times at the rate of £30 a year, but he always refused to pay rent at £130 a year. The rateable value of the premises was at all material times £24 16s. a year. The plaintiffs claimed possession of the public-house on the ground of the defendant's breach of obligation to pay rent at the rate of £130 per annum, and they also claimed one quarter's rent at that rate. McCardie, J. held that, in deciding what the standard rent of the premises was, the court could only consider the rent paid by the occupying tenant on the 3rd Aug. 1914, which was £24, notwithstanding that that rent was a "tied house rent, and the landlords could not add to that sum and raise the rent to £130, and their notice to that effect was not valid. The defendant, having tendered more than the rent lawfully due from him, had committed no breach of his obligation. The plaintiff appealed. Held, that the judgment of McCardie, J. was right. Appeal dismissed. [Glossop v. Ashley. Ct. of App.: Bankes, Scrutton, and Atkin, L.JJ. June 10 and 13.-Counsel: Disturnal, K.C. and Sandlands, Wootten, K.C., and Ralph Thomas. Solicitors: Stevens, Son, and Par ces; Gibson and Weldon, for Pym and Pym, Belper.] Emergency Legislation-Rent Restriction-Landlord and TenantPayment of Premium by Third Person to Tenant to go outIncrease of Rent, &., Act 1920 (10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 17), s. 8. Sect. 8 (1) of the above-named Act provides that “ a person shall not, as a condition of the grant, renewal, or continuance of a tenancy or sub-tenancy of any dwelling-house to which the Act applies, require the payment of any fine, premium, or other like sum, or the giving of any pecuniary consideration, in addition to the respondent, and when any such payment or consideration has been made or given in respect of any such dwelling-house under an agreement made after the 25th March 1920, the amount or value thereof shall be recoverable by the person by whom it was made or given." Sub-sect. 2 prescribes a penalty not exceeding £100 on summary conviction. The defendant was the tenant under a three years' agreement of a house at Wandsworth, and when one year had expired he wished to go out, and negotiated with the landlord a fresh tenancy for the plaintiff. The plaintiff paid £18) to the tenant on condition that the tenant should leave the premises and hand over the fixtures to him, and that the landlord should grant to him a fresh tenancy for three years. The plaintiff went into possession, and after the passing of the Act of 1920 claimed the £180 back from the defendant. The County Court judge held that the sum was not recoverable. The Divisional Court differed, Shearman, J. affirming the judgment below, Bailhache, J. dissenting. The plaintiff appealed. Held, that the plaintiff could not recover the sum claimed. Bankes, L.J. said that the question was whether sect. 8 of the Act referred to a grant by the person who required the payment of a fine, premium, or other like sum, or to a grant by a third person. The section was capable of either construction, but the more natural construction was to read as applying to a grant, renewal, or continuance by the person who requires the payment of the fine, premium, or other like sum. Where a statute was penal the general rule of construction was that if there were two Fossible meanings, the court should adopt the more lenient one. Scrutton and Atkin, L.JJ. concurred in dismissing the appeal. [Remmington v. Larchin. Ct. of App.: Bankes, Scrutton, and Atkin, L.JJ. June 14.-Counsel: for the appellant, Woolf; for the respondent, Charles Bray. Solicitors: Telfer Leviansky, and Co.; Young, Son, and Ward.] Shipping - Charter-party - -Shipbroker's Commission — Subsidiary Benefit-Stipulation for Commission for Prolongation-Risk of Curtailment Sale of Ship during Charter-party. on In May 1919 the defendants, who were shipowners, employed the plaintiffs, who were shipbrokers, to effect a charter of a steamship, the C. The plaintiffs obtained a charter for eighteen months, but after the charter had run for four months the defendants sold the steamer to the charterers, and the charter thereupon came to an end. By a clause in the charter-party it was provided that commission was payable to the plaintiffs the hire paid and earned under this charter and on any continuaition." The defendants paid the commission as provided under the charter-party for four months during which the charter was in existence, but they refused to pay anything further. The plaintiffs contended that they were entitled to commission for the whole of the eighteen months of the charter which they had effected for the defendants, and they claimed the commission for the outstanding fourteen months, either as damages for the breach of an implied term of the contract, or as payment for work done on behalf of and at the request of the defendants. Roche, J., held that the claim failed because the earning of commission, although important to the plaintiffs, was only an accessory or subordinate benefit arising out of the main provisions of the contract, and the plaintiffs by accepting a provision entitling them to commission on any prolongation of the charter impliedly took the risk of curtailment of the charter. The plaintiffs appealed. Held, that the court were bound by the decision in White v. Turnbull (1898, 78 L. T. Rep. 726; 8 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 406; 3 Com. Cas. 183). A term that the shipowners must not voluntarily put an end to the charter-party ought not to be implied in a charter-party which contains a provision for payment of commission or hire paid and earned under the charter. Appeal dismissed. French and Co. v. London Shipping Company. Ct. of App.: Bankes, Scrutton, and Atkin, L.JJ. June 15.