tentive to any other. To suppose its end to be the vague purpose of acquiring all possible accidental good, is, in politics, a mere solecism; as hath been sufficiently shewn by the writers on this question *. And how untrue it is in fact, may be gathered from what hath been said in the beginning, of the origin of Society. Civil society then, I suppose, will be allowed to have been instituted for the attainment of some certain end or ends, exclusive of others: and this implies the necessity of distinguishing this end from others. Which distinction arises from the different properties of the things pretending. But again, amongst all those things, which are apt to obtrude, or have, in fact, obtruded upon men, as the ends of civil government, there is only this difference in their properties, as ends; That, one of them is attainable by cicil Society only, and all the rest are easily obtained without it. The thing then with that property or quality must needs be the genuine end of civil Society. And this end is no other than SECURITY TO THE TEMPORAL LIBERTY AND PROPERTY OF MAN. For this end (as we have shewn) civil Society was in vented; and this, civil Society alone is able to procure. The great, but spurious rival of this end, the SALVATION OF SOULS, or the security of man's future happiness, belongs therefore to the other division. For this not depending on outward accidents, or on the will or power of another, as the body and goods do, may be as well attained in a state of nature, as in civil society; and therefore, on the principles here

• See Locke's Defences of his Letters on Toleration. This appears to have been Aristotle's opinion- — φύσει μὲν ἦν διώρισαν τὸ θῆλε, καὶ τὸ δέλον· ἐδὲν γὰρ ἡ φύσις ποίει τοιῦτον, οἷον χαλκοτύποι τὴν Δελφικὴν μάχαιραν πενιχρῶς, ἀλλ ̓ ἂν πυρὸς ἕν, &c. Poll.i.c.2. delivered,

delivered, cannot be one of the causes of the institution of civil government; nor, consequently, one of the ends thereof. But if so, the promotion of it comes not within the proper province of the Magistrate.

II. Secondly, as to religious Society, or a Church. This being instituted to preserve purity of faith and worship, its ultimate end is the SALVATION OF SOULS: From whence it follows,

1. That the religious Society must needs be soveREIGN, and INDEPENDENT ON THE CIVIL. Natural dependency of one Society on another, arises either from the law of nature, or of nations. Dependency by the law of nature, is from essence or generation. Dependency from essence there can be none. For this kind of dependency being a mode of natural union and coalition; and coalition being only where there is an agreement in eodem tertio; and there being no such agreement between two Societies essentially different, as these are, there can possibly be no dependency. Dependency from generation is where one Society springs up from another; as corporations, colleges, companies, and chambers, in a city. These, as well by the conformity of their ends and means, as by their charters of incorporation, betray their original and dependency. But religious Society, by ends and means quite different, gives internal proof of its not arising from the State; and we have shewn by external evidence*, that it existed before the state had any being. Again, no dependency can arise from the law of nations, or the civil law. Dependency by this law is, where one and the same people composing two different Societies, the imperium of the one clashes with

* See Book III. sect. 6.

the imperium of the other. And, in such case, the lesser Society becomes, by that law, dependent on the greater; because the not being so, would make that absurdity in politics, called imperium in imperio. But now civil and religious Society, having ends and means entirely different; and the means of civil Society being coercive power, which power therefore the religious hath not; it follows, that the administration of each Society is exercised in so remote spheres, that they can never meet to clash: And those Societies which never clash, necessity of state cannot bring into dependency on one another.

2. It follows, That this independent religious Society hath not, in and of itself, any coactive power of the civil kind: Its inherent jurisdiction being, in its nature and use, entirely different from that of the State. For if, as hath been proved, civil Society was instituted for the attainment of one species of good (all other good, requisite to human happiness, being to be attained without it) and that civil Society attains the good, for which it was ordained, by the sole mean of coercive power; then it follows, that the good, which any other kind of Society seeks, may be attained without that power; consequently, coercive power is unnecessary to a religious Society. But that mean, which is unnecessary for the attainment of any end, is likewise unfit; in all cases, but in that, where such mean is rendered unnecessary by the use of other means of the same kind or species. But religious society attains its end by means of a different kind; therefore coercive power is not only unnecessary, but unfit. Again, Ends, in their nature different, can never be attained by one and the same mean, Thus in the case before us: coercive

power

power can only influence us to outward practice; by outward practice only, is the good which civil Society aims at, immediately effected; therefore is coercive power peculiarly fit for civil Society. But the good, which religious Society aims at, cannot be effected by outward practice; therefore coercive power is altogether unfit for this Society.

Having thus by a diligent enquiry found,

I. First, That the care of the civil Society extends only to the body, and its concerns; and the care of the religious Society only to the soul: it necessarily follows, that the civil Magistrate, if he will improve this natural influence of Religion by human art and contrivance, must seek some UNION or ALLIANCE with the Church. For his office not extending to the care of souls, he hath not, in himself, power to enforce the influence of religion and the Church's province not extending to the body, and consequently being without coactive power, she has not, in herself alone, a power of applying that influence to civil purposes. The conclusion is, that their joint powers must co-operate thus to apply and inforce the influence of religion. But they can never act conjointly but in union and alliance.

II. Secondly, having found that each society is sovereign, and independent on the other, it as necessarily follows, that such union can be produced only by FREE CONVENTION AND MUTUAL COMPACT: because, whatever is sovereign and independent, can be brought to no act without its own consent: but nothing can give birth to a free convention, but a sense of mutual wants, which may be supplied; or a view of mutual benefits, which may be gained by it.

Such

Such then is the nature of that Union which produceth a RELIGION BY LAW ESTABLISHED: and which is, indeed, no other than a public league and alliance for mutual support and defence. For the State not having the care of souls, cannot inforce the influence of religion; and therefore seeks the concurring aid of the Church: and the Church having no coercive power (the consequence of its care's not extending to bodies) as naturally flies for protection to the State: this being of that kind of Alliance which Grotius calls FEDUS INÆQUALE "Inæquale foedus (say she) "hic intelligo quod ex ipsa vi pactionis manentem prælationem quandam alteri donat: hoc est, ubi quis tenetur alterius imperium ac majestatem con"6 servare UT POTENTIORI PLUS HONORIS, INFIRMIORI PLUS AUXILII DEFERATUR

An Alliance, then, by free convention, being in its nature such that each party must have its motives for contracting; our next enquiry will be,

I. What those motives were, which the State had for seeking, and the Church for accepting, the offers of an union: And,

II. The mutual benefits and advantages thereby arising.

The motives the Magistrate had to seek this alliance, were these:

I. To preserve the essence and purity of religion; II. To improve its usefulness, and apply its influence in the best manner;

III. To prevent the mischief which, in its natural independent state, it might occasion to civil society.

• De Jure Belli et Pac. I. I. c. 3. § 21.