DRUNKARDS—FOREIGNERS-CORPORATIONS. 23 Husband and wife were jointly | cide, it appeared that the prisoner tried upon an indictment charging was at the time of the alleged ofthem with feloniously wounding, fence so drunk that she did not with intent to disfigure. The jury know what she did :-Held, that found that the wife, at the time of this negatived the attempt to comthe commission of the offense, acted mit suicide. Reg. v. Moore, 3 C. & under the coercion of her husband, K. 319; 16 Jur. 750-Jervis. and that she herself did not personally inflict any violence:--Held, that she could not be convicted. Reg. v. Smith, Dears. & B. C. C. 553; 4 Jur., N. S. 395; 27 L. J., M. C. 204; 8 Cox, C. Č. 27. 5. Drunkards. Drunkenness is not, in law, any excuse for crime. Pearson's case, 2 Lewin, C. C. 144—Park. In case of stabbing where the prisoner has used a deadly weapon, the fact that he was drunk does not at all alter the nature of the case; but if he had intemperately used an instrument, not in its nature a deadly weapon, at a time when he was drunk, the fact of his being drunk might induce the jury to less strongly infer a malicious intent in him at the time. Rex v. Meakin, 7 C. & P. 297-Alderson. If a man is drunk, this is no excuse for any crime he may commit; but where provocation by a blow has been given to a person, who kills another with a weapon which he happens to have in his hand, the drunkenness of the prisoner may be considered on the question, whether he was excited by passion, or acted from malice; as, also, it may be on the question, whether expressions used by the prisoner manifested a deliberate purpose, or were merely the idle expressions of a drunken man. Rex v. Thomas, 7 C. & P. 817-Parke. Though drunkenness is no excuse for crime, it may be taken into account by the jury, when considering the motive or intent of a person acting under its influence. Reg. v. Gamlen, 1 F. & F. 90-Crowder. Where, on the trial of an indictment for an attempt to commit sui 6. Foreigners. A person naturalized in this country becomes, to all intents and purposes, a British subject, and ceases to be an alien. Reg. v. Manning, 2 C. & K. 903; 13 Jur. 962; T. & M. 155. It is no defence on behalf of a foreigner charged in England with a crime committed there, that he did not know he was doing wrong, the act not being an offence in his own country. But though it is not a defence in law, yet it is a matter to be considered in mitigation of punishment. Rex v. Esop, 7 C. & P. 456-Bosanquet and Vaughan. 7. Corporations. A corporation must prosecute in its corporate name. Rex v. Patrick, 1 Leach, C. C. 253. A corporation aggregate may be guilty of a misdemeanor by nonfeasance, such as the nonrepair of bridges which it is their duty to repair. Reg. v. Birmingham and Gloucester Railway Co., 3 Railw. Cas. 148; 2 G. & D. 236; 9 C. & P. 469; 3 Q. B. 223; 6 Jur. 804. In such a case an indictment is maintainable against it in its corporate name. Ib. If indicted in the Queen's Bench, they can appear by attorney; but if indicted at the assizes, or sessions, where they cannot appear by attorney, they should apply for a certiorari and appear by attorney, and compel appearance by distress infinite. Reg. v. Birmingham and Gloucester Railway Company, 9 C. & P. 469-Parke. See S. C., 3 Q. B. 223; 1 G. & D. 457; 5 Jur. 40. An indictment will lie against a corporation for a misfeasance at common law. Reg. v. Great North proved. Rex v. Owen, 4 C. & P. of England Railway Company, 9 Q. 236-Littledale. B. 315; 10 Jur. 755; 16 L. J., M. C. 16. An incorporated company demurred to a bill in equity, because the discovery thereby sought might subject it to criminal prosecution under 59 Geo. 3, c. 69 (Foreign Enlistment Act) :--Held, that a corporation was not liable to be indicted under that act, and the court overruled the demurrer. Two Sicilies (King) v. Willcox, 1 Sim., N. S. 334; 14 Jur. 751; 19 L. J. Chanc. 488. Where an indictment against a corporation, for the non-repair of a highway, is removed by certiorari, at the instance of the prosecutor, the prosecutor is not required by 16 & 17 Vict. c. 30, s. 5, to enter into recognisances to pay the defendant's costs in case of acquittal, indictments against corporations being excepted from the operation of the act. Reg. v. Manchester (Mayor, &c.), 7 El. & Bl. 453; 3 Jur., N. S. 839; 26 L. J., M. C. 65. 