-Counsel: for the appellants, Miller, K.C. and Le Quesne; Mackinnon, K.C. and Jowitt. Solicitors: Charles Lightbound and Co.; Holmes, Fenwick, and Willan.] CHANCERY DIVISION Company-Debentures-Collateral Bargain-Clog on Equity of Redemption-Liquidation-Surplus Asset-Right of Debenture Holders to participate after Payment off. A company was incorporated in 1911 as a private company with a capital of £33,000 divided into 33,000 shares of £1 each of which 32,753 shares were issued and fully paid. In 1912 the company created an issue of debenture stock for £20,000 and secured the same by a deed poll in which it was provided that the stock should bear interest at 6 per cent. and should carry the right to 50 per cent. of the net profits of the company available for distribution as dividend and on the winding up after payment in full of the debenture stock for the time being outstanding of that issue and of the share capital of the company of the surplus assets. One of the conditions of the issue of this stock was that the company should have the right to pay it off at any time on giving six months' notice. The company issued debenture stock of the said issue amounting to £15,950. At a meeting of the holders of the debenture stock held on the 11th Nov. 1913, in accordance with the provisions of the Deed Poll, resolutions were passed (inter alia) (1) authorising the company to create in priority to the existing debenture stock an issue of not exceeding £20,000 prior lien debenture stock carrying interest at 6 per cent.; (4) That in lieu of the debenture stock carrying the right to 50 per cent. of the net profits of the company available as aforesaid and on a winding up (after payment in full of the debenture stock for the time being outstanding and of the share capital of the company as provided by the terms of issue thereof to 50 per cent. of the surplus assets the balance of such net profits, and in the case of winding up any surplus assets shall after the redemption in full of the prior lien debenture stock and the 6 per cent. debenture stock be payable as to one-third to the prior lien debenture stockholders as to another third to the 6 per cent. debenture stockholders and as to the remaining third to the company. The company went into liquidation in 1920, and prior to its liquidation the whole of the principal moneys secured by prior lien debenture stock and debenture stock of the company had been paid to the respective holders. The liquidator, desiring to know how to deal with a sum which would remain in his hands after the payment of the debts and liabilities of the company, took out this summons for the determination of the questions (1) whether the provisions of the fourth resolution were valid and binding on the company, and (2) whether, having regard to the fact that the principal sums secured by the prior lien debenture stock and debenture stock referred to in that resolution were fully paid off and discharged prior to the winding up of the company, the holders or former holders of such prior lien debenture stock and debenture stock were entitled to participate to any and what extent in the surplus assets of the company. Held, that the principles covering the determination of the questions arising on this application were fully expounded in the judgment of Lord Parker in Kreglinger v. New Patagonia Meat and Cold Storage Company Limited (109 L. T. Rep. 802; (1914) A. C. 25), that the court was considering a bargain for the payment to debenture holders of an additional sum on a winding up of the company; that such a bargain if fairly made was valid, as it was neither in the nature of a penalty clogging the equity of redemption nor was it inconsistent with or repugnant to the contractual and equitable rights of the company to redeem ; and that the provisions of the said fourth resolution were valid and binding on the company. Noakes and Co. v. Rice (86 L. T. Rep. 62; (1902) A. C. 24) distinguished. [Re Cuban Land and Development Company (1911) Limited. Ch. Div. P. O. Lawrence, J. May 31 and June 7.-Counsel: J. B. Lindon; H. E. Wright; W. P. Spens. Solicitors: Gilbert Samuel and Co.; W. L. Dell.] Company-Liquidation-Crown Debts-Priority Companies (Consolidation) Act 1908 (8 Edw. 7, c. 69), ss. 186, 207, 209-Bankruptcy Act 1914 (4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 59), ss. 33, 151. By the New Ministries and Secretaries Act 1916, the Ministry of Food was established for regulating the supply and consumption The of food during the emergency occasioned by the war. Food Controller appointed a certain company to act as agents for the sale and distribution of consignments of frozen rabbits imported from Australia. The company disposed of the rabbits and subsequently went into voluntary liquidation without having previously made any payments to the food controller in respect of the rabbits sold by them. At the time of the liquidation the sum of £9689 5s. 10d. was owing to the Crown in respect of the rabbits. An application was made by the Crown in the winding up of the company in which the Food Controller claimed: (1) That the above-mentioned sum was a debt due to the Crown, and (2) that the liquidator, in administering the assets of the company, was bound to pay the said sum in priority to all creditors, or, in the alternative, to all creditors to whom It was contended on preference was not given by statute. behalf of the liquidator that the Crown was not entitled to priority over other creditors in a winding up, as the present effect of the statutes was to make provision priority to be given to certain specified Crown debts (amongst which, debts of the nature of that in question in the present case were not included). Sects. 