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LANDLORD AND TENANT.

of the proceeds in his hands was properly made.

A. being indebted to B., and C. being his surety, A. conveyed certain premises by way of mortgage to C. to indemnify him, and attorned as tenant to C. at a rent of 50l. a year payable in advance. The goods of A. having been seized under a writ of execution :-Ield, that by 8 Ann, c. 14, s. 1, C. was entitled to payment of this rent as against the execution creditor. Yates v. Ratledge, 249

(3). Right of Landlord to Rent where goods of a Stranger, on demised premises are taken in Execution under a Process of County Court.

Under the 19 & 20 Vict. c. 108, s. 75, a landlord cannot claim his rent, where a bailiff takes in execu

tion, upon the demised premises, the goods of a stranger; for that enactment only applies where the levy is made on the goods of the tenant. Foulger v. Taylor, George Searby, Claimant, Robert Wilcoxon, Peter Rolt and George Moore, Landlords,

202

(4). Notice to Quit. Between nine and ten o'clock on the 25th March a tenant put into a post office in London a letter containing a notice to quit on the following Michaelmas, and addressed to the place of business in London of his landlord's agent. The agent was at his place of business until between six and seven o'clock in the evening and did not receive the letter, but found it on the following morning. Held a sufficient notice to determine the tenancy, the jury having found that the letter was delivered on the 25th March, after the agent left.-Papillon v. Brunton, ૨૨ ૨

518.

VOL. V.

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A testator, who died in 1820, by his will directed his estate to be divided into two moieties, in one of which a sum of 4300l. 31. per cent. Consols then standing in his name was to be included: and as to this moiety he directed that (after payment of certain debts) the surplus beyond the 43001. Consols should be invested in the funds in the names of his executors, in trust to pay the dividends thereon and also on the 4300/. Consols to his wife for life; this moiety to A., save and except and upon her death he bequeathed the 43004. Consols, the dividends upon which, amounting to 1297. a year, he directed to be paid to three the remainder to a nephew during annuitants of 201. a year each, and his life. He then bequeathed the annuities of 20l. to three other an. nuitants, and after the decease of the survivor of them he bequeathed the 43001. Consols to A. absolutely. The executors realized the property, and it was ascertained that 50997, was the amount to be invested to make up, together with the 43001. Consols, the moiety of the dividends on which were to be paid to the wife for life. The executors entered into an arrangement with the widow and A. and her husband, by which the 50997. was paid over to the latter, but no legacy duty was paid upon it. The widow died in May, 1835, and in May 1837 A. sold and assigned to B. the 4300/. Consols, subject to the annuities then in existence and legacy chargeable on A. in respect thereof. Held: First, that the 50997. and 4300l. were separate legacies, and

EXCH.

that B. was not a debtor to the Crown in respect of the legacy duty payable on the 50991.

Secondly, that the Crown had no lien on the 43007. in respect of such duty. The Attorney General v. Giles, 255

LEGACY DUTY.

(2). Legacy "delivered, paid, satisfied or discharged" by payment in Court of Chancery.

Sir C W. bound himself by bond conditioned for payment to M. and C. after the decease of himself and his wife, of 16,0007., and by indenture of settlement, made on the marriage of C. W. and J. N., declared that the bond was given upon trust, that the trustees should after his decease receive the amount and invest it, and pay the proceeds to C. W. during the joint lives of C. W. and J. N., and to the survivor during the life of such survivor; and then, subject to trusts in favour of their issue, which never took effect, in trust to assign the said sum of 16,000l., and the funds wherein the same should be invested, to himself, his executors, &c., for his and their own use. By his will "in case the said sum of money on bond, or any part thereof, should revert into the residuum of his estate at any time, pursuant to the limitations in the settlement," Sir C. W. "bequeathed all the said sum of 16,000l., to such of his trustees as should be then existing, in trust that they should pay thereout the sum of 14,000l. to L. After the death of Sir C. W. a suit in Chancery was instituted, in which L. was plaintiff and A. W. (the surviving executrix of Sir C. W.), C. W. and J. N. his wife, the trustees aforesaid, and other persons, were defendants. The bill stated that A. W. was possessed of personal estate

