party accused did an act which was in itself criminal, under the influence of an insane delusion, with a view of repressing or avenging some supposed grievance or injury, or of producing some public benefit, he is nevertheless punishable if he knew at the time that he was acting contrary to law. Macnaghten's case, 10 Č. & F. 200; 8 Scott, N. R. 595; 1 C. & K. 130. If the accused was conscious that the act was one which he ought not to do, and if the act was at the same time contrary to law, he is punishable. In all cases of this kind the jurors ought to be told, that every man is presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary is proved to their satisfaction; and that, to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of committing the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or that what he was doing was wrong. Ib. A party labouring under a partial delusion must be considered in the same situation, as to responsibility, as if the facts, in respect to which the delusion exists, were real. Ib. Where an accused person is supposed to be insane, a medical man who has been present in court and heard the evidence may be asked, as a matter of science, whether the facts stated by the witnesses, supposing them to be true, show a state of mind incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong. Ib.; S. P. Rex v. Wright, R. & R. C. C. 456; Rex v. Searle, 1 M. & Rob. 75. To entitle a prisoner to be acquitted on the ground of insanity he must, at the time of the committing of the offence, have been so insane that he did not know right from wrong. Reg. v Higginson, 1 C. & K. 129-Maule. When the defence of insanity is set up in order to warrant the jury in acquitting the prisoner, it must be proved affirmatively that he is insane; if the fact be left in doubt, and if the crime charged in the indictment is proved, it is their duty to convict. Reg. v. Stokes, 3 C. & K. 185-Rolfe. On a trial for murder, evidence was called, on the prisoner's behalf, to prove his insanity. A physician who had been in court during the whole trial was then called on the part of the prosecution, and asked whether, having heard the whole evidence, he was of opinion that the prisoner, at the time he committed the alleged act, was of unsound mind? Held, notwithstanding the opinion of the judges in Reg. v. Macnaghten (supra), that such a question ought not to be put, but that the proper mode of examination was to take particular facts, and assuming them to be true, to ask the witness whether, in his judgment, they were indicative of insanity on the part of the prisoner at the time the alleged act was committed. Reg. v Frances, 4 Cox, C. C. 57-Alderson. Where a prisoner sets up insanity as a ground of defence, one cardinal rule is, that the burden of proving his innocence on that ground rests on the party accused. The question in such a case for the jury is not whether the prisoner was of sound mind, but whether he has made out to their satisfaction that he was not of sound mind. The jury may come to a conclusion on this point from the conduct and acts of the accused shortly before and down to the commission of the alleged crime. Although insanity on one point, for instance-a delusion as to property-will not exempt a party from responsibility, the fact is not immaterial in considering his responsibility at another time and on another subject. The want of motive for the commission of the crime, and its being committed under circumstances which render detection inevitable, are important points for the consideration of the jury, when coupled with evidence of insanity on any particular point. Reg. v. Layton, 4 Cox, C. C. 149-Rolfe. To ask a witness whether, in his opinion, the prisoner is capable of judging between right and wrong, is an improper question, for that is what no witness thought of, or is prepared to answer. Ib. Á married woman, having killed her husband immediately after an apparent recovery from a disease (the result of childbirth) which caused a great loss of blood, and exhausted the vessels of the brain, and thus so weakened its power and so tended to produce insane delusions of the senses, which, while suffering under such disease, she complained of, and which, by her own account, had been renewed at the time of the act of homicide (although they were not such as would lead to it):-Held, evidence from which a jury might properly find that she was not in such a state of mind at the time of the act as to know its nature or be accountable for it. Reg. v. Law, 2 F. & F, 836 -Erle. Where a married woman, fondly attached to her children, and apparently most happy in her family, had poisoned two of them with some evidence of deliberation and design; but it appeared that there was insanity in her family; and, from her demeanor before and after the act, which, although not wholly irrational, yet was strangely erratic and excited; and from recent antecedents, and the presence of certain exciting causes of insanity, and her own account of her sensations, the medical men were of opinion that she was labouring under actual cerebral disease, and that she was in a paroxysm of insanity at the time of the act; this was left to the jury as evidence on which they might rightly find her not guilty on the ground of insanity. Reg. v. Vyse, 3 F. & F. 247-Wightman. The delusions which indicate a defect of sanity such as will relieve a person from criminal responsibility, are delusions of the senses, or such as relate to facts or objects not mere wrong notions or impressions, or of a moral nature; and the aberration must be mental, not moral, to affect the intellect of the individual. It is not enough that they show a diseased or a depraved state of mind, or an aberration of the moral feelings, the sense of right and wrong being still, although it may be perverted, yet not destroyed; and the theory of a moral insanity, or insanity