8. Infants. "See 10 & 11 Vict. c. 82, and 13 "& 14 Vict. c. 37, for the speedy "and summary trial, conviction and "punishment of juvenile offenders; "and as to the care and education "of infants convicted of felony by "the Court of Chancery, see 3 & 4 "Vict. c. 90." An infant, under the age of seven years, cannot incur the guilt of felMarsh v. Loader, 14 C. B., N. S. 535; 11 W. R. 784. ony. A boy who, at the time of the commission of the offence of rape, is under fourteen, cannot, in point of law, be guilty of an assault with intent to commit a rape; and if he is under that age, no evidence is admissible to show that, in point of fact, he could commit the offence. Reg. v. Phillips, 8 C. & P. 736— Patteson: S. P., Rex v. Groombridge, 7 C. & P. 582-Gaselee. A boy under fourteen years of age cannot, by law, be convicted of feloniously carnally knowing and abusing a girl under ten years old, even though it was proved that he was arrived at the full state of puberty. Reg. v. Jordan, 9 C. & P. 118-Williams: S. P. Reg. v. Brimilow, 9 C. & P. 366; 2 M. C. C. 122. A child under fourteen, indicted for murder, must be proved conscious of the nature of the act. Reg. v. Vamplew, 3 F. & F. 520— Pollock. 9. Peers. 10. Persons under Compulsion. An apprehension, though ever so well grounded, of having property wasted or destroyed, or of suffering any other mischief not endangering the person, will afford no excuse for joining or continuing with rebels. Rex v. M' Growther, 1 East, P. C. 71. C. 71. But it is otherwise if the party If a child, more than seven and joins from fear of death or by comunder fourteen years of age, is in-pulsion. Rex v. Gordon, 1 East, P. dicted for felony, it will be left to the jury to say whether the offence was committed by him, and, if so, whether, at the time of the offence, the prisoner had a guilty knowledge that he or she was doing wrong. The presumption of law is, that a child of that age has not such guilty knowledge, unless the contrary is On an indictment on 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 30, s. 4, for breaking a threshing-machine, the judge allowed a witness to be asked whether the mob, by whom the machine was broken, did not compel persons to go with them, and then compel each person to give one blow to the ma chine; and also, at the time when the prisoner and himself were forced to join the mob, they did not agree together to run away from the mob the first opportunity. Rex v. Crutchley, 5 C. & P. 133. A., who was insane, collected a number of persons together, who armed themselves, having a common purpose of resisting the lawfully constituted authorities; A. having declared that he would cut down any constable who came against him. A., in the presence of C. and D., two of the persons of his party, afterwards shot an assistant of a constable, who came to apprehend A. under a warrant :-Held, that C. and D. were guilty of murder, as principals in the first degree, and that any apprehension that C. and D. had of personal danger to themselves from A., was no ground of defence for continuing with him after he had so declared his purpose; and also, that it was no ground of defence that A. and his party had no distinct or particular object in view when they assembled together and armed themselves. Reg. v. Tyler, 8 C. & P. 616-Den man. The apprehension of personal danger does not furnish any excuse for assisting in doing any act which is illegal. Ib. one of them maims a pursuer to avoid being taken, the others are not to be considered principals in such act. Rex v. White, R. & R. C. C. 99. If several act in concert to steal a man's goods, and he is induced by fraud to trust one of them in the presence of the others with the possession of the goods, and then another of the party entices the owner. away, in order that the party who has obtained possession of the goods may carry them off, all will be guilty of the felony; the receipt by one, under such circumstances, being a felonious taking by all. Rex v. Standley, R. & R. Č. C. 305. Going towards a place where a felony is to be committed in order to assist in