more than sufficient to satisfy all the testator's debts and funeral expenses; that all the debts, except that of 16,000l. and one other, were paid; and prayed (inter alia) that the will of Sir C. W. might be established, and the trusts of it performed. By her answer A. W., the surviving executrix, admitted the facts stated, submitted that the wil might be established, and the trusts thereof carried into execution, and that she was willing to account. A. W. paid into Court monies sufficient to satisfy the 16,0007. She died in 1805. By an order of the Court of Chancery, dated the 4th of July, 1807, reciting that the Master had reported that the 16,0007, was a specialty debt due from the estate of Sir C. W. to the trustees, and that it was prayed that so much Bank annuities as would make up the sum of 16,0007. might be carried on to an account to be entitled "The Account of C. W. ;" and that the interest thereof might be paid to C. W. during his life, or until the further order of the Court; it was ordered that so much 37. per cent. Bank annuities, as the Master should find to be of the value of 16,0007., should be carried over in trust to the said cause, L. v. W. "The account of C. W.;" and the Accountant General was to declare the trusts thereof accordingly. In pursuance of this order, in November, 1807, a sum of 28,7021. 16s. 3d. Bank annuities was carried over by the Accountant General in the said cause to "The account of C. W." At the date of the order both C. W. and J. N. were alive, but the former died on the 17th of July, 1807. J. N. received the dividends on the 16,000l. until her death in 1848, when L. received the 14,000/.

Held, that the legacy to L. was "delivered, paid, satisfied or dis

charged" by the payment into Court | and investment of the money in 1807, and consequently that no legacy duty was payable under the 55 Geo. 3, c. 184, schedule, part 3. The Attorney General v. Los combe, 564

LESSOR AND LESSEE. See DEMISE.

DISTRESS.

LANDLORD AND TENANT. WAY.

plaintiff advertised certain of his goods for sale by auction, and that the defendant printed and published, concerning the plaintiff and the said intended sale, a malicious and defamatory libel, whereby after reciting that the plaintiff had advertised certain goods for sale, and that he unlawfully detained certain goods the property of defendant, and which he was informed the plaintiff also intended disposing of; the defendant gave notice that the same were his absolute property, and in case any person

(1). Cancellation of Lease by Mutual should purchase them he would be

Consent.

The cancelling a lease by the mutual consent of both parties does not destroy the estate vested in the lessee, and the lessor may therefore maintain an action of debt on the demise, for the recovery of the rent. Lord Ward v. Lumley, 87

(2). Demand of Rent to create Forfeiture.

By a lease rent was reserved payable on the usual quarter days, provided that if the rent should be in arrear for the space of twenty-eight days next after any of the days appointed for payment of the same had been lawfully demanded, it should be lawful for the lessor to re-enter and take possession of the premises without bringing an action of ejectment. The rent being unpaid :-Held, that a demand made on the premises at half-past ten o'clock on the morning of the last day was not sufficient to entitle the lessor to re-enter without action. Acocks v. Phillips,

LIBEL.

See SLANDer.

182

(1). Slander of Title to Goods. A declaration stated, that the ૨૨૨ 2

held responsible: thereby meaning to cause it to be believed that no person could safely purchase any goods at the said advertised sale: by means of which persons were prevented from attending, and the sale failed altogether. Plea: that the plaintiff did unlawfully detain certain goods the property of the defendant; and that the defendant was informed

and believed that the plaintiff did intend to dispose of the same at the advertised sale, and thereupon the defendant published the said words for the purpose of warning all persons from purchasing the said goods so unlawfully detained by the plaintiff, and not otherwise. On demurrer to the plea :-Held, that though, on application to a Judge at Chambers, the plea might have been struck out or amended, yet on demurrer it was good, as amounting to the general issue: per totam Curiam.

Per Bramwell, B., that the plea might also be supported on the ground that it shewed that the alleged defamatory statements were 783 Carr v. Duckett,

true.

(2). Imputation of being a "Truckmaster."

