v. Francis, Cornwall Sum. As. 1837., S. C. 4 M. & W.331. Where there was a proviso in a lease, that if either of the parties should be desirous to determine it, it should be lawful for him, "his executors or administrators," so to do upon twelve months' notice to the other of them, "his heirs, executors," &c., it was held that the devisee of the lessor was entitled to give such notice. Roe v. Hayley, 12 East, 464. A receiver appointed by the Court of Chancery with authority to let

lands has also authority to give a notice to quit. Doe v. Read, 12 East, 57. But a mere receiver of rent, as such, has no power to determine a tenancy. Per Parke J., Doe v. Walters, 10 B. & C. 633. An agent to receive and let has authority to determine a tenancy. Per Patteson J., Doe v. Mizem, 2 M. & Rob. 56. An agent of an agent cannot give a notice. Doe v. Robinson, 3 New Ca. 677. A verbal notice from the steward of a corporation is sufficient, without shewing an authority under seal. Roe v. Pierce, 2 Camp. 96.; recognised in Smith v. Birmingham Gas Co., 1 A. & E. 531.

Notice to quit, to whom to be given.] Where the premises have been underlet, the sub-tenancy must be determined either by a notice from the lessor to the lessee, or from the lessee to the sub-lessee; a notice from the lessor to the sub-lessee is inoperative; Pleasant v. Benson, 14 East, 234.; and unnecessary; Roe v. Wiggs, 2 New Rep. 330. The notice from the lessor to the lessee should be served upon the latter; service upon a relation of the sub-tenant on the premises is iusufficient, though addressed to the original lessee. Doe v. Levi, Adams, Eject. 115. Where A. had been tenant of certain premises, and, upon his leaving them, B. took possession, it was held that, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it might be presumed that he came in as assignee of A., although he had never paid rent; and that notice to quit was therefore rightly given to B. Doe v. Williams, 6 B. & C. 41. Where a corporation is tenant, notice to quit should be given to the corporation, and served upon its proper officers. Doe v. Woodman, 8 East, 228.

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Notice to quit, form of.] The form of notice is not material. It must, however, refer to some distinct time; therefore a notice to quit "forthwith," or " from henceforth," or " to quit" generally, would be bad. Goode v. Howells, 4 M. & W. 199. 201. But semble, a notice to quit given by a tenant "as soon as by law he might," would be good. Per Lord Abinger C. B. ib. The notice may be by parol, unless required to be in writing by agreement of the parties (Timmins v. Rowlison, 3 Burr. 1603.; Doe v. Crick, 5 Esp. 196.) or by the provisions of a power. Doe v. Benion, Willes, 43. Though the courts listen with reluctance to objections to the form of the notice, (Doe v. Archer, 14 East, 245.), it must yet be explicit and positive, and not give the tenant an option of continuing under a new agreement; but a notice to quit, or I shall insist on double rent," was held good, because the latter part of the notice evidently referred only to the penalty inflicted by 4 Geo. 2. c. 28., though the terms of that statute (which gives double the annual value) were mistaken. Doe v. Jackson, 1 Doug. 175. If the notice had really contained the option of a new agreement, and said, for instance, or else that you agree to pay double rent," Lord Mans. field C. J., was of opinion that it would not have been good. Ibid. Where the notice stated that the tenant on failure would be required to pay double rent or value so long as he detained possession, it was held good. Doe v. Goldwin, 2 Q. B. 143. So where the notice was to quit on the 25th day of March, or 8th day of April next ensuing," and was delivered before new Michaelmas day, it was held good as intended to meet a holding commencing either at new or old Lady day, and not to give an alternative. Doe v. Wrightman, 4 Esp. 5. And it has been held that a notice to quit at " Michaelmas," will do either for

