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shew motive or personal malice, or a particular intent to kill the deceased; and if he killed A., meaning to kill B., it is clearly murder; yet, where it is a main part of the proof that he killed the deceased, that he meant to kill some one else, it is essential to prove that he had an intent to kill such other person, and that such person was or might be supposed to be at or near the spot, at or about the time of the fatal blow. Reg. v. Cleary, 2 F. & F. 850-Erle.

On an indictment for manslaughter, where the death is occasioned by the application of a lotion to the skin, evidence may be given of the effect of the lotion when applied to other patients. Rex v. St. John Long, 4 C. & P. 398-Park and Garrow.

An allegation in an indictment, charging that the death of a person was caused by a plaister made and applied by the prisoner, is sufficiently proved by shewing that three plaisters were applied, and that two of them were applied by the prisoner, and the third made from materials furnished by the prisoner. Rea V. Spiller, 5 C. & P. 333-Bolland and Bosanquet.

attack, which would have endangered his life, spurred his horse, which became frightened, and threw him, giving him a mortal fracture. The evidence was, that the prisoner struck the deceased with a small stick, and that the latter rode away, and the former rode after him; whereupon the deceased spurred his horse, which then winced and threw him, whereby he was killed :—Held, that this evidence sufficiently supported the indictment. Rex v. Hickman, 5 C. & P. 151-Park.

In a case of manslaughter, it was proved that the deceased was at an inn for three days, and that the innkeeper asked him what his name was, and that while there letters arrived at the inn directed in that name, which letters were delivered to the deceased, and received by him :-Held, that the innkeeper might be asked what name the deceased gave. Rex v. Timmins, 7 C. & P. 499-Patteson.

A. was charged with manslaughter, in killing B., by driving a cabriolet over him. C. saw the cabriolet drive by, but did not see the accident. Immediately afterwards, on hearing B. groan, C. went up to him, when B. made a statement as An indictment charged that the to how the accident had happened: death of the deceased was caused-Held, that this statement, being by a mortal wound of the head, inflicted with a swingle. It was proved that the death was caused by a blow on the head by a piece of wood, and that the external skin was not broken, but that there was extravasation of blood, pressing on the brain, and a collection of blood between the scalp and the brain. The surgeon stated this to be a contused wound, with effusion of blood: -Held, that the evidence supported the indictment. Reg. v. Warman, 2 C. & K. 195; 1 Den. C. C. 183.

An indictment charged, that the deceased was on horseback, and that the prisoner struck him with a stick, and that the deceased, from a wellgrounded apprehension of a further

made at the moment of the accident occurring, was receivable on the trial of A. for the manslaughter of B. Rex v. Foster, 6 C. & P. 325— Park, Patteson, and Gurney.

Statements made by the deceased to the first person who comes up after he has been wounded, are admissible as part of the res gestæ. The deceased died from the effects of a wound on his head, inflicted by a stick. A girl in the neighbourhood heard a cry, and coming out found the deceased standing with his cap in his hand, and apparently weak and injured. The deceased did not survive more than a few hours :-Held, the statement made by the deceased to the witness im

mediately on her coming up, com

By 31 & 32 Vict. c. 24, "capital "punishment for murder is to be "carried out within the prison "walls."

"last confined after conviction, and plaining of the injury, was admis-" the sentence of the court shall so sible in evidence, being part of the "direct." res gestæ. Reg. v. Lunny, 6 Cox, 25 & 26 Vict. c. 65, 66 provides C. C. 477-Ir. C. C. R. "for the speedier trial of offenders, The evidence against a prisoner" subject to martial law, commiting charged with manslaughter was an "murder or manslaughter on parties admission on his part, that, unfor-" also subject to martial law." tunately, he was the man who shot the deceased; and the fact that, on their coming together, apparently not in ill-humour, from the South Metropolitan Cemetery, where the prisoner was a watchman, but with which the deceased had no connexion, the prisoner said to the deceased, "Now, you mind, don't let me see you on my premises any more." At the time this was said, the wound had been given of which the deceased eventually died :-Held, that, in point of law, the evidence was suf ficient to sustain the charge. Rev v. Morrison, 8 C. & P. 22-Park.

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By 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 2, upon every conviction for murder "the court shall pronounce sentence "of death, and the same may "be carried into execution, and "all other proceedings upon such "sentence and in respect thereof may be had and taken, in the same manner in all respects as "sentence of death might have been pronounced and carried into execution, and all other proceedings thereupon and in respect thereof "might have been had and taken, "before the passing of this act, upon a conviction for any other "felony for which the prisoner might have been sentenced to "suffer death as a felon."

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Where two persons charged with murder by the same indictment had made statements implicating one another, and those statements were evidence for the prosecution, the court, upon the application of the counsel appearing for one prisoner, allowed them to have separate trials. Reg. v. Jackson, 7 Cɔx, C. C. 357 -Martin.

A man upon whom sentence of death has passed ought not, while under that sentence, to be brought up to receive judgment for another felony, although he was under that sentence when he was tried for the other felony, and did not plead his prior attainder. Rex v. Brady, R. & R. C. C. 268.

