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which was confined to the straw of wheat, oats, barley and rye. Reg. v. Baldock, 2 Cox, C. C. 55.

within 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 89,-Held, that the count was sufficient, inasmuch as it is not necessary to the character of a stack that it should be erected out of doors. Reg. v. Munson, 2 Cox, C. C. 186

A. and B. were convicted for unlawfully and maliciously setting fire-Coleridge. to a stack of grain. The stack was of the flax plant, with the seed or grain in it, and the jury found that the flax seed is a grain :-Held, that the stack was a stack of grain within 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 89, s. 10. Reg. v. Spencer, Dears. & B. C. C. 131; 2 Jur., N. S. 1212; 26 L. J., M. C. 16; 7 Cox, C. C. 189.

A. and B. were charged with setting fire to a wood. They set fire to a summer-house which was in the wood, and from the summerhouse the fire was communicated to the wood:-Held, that they might be convicted on this indictment. Reg. v. Price, 9 C. & P. 729— Gurney.

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12. Coal and Other Mines.

It was a sufficient overt act to render a person liable to be found guilty of attempting to set fire to By 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s. 26, a stack, under 9 & 10 Vict. c. 25, whosoever shall unlawfully and s. 7, if he went to the stack with "maliciously set fire to any mine the intention of setting fire to it"of coal, cannel coal, anthracite, and lighted a lucifer match for "or other mineral fuel, shall be that purpose, but abandoned the "guilty of felony, and being conattempt because he found that he "victed thereof shall be liable, at was being watched. Reg. v. Tay- "the discretion of the court, to be lor, 1 F. & F. 511-Pollock. 'kept in penal servitude for life or A stack, of which the lower part "for any term not less than five consisted of cole-seed straw, and the years (27 & 28 Vict. c. 47), or to upper part of wheat stubble, was" be imprisoned for any term not not a stack of straw; and the set- exceeding two years, with or withting it on fire was not therefore a "out hard labour, and with or withcapital offense within 7 & 8 Geo. 4,"out solitary confinement, and, if c. 29, s. 17. Rex v. Tottenham, 7 a male under sixteen, with or C. & P. 237-Denman and Gaselee." without whipping." (Former proSetting fire to a score of faggots vision, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 89, which were piled one upon another s. 9.) in a loft, which was made by means By s. 27, "whosoever shall unof a temporary floor put over an "lawfully and maliciously by any archway roofed in between two "overt act attempt to set fire to houses, and under which carts could any mine, under such circumgo, was not setting fire to a stack" stances that if the mine were of wood within 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 30,"thereby set fire to, the offender s. 17. Rex v. Aris, 6 C. & P. 348 "would be guilty of felony, shall -Park. "be guilty of felony, and being A count charged an attempt to "convicted thereof shall be liable, set fire to a stack of haulm. It 66 at the discretion of the court, to was proved that some haulm had" be kept in penal servitude for any been carted from a field, and stacked" term not exceeding fourteen and in a building originally intended for "not less than five years (27 & 28 a stable, but afterwards divided into "Vict. c. 47), or to be imprisoned three parts by a wall, which reached "for any term not exceeding two only to the eaves, one part was used years, with or without hard labour, as a stable, and the part fired con- and with or without solitary contained the haulm and a lot of tiles: finement, and, if a male under

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"sixteen, with or without whip-"prove an intent to injure or de ping." (Former provision, 9 & 10 "fraud any particular person, but it Vict c. 25, s. 7.)

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If A. counsels and encourages B. to set fire to a malthouse, and B. attempts to set it on fire, both may be jointly indicted as principals for the misdemeanor of attempting to set the malthouse on fire, although A. was not present at the time of the attempt. Reg. v. Clayton, 1 C. & K. 128-Williams.

On an indictment for maliciously setting fire to a building, it is not necessary to prove actual ill-will in the prisoner towards the owner; and in order to justify a jury in acquitting a prisoner on the ground of insanity, they must believe that he did not know right from wrong; but if they find that the prisoner, when he did the act, was in a state of mind that he was not conscious that the effect of it would be to injure any other person, that will amount to a general verdict of not guilty. Reg. v. Davies, 1 F. & F. 69-Crompton.

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14. Indictment.

By 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s. 60,"it "shall be sufficient in any indictment for any offence against the act, where it shall be necessary to allege an intent to injure or defraud, to allege that the party ac"cused did the act with intent to "injure or defraud, as the case may "be, without alleging an intent to "injure or defraud any particular person, and on the trial of any such offence, it shall not be necessary to

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"shall be sufficient to prove that "the party accused did the act charged with an intent to injure "or defraud, as the case may be."

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It must appear upon the face of an indictment for arson that the house was that of another; and it must state whose house, and with that the proof should agree. Rex v. Rickman, 2 East, P. C. 1034. And see Rex v. Glandfield, 2 East, P.

C. 1034.

An indictment for setting fire to an out-house was good, though formed part of the dwelling-house, it might have, in point of law, the burning of which was arson at common law. Rex v. North, 2 East, P. C. 1021.