186, 207, and 209 of the Companies (Consolidation) Act of 1908 and sect. 33 and 151 of the Bankruptcy Act 1914 were referred to. On behalf of the Crown it was argued that, while under the Bankruptcy Act of 1914, s. 151, the prerogative of the Crown in bankruptcy was taken away this was not done in the Companies (Consolidation) Act 1908. Held, that there being in the Act of 1908 no such provision as that contained in sect. 151 of the Bankruptcy Act 1914, the Act of 1908 did not abrogate the prerogative rights of the Crown as defined in the Court of Appeal in Re Henley and Co. (39 L. T. Rep. 53; 9 Ch. Div. 469); that the Crown was therefore entitled to the priority claimed; and that there must be an order in the terms of the summons. [Re H. J. Webb and Co. Limited. Ch. Div.: P. O. Lawrence, J. June 1 and June 14.-Counsel: for the Crown, Roland Burrows (with him Sir Gordon Hewart, A.-G.); for the liquidator, Sir John Simon, K.C., Montgomery, K.C., and Costello. Solicitors: E. P. Lickfold; F. C. Mathews and Co.] Defence of the Realm-Works executed-Nuisance-Action for injunction Certificate of Admiralty Commissioners-Stay of action-Practice-Defendants' right to Costs-Indemnity Act 1920 (10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 48), 8. (1), (3). The plaintiffs as highway authority, on the 27th July 1920, with the fiat of the Attorney-General, commenced an action against the defendant company claiming an injunction for the removal of the defendants' jetty, which was alleged to have caused mud to be silted on to the public highway so as to be a nuisance and obstruction. In consequence of the Passing of the Indemnity Act 1920, on the 16th Aug. 1920, the plaintiffs were unable to proceed with the action. The defendants obtained from the Admiralty Commissioners a certificate that the jetty complained of in the action was executed, constructed, and maintained by the defendants for the Defence of the Realm and the public safety under the authority of the commissioners. The defendants took out a summons for an order to stay the action, and asked that the plaintiff Rural District Council should pay the defendants' cost of the action and application. The plaintiffs opposed the order being made for payment of the defendants' costs on the ground that the Act itself discharged proceedings, whether instituted before or after the passing of the Act, and that in a proceeding instituted after the 20th July 1920, as the plaintiffs' action was, the costs could not be given against them. Indemnity Act 1920, provides by sect. 1-(1) That no action or other legal proceeding whatsoever whether civil or criminal, shall be instituted in any court of law, for or on account of or in during the war respect of any act, matter or thing done before the passing of this Act if done in good faith" in the public interest by the persons specified, and if any such proceeding has been instituted whether before or after the passing of this Act, shall be discharged and made void, subject in the case of a proceeding instituted before the 20th July 1920, to such orders as to costs as the court or a judge thereof may think fit to make.” By sub-sect. (3) a certificate by a Government department is made evidence that the Act was done in the execution of duty under authority, and shall be deemed to have been done in good faith unless the contrary be proved. The Held, that the action must be stayed under sect. 1, sub-sect. 1(1). and Leonard; Kingsford, Dorman and Co., for Guy Tassell, Second Sheet. Volume 151-433 Practice-Mortgage-Foreclosure-Sale by Mortgagee-Mortgagor in Possession Originating Summons-Claim for Delivery of Possession-Jurisdiction-Orders XVIII., r. 2, 55, and 5A. The plaintiff mortgagee-under original mortgage of the 22nd Sept. 1914, from the first defendant, and a transfer dated the 26th May 1920 had sold on the 3rd Dec. 1920, the freehold mortgaged property with vacant possession, the interest being in arrear since Nov. 1919, and the first defendant's husband, the second defendant, being in occupation of the premises with her. The question raised by the originating summons of the applicant mortgagee was whether he was entitled by means of an originating summons under Order LV., r. 5A, to an order for delivery of possession by the defendants of the mortgaged hereditaments when the only relief claimed by the summons was possession and there was no claim for relief by foreclosure or sale. On his behalf it was argued that the object aimed at in that rule was to alter the previously existing procedure so as to expedite and cheapen the relief granted to mortgagees: (Bank of Ireland v. Slattery, 1911, 1 I. R. 33; Bunyan v Bunyan, 1916, 1 I. R. 70). For the defendant the practice which had been regarded as settled by Stirling, J. at chambers in 1887, referred to in the Annual Practice for 1921, p. 997; Coote on Mortgages, p. 1083, 8th edit.; and other text-books was relied on. Held, notwithstanding the absence of the conjunction "and" from the concluding paragraph of Rule LV., 5A, the rule did not mean that the mortgagee was entitled to take out as of course an originating summons for the relief of delivery of possession simpliciter. According to the practice in this country, there was no jurisdiction to make the order on originating summons, and the plaintiff's summons must be dismissed. [Wallis v. Griffiths. Ch. Div.: Eve, J. June 15.