of the moral feelings, while the sense of right and wrong remains, is not to be reconciled with the legal doctrine on the subject. Reg. v. Burton, 3 F. & F. 772 -Wightman. Where, upon a trial for murder, the plea of insanity is set up, the question for the jury is, Did the prisoner do the act under a delusion, believing it to be other than it was? If he knew what he was doing, and that it was likely to cause death, and was contrary to the law of God and man, and that the law directed that persons who did such acts should be punished, he is guilty of murder. Reg. v. Townley, 3 F. & F. 839-Martin. The circumstances of a person having acted under an irresistible influence to the commission of homicide is no defence, if at the time he committed the act he knew he was doing what was wrong. Reg. v. Haynes, 1 F. & F. 666-Bramwell. On a trial for murder, the defence of insanity by the evidence showing a great amount of senseless extrav agance and absurd eccentricity of conduct, coupled with habits of excessive intemperance, causing fits of delirium tremens, the prisoner, however, not having been labouring under the effects of such a fi tat the time of the act, and the circum- | removed by order of the Secretary stances showing sense and delibera- of State to the County lunatic asytion, and a perfect understanding of the nature of the act:-Held, that the evidence was not sufficient to support the defence, as it rather tended to show wilful excesses and extreme folly than mental incapacity. Reg. v. Leigh, 4 F. & F. 915 -Erle. A mere uncontrollable impulse of the mind, co-existing with the full possession of the reasoning powers, will not warrant an acquittal on the ground of insanity; the question for the jury being, whether the prisoner, at the time he committed the act, knew the character and nature of the act, and that it was a wrongful one. Reg. v. Barton, 3 Cox, C. C. 275-Parke. lum, and the governor of the asylum had made an affidavit that he was in a hopeless state of insanity, the court will nevertheless require that he be brought up, and his alleged insanity inquired into by a jury, unless it is shown that it would be dangerous to bring him into court, and in that case the court will allow the witnesses their costs, and bind them over to appear when called upon. Reg. v. Dwerryhouse, 2 Cox, C. C. 446-Patteson. A party having been indicted for a misdemeanor, of uttering seditious words, and upon his arraignment refusing to plead, and showing symptoms of insanity; and an inquest being forthwith taken under 39 & 40 Geo. 3, c. 94, s. 2, to try whether he was insane or not :-Held, first, that the jury might form their own judgment of the present state of the prisoner's mind from his demeanor while the inquest was being taken; and might thereupon find him to be insane, without any evidence being given as to his present state. Reg. v. Goode, 7 A. & E. 536. Where a person is in a state of mind in which she is liable to fits of madness, it is for the jury to consider whether the act done was during such a fit, though there is nothing before or after the act to indicate it, and though there is some evidence of design and malice. A medical witness should give his opinion as to the state of mind, not as to the responsibility of the prisoner; the latter is for the jury under the direction of the judge. Reg. v. Rich-ity in court during the taking of the ards, 1 F. & F. 87-Crowder. On an indictment for maliciously setting fire to a building, it is not necessary to prove actual ill-will in the prisoner towards the owner; and in order to justify a jury in acquitting a prisoner on the ground of insanity, they must believe that he did not know right from wrong; but if they find that the prisoner, when he did the act, was in such a state of mind that he was not conscious that the effect of it would be to injure any other person :-Held, that this will amount to a general verdict of not guilty. Reg. v. Davies, 1 F. & F. 69-Crompton. Arraignment.]-Where a bill had been found against an insane prisoner for murder, and he had been Held, secondly, that, upon his showing strong symptoms of insan inquest, it became unnecessary to ask him whether he would crossexamine the witnesses, or would offer any remark on the evidence. Ib. A grand jury has no authority by law to ignore a bill for murder on the ground of insanity; it is their duty to find the bill; otherwise the court cannot order the detention of the party during the pleasure of the crown, either on arraignment or trial, under 39 & 40 Geo. 3, c. 94, ss. 1 & 2. Reg. v. Hodges, 8 C. & P. 195-Alderson. The prisoner was indicted for shooting at his wife with intent to murder her, and was defended by counsel, who set up for him the defence of insanity. The prisoner, however, objected to such a defence, overseers to levy a debt claimed to be due to the lunatic by ordering them to seize a sum of money in the possession of the alleged debtor. And on motion for a mandamus at the instance of such overseers, calling upon the alleged debtors to pay them such money, the prosecutors adducing evidence to shew that such debt was due, and that the sum demanded was in the possession of the alleged debtor, the court, on cause shewn, refused a mandamus. Reg. v. Longhorn, 17'Q. B. 77. asserting that he was not insane; and he was allowed by the judge to suggest questions to be put by his lordship to the witnesses for the prosecution, to negative the supposition that he was insane; and the judge also, at the request of the prisoner, allowed additional witneses to be called on his behalf for the same purpose. They, however, failed in shewing that the defence was an incorrect one; and, on the contrary, their evidence tended to establish it more clearly, and the prisoner was acquitted on the ground of insanity. Reg. v. Pearce, 9 C. & P. 667-Bosanquet. Where a jury is impanneled to try whether a prisoner is insane or not at the time when he is brought up to plead to an indictment, the counsel for the prosecution is to begin and call his witnesses to prove the sanity of the prisoner. Reg. v. Davies, 6 Cox, C. C. 326; 3 C. & K. 328-Williams. But where a jury is impanneled, at the instance of the counsel for a prisoner, to try whether he is insane or not at the time when brought up to plead to an indictment, the proof of the insanity is incumbent on his counsel. Reg. v. Turton, 6 Cox, C. C. 385-Cresswell. Commitment.]