A house, in part of which a man lives, and other parts of which he lets to lodgers, may be described, in an indictment for setting fire to it, as his house, though he has taken the benefit of the insolvent debtors' act, and executed an assignment including the house, if the assignee has not taken possession; at least, counts it is stated as the house of no objection can be made, if in other the assignee, and in others of the lodger whose room was set fire to. Ball, 1 M. C. C. 30.

Rex v.

A prisoner was convicted on an indictment for setting fire with intent to injure A. B. The property fired belonged to A. B. The jury found the intent to injure C. D.:— Conviction held good. Rex v. Newill, 1 M. C. C. 458.

So an indictment under 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 30, s. 17, for setting fire to a stack of straw, was good, without stating any intent to injure. Ib.

It was not necessary to aver in an indictment on 9 Geo. 1, c. 22, for setting fire to a hay-stack, that the stack" was thereby burnt." v. Salmon, R. & R. C. C. 26.

Rex

In an indictment on 9 Geo. 1, c. 22, for setting fire to a hay-stack, it was no answer to the charge that

the prisoner had no malice or spite | The judges will take notice that to the owner of the stack. Ib. beans are pulse. Ib.

An indictment on 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 30, s. 17, charged a party with setting fire to a stack of barley, of the value of 100l., of R. P. W. was good, although the words of the statute creating the offence were 'any stack of corn or grain." Rex v. Swatkins, 4 C. & P. 548—Patteson.

An indictment for setting fire to a barge, the property of another, ought to contain an averment that it was done with an intent to injure the owner. Rex v. Smith, 4 C. & P. 569-Gaselee and Alderson. Sed quære, see Rex v. Newill, 1 M. C. C." 458, and 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s. 60. On an indictment for setting fire to a mill, with intent to injure the Held, also, that if the indictment occupiers thereof:-Held, that an stated" that the prisoner feloniousinjury to the mill being the neces-ly, unlawfully and maliciously did sary consequence of setting fire to set fire to a certain stack of barley, it, the intent to injure might be in- of the value of 100l., of R. P. W., ferred; for a man must be supposed then and there being," this is suffito intend the necessary consequence cient, without stating that the prisof his own act. Rex v. Farrington, oner feloniously, unlawfully and R. & R. C. C. 207. maliciously did then and there set fire to the stack. Ib.

An indictment on 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 30, ss. 2 and 17, for setting fire to a barn and a stack of straw, charged the offences to have been committed

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15. Evidence.

Notice to produce Policy.]-On an indictment for arson on the prosecution of an insurance company, their books are not evidence of the insurance, without notice to produce the policy. Rex v. Doran, 1 Esp. 127 -Kenyon.

The prisoners had set fire to a stack of stubble (which, in Cam- A prisoner tried at the assizes for bridgeshire, is called haulm); they arson, on Wednesday, the 20th of were indicted on a first indictment March, was on Monday, the 18th, for setting fire to a stack of straw: served at the prison with a notice -Held, that this was not straw. to produce a policy of insurance. And, on their being again indicted The commission day was Friday, for setting fire to a stack of straw the 15th, and the prisoner's home called haulm, the judge intimated was ten miles from the assize town: that to convict upon such a count-Held, that the notice was served would not be safe; and the verdict, too late. Rex v. Ellicombe, 5 C. & in consequence, was taken upon P. 522; 1 M. & Rob. 260-Littleother counts, charging the setting dale. fire to a barn and a wheat stack. ть.

On an indictment for setting fire to a stack of beans, a mistake as to the name of the place where the offence was committed is immaterial; the charge is transitory, not local. Rex v. Woodward, 1 M. C. C. 323. Upon a statute which made it capital to set fire to a stack of pulse, it was sufficient to state that the prisoner set fire to a stack of beans.

Notice to produce policies of insurance, served on the prisoner's attorney on Tuesday evening, the prisoner then in Maidstone, the policies being twenty miles off, and the trial taking place on Thursday, is sufficient. Reg. v. Barker, 1 F. & F. 326-Bramwell.

Upon an indictment for arson, with intent to defraud an insurance company, the nature of the proceedings does not give notice to the pris

oner to produce the policy, so as to dispense with actual notice to produce it. Reg. v. Kitson, Dears. C. C. 187; 17 Jur. 422; 22 L. J., M.

C. 118.

gine station. Reg. v. Regan, 4 Cox, C. C. 335.

Upon such an indictment it is not competent for the prosecutors to shew that other fires, of which notice was given by the prisoner, were of a similar nature to the one in question, and different from those of which notice was given by other parties. Ib.

On an indictment for arson, one count laying an intent to defraud, and it being opened for the prosecution that the motive might have been to realise the money insured by the prisoner upon her goods; evidence was received that she was

to shew that she was at all events under no pecuniary temptation to commit such an act. Reg. v. Grant, 4 F. & F. 322-Pollock.