-Counsel: R. Leigh Ramsbotham; Roger Turnbull. Solicitors: Rider, Heaton, Meredith, and Mills, agents for E. L. Wallis and Son, Hereford; Calder Woods, and Pethick.] KING'S BENCH DIVISION Contract Hire of Cash Register-Hiring Agreement with Option to Purchase-Tender of Machine to Hirer-Refusal of Hirer to accept Delivery Breach of Contract-Plaintiff's Remedy-Damages. By an agreement in writing dated the 23rd Aug. 1920, the plaintiffs agreed to deliver, and the defendant agreed to rent, one of the plaintiffs' cash registers for ten months certain. The defendant agreed to pay, as rent for the use and hire of the register, £8 for the first month and £8 per month subsequently, in advance, the first payment to be made forthwith. The agreement also provided that at any time within one month after payment of all the rent for the whole of the agreed period of hiring, the hirer might purchase the register by paying an additional sum of £8, and until the hirer did so purchase the machine, it was to remain the property of the plaintiffs. In case of default in the payment of rent for fourteen days, the hirer was under an obligation to deliver up the register to the plaintiffs on demand, failing which the plaintiffs were to be entitled to enter and retake possession of the machine and determine the hire. The defendant paid £2 on account of the first month's rent. Three days later, the plaintiffs tendered a machine to the defendant, who asked them to postpone delivery for a time. Later, the defendant wrote asking the plaintiffs to cancel the order, but the plaintiffs tendered another machine, which they appropriated to the contract and refrained from hiring to any other customer. The defendant refused to accept delivery. The plaintiffs claimed £30, being four months' rent under the agreement less the £2 paid on signing the agreement. 66 Held (distinguishing Wright v. Melville, 3 Car. & P. 542) that the plaintiffs' remedy for the breach of contract lay in damages use and hire." only, and they were not entitled to rent for [National Cash Register Company v. Stanley. K. B. Div.: Lush and Sankey, JJ. June 2.-Counsel: Hollis Walker, K.C. and G. H. Head; F. Hinde and Latey. Solicitors: C. M. Benwell; Beardall and Co.] Contract-Sale of Goods-F.o.b. Contract-No specific Day fixed for Payment of Price-Buyer's Failure to Provide Ship-Passing of the Property Right of Seller to sue for Price. The plaintiff sold to the defendants a quantity of unascertained leather goods, "f.o.b. Liverpool." There was no agreement that the price should be payable on any specific date before or irrespective of delivery. The plaintiff was instructed by the defendants to consign the goods to Liverpool for shipment on board a named ship. The plaintiff duly dispatched the goods according to the defendants' instructions, but the named ship was by then withdrawn from service by her owners, and the other vessels which were substituted were prevented from taking the goods on board, and no effective ship was provided, consequently the goods were left lying at the docks at Liverpool and unshipped. The plaintiff thereupon sued the defendants on a specially endorsed writ for the price of the goods, and contended that the defendant's failure to provide an effective ship had relieved him from the performance of his obligation to put the goods on board ship as a condition precedent to the passing of the property and his right to sue for the price. Held, that the goods having been sold f.o.b., the property in them had not passed to the defendants, and as there was no agreement as to payment of the price before delivery of the goods, the plaintiff could not sue for the price, as distinguished from damages for breach of contract. [Colley v. Overseas Exporters Limited. K. B. Div.: McCardie, J. May 12 and June 9.-Counsel: Willes; J. G. Joseph. Solicitors: Ellis, Bickersteth, and Co., for C. Barker, Sheffield; Ernest Salaman and Co.] Gaming and Wagering Cheques given in Payment of Betting Losses— Illegal Consideration-Betting Agent-Indemnity against LossesCheques given to Agent-Payment to Indorsee or Holder-Gaming Act 1835 (5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 41), ss. 1, 2. The plaintiff claimed against the defendant the sum of £627 odd as moneys paid by the plaintiff to the holders of ten cheques given by the plaintiff to the defendant (as payee) for losses on bets on horse races made by the defendant on behalf of the plaintiff, from March 1920 to June 1920. The defendant was the manager of a public house which was owned by B. and later by B.'s executors. The plaintiff employed the defendant to make bets with C., who was a betting man known to the defendant. The plaintiff decided on the bets which he wished to make, and then instructed the defendant to make these bets with C. on his (the plaintiff's) behalf, and the bets were accepted by C., who knew and trusted the defendant. The defendant also made bets with C. on his own behalf. At the end of the week the plaintiff and defendant met, picked their respective bets from C.'s weekly account, and shared the winnings or losses, as the case might be. Where C.'s weekly account showed a debit, the plaintiff, after his share of the debit was arranged with the defendant gave the defendant a cheque for the agreed share of the debit. Each cheque was made out to 'J. Hill or order," and was crossed, but none of the cheques was marked negotiable." The defendant duly endorsed the cheques to B., who paid them into his banking account and paid the cash to the defendant. After B.'s death the defendant paid the cheques into the account of the executors, and thus cashed them, and with the cash paid C.'s account. The defendant was a betting agent and not a betting principal with the plaintiff. The plaintiff paid the defendant a commission on the winnings. The plaintiff now claimed the return of the moneys under sect. 2 of the Gaming Act 1835, as being money paid by the plaintiff to the holder, indorsee or assignee of a note, bill, &c., given for an illegal consideration within the meaning of the Gaming Act 1835. 66 not Held, that the Gaming Act 1835 does not apply to the case of cheques given by a principal to reimburse his agent for losses incurred by the agent through bets made by him on the principal's behalf. The action therefore failed. [Maskell v. Hill. K. B. Div.: McCardie, J. June 9, 17.