The time and place of the execution of a convicted felon form no part of the sentence. Rex v. Doyle, 1 Leach, C. C. 67.

A judge might, if he saw fit, have ordered a person convicted of murder to be executed immediately, or at any time within 48 hours after the conviction, as he might have done in any other capital felony. Rex v. Wyatt, R. & R. C. C. 230.

It was not essential to award the day of execution in the sentence, the 25 Geo. 2, c. 37, being in that respect only directory; and if a wrong day was awarded, it would not vitiate the sentence, if the mistake was discovered and set right during the assizes. Ib.

The bodies of executed murderers were by the common law at the king's disposal, and therefore the court could not direct them to be

hung in chains. Rex v. Hall, 1 Leach, C. C. 21.

Where a woman who had been condemned to death did not, when called upon to say why execution should not be done upon her, plead her pregnancy, the court would not permit that question to be formally inquired into, at the suggestion of her counsel that she was in fact pregnant. Reg. v. Hunt, 2 Cox, C. C. 261.

Sentence of death might under 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 30, be recorded against a person convicted of murder. Reg. v. Hogg, 2 M. & Rob. 381-Denman.

a commission of over and terminer and general gaol delivery. Ib.

A proclamation promising a pardon cannot be pleaded as a pardon. Ib.

But where such proclamation had been made, the court, in their discretion, deferred the awarding of execution upon the sentence, until the prisoner should have had time to apply to the secretary of state for a pardon, according to the terms of the proclamation. Ib.

The attorney-general is entitled, as of course, to a habeas corpus and certiorari, to bring up a prisoner and the record of his conviction in case of felony. Ib.

A sheriff is not bound, upon service of a copy of the calendar of prisoners signed by a justice of gaol delivery at the assizes, to execute prisoners against whom sentence of death has been passed, unless such prisoners are in his legal custody.

Quære, whether on passing sentence of death on a conviction for murder, the award of dissection and anatomizing, in pursuance of 25 Geo. 3, c. 37, was an essential part of the sentence to be pronounced by the judge? Rex v. Fletcher, R. & R. C. C. 58. The omission of it might be rem-Rex v. Antrobus, 4 N. & M. 565; 2 edied by the judge going again A. & E. 798; 1 H. & W. 96; 6 ̊C. into court after adjournment, from & P. 784. his lodgings, and ordering the prisoner to be again brought up, and then passing the proper judgment, as the sentence might be corrected or altered at any time during the assizes. Ib.

Where the sheriff has the custody of a prisoner, the judgment of the court passing sentence of death upon him is, without any warrant or copy of the calendar, sufficient to authorize and require the sheriff to do execution; the copy of the calendar signed by the judge is a mere memorial. Ib.

On a conviction for murder, in which the prisoners were brought up by habeas corpus, and the record by certiorari, the court gave the prisoners three days' time to exam- 14. Punishment for Manslaughter. ine the record and instruct coun- By 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 5, sel to shew cause why execution" whosoever shall be convicted of should not be awarded against them." manslaughter shall be liable, at Rex v. Garside, 4 N. & M. 33; 2" the discretion of the court, to be A. & E. 266. kept in penal servitude for life, or "for any term not less than three " years (now by 27 & 28 Vict. c.

Semble, that a pardon after judgment may be pleaded ore tenus, and in bar of execution; and there may be a demurrer to such a plea ore tenus. Ib.

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47, not less than five years), or to "be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years, with or withThe court of King's Bench has "out hard labour, or to pay such authority to order the sheriff of any "fine as the court shall award, in county, or the marshal of the court," addition to or without any such to carry into execution a sentence of "other discretionary punishment as death, pronounced by a judge under" aforesaid."

XXIV. NIGHT POACHING AND OFFENCES RELATING TO GAME, HARES AND RABBITS.

1. The Offence, 384.

field was not a joint act of the three. Reg. v. Nickless, 8 C. & P. 757— Patteson.

Six were indicted under 9 Geo. 4,

2. Limitation of Time for Prosecu- c. 69, s. 9, for having been in a field

tion, 389.

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57 Geo. 3, c. 90.

The 9 Geo. 4, c. 69, s. 9, creates two distinct offences. First, the entering in the night on land to the number of three, some one of them being armed; and second, the being in the night on land to the number of three, some one of them being armed. Rex v. Kendrick, 7 C. & P. 184-Coleridge.

In a case of night poaching by three or more armed, if one has a gun, all are armed within 9 Geo. 4, c. 69, s. 9. Reg. v. Goodfellow, 1 C. & K. 724; 1 Den. C. C. 81; S. P., Reg. v. Andrews, 1 Cox, C. C. 144; Reg. v. May, 5 Cox, C. C. 176-Patteson.

Entry.]-If nets are hung on the twigs of a hedge within the close, it is an entry, though the parties are in a lane outside the hedge. Athea's case, 2 Lewin, C. C. 191-Alderson. See Pickering v. Rudd, 1 Stark. 56; 4 Camp. 219.

