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in respect of injury to his pecuniary interests. The 40th section of The Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, relating to the joinder of causes of action by husband and wife, does not affect this question. It does not create a cause of action where there was none before. The authorities do not support the position laid down in Starkic on Slander, vol. 1, p. 202, where it is said: "The most trifling loss sustained in consequence of such slander, as of a dinner or other hospitable gratuitous entertainment (a), will entitle the party to her action."

Prentice, contrà.-Admitting that the declaration does not shew a cause of action in respect of the loss of society by the plaintiff Hannah, there is an allegation that "by reason of the committing of the grievances the said Hannah became and was ill and unwell for a long time, and unable to attend to her necessary affairs and business." The question is whether such illness is not a sufficient special damage to constitute a cause of action. [Pollock, C. B.—The law deals with damage which might reasonably result, not with that which may depend on the idiosyncrasy of the party. Suppose the allegation was that the plaintiff, being a person liable to the gout, was thrown into a violent fit of anger, and was seized with a fit of the gout.] It is submitted that it would be sufficient; since the defendant was guilty of a wrongful act. In actions arising out of contract the defendant is liable only for such damages . as might have been foreseen, but in actions of tort for all the injury resulting from the wrongful act. It was said by Holt, J., that "at common law, if a man do an unlawful act, he shall be answerable for all the consequences, especially where the act is done with the intent that consequential damage shall follow :" Starkie on Slander, vol. 1, p. 203. The criminal act must be the causa causans: per (a) Citing Moore v. Meagher, in error, 1 Taunt. 39.

Pollock, C. B., Boyle v. Brandon (a). If that is made out, it is enough. In Sedgwick on Damages, p. 92, it is said that in New York, in an action on the case for negligently running over and killing the plaintiff's son, the plaintiff was allowed to recover for the deprivation of the society of the wife and the expense resulting from her illness consequent upon the death of the child, these damages being specially laid in the declaration, and clearly proved to have been the consequence of the act complained of (b). In Davis v. Gardiner (c), cited, 1 Starkie on Slander, vol. 1, p. 198, it was resolved that the action was maintainable on the ground that the plaintiff was defeated of her marriage; yet that was no more a necessary consequence of the speaking of the words than the illness of the plaintiff Hannah in the present case. In Peake v. Oldham (d) cited in Starkie on Slander, p. 204, Lord Mansfield expressed an opinion that the expense of an inquest incurred by the plaintiff, who had been wrongfully accused of murder, might be considered as special damage.

Quain, in reply.-The special damage alleged is not the necessary or natural consequence of the words spoken, and therefore it is not a ground of action: Vicars v. Wil cocks (e).

POLLOCK, C. B.-We are all of opinion that the defendant is entitled to judgment. There is no precedent for any such special damage as that laid in this declaration being made a ground of action, so as to render words actionable which otherwise would not be so. We ought to be careful not to introduce a new element of damage, recollect

(a) 13 M. & W. 738. (b) Referring to Ford v. Monroe, 20 Wendell, 210.

(c) 4 Rep. 16.
(d) Cowp. 275. 277.
(e) 8 East, 1.

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ing to what a large class of actions it would apply, and
what a dangerous use might be made of it. In actions for
making false charges before magistrates, for giving false
characters, and for torts of all kinds, illness might be said
to have arisen from the wrong sustained by the plaintiff.
The case of Ford v. Monroe (a) is the only authority that
has any tendency to throw light on the argument; but we
ought not to act upon the authority of that case, opposed
as it is to the universal practice of the law in this country.
The Courts here have always taken care that parties shall
not be responsible for fanciful or remote damages, or in
fact any that do not fairly and naturally result from the
wrongful act itself. It is only lately that a clear and dis-
tinct view of the subject of damages was taken, in Hadley
v. Baxendale (b), in which it was held that a person whose
duty it is to deliver goods to another is not responsible for
any damages resulting from the nondelivery, unless they are
the damages which would result immediately and naturally,
that is, according to the usual course of things, from the
breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be
supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties
at the time they made contract.
Slander may be repeated,
and the repetition may cause
nothing is more natural than that such should be the case.
So there are many other consequences which may follow
in libel and slander in respect of which there is no remedy.
This particular damage depends on the temperament of the
party affected, and it may be laid down that illness arising
from the excitement which the slanderous language may
produce is not that sort of damage which forms a ground
of action.

mischief. In one sense

MARTIN, B.-I am of the same opinion. The words are (b) 9 Exch. 341.

(a) 20 Wendell, 210.

not actionable in themselves. The law is jealous as to actions for mere words, and therefore stringent rules have been laid down on the subject, to which we ought to adhere. Words which, if written, would be the foundation of an action of libel, in many instances only afford a ground of action in slander if special damage results. But that special damage must be the natural or necessary result, not depending on the peculiarities of the particular individual. In the absence of all authority it is the sounder way of dealing with this matter to hold that the action is not maintainable.

BRAMWELL, B.-I am of the same opinion. The question seems to me one of some difficulty, because a wrong is done to the female plaintiff who becomes ill and therefore there is damage alleged to be flowing from the wrong; and I think it did in fact so flow. But I am struck by what has been said as to the novelty of this declaration, that no such special damage ever was heard of as a ground of action. If it were so I am at a loss to see why mental suffering should not be so likewise. It is often adverted to in aggravation of damages, as well as pain of body. But if so, all slanderous words would be actionable. Therefore, unless there is a distinction between the suffering of mind and the suffering of body, this special damage does not afford any ground of action. There is certainly no precedent for such an action, probably because the law holds that bodily illness is not the natural nor the ordinary consequence of the speaking of slanderous words. Therefore, on the ground that the damage here alleged is not the natural consequence of the words spoken by the defendant, I think that this action will not lie.

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WILDE, B.-I agree that there must be judgment for the

VOL. V.-N. S.

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EXCH.

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defendant. The only question is, whether there appears on the declaration a sufficient statement of special damage. This is one of a large class of cases in which, if such damage were allowed, it might be alleged, such as actions for malicious arrest and the like. As special damage, it is of an entirely novel character. It has long been established that special damage, to constitute a ground of action, must be the natural consequence of the wrongful act; and it is not desirable that any new rule on this subject should be adopted.

Judgment for the defendant.

April 23.

·PRICE v. TAYLOR and FISHER.

A promissory DECLARATION.—That the defendants, together with

note was made
in the follow-
ing form:-
"Midland
Counties
Building So-
ciety, No. 3.
Birmingham,
March 12,
1858. Two
months after
demand in
writing we

one W. R. Heath, on the 12th of March, 1858, made their promissory note in writing now overdue, which note is in the words and figures following, that is to say:

"Midland Counties Building Society, No. 3.

66

Birmingham.

"March 12, 1858.

"Two months after demand in writing we promise to pay to Mr. Thomas Price the sum of one hundred pounds, promise to pay to T. P. one with interest after the rate of six pounds per centum per hundred pounds with annum, for value received. interest, &c., for value re

ceived. W. H. and J.T., trustees.

W. F.,

secretary.

Held, that the parties who

signed the note

"100.”

"W. R. Heath,

"John Taylor, Trustees.

"W. D. Fisher, Secretary."

Averments: that the signatures John Taylor and W. D.

were personally liable upon it, and that the right of the holder to sue them was not affected by the 6 & 7 Wm. 4, c. 32, and the 10 Geo. 4, c. 56, s. 21.