— Counsel: Colam, K.C. and Daniel Warde; Cautley, K.C. and Harold Murphy. Solicitors: Walter H. Cowl; Durrant Cooper and Hambling.] Insurance (Accident)-Negligent driving of Motor-car-Death caused by Negligence-Liability of Insurers-Public Policy. By a policy dated the 26th July 1920, effected with the defendants, the plaintiff insured for one year against his liability to third parties and all loss or damage suffered by him in the driving of a motor car. The defendants undertook to pay the plaintiff any sum which the plaintiff should become legally liable to pay to any other persons, including passengers, as compensation for accidental personal injuries or damage to property or animals, suffered or caused through the driving of the car. On the 4th Nov. 1920 the plaintiff was driving the car along Shaftesbury-avenue, and in consequence of an accident caused the death of one person and personal injuries to two others. Several actions arising out of the accident were pending against the plaintiff. He claimed a declaration that on the true construction of the policy he was entitled to be indemnified by the defendants against all liability for claims made against him arising out of the accident. He also claimed the cost of repairing the car, any costs that he might be ordered to pay in the actions already commenced against him, and his own costs in defending such actions. The plaintiff was indicted at the Central Criminal Court for manslaughter. The case was tried twice. On the first occasion the jury disagreed, and on the second the plaintiff pleaded guilty (an allegation of drunkenness being withdrawn), and was bound over. By their defence the defendants pleaded that the death and injuries were caused owing to the fact that the defendant was in the course of committing criminal acts as he was drunk while driving the car, and was driving to the danger of the public, so that the death of the person killed amounted to manslaughter. They further pleaded that the contract of insurance was contrary to public policy so far as it could be held to be an indemnity against the consequences of the plaintiff's criminal acts. Held, that if the only result of the accident had been that two persons were injured and no one killed, there would have been no defence to the action, and the fact that someone was killed made no difference. The same act of negligence had killed one person and injured two others, and to hold that there was any difference would be to hold that the question depended on the degree of negligence, which was impossible, as there was often as much negligence where a person was injured as where he was killed. The fact that someone was killed was therefore immaterial, though if the act had been intentional, the policy would not have covered the assured. The point raised was a novel one, but it must fail. The plaintiff was driving at an excessive speed, but was not drunk. There must be judgment for the declaration asked for by the plaintiff with costs. [Tinline v. Whitecross Insurance Company. K. B. Div.: Bailhache, J. May 13.-Counsel: Barrington-Ward, K.C. and J. D. Cassels; Stuart Bevan, K.C. and W. A. Jowitt. Solicitors: Colyer and Colyer; Oswald Hickson, Collier, and Co.] PROBATE, DIVORCE, AND ADMIRALTY DIVISION Admiralty Bill of Lading-Shipment of Potatoes in bags—“ Shipped in Good Order and Condition Quality Condition unknown”—Bags damaged and some bags missing on Shipment-Clean Bills of Lading -Undertaking by Shipper to Indemnify the Master-Shipper Acting as Agent of Consignee-Estoppel-Arrest of the Ship. The plaintiffs agreed to purchase through A. and the B. agency in Sweden potatoes f.o.b. Gothenburg, payment to be made on signing of clean bills of lading. A. chartered the Dutch sailing vessel Tromp to carry some of the potatoes to Hull. The plaintiffs subsequently ratified the chartering of the Tromp, and the potatoes were loaded under the supervision of A., whom the plaintiffs authorised to act for them in certain matters connected within the stowage of the cargo. The bags of potatoes were brought to the ship in a wet condition, and the full number described in the bills of lading was not loaded. The master of the Tromp accordingly refused to sign clean bills of lading. On the undertaking of the B. agency, given with the knowledge and approval of A., to indemnify him against loss of freight or other liabilities which he might incur thereby, and acting upon the advice and with the approval of his owners' agents, he ultimately signed clean bills of lading, which described the cargo as " shipped in good order and condition quality condition unknown.' Thereupon payment was made by the plaintiffs in Gothenburg in accordance with the terms of sale. On the arrival of the Tromp at Hull, the whole of the cargo was found to be damaged. The plaintiffs accordingly arrested the Tromp in an action for damage to cargo and short delivery, contending that they were consignees of the bills of lading without notice of the condition of the cargo, and that the defendants were estopped by the admissions contained in the bills from denying that the cargo was shipped in good order and condition. The defendants denied that the plaintiffs were indorsees without notice, saying that the property in the cargo passed to the plaintiffs before shipment, that the plaintiffs were identified with the shippers, and that the goods were shipped by them under the direction of their agents. Held, that A. did not exercise authority from the plaintiffs to charter the Tromp, or to authorise the shipment of the potatoes in the condition in which they were shipped. The plaintiffs were indorsees of the bills of lading without notice, and the defendants were, therefore, estopped from denying as against them that the cargo was shipped in good order and condition. The description "shipped in good order and condition" applied to the external condition of the bags, and was not in contradiction with the subsequent words, quality condition unknown." The condition of the cargo on delivery at Hull must be attributed to its treatment by the defendants' servants after shipment. The defendants' agents at Gothenburg were acquainted with the true position of A., and the terms of the sale. The property in the potatoes passed to the plaintiffs on the signing of the bills of lading. [The Tromp. Adm. Div.: Sir Henry Duke, P. April 14, 15, May 27.