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old or new Michaelmas-day according to the period of the commencement of the tenancy. Doe t. Vince, 2 Camp. 256.; Doe v. Walker, 2 Peake Add. Ca. 194. A notice to quit on the 24th of June," agreeably to covenant," the covenant requiring a notice expiring at Michaelmas, is bad; and evidence is not admissible to shew that the landlord understood it to mean Michaelmas. Cadby v. Martinez, 11 A. & E. 720. An obvious mistake will not vitiate the notice; as where a notice was given at Michaelmas, 1795, to quit at Lady-day, "which will be in the year 1794," and the defendant was told at the time of the service of the notice that he must quit at next Lady-day. Doe v. Kightley, 7 T. R. 63. So a notice dated 27th September, and served on the 28th, requiring the tenant to quit at " the end of his current year," (which was Michaelmas), will be understood to mean Michaelmas in the succeeding year. Doe v. Culliford, 4 D. & R. 248. So, where the tenancy of land began on 2d February, and of houses on 1st May, a notice dated and served on 22nd October, 1833, to quit both land and houses, "at the expiration of half a year from this notice, or at such other time or times as your present year's holding of the premises or any part thereof respectively shall expire after the expiration of half a year from this notice," was held a sufficient notice to determine the tenancy of the houses on 1st May, 1834, and of the lands on 2nd February, 1835. Doe v. Smith, 5 A. & E. 350. A misdescription of the premises which can lead to no mistake will not be fatal, as where a house is described as "the Waterman's Arms," when in fact it is called "the Bricklayer's Arms," there being no sign called the Waterman's Arms in the parish. Doe v., 4 Esp. 185. So where the parish was misnamed in the notice. Doe v. Wilkinson, 12 A. & E. 743. As a lessor cannot determine the tenancy as to part of the things demised and continue it as to the rest, the notice must include all the premises held under the same demise, and the courts will if possible give effect to the notice so as to determine the tenancy altogether. Doe v. Archer, 14 East, 245.; Doe v. Church, 3 Camp. 71. Where the notice is directed to the tenant by a wrong christian name, and he keeps it, the irregularity is waived. Doe v. Spiller, 6 Esp. 70. A notice to quit to a tenant of lands originally devised to the rector and churchwardens of a parish and their successors in trust, signed by the rector and churchwardens, requiring the tenant to deliver up the premises "to the rector and churchwardens for the time being" (there being no such corporation) is bad. Doe v. Fairclough, 6 M. & S. 40. Where a tenant gives an irregular notice to quit, the landlord cannot treat it as a surrender. Doe v. Milward, 3 M. & W. 328.

Notice to quit, service of.] When the notice is in writing, it is not necessary that it should be personally served upon the tenant. Doe v. Wrightman, 4 Esp. 5. It is sufficient if the notice is delivered and explained to the servant of the tenant at his dwelling-house, though the dwelling-house be not on the demised premises; such service affording presumptive evidence that the notice came to the hands of the tenant, the servant not being called; Doe v. Marsh, 4 T. R. 464. ; and it is sufficient, though the tenant, by reason of absence, be not informed of it till within half a year of its expiration. Doe v. Dunbar, M. & M. 10. And it seems that service at the tenant's dwelling-house is sufficient, without proof that he in fact received it; ib. n. (a);

Smith v. Clark, 9 Dowl. P. C. 202.; but it is not sufficient that the notice was left at the tenant's dwelling-house without shewing that it was delivered to a servant and explained to him, or that it came to the tenant's hands. Doe v. Lucas, 5 Esp. 153. Service of the notice on the premises upon one of two joint-tenants who resides on the premises, is presumptive evidence of the notice having reached the other joint-tenant. Doe v. Watkins, 7 East, 557. ; Doe v. Crick, 5 Esp. 196. If there be a sub-tenant, the notice from the original lessor must be served upon the lessee. See suprà, p. 425. Notice to a corporation may be served upon its proper officers. Doe v. Woodman, 8 East, 228.

The

Notice to quit, waiver of] The notice may be waived by the acceptance of rent after the expiration of the notice; but the rent must be received quâ rent, and this is a question for the jury. Doe v. Cordwent, 6 T. R. 219.; Doe v. Batten, Cowp. 243. Where a quarter's rent, due after the expiration of the notice, had been received by the landlord's banker without any special authority, though the rent was usually paid to him, it was held, in the absence of any proof that the rent had come to the landlord's hands, to be no waiver. Doe v. Calvert, 2 Camp. 387. A distress for rent accruing after the expiration of the notice is a waiver. Doe v. Willingale, 1 H. Bl. 311. So a recovery in an action for use and occupation for a period subsequent to the expiration of the notice. Birch v. Wright, 1 T. R. 387. notice may be waived by a subsequent notice; for it recognises a tenancy subsisting after the expiration of the former. Doe v. Palmer, 16 East, 53. But where a second notice was given after the expiration of the first, and after the commencement of an ejectment in which the landlord continued to proceed notwithstanding the second notice it was held no waiver; for it was not possible for the defendant to suppose that the plaintiff intended to waive the first notice, when he knew that the plaintiff was, on the foundation of that very notice, proceeding by ejectment to turn him out. Doe v. Humphreys, 2 East, 237. So where, after the expiration of a notice, the landlord gave a second notice, "I do hereby require you to quit the premises which you now hold of me within fourteen days from this date, otherwise I shall require double value," it was ruled that the latter notice, having for its object only the recovery of the double value, did not operate as a waiver. Doe v. Steel, 3 Camp. 115. So where no notice to quit was necessary, and a notice was given" to quit the premises which you hold under me, your term therein having long since expired," the court considered it a mere demand of possession, and not a recognition of a subsisting tenancy. Doe v. Inglis, 3 Taunt. 54. And where a landlord gave his tenant notice to quit, but promised not to turn him out unless the premises were sold; and afterwards, and after the expiration of the notice to quit, the premises were sold, but the tenant refused to deliver up the possession; it was held that the promise was no waiver of the notice, and that the refusal of the tenant made him a trespasser from the expiration of the notice to quit. Doe v. Symonds, 10 East, 13. A notice may be waived by the tenant who gives it, as well as by a landlord; and where the tenant continued in possession after the expiration of the notice, under an alleged custom, it is a question for the jury whether he intended to waive the notice, or merely acted in pursuance of the supposed right to continue for certain purposes after the end of the tenancy. Jones v. Shears, 4 A. & E. 832.