carrying off the property, and assisting accordingly, will not make a man a principal, if he was at such a distance at the time of the felonious taking as not to be able to assist in it. Rex v. Kelly, R. & R. C. C. 421. * A person waiting outside of a house to receive goods, which a confederate is stealing in the house, is a principal in the theft. Rex v. Owen, 1 M. C. C. 96. Where a prosecutor left his goods in a cart standing in the street, and M. came and led the cart away, and having taken it a short distance, delivered it to another man, with directions to take it to his, M's, house. Upon the cart arriving at the house, S., who was at work in the cellar, having directed a com II. PRINCIPALS, ACCESSORIES AND panion to blow out the light, came ABETTORS. 1. Principals, 25. 2. Accessories, 26. 3. Abettors, 28. 4. Trial, 28. 5. Indictment, 29. 1. Principals. If several are out for the purpose of committing a felony, and upon an alarm run different ways, and up and assisted in removing the goods from the cart:-Held, that S. could not be indicted as a principal. Rex v. M'Makin, R. & R. C. C. 333, n.-Lawrence. And see Rex v. Dyer, 2 East, P. C. 767. All those who assemble themselves together, with an intent even to commit a trespass, the execution whereof causes a felony to be committed; and continue together, abetting one another, till they have act . ually put their design into execu- "be passed, may be indicted, tried, tion; and also all those who are "convicted and punished in all represent when a felony is commit-"spects as if he were a principal ted, and abet the doing of it, are "felon." (Former provision, 11 & principals in felony. Reg. v. How- 12 Vict. c. 46, s. 1.) ell, 9 C. & P. 437-Littledale. In misdemeanors all guilty par-"sel, procure or command any other ticipators are principals. Reg. v. "person to commit any felony, Greenwood, 16 Jur. 390; 21 L. J., "whether the same be a felony at M. C. 127; 2 Den. C. C. 453. 66 By s. 2, "whosoever shall coun common law or by virtue of any "act passed or to be passed, shall "be guilty of felony, and may be "indicted and convicted either as "an accessory before the fact to the "principal felony, together with the "principal felon, or after the con"viction of the principal felon, or " 'may be indicted and convicted of "a substantive felony whether the "principal felon shall or shall not "have been previously convicted, "or shall or shall not be amenable "to justice, and may thereupon be "punished in the same manner as "any accessory before the fact to "the same felony, if convicted as "an accessory, may be punished." (Former provision, 7 Geo. 4, c. 64, 9.) It is not sufficient to make a man a principal in uttering a forged note, that he came with the utterer to the town where it was uttered, went out with him from the inn where they put up, joined him again in the street after the uttering at a little distance, and ran away when the utterer was apprehended. Rex v. Davis, R. & R. C. C. 113-Bayley. If A. unlocks a door of a room of which he has the key, in order to allow B. to commit a larceny in it, and A. then goes away, and B., in his absence, enters the room and removes articles out of it, A. is not a principal in the larceny. Reg. v. Jeffries, 3 Cox, C. C. 85-Cresswell. A principal in the second degrees. cannot at the same time be treated as a receiver. Reg. v. Perkins, 2 Den. C. C. 459; 16 Jur. 481; 21 L. J., M. C. 152; 5 Cox, C. C. 554. To incite a servant to rob his master is a misdemeanor at common law; and an incitement to steal any silk that may be in the servant's care, without further defining the particular silk to be stolen, is sufficiently certain to support a conviction. Reg. v. Quail, 4 F. & F. 1076Willes. A soliciting and inciting a person to commit an offence where no other act is done except the soliciting and inciting, is a misdemeanor only. Ib. 2. Accessories. Before the Fact.]