-A commitment of an insane person, under 39 & 40 Geo. 3, c. 94, s. 3, is not a commitment in execution, and is not to be construed with the same strictness. Rex v. Gourlay, 7 B. & C. 669; 1 M. & R. 619. But see 1 & 2 Vict.c.14. Property.]-Under 3 & 4 Vict. c. 54, s. 2, which for the repayment to parishes or counties of expenses incurred in the maintenance of criminal lunatics, enables justices to order the overseers of any parish where money, goods or chattels of the lunatic shall be, to seize the money or seize and sell the goods and chattels, justices cannot authorise the 3. Deaf and Dumb. A person, deaf and dumb, was to be tried for a capital felony: the judge ordered a jury to be impanneled, to try whether he was mute by the visitation of God; the jury found that he was so. The jury was then sworn to try whether he was able to plead, which they found in the affirmative; and the prisoner by a sign pleaded not guilty. The judge then ordered the jury to be sworn to try whether the prisoner was now sane or not; and on the question, he directed the jury to consider whether the prisoner had sufficient intellect to comprehend the course of the proceedings, so as to make a proper defence, to challenge any juror he might wish to object to, and to comprehend the details of the evidence; and that if they thought he had not, they should find him not of sane mind. The jury did so, and the judge ordered the prisoner to be detained under 39 & 40 Geo. 3, c. 94, s. 2. Rex v. Pritchard, 7 C. & P. 303-Alderson. A person deaf and dumb was to be tried for a misdemeanor. A jury was impanneled to try whether he was mute by the visitation of God, and on their finding that he was so, they were sworn to try if he was of sound mind, and on their finding that he was so, his counsel pleaded not guilty for him, and the trial proceeded in the usual manner, and the evidence was not interpreted to the prisoner. Reg. v. Whitfield, 3 | the absence of the husband, the C. & K. 121--Williams. 4. Presumed Coercion of Wife. A wife cannot commit larceny in the company of her husband; for it is deemed his coercion, and not her voluntary act; yet, if she does it in his absence, and by his mere command, she is then punishable as if she was sole, and the husband, it is said, may be accessory to the wife. Anon., 2 East, P. C, 559. The law, out of tenderness to the wife, if a felony is committed in the presence of the husband, raises a presumption prima facie and prima facie only, that it was done under his coercion. Rex v. Hughes, 2 Lewin, C. C. 229--Thompson. conviction of the wife was wrong, though she had been more active than her husband. If larceny is committed jointly by husband and wife, the latter is entitled to be acquitted, as she must be presumed to be under his coercion and control: and where she was indicted as "the wife of A.,” it is sufficient proof that she was so, without adducing further evidence to prove that fact. Rex v. Knight, 1 C. & P. 116-Park. Husband and wife were jointly indicted for a misdemeanor in uttering counterfeit coin :-Held, that the wife was entitled to an acquittal, as it appeared that she uttered the money in the presence of her husband. Rex v. Price, 8 C. & P. 19--Park, Bosanquet and Coltman. A wife went from house to house uttering base coin. Her husband accompanied her, but remained out- Where stolen goods are found in side-Held, that the wife acted a man's house, and his wife, in his under the husband's coercion. Con- presence, makes a statement exonolly's case, 2 Lewin, C. C. 229-erating him, and criminating herBayley. self:--Semble, that, with respect to the admissibility of this statement in evidence against her, it may be a question whether the doctrine of presumed coercion does not apply. Rex v. Laugher, 2 C. & K. 225. A wife, by her husband's order and procuration, but in his absence, knowingly uttered a forged order and certificate for the payment of prize-money-Held, that the presumption of coercion at the time of uttering did not arise, as the husband was absent; and that the wife might be convicted of the uttering, and the husband of procuring. Rex v. Morris, R. & R. C. C. 270. On an indictment against a married woman for falsely swearing herself to be next of kin, and procuring administration :-Held, that she might be guilty, although her husband was with her when she took the oath. Rex v. Dicks, 1 Russ. C. & M. 16. Where a woman is charged with comforting, harbouring and assisting a man who has committed a murder, if the counsel for the prosecu tion has reason to believe that she was married to the man, and it ap pears clearly that she considered herself as his wife, and lived with him as such for years, he will be justified in not offering any evidence against her, even though he has also reason to believe that the marriage was in some respects irreg ular, and, probably, invalid. Reg. v. Good, 1 C. & K. 185-Alderson and Coltman. In the case of Rex v. Archer, 1 M. C. C. 143, husband and wife were jointly indicted for receiving If husband and wife jointly comstolen goods, and both convicted:mit a murder, both are equally amenHeld, that as the charge against the husband and wife was joint, and it had not been left to the jury to say whether she received the goods in able to the criminal law, as the doctrine of presumed coercion of the wife does not apply to murder. Reg. v. Manning, 2 C. & K. 903. |