If three persons go out together night poaching, one being armed, and two of them stand in a road, and set nets in the hedge of a field of A., and send their dog into the field to drive hares into the net, and after this the third leaves them in the road and goes to poach by himself in another field of A.; this will not support an indictment for nightpoaching on land of A.; for the sending in of a dog is not an entering of land within 9 Geo. 4, c. 69, s. 9; and the entering of the second

at night, armed for the purpose of taking game. Three of the six had been in the field, and three had remained outside of it, aiding and assisting the others :-Held, that the actual entry of some of the party, armed, was sufficient to support the conviction of all, though it could not be proved which of them had actually entered the field. Reg. v. Whittaker, 1 Den. C. C. 310; 3 Cox, C. C. 50.

In order to bring a case of nightpoaching within 9 Geo. 4, c. 69, s. 9, it is not necessary to prove that three persons were all within the same close or inclosure, on the same piece of open land, if all were of one party, or being armed, with the same common purpose, in the place described in the indictment. Reg. v. Uezzell, 2 Den. C. C. 274; T. & M. 598.

A count stated that the prisoners were in a field called A., for the purpose of then and there taking game:-Held, that they could not be convicted on that count, unless the jury was satisfied that the prisoners had an intention of taking game in that particular field. Rex v. Capewell, 5 ̊C. & P. 549—Parke.

A defendant was convicted under 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 32, s. 30, of trespassing on land in the possession and occupation of B. in pursuit of game :-Held, that the entry upon the land under that section must be a personal entry, but it having been proved that the defendant was on the highway in pursuit of game, and not as a traveller, and that B. was the owner of the land on both sides of the highway :-Held also, that, as the soil and freehold of the highway were in B. as owner of the adjoining land, there was a personal entry on the land by the defendant. Reg. v. Pratt, Dears. C. C. 502; 3

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C. L. R. 686; 1 Jur., N. S. 681; | formation or complaint in writing

24 L. J., M. C. 113; 4 El. & Bl. 860.

On an indictment on 57 Geo. 3, c. 90, he having entered a given close with intent there to kill game, and being there found armed, it was necessary to prove an entry with that intent into the close specified. Rex v. Barham, 1 M. C. C. R. 151.

On an indictment under 57 Geo. 3, c. 90, a man might have been convicted of having entered a wood, and of being found armed there, though he was not seen in such wood. It was sufficient if there was evidence to shew that he had been there armed. Rex v. Worker, 1 M. C. C. R. 165. In this case the prisoner was not seen in the wood, but a gamekeeper saw flashes in the wood and heard reports of guns, and saw the prisoner afterwards in the close adjoining the wood.

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that the offence was "entering land for the purpose of taking game there," in order to prove the justice's jurisdiction before whom perjury is alleged to have been committed. Reg. v. Western, 11 Cox, C. C. 93; 1 L. R., C. C. 122; 18 L. T., N. S. 299; 16 W. R. 730.

An information under 9 Geo. 4, c. 69, s. 1, for entering land for the purpose of taking game, is sufficient to give the justices before whom it is laid jurisdiction to hear the charge, although it does not allege that the entry was for the purpose of taking game there. Reg. v. Western, 1 L. R., C. C. 122; 18 L. T., N. S. 299; 16 W. R. 730; 37 L. J., M. C. 81.

In Concert and Co-operation.] To support an indictment for night poaching by three or more being armed, it is not sufficient to prove that one of the prisoners was in the place laid in the indictment, and that the rest of the party was in another wood which was separated from the place mentioned in the indictment by a turnpike road. Rex v. Dowsell, 6 C. & P. 398-Patteson.

Two were charged with being by night, and armed, in a close for the purpose therein of destroying game. It was proved that they passed through the close without doing anything in it, and that after being lost sight of for To sustain an indictment for two hours, they were found three night poaching, the parties must miles off with game in their posses- have been in the place charged in sion -Held, that there was evi- the indictment, with intent to dedence that they were in the partic-stroy game there, and it is incumular close for the purpose of taking bent on the prosecutor to convince game, and that if persons went out the jury that the defendants had with a general intention of taking an intent to destroy game in the game, that was sufficient evidence particular place mentioned in the of an intent to take game in every indictment. Rex v. Gainer, 7 C. field through which they passed, in & P. 231-Coleridge. which game might be expected to be found. Reg. v. Higgs, 10 Cox, C. C. 527-Willes.

Information.]-In an indictment, perjury was alleged to have been committed on the hearing of a complaint for entering land for the purpose of taking game, contrary to 9 Geo. 4, c. 69:-Held, that it need not appear on the face of the inFISH. DIG.-29.

If one of a party of poachers is found in the land specified, the rest co-operating in the pursuit in adjoining land, all may be alleged to be found in the land specified. Rex v. Andrews, 2 M. & Rob. 37—Gurney; S. P., Rex v. Lockett, 7 C. & P. 300-Alderson.

Those who are watching at the outside of a preserve, for the purpose of giving the alarm, on the

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