As full, as perfect, in vile Man that mourns, Our VARIATIONS. After 282. in the MS. Reason, to think of God when she pretends, COMMENTARY. VER. 281. Ceafe then, nor Order Imperfection name:] And how the poet, as he had promifed, having vindicated the ways of God to Man, concludes (from 280 to the end) that, from what had been faid, it appears, that the very things we blame, contribute to our Happiness, either as Particulars, or as Parts of the Univerfal fyftem; that our State of Ignorance was allotted to us out of compaffion; that yet we have as much Knowledge as is fufficient to fhew us that we are, and always fhall be, as bleft as we can bear; for that NATURE is neither a Stratonic chain of blind Causes and Effects, (All Nature is but Art, unknown to thee) nor yet the fortuitous refult of Epicurean Atoms, (All Chance, Direction, which thou canst not See) as those two species of atheism supposed it; but the wonderful Art and Direction, unknown indeed to Man, of an all-powerful, all-wife, all-good, and free Being. And therefore, we may be affured, that the arguments, brought above, to prove partial moral Evil productive of universal Good, are conclufive; from NOTES. VER. 278. As the rapt Seraph &c.] Alluding to the name Seraphim, fignifying burners. Know thy own point: This kind, this due degree Secure to be as bleft as thou canft bear: COMMENTARY. 285 whence one certain truth results, in spite of all the pride and cavils of vain Reason, That wHATEVER IS, IS RIGHT. That the reader may fee in one view the Exactness of the Method, as well as Force of the Argument, I fhall here draw up a fhort fynopfis of this Epiftle. The poet begins by telling us his fubject is an Effay on Man: That his end of writing is to vindicate Providence: That he intends to derive his arguments, from the visible things of God feen in this fyftem: Lays down this Propofition, That of all poffible fyftems infinite Wisdom has form'd the beft: draws from thence two Confequences, 1. That there must needs be fomewhere fuch a creature as Man; 2. That the moral Evil which he is author of, is productive of the Good of the Whole. This is his general Thefis; from whence he forms this Conclufion, That Man fhould reft fubmiffive and content, and make the hopes of Futurity his comfort; but not fuffer this to be the occafion of PRIDE, which is the cause of all his impious complaints. He proceeds to confirm his Thefis,-Previously endeavours to abate our wonder at the phænomenon of moral Evil; shews, first, its Ufe to the Perfection of the Univerfe, by Analogy, from the use of physical Evil in this particular fyftem.-Secondly, its ufe in this fyftem, where it is turned, providentially, from its natural bias, to promote Virtue. Then goes on to vindicate Providence from the imputation of certain supposed natural Evils; as he had before juftified it for the Permiflion of real moral Evil, in fhewing that, though the atheift's complaint against Providence be on pretence of real moral Evil, yet the true cause is his impatience under imaginary natural Evil; the iffue of a depraved appetite for fantaftical advantages, which, if obtained, would be useless or hurtful to Man, and deforming All Nature is but Art, unknown to thee; All Chance, Direction, which thou canst not fee All Discord, Harmony not understood; All partial Evil, univerfal Good: COMMENTARY. 291 and deftructive to the Univerfe, as breaking into that Order by which it is fupported.---He defcribes that Order, Harmony, and clofe Connection of the Parts; and, by fhewing the intimate prefence of God to his whole creation, gives a reafon for an Universe so amazingly beautiful and perfect. From all this he deduces his general Conclufion, That Nature being neither a blind chain of Caufes and Effects, nor yet the fortuitous refult of wandering atoms, but the wonderful Art and Direction of an all-wife, all-good, and free Being; WHATEVER IS, IS RIGHT, with regard to the Difpofition of God, and its Ultimate Tendency; which once granted, all complaints against Providence are at an end. NOTES. VER. 294. One truth is clear, &c.] It will be hard to think any caviller fhould have objected to this conclufion, especially when the author, in this very epiftle, has himself thus explained it; Refpecting Man, whatever wrong we call, But without any regard to the evidence of this illuftration, there is one who exclaims: "See the general conclufion, "All that is, is right. So that at the fight of Charles the "firft lofing his head on the fcaffold, we must have said "this is right; at the fight too of his judges condemning "him, we must have said this is right; at the fight of some "of thefe judges, taken and condemned for the action which " he had owned to be right, we must have cried out this is doubly right." Never was any thing more amazing than that And, fpite of Pride, in erring Reason's spite, NOTES. the abfurdities arising from the sense in which this critic takes the grand principle, of whatever is, is right, did not fhew him his mistake: For could any one in his fenfes employ a propofition in a meaning from whence fuch evident abfurdities immediately arife? I have obferved, that this conclufion, whatever is, is right, is a confequence of these premises, that partial Evil tends to univerfal Good; which the author employs as a principle to humble the pride of Man, who would impiously make God accountable for his creation, What then does common sense teach us to understand by whatever is, is right? Did the poet mean right with regard to Man, or right with regard to God; right with regard to itself, or right with regard to its ultimate tendency? Surely WITH REGARD TO Gop; for he tells us his defign is to vindicate the ways of God to Man. Surely, with regard to its ULTIMATE TENDENCY; for he tells us again, all partial ill is univerfal good, † 291. Now is this any encouragement to Vice? Or does it take off from the crime of him who commits it, that God providentially produces Good out of Evil? Had Mr. Pope abruptly faid in his conclufion, the refult of all is, that whatever is, is right, the objector had even then been inexcufable for putting fo abfurd a fenfe upon the words, when he might have feen that it was a conclufion from the general principle abovementioned; and therefore must neceffarily have another meaning. But what muft we think of him, when the poet, to prevent mistakes, had delivered, in this very place, the principle itself, together with this conclufion as the consequence of it. All Difcord, Harmony not understood; All partial Evil, univerfal Good: And, fpite of Pride, in erring Reason's spite, He could not have told his reader plainer that this conclufion was the confequence of that principle, unless he had written THEREFORE in great Church letters. ARGUMENT OF EPISTLE II. Of the Nature and State of Man with respect to I. THE bufinefs of Man not to pry into God, but to 81, &c. III. The PASSIONS, and their use, & 93 to 130. The Predominant Paffion, and its force, & 132 to 160. Its Neceffity, in directing Men to different purposes, 165, &c. Its providential Use, in fixing our Principle, and afcertaining our Virtue, 177IV. Virtue and Vice joined in our mixed Nature; the limits near, yet the things separate and evident : What is the Office of Reason, y 202 to 216. V. How odious Vice in itself, and how we deceive ourselves into it, & 217. VI. That, however, the Ends of Providence and general Good are answered in our Paffions and Imperfections, 238, &c. How usefully thefe are diftributed to all Orders of Men, 241. How ufeful they are to Society, 251. And to the Individuals, 263. In every state, and every age of life, 273, &c. |