-By 24 & 25 Vict. c. 94, s. 1, "whosoever shall "become an accessory before the "fact to any felony, whether the same be a felony at common law, "or by virtue of any act passed or to A person is not to be convicted of larceny if doubtful whether an accessory before or after the fact. Reg. v. Munday, 2 F. & F. 170Byles. A servant let a person into his master's house on a Saturday afternoon, and concealed him there all night in order that he might rob the house; and on the Sunday morning left the premises in pursuance of the previous arrangement. The man, in the servant's absence, broke into the bed-room of the master, and stole the contents of the cash-box: -Held, that the man who took the property from the cash-box was rightly charged as a thief, and the servant who let him into the house as an accessory before the fact. Reg. v. Tuckwell, Car. & M. 215— Coleridge. If a charge against an accessory is, that the principal felony was committed by persons unknown, it is no objection that the same grand jury has found a bill imputing the principal felony to J. S. Rex v. Bush, R. & R. C. C. 372. By s. 4, "every accessory after "the fact to any felony (except when "it is otherwise specially enacted), "whether the same be a felony at It is not essential that there should "common law or by virtue of any have been any direct communica- "act passed or to be passed, shall tion between an accessory before "be liable, at the discretion of the the fact and the principal felon. It"court, to be imprisoned in the comis enough if the accessory directs an "mon gaol or house of correction intermediate agent to procure an-"for any term not exceeding two other to commit a felony; and it will be sufficient even if the accessory does not name the person to be procured, but merely directs the agent to employ some person. Rex v. Cooper, 5 C. & P. 535—Parke. The prisoner had procured certain drugs and gave them to his wife, with intent that she should take them in order to procure abortion. She took them in his absence and died from their effects. On an indictment against him for manslaughter, it was objected that he was only an accessory before the fact, and that in law there cannot be an accessory before the fact to manslaughter:-Held, that he was properly found guilty of manslaughter. Reg. v. Gaylor, 7 Cox, C. C. 253; Dears. & B. C. C. 288. 66 66 After the fact.]-By 24 & 25 Vict. c. 94, s. 3, "whosoever shall become an accessory after the fact to any "felony, whether the same be a "felony at common law or by vir"tue of any act passed or to be "passed, may be indicted and con"victed either as an accessory after "the fact to the principal felony, "together with the principal felon, or after the conviction of the principal felon, or may be indicted and "convicted of a substantive felony, "whether the principal felon shall "or shall not have been previously "convicted, or shall or shall not be "amenable to justice, and may 'thereupon be punished in like man"ner as any accessory after the fact "to the same felony, if convicted "as an accessory, may be punish"ed." (Former provision, 11 & 12 Vict. c. 46, s. 2.) “ years, with or without hard labour, "and it shall be lawful for the court, "if it shall think fit, to require the "offender to enter into his own re"cognizances and to find sureties, "both or either, for keeping the "peace, in addition to such punish"ment; provided that no person "shall be imprisoned under this "clause, for not finding sureties, "for any period exceeding one "year." H. & S. broke open a warehouse, and stole thereout thirteen firkins of butter, which they carried along the street thirty yards: they then fetched the prisoner, who was apprised of the robbery, and he assisted in carrying away the property; he was indicted for theft:-Held, that he was only an accessory, and not a principal. Rex v. King, R. & R. C. C. 332. Where three persons agreed to utter a forged note, and one uttered it at Gosport, and the other two, by previous concert, waited at Portsmouth, they were held to be acces sories. Rex v. Soares, 2 East, P. C. 974; R. & R. C. C. 25. Although a statute which creates a new felony will attach to that felony all the common-law incidents to felony, so that accessories thereto will be included, yet it will go no further. Rex v. Sadi, 1 Leach, C. C. 468; 2 East, P. C. 748. An accessory after the fact to a felony cannot be convicted upon an indictment charging the commission of the felony only: he should be indicted as an accessory after the fact. Reg. v. Fallon, 9 Cox, C. C. 242; L. & C. 217; 32 L. J., M. C. |
