1860. ATTORNEY v. LORD BRAY BROOKE. estates, and which he had himself purchased, and which are hereinafter referred to as the 'Audley End purchased Estates;' 2ndly, of divers real estates situate in the counties of Berks and Wilts, and forming the ancient estates of the Neville family, which were inherited by him, and which are hereinafter referred to as the 'Billingbear Old Estates,' subject to certain charges thereon; 3rdly, of divers real estates situate near the said Billingbear Old Estates purchased by my said father, and hereinafter referred to as the 'Billingbear purchased Estates,' and was also possessed absolutely of the sum of 10,1341.5s. 8d., charged by way of mortgage on the said Audley End mansion and estates; also of several sums of 50007., 5000l. and 6000l., charged on the Billingbear Old Estates; and I say that the value of the several classes of estates above mentioned, estimated in round numbers, is as follows, that is to say, the value of the said Audley End mansion and estates is about 180,000l., the value of the Billingbear Old Estates is about 300,000l., and the value of the Audley End purchased Estates and the Billingbear purchased Estates together amount to between 90,000l. and 100,000l., and that immediately before the deed of the 1st day of January, 1850, in the information mentioned, was executed, I and my father had at our disposal a sum of 7400l. of the capital stock of the London and North Western Railway Company, and 135 Extension Shares of the York and North Midland Railway Company, and that in the year 1850 my father the said third Lord Braybrooke, with the view of inducing me to concur with him in exercising the joint power of appointment created by us over the Audley End mansion and estates, proposed to me that if I would give up the absolute power of disposition reserved to me by the indenture of the 21st of July, 1841, in the said information mentioned, and in favour of his younger sons the two next presentations to Magdalen College, and would join with him in a settlement of the estates over which we had the joint power, he would in such settlement settle the said Audley End purchased Estates, Billingbear Old Estates and Billingbear purchased Estates, and would make an immediate provision for me during his lifetime. I entertained and ultimately acceded to the proposal, and it was agreed that my father should have the two next presentations to Magdalen College in favour of his younger sons, and that a settlement should be made of all the estates, and that the said sums of stock in the said railway Company should be included in the settlement, and that the estates upon which my father had incumbrances as before stated should be settled free from such charges, my father giving up such charges, and that the settlement should contain the powers and provisions afterwards mentioned. "In pursuance of such arrangement, on the 1st of January, 1850, EASTER TERM, 23 VICT. my father, the said third Baron Braybrooke, and I this defendant together made and duly sealed and delivered in presence of two credible witnesses, who duly attested the same, the indenture or deed of appointment of that date in the said information in that behalf mentioned, which was to the effect in the said information in that behalf stated, so far as the same is therein set forth, but I say that the effect of that indenture is imperfectly stated in the said information, for I say that thereby the said Audley End mansion estates were discharged from the said sum of 10,1347. 5s. 8d. so charged thereon by way of mortgage as aforesaid, the said Billingbear Old Estates were discharged from the said sums of 5000l., 5000l. and 60007. respectively charged thereon by way of mortgage as aforesaid, and the said Audley End purchased Estates, Billingbear Old Estates and Billingbear purchased Estates were, together with the Audley End mansion and estates settled to the uses and upon the trusts to and upon which the said Audley End mansion and estates are by the said information stated to have been settled, and the said sums of stock in railway Companies were also settled so as to be laid out in land and go along with the settled estates. There was in the same indenture contained a power for me, when in possession of the said estates, to raise 10,000l. for my own use, and a further sum of 10,000l. for my own use if I should have no children who should succeed to the said estates, and there was also contained in the said indenture powers for me to jointure any wife I might marry and to raise portions for my younger children (both of which last mentioned powers I exercised on my subsequent marriage), and there was also in pursuance of the agreement in the said indenture contained a power for my said father the said third Lord Braybrooke by deed or will to give to any of his younger sons the two next presentations to Magdalen College and to the rectories of Heydon and Widdington, and to grant Heydon House and twenty acres of land to his son the Honorable Charles Cornwallis Neville for life. For further certainty as to the terms and effect of the said indenture or deed of appointment I desire to refer to the instrument itself, which I am ready to produce, or to a copy thereof. "Since the date of the indenture of the 1st of January, 1850, my father and myself sold portions of the estates therein comprised in exercise of the joint power of appointment therein contained. "My father, the said third Lord Braybrooke, also exercised the power thereby given him, and presented his son the Honorable and Reverend Latimer Neville to the Mastership of Magdalen College, and his said son Latimer Neville to the rectory of Heydon, and granted Heydon House aforesaid and the said twenty acres of land to his said son the Honorable Charles Cornwallis Neville. 