attaining majority (t). Under the Infant Settlements Act, Infants. 1855, infants may settle their real estate with the sanction of a judge of the Chancery Division; and in many special cases infants, or their guardians, are authorised by statute to sell land for public purposes, as for public works under the Lands Clauses Act and the Defence Acts, for meeting the expense of inclosing commons under the Inclosure Acts, for redeeming the land-tax, for providing churchyards, sites for churches, schools, and other buildings connected with purposes of charity, art, literature, and public instruction (u). By the Settled Land Act, 1882, it is provided that where a person who is, in his own right, seised of or entitled in possession to land, is an infant, the land is settled land for the purposes of that Act, and the infant is to be deemed tenant for life of the land (x). The Act also provides that where a tenant for life, or a person having the powers of a tenant for life under the Act, is an infant, or where an infant would, if he were of full age, be a tenant for life or have the powers of a tenant for life, such powers as the Act empowers a tenant for life of full age to exercise may be exercised on behalf of the infant tenant by the trustees of the settlement, and if there are no trustees, then by such person as the Court may order on the application of a testamentary or other guardian or next friend of the infant (y). A lunatic, idiot, or person of unsound mind, is not bound Lunatics. by his conveyance, except where the vendor, being apparently a person of sound mind, has entered into a contract which is executed before his incapacity is discovered, or where a bonâ fide purchaser has dealt with him not knowing of the incapacity (≈). It is now provided by the Lunacy Act, 1890 (a), that the committee of the estate (t) Zouch d. Abbot ▼. Parsons, 3 Burr. 1794, 1801. (u) See Dart's V. & P. 3, 17, 18. (z) Moulton v. Camroux, 4 Exch. 17; Elliot v. Ince, 7 De G. M. & G. 475, 488; and cases collected in Dart's V. & P. 6, n. (h). (a) 53 Vict. c. 5. Married women. of a lunatic may, under order of the judge in lunacy, sell, lease, exchange, or convey, in pursuance of a contract, any property belonging to the lunatic, or in which he is interested (b). The powers exerciseable by the committee under the order of the judge are enumerated in sect. 120 of the Act, and the four following sections contain various provisions as to the exercise of these powers, and as to carrying the judge's orders into effect. Prior to the 1st of January, 1883, a married woman's estate in copyholds could not be surrendered without her husband's assent, and without her separate examination either by the steward, or under a special usage by two tenants or the like (c); and it was held that a custom for a married woman to surrender her copyholds without the assent of her husband was not a reasonable custom (d). The husband's consent did not need to be specified in the surrender and admittance unless it was required by the custom (e). Under special circumstances the consent of the husband might have been dispensed with, and it was not required where the husband and wife were living apart (f). A husband's interest in his wife's copyhold passed, and his interest in a tenement of which they were seised as tenants by entireties, will still pass by a separate surrender. A surrender in fee by the husband alone, however, never operated as a discontinuance of the wife's copyhold estate, and on the death of the husband the wife might enter on the copyhold notwithstanding his surrender in fee (g). But now by virtue of the provisions of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, every married woman, although married before January 1st, 1883, may dispose of all copyholds, her title to which, whether vested (b) 53 Vict. c. 5, ss. 120-124. Tyrell, 2 Wils. 1. (e) Scamon v. Maw, 3 Bing. 378; Doe d. Shelton v. Shelton, 3 A. & E. 265. (f) Ex parte Shirley, 5 Bing. N. C. 226; Re Rogers, L. R. 1 C. P. 47. (g) Bullock v. Dibley, 4 Rep. 23a. or contingent, and whether in possession reversion or remainder, accrued after that date, as her separate property in the same manner as if she were a feme sole (h). A woman married after the 1st of January, 1883, is entitled to dispose of all copyhold estates, whether belonging to her at the time of her marriage, or acquired by or devolving on her afterwards, as her separate property, as if she were a feme sole (i). In the case, therefore, of a woman who was married prior to the 1st of January, 1883, and whose title to copyholds accrued before that date, the old law will still prevail, and her separate examination by the steward and her husband's consent will be required for a valid surrender. Where a copyholder is entitled to surrender his estate, Surrender by by the general custom of copyholds he may surrender by attorney. attorney (). But where the surrender has to be performed in a certain mode, as where the custom of the manor is that the copyholder shall surrender to the lord by the hands of two customary tenants, or into the hands of the bailiff