-Counsel: Stephens, K.C., and Clement Davis; Wright, K.Č., and Bisschop. Solicitors: Pritchard and Sons, agents for Andrew M. Jackson and Co., Hull; A. W. J. Gross.] Ship-Salvage-Benefit Derived from the Services-Request Services -Life Claims by an Engaged Tug. A steamer whilst being towed in the Mersey sustained damage in a collision with another vessel, and began to sink. Those on board her hailed the tug which had had her in tow, asking to be taken off. The tug went alongside at some risk, and took off the master and crew. Soon afterwards the master asked to be put back again on his ship. The tug accordingly again went alongside and put him and one seaman on board. The master then requested the tug to tow his vessel inshore. The tug accordingly made fast and endeavoured to do so, but the steamer grounded on Pluckington Bank, some distance from the shore, where she afterwards became a total loss. Cargo of the net value of 17,000%. was, however, ultimately recovered by the owners from the wreck. The owners, master and crew of the tug claimed salvage remuneration for services rendered to the cargo and to the lives of the crew. At the trial it appeared from the plaintiff's evidence that, had the steamer sunk in mid-river at the place where the services began the cost of removing the wreck would have been far greater than was in fact the case; but, on the other hand, cargo of no less value would have been recovered than was under the circumstances restored to the cargo owners. The defendants, without calling evidence, thereupon submitted that since no benefit had been conferred on the cargo or its owners, no case for a salvage reward had been made out. Held, that since the cargo when left by the tug was of no greater value than it would have been if the tug had never taken hold of the steamer at all, no benefit had resulted from what the tug had done. The cargo was never brought into complete safety, and had still, at the conclusion of the services, to be recovered from a position of grave peril. The tug had thus not contributed to the salving of the cargo, and was not entitled to salvage reward. Neither were the plaintiffs entitled to an award on the ground that the services which the master of the steamer had requested them to perform had been successfully carried out. The master had asked to be towed inshore, and his ship was in fact left some distance from the shore. The life claims also failed on the facts. Even if the evidence had shown that the lives of the master and crew were in danger, it is doubtful whether a tug, in taking the crew off the ship which she is engaged to tow, is acting outside the scope of her towage contract in such a manner as to entitle her to a salvage reward. [The Tarbert. Adm. Div.: Hill, J. June 1, 14, 1921.Counsel: Laing, K.C. and J. B. Aspinall; Bateson, K.C., and Balloch. Solicitors: Hill, Dickinson, and Co., Liverpool; Batesons and Co., Liverpool.] Birmingham, Friday, July 1 Blackburn, Thursday, June 30 Brighton, Monday, June 27 Monday, Cambridge, Monday, June 27 Faversham, Monday, June 27 Hastings, Friday. July 8 Newcastle- Friday, Friday, Northampton, Friday, July 8 at 10. LEGISLATION Declarations of Right 66 Ir is a trite, though none the less a true, saying that history tends to repeat itself, and as human nature remains much the same, it is perhaps not surprising to find Parliament called upon to deal with a situation demanding a Declaration of Right. Lord Robert Cecil, K.C., with others, is responsible for a short measure declaratory of the right of Parliament alone to decide both the matter and the manner, the measure and the time, in respect of which a tax is to be levied. There is to anyone who reads the passing events of the day no secret as to the object of this Bill, and in it there is, at any rate, no repetition of grievances as against the Crown itself. The Bill states in a single operative clause that among the true, ancient, and indubitable rights of the people of this kingdom is the right not to have any money or tax levied for or to the use of the Crown save by the express decision of the Commons House of Parliament specifically defining the matter, manner, measure, and time in which such tax should be levied and paid. The great Declaration of Right delivered in Feb. 1688-9 by the Lords and Commons to the Prince and Princess of Orange led to the enactment of 1 W. & M. sess. 2, cap. 2, a Bill of Rights which forms a milestone in English history. The flight of James II. was followed by the calling of the Convention Parliament at a time when the country was split into half a dozen different and waning parties, and the Commons passed a resolution declaring, in brief, that the King had broken his contract with the people by violating fundamental laws, and the throne was declared to be vacant. His religious views as a papist were declared inconsistent with the welfare of a Protestant kingdom. The Lords differed upon the wording of the resolutions, and in the confusion William stepped forward announcing his refusal to be a mere regent or a king consort, and after much division of opinion in the Lords William and Mary were declared King and Queen. As an enactment of new laws restraining the exercise of the powers of the Crown would be dilatory, reforms were postponed, and it was decided to frame a distinct and solemn assertion of the underlying principles of government. So arose the Declaration of Right. The Scottish Convention acted on parallel lines, and there