Notice to quit, when dispensed with by disclaimer.] When a tenant from year to year has attorned to another person, or done any act disclaiming to hold of his landlord, or has in any way put him at defiance, the landlord may treat him as a trespasser, and no notice to quit will be necessary. B. N. P. 96.; Doe v. Whittick, Gow. 195. The act must be one inconsistent with the relation of landlord and tenant; thus, where the tenant, who had concluded a bargain for the purchase of the property from his landlord, refused to deliver it up to the landlord on demand, saying, "he had bought it and would keep it, and was ready to pay the money;" it was held that this was no disclaimer on which ejectment would lie without notice. Doe v. Stanion, 1 M. & W. 695. So a refusal to pay rent to a devisee under a contested will, the tenant declaring that he was ready to pay the rent to any person entitled to it, was held not to dispense with a notice to quit. Doe v. Pasquali, Peake, 196. So where rent is demanded by the assignee of the lessor it is no disclaimer, if the defendant withholds rent while he is honestly inquiring into the assignee's title, or because he believes himself liable to the assignor. Doe v. Cooper, 1 M. & G. 135., 138. And it seems that whether the act amounts to a disclaimer is for the judge; whether the evidence proves a disclaimer is for the jury; S. C. ib.; and see Doe v. Evans, 9 M. & W. 48. The mere act of paying the rent to a third person does not cperate as the forfeiture of a lease. Doe v. Parker, Gow. 180. But where a tenant pays rent to a third person claiming to be landlord, and allows him to mark and cut the trees, the submission to these acts by the tenant is an acknowledgment of the title of the claimant. Per Lord Tenterden C. J., Doe v. Grubb, 10 B. & C. 824. And where the defendant, who held under a tenant for life, received on his death a letter from the lessor of the plaintiff, claiming as heir and demanding rent, to which the defendant answered that he held the premises as tenant to S., that he had never considered the lessor of the plaintiff as his landlord, that he should be ready to pay the rent to any one who should be proved to be entitled to it, but that, without disputing the lessor of the plaintiff's pedigree, he must decline taking upon himself to decide upon his claim without more satisfactory proof in a legal manner, it was held that this was a disclaimer; Doe v. Frowd, 4 Bing. 557.; in which case, Best C. J. doubts the necessity of a notice in any case where there is not a tenancy admitted on both sides. Where tenant at will died, and his heir entered and claimed the land as his own, held that the devisees of the lessor might eject without notice or demand. Doe v. Thompson, 5 A. & E. 532.; antè, p. 421. Where a tenant for years delivered up possession of the premises and the lease, in fraud of his landlord, to a person claiming under a hostile title, it was held to be a forfeiture of the lease. Doe v. Flynn, 1 C. M. & R. 137. So where the tenant said to the landlord, "I have no rent for you, for P. has ordered me to pay none," it was held to be a disclaimer. Doe v. Pittman, 2 Nev. & M. 673. A mere verbal disclaimer without any other act done, may be a forfeiture; Parke B., in Doe v. Stanion, 1 M. & W. 702. And where the ejectment is brought against several joint defendants who hold separate tenements, the plaintiff may recover against those who have disclaimed, and fail as to the others. Doe v. Clarke, Peake, Add. Ca,

239.

The doctrine of forfeiture by disclaimer in pais has been sometimes