or reeve, there a copyholder cannot surrender by attorney without a special custom to warrant it, and such a special custom must be strictly proved (7). If the copyholder is an infant, he cannot appoint an attorney to surrender his copyholds by analogy to the rule of the common law in the case of freeholds, but the surrender will be made on his behalf by the persons who are authorised by the provisions of the Settled Land Act, 1882 (m), to act on behalf of an infant in his own right seised of or entitled in possession to land. Married women were also unable to surrender by attorney, not being entitled at the common law to appoint such attorney to act for them in respect of freehold estates (n); but by the Conveyancing and Law of Pro (h) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75, s. 5. (k) Combes' Case, 9 Rep. 75 a. 60. (m) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 38, ss. 59, (n) See Graham v. Jackson, 6 Q. B. 811. perty Act, 1881, it was provided that a married woman, whether an infant or not, should, by virtue of the Act, have power, after the 31st of December, 1881, to appoint by deed, as if she were unmarried and of full age, an attorney on her behalf for the purpose of doing any act which she herself could do (o); and now under the provisions of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, any woman, though married prior to the 1st of January, 1883, is capable of disposing of all real estate her title to which accrues after that date, as if she were a feme sole (p); and every woman married after the last-mentioned date is entitled to deal with all her realty, whether belonging to her at the time of her marriage, or acquired by or devolving on her afterwards, in the same manner as she would have been entitled to do if she had been a feme sole (q). The vendor should surrender in person, if possible, as the purchaser ought not to be forced to rely on a power of attorney which may have become void by the death of the vendor or the subsequent incapacity of the attorney; and in equity he will not be aided unless he surrenders in person, or gives a good reason for doing it by deputy (r); but if the instrument creating the power is executed after the 31st of December, 1882, and is declared to be irrevocable for a fixed time therein specified, not exceeding one year from the date of the instrument, the power will not be deemed, as against the purchaser, to be revoked within that fixed time, either by anything done by the vendor without the concurrence of the attorney, or by the death, marriage, lunacy, unsoundness of mind, or bankruptcy of the vendor (s). If the vendor has covenanted to surrender on request, it is no breach to refuse to authorise an attorney to surrender for him (t). The attorney must be regularly appointed by deed, and may be an infant, or married woman, or under (0) 44 & 45 Vict. c. 41, s. 40. (p) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75, s. 5. (q) Ibid. s. 2. (r) Mitchel v. Neale, 2 Ves. 679; Noel v. Weston, 6 Madd. 50. (s) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 39, s. 9. 299. render. any disability, if only of sound mind. The attorney should make the surrender in the usual way, by the rod, or otherwise according to the custom, and either in the name of his principal, or in his own name showing the authority (u) and stating that the act is done by force of it. If he exceeds his authority, his act will be valid only so far as he was authorised by the principal (x). The power of attorney is revoked by the death of the person who gave it, unless there is a custom within the manor to give an authority in the nature of a power which shall be good after the copyholder's death (y), or unless the power falls within the provisions of the Conveyancing Act, 1882 (≈). The surrender may be in general words, but it should Uses of surdeclare what estate the surrenderee is to take, for a surrender without such a limitation might be held to be a relinquishment to the use of the lord, unless the uses were explained by the subsequent admittance, or unless there should be evidence of a resulting trust (a). If the limitation of the use is general, as to the use of A., he will have but an estate for life, for the same words are necessary to create an estate in fee simple or in fee tail in copyholds as are required in freeholds, unless there is a special custom to the contrary (b). It has been held, however, that a custom that the lord may grant in fee to him to whose use the surrender is made, where the surrender contains no limitation of the estate, is a good custom (c). The surrender may be made to the use of anyone who could take under a common-law assurance if the land were freehold, and to some others, as to one who is not capable of taking at the time of surrender, or to an unborn or unascertained person, provided such person is capable of taking at the (u) See 44 & 45 Vict. c. 41, s. 46. (1) Carter v. Carter, 3 K. & J. 617. (y) See Roby v. Twelves, Sty. 423. (b) Bunting v. Lepingwell, 4 Rep. 29a, 29 b; Co. Litt. 59 b; Co. Copyh. s. 49. (c) Brown v. Forster, Cro. Eliz. 392. |