was thus accomplished what Macaulay has described as the Glorious Revolution." It is this solemn affirmation of ancient and fundamental law that forms 1 M. & W. sess. 2, cap. 2, and the precedent for Lord Robert Cecil's new Bill. It dealt specifically with levying money "for other time and in other manner than the same was granted by Parliament," the question of a standing Army and quartering soldiers, which were also financial grievances, and other matters to which we need not here refer. The principles involved in these declara tions are those, mutatis mutandis, underlying the constitution of the United States of America. The stormy period through which both England, Scotland, and Ireland passed as sequels to the struggles between the adherents of William and James fructified in the end in many Parliamentary financial measures to meet the expenses of carrying on the nation's affairs. The land tax was revised, the national debt created, the Bank of England came into existence, and there was a renewal of the national coinage. Parliament itself was confirmed by the Triennial Act, and the Ministry was made to harmonise with the majority in power. Parliament began then to exercise its power by reducing the standing Army to ten thousand men, a reduction carried still further by a new Parliament which insisted on the King dismissing his Dutch guards, and relying entirely on English troops. Constitutional lawyers sometimes find it difficult to regard the Convention Parliament as a duly constituted body, called, as it was, by a Prince of Orange, and the situation is undoubtedly one without precedent, and the difficulty is not erased by the confirming statute itself. Much of the technical legality remained with the Jacobites, but the bloodless revolution has long since been accepted, and the principles it laid down are those which Constitutionalists to-day are desirous of emphasising as fundamental of the well being of society. The claim of the Commons to preclude amendment of money Bills is heard of shortly before these events, and this privilege, always disputed by the Lords, led to the blending of money and land measures even in those far away days. The claim of critics in the Commons to examine the estimates by reference to a Committee is also heard during the reign of William III., and here again we find a point of contact between the past and present times. This brief narrative suggests a parallelism of the period of the great declaration of right, and the declaration which now stands for early consideration before the Commons at a time when another peaceful revolution is taking place as the aftermath of war, but with the happy difference that the country to-day stands united in its reverence for the occupants of the Throne. Prevention of Unemployment A LARGE and controversial measure on this subject comes at this juncture, when the country's financial position is so grave, under no favourable circumstances. It proposes to set up a large central authority by transferring to the Ministry of Labour persons enployed under any department or local authority wholly or partially in duties transferred to the Ministry. The Ministry is also to be given, in addition to its powers under the Unemployment Insurance Act 1920 and 1921, all powers connected with the prevention of destitution, the relief of the able-bodied poor, including workmen in distress from unemployment and vagrancy, and so forth, being powers now vested in or imposed on parishes, townships, distress committees, central bodies, boards of guardians, churchwardens, overseers, justices of the peace, and the Ministry of Health. This central body is, so far as may be practicable, to maintain a constant level in the national demand for labour both by private and Government employers, and advise how best works and services can be organised and apportioned over the year to regularise employment. The Ministry of Labour for this purpose is called upon to consult with other departments making grants in aid to local authorities in respect of erections and other works, and advise how the grants may be so conveniently spread as to maintain this constant level in the demand for labour. It is proposed to give the Ministry power, where the method of employment in any industry or occupation is casual or intermittent, or in the case of children or young persons likely to lead to widespread unemployment, to order, after inquiry, that employers must get their hands through the Employment Exchange, and at no other place where the engagement is for a period of not less than one month. The order is not, however, to bind the employer to engage any particular person or to affect his right to choose which employee he will engage. This Bill would also transfer to the Ministry of Labour all the powers relative to aliens, other than the power of expulsion, and the work done by the Emigration Information Office and all the powers and duties of guardians in reference to emigration. Tremendous expenses may be involved in the proposals to establish receiving houses for temporary accommodation and day and residential colonies for the unemployed, together with provision for the wives and children of dependants. Local Authorities and General It is proposed to set up in each locality a local unemployment authority and committees representative of employers and wageearners to prevent unemployment. They are to consider from month to month the numbers of unemployed, what is affecting adversely the labour market and to organise local employment so as to maintain its level, both in public and private work. Their expenses are to be put upon the rates, and if they exceed 1d. in the £ on its rateable value the excess is to be recoverable from the Treasury. The Bill suggests certain amendments to the Unemployment Insurance Acts, but there is no memorandum to give