In an action for libel inputing to "truckthe plaintiff that he was a

954 MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT.

master," there being no innuendo to explain the meaning of the word :Held, that although the word was not to be found in any English dictionary yet, as it was composed of two well known English words, the plaintiff was not bound to give evidence of its meaning, nor the Judge to explain it to the jury; but that it was properly left to them to say whether, under all the circumstances, it was used in a defamatory sense. Homer v. Taunton, 661

LIVERPOOL LIBRARY.

See RATE.

LORD MAYOR'S COURT.

See PROHIBITION.

LORD OF MANOR.
See INCLOSURE Act.

MALICE.

See COUNSEL.

MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT.

Limitation to Illegitimate Child, Valid against Subsequent Mortgagee.

MARYPORT IIARBOUR ACT.

son claiming title under the mortgagee, it was proved that, in October, 1830, the husband and wife let the property to T., and received the rents of it for some years. — Held: First, that the limitation in the marriage settlement to the plaintiff, though a bastard, was not fraudulent and void against the mortgagee, by the 27 Eliz. c. 4. Secondly, that there was evidence of the seisin of D. at the time of the execution of the settlement. Dickinson v. Wright,

401

MARYPORT HARBOUR ACT. (3 & 4 WM. 4, c. cxiii.)

Liability of Trustees.

The 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. cxiii., An Act for better preserving the harbour of Maryport, and for lighting and otherwise improving the township of Maryport, section 7, appoints trustees to carry the act into execution. By section 21, they may elect a harbour master, who, by section 47, may direct any person, having the command of any vessel entering into or being within the harbour, to anchor and place the same in such situation within the harbour as he shall direct. After the passing of the Act some D., a widow, being possessed of coals were shot into a berth in the certain real property, by settlement harbour which rendered it dangerous. in contemplation of her marriage, The trustees at a board meeting havdated the 17th of May, 1830, recit- ing had notice of the state of the ing that, upon the treaty for the mar- berth, gave directions to their clerk riage, it was agreed that the property to have the coals removed, and the should be appointed, released and coals were accordingly partly, but conveyed as thereinafter mentioned, not sufficiently, removed at their exlimited the property to trustees in pense. After this the harbour mastrust for herself for life, with re-ter, without the knowledge of the mainder, as to part, to her hus- trustees, directed the plaintiff to band for life, remainder to the use place his vessel in the berth. He of her illegitimate son, the plaintiff. did so, and the vessel while lying She and her husband subsequently there sustained damage in consemortgaged the property. In eject-quence of the berth being unsafe. ment by the plaintiff against a per- The harbour master knew that the

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(1). Right of Servant to maintain

Action for Negligence.

The plaintiff, a servant of J. & Co., who were employed by the defendants to carry cotton from a warehouse, was receiving the cotton into his lorry when, in consequence of the negligence of the defendants' porters, in lowering the bales from the upper floor of the warehouse, a bale fell upon him.--Held, that the plaintiff and the defendants' servants not being under the same control, or forming part of the same establishment, were not so employed upon a common object, as to deprive the plaintiff of a right of action against the defendants for such negligence. Abraham v. Reynolds,

(2). Hiring of Clerk.

143

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serve the defendant faithfully for three years in his business of a manufacturer of lard; and alleged as a breach the wrongful dismissal of the plaintiff before the expiration of that period. Plea: that the plaintiff did not serve the defendant faithfully as in the agreement stipulated. At the trial it appeared that bladders are essential in the business of a manufacturer of lard; and that the plaintiff, without the knowledge of the defendant, entered into a contract with C. for the purchase of several thousand bladders, which were invoiced and delivered to G., who allowed the plaintiff, from time to time, to have as many as were required for the defendant's business. C. having made a claim upon the defendant in respect of the bladders, he dismissed the plaintiff.

Held-First, that there was no misdirection in telling the jury that, so far as it was matter of law, the defendant was justified in dismissing the plaintiff.

Secondly, that the facts were admissible in support of the plea, that the plaintiff did not serve the defendant faithfully. Horton v. Mc Murtry,

MEMORANDA, 52, 73, 459.

MERGER.

667

Termor for Years Tenant by the Curtesy.

A term of years and a freehold may subsist in the same person without merger, if held in different rights.

Quare: whether there is an exception in the case of the freehold being acquired by the act of the party, and not by the act of the law.

If a husband is possessed of a term of years, and the owner of the

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