1860. ATTORNEY V. LORD BRAYBROOKE. 1860. ATTORNEY v. LORD BRAYBROOKE. "I admit that I refused to pay succession duty at the rate demanded on behalf of the Crown, on the ground that under the circumstances herein stated I do not think that the Crown is entitled to demand the same; and I admit that I claim an allowance in respect of my said annuity of 1200/. in the said information mentioned, on the ground that I relinquished or was deprived of the same on the death of my said father the third Baron Lord Braybrooke, and, therefore, am entitled to such allowance in pursuance of the Succession Duty Act, 1853." The Attorney General (The Solicitor General and Hanson with him) argued for the Crown (a) (May 5).—The decision in The Attorney General v. Sibthorp (b) governs this case. The limitations are substantially the same in both cases (c). (a) Before Pollock, C. B., Martin, B., and Bramwell, B. (c) In Sibthorp's case the dis- 1. To the uses of the joint The uses limited by the deed executing the power, subject to a rent-charge for the son, were1. To the father for life, remainder 2. To the son for life, remain ders over. In the present case the limitations of the disentailing deed In the former it was held that the use taken by the son under the resettlement was the old use which belonged to him as tenant in tail in remainder, and that the father took back his life estate. Here the defendant took either his former estate or a modification of it. A succession is the beneficial interest in property which one person takes on the death of another, and the duty is regulated by the relation between the predecessor and successor. Therefore it must first be ascertained whether there is a succession, and next from whom that succession is derived. The question then is, from whom is the estate taken by the defendant under the resettlement derived? It being the same estate which he previously had, or a modification of it, it is derived from the same author as the old entail, who is the "predecessor." A disposition of that estate was made by the defendant. The 12th section of the Succession Duty Act (16 & 17 Vict. c. 51) lays down a rule as to a succession taken by any person under a disposition made by himself. Then, is this particular modified estate, possessed by the same tenant under a disposition made by himself, part of the original estate tail and to be governed by the same rule? The Attorney General v. Sibthorp is an authority that it is. If the defendant had taken the estate tail he would have taken it by virtue of the will of Lord Howard de Walden, who would have been the predecessor; and the fact that the defendant takes the life estate as a purchaser under a disposition made by himself does not alter the relation in which he stood to the testator. No doubt, collateral arrangements as to other property formed part of the general arrangement to resettle the estate; but that was so in The Attorney General v. Sibthorp. The Court cannot weigh the consideration, but only inquire into the history of the estate. It is true that if a man buys an estate of another, and directs it to be conveyed to a 1860. ATTORNEY v. LORD BRAY BROOKE. 1860. ATTORNEY v. LORD BRAYBROOKE. third person, though the vendor is the hand which conveys, the individual who disposes is he who purchases and pays the price. But where a new settlement is made in pursuance of a family arrangement, and a son gives up a larger estate under a disposition made by himself and takes a smaller one, the question is, what is the character and quality of the smaller estate? It is the old use. Then the 12th section says, if it be part of the original estate, being a succession, it shall be dealt with as the original estate. There is no distinction between a "succession" constituted of a fee simple and a "succession" constituted of a life estate. For the purposes of this Act all tenants are treated as having life estates only, and therefore the defendant, when he reduced his estate of inheritance to an estate for life, retained in that estate a succession answering all the exigencies of the Act; and the circumstance that he gave the surplus ownership, viz. his estate of inheritance subject to the life estate, in consideration of the collateral agreement, does not affect his liability under the statute in respect of his life estate. Rolt, C. Hall and Thring, for the defendant.-First, there are substantial differences between this case and that of The Attorney General v. Sibthorp (a). The principles upon which that case was decided are inapplicable, as regards the claim of 107. per cent. duty. There Bramwell, B., adopted one view of the principle to be applied to the facts, and the two other Judges adopted another and somewhat inconsistent view; but, whichever principle is to prevail, the defendant is not subject to a duty on the whole estate of 107. per cent. It is conceded that he is chargeable with a duty of 17. per cent. on half the estate, but he is not chargeable with any duty on the other half; or, at all (a) 3 H. & N. 424. |