any clue to the expense which such amendments would entail on the top of the already swollen expenditure. The weekly rate is to be £2 for a person over eighteen with one dependant, and with an extra 5s. for each additional dependant. A duty is then imposed on Labour Exchanges to find work on maintenance and relief is to be no disqualification for voting. OCCASIONAL NOTES Workmen's Compensation appeals will be taken after the disposal of Chancery appeals. Mr. Justice Darling and Mr. Justice Coleridge will open the commission at Winchester on Monday next. When the business at this town is finished they will return to London and remain until the end of the present sittings. Mr. Justice Lush and Mr. Justice Greer will to-day (Saturday) leave London for Newcastle on the North-Eastern Circuit, and will open the commission on Monday next. They will not return to London until the business at Leeds is finished, the commission day for such town being fixed for Thursday, the 14th prox. The revenue paper will be taken by Mr. Justice Sankey on Tuesday next and following days. The King's Bench common jury list will again be taken on Monday, the 18th prox. The Midsummer Quarter Sessions for cases arising in the County of Middlesex will commence on Saturday next, the 2nd prox., at the Guildhall, Westminster, at 10.30. We are officially informed that there is no foundation whatever for the report that His Honour Judge Sir Thomas Granger has retired or is about to retire. The annual meeting of the Medico-Legal Society will be held on Thursday, the 7th prox., at 8.15 p.m., at 11, Chandos-street, Cavendish-square, W. Lord Justice Atkin has been nominated for selection as president. An ordinary meeting will follow, when Dr. A. Louise McIlroy, O.B.E., will read a paper entitled "Some Factors in the Control of the Birth-rate." Members of the Legal Profession are invited to attend and to take part in the discussion. 66 66 The Times, in a leading article on the 11th inst., entitled "Pigeon Shoots and Publicity," expresses gratification at the fact that "The Captive Birds (Shooting) Prohibition Bill has found both Houses of Parliament and awaits only the Royal assent to become law." In the following passage the Times echoes, albeit unconsciously, a proposition of juridical morality enunciated by Sir Henry Maine in respect to progressive societies, that social necessity and social opinion are always in advance of law, and that the “ gap between them" has a perpetual tendency to re-open. Our columns," writes the Times, "bear witness to the widespread indignation aroused by the knowledge of what was involved in the shooting of captive birds. The Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals verified our belief that these competitions were still within the letter of British law and promptly drafted and caused to be introduced the Bill that has just been passed. We are no partisans of an autocratic curriculum which would make people good by Act of Parliament or transform every low practice into a legal crime. Law to be effective should follow public conscience rather than lead it. The Press can do no more useful work than to explore existing gaps between the two and measure their width." With respect to progressive societies," writes Sir Henry Maine in his monumental work, Ancient Law, "it may be laid down that social necessities and social opinion are always more or less in advance of law. We may come indefinitely near to the closing of the gap between them, but it has a perpetual tendency to re-open. Law is stable, the societies we are speaking of are progressive. The greater or less happiness of a people depends on the degree of promptitude with which the gulf is narrowed." With reference to the plea of superior orders raised at the Leipsic trials, it is interesting to note that Sir Fitzjames Stephen, writing in 1882, a generation before the commencement of the Great War, thus discusses the analogous case of a plea of obedience to superior orders as a defence of soldiers or sailors in making an attack on civilians. "I do not think," he writes, "that the question how far superior orders would justify soldiers or sailors in making an attack upon civilians has ever been brought before the courts of law in such a manner as to be fully considered and determined. Probably upon such an argument it would be found that the order of a military superior would justify his inferiors in executing any orders for giving which they might fairly suppose their superior officer to have good reasons. Soldiers might reasonably think that their officer had good grounds for ordering them to fire into a disorderly crowd, which to them might not appear at the moment engaged in acts of dangerous violence, but soldiers could hardly suppose that their officer would have very good grounds for ordering them to fire a volley down a crowded street when no disturbance of any kind was either in progress or apprehended. The doctrine that a soldier is bound under all circumstances to obey his superior officer would be fatal to military discipline itself, for it would justify the private in shooting the colonel by the orders of the captain or in deserting to the enemy on the field of battle on the order of his immediate superior. I think it not less monstrous to suppose that superior orders would justify the massacre of unoffending civilians in time of war or in the exercise of inhuman cruelties such as the slaughter of women and children during a rebellion. The only rule that presents itself to my mind is that a soldier should be protected by orders for which he might reasonably believe his officer to have good grounds. The inconvenience of being subject to two jurisdictions, the sympathies of which are not unlikely to be opposed to each other, is an inevitable consequence of the double necessity of preserving on the one