Commission of Act-Motives and Intent.-A. was indicted for wilfully setting fire to a rick by firing a gun close to it on the 29th of March evidence that the rick was also on fire on the 28th of March, and that A. was then close to it, having a gun in his hand, is receivable to shew that the fire on the 29th was not accidental. Reg. v. Dossett, 2 C. & K. 306; 2 Cox, C. C. 243-Maule. On an indictment for arson in set-in easy circumstances, with a view ting fire to a rick, the property of A., evidence may be given of the prisoner's presence and demeanor at fires of other ricks, the property respectively of B. and C., occurring the same night, although those fires are the subject of other indictments against the prisoner, such evidence being important to explain his movements and general conduct before and after the fire of A.'s rick; but evidence is not admissible of threats, of statements, or of particular acts, pointing alone to other indictments, and not tending to implicate or explain the conduct of the prisoner in reference to that fire. Reg. v. Taylor, 5 Cox, C. C. 138Patteson.

Under an indictment for arson, where the prisoner is charged with wilfully setting fire to her master's house, the previous and abortive attempts to set fire to different portions of the same premises are admissible, though there is no evidence to connect the prisoner with either of them. Reg. v. Bailey, 2 Cox, C. C. 311.

Upon an indictment for arson, with intent to injure the person in occupation of the premises, the prisoner may be found guilty, although his intent is proved to have been to obtain a reward for giving the earliest intimation of a fire at the en

On a charge of arson (the case turning on identity) evidence was rejected that, a few days previously to the fire, another building of the prosecutor's was found on tire, and the prisoner was seen standing by, with a demeanor which shewed indifference or gratification. Reg. v. Harris, 4 F. & F. 342--Willes.

VI. ASSAULT AND BATTERY.

1. Common, 47.

2. On Clergymen or Ministers of Religion, 49.

3.

On Magistrates or other Persons preserving Wrecks, 49.

4.

On Prace and other Officers in Ex

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13. Indecent and with Intent to ravish keeps him in a dark room without -See RAPE, ABUSE AND DE-sufficient warmth or clothing, this FILEMENT OF WOMEN AND will not be an assault or an impris 14. With Intent to rob-See ROB-onment, nor will proof of this sup

CHILDREN.

BERY.

1. Common.

To support a charge of assault, such an assault must be shewn as could not be justified if an action was brought for it, and leave and licence pleaded. Reg. v. Meredith, 8 C. & P. 589-Abinger.

port an indictment for an assault or an imprisonment. Rex v. Smith, 2 C. & P. 449-Burrough.

B. was indicted, with three others, for an assault with intent to do some grievous bodily harm. It was proved that he, with the other prisoners, had assaulted the prosecutor, and afterwards they had returned If a person presents a pistol, pur- together and picked up some stones. porting to be a loaded pistol, at an- Then B. withdrew, and the other other, and so near as to have been prisoners threw the stones and dangerous to life if the pistol had wounded the prosecutor. The jury gone off; semble, that this is an as- found the three prisoners who threw sault, even though the pistol was, in the stones guilty of the felony, and fact, not loaded. Reg. v. St. George, B. guilty only of a common assault: 9 C. & P. 483-Parke. But see-Held, that B. was rightly conBlake v. Barnard, 9 C. & P. 626—victed. Reg. v. Phillips, 3 Čox, C. Abinger.

C. 225.

A. presented a loaded pistol at A. was advancing in a threatenB., but was prevented from pulling ing attitude, with an intention to the trigger:-Held, that A. could strike B., so that his blow would be properly convicted of this as- have almost immediately reached sault, on an indictment for felon- B., if he had not been stopped:iously attempting to discharge load-Held, that it was an assault in point ed arms at B. Ib.

Making a female patient strip naked, under the pretence that the defendant, a medical man, cannot otherwise judge of her illness, is, if he himself takes off her clothes, an assault. Rex v. Rosinski, 1 M. C. C. 19.

If a schoolmaster takes indecent liberties with a female scholar, without her consent, though she does not resist, he is liable to be punished as for a common assault. Rex v. Nichol, R. & R. C. C. 130.

If parish officers cut off the hair

of a
pauper in the poor-house by
force, and against the will of such
pauper, this is an assault; and if it
be done as matter of degradation,
and not with a view to cleanliness,
that will be an aggravation, and go
to increase the damages. Forde v.
Skinner, 4 C. & P. 239-Bayley.

If one has an idiot brother who is bed-ridden in his house, and

of law, though, at the particular moment when A. was stopped, he was not near enough for his blow to take effect. Stephens v. Myers, 4 C. & P. 349-Tindal.

If one man strikes another a blow, that other has a right to defend himself, and strike a blow in his defence, but he has no right to revenge himself; and if, when all the danger is past, he strikes a blow not necessary, he commits an assault and a battery. Reg. v. Driscoll, Car. & M. 214-Coleridge.

If two go out to strike one another, and do so, it is an assault in both, and it is quite immaterial who strikes the first blow. Reg. v. Lewis, 1 C. & K. 419-Coleridge.

Three boys under fourteen had connection with a girl, aged nine; they were indicted for an assault; the jury found them guilty, the child being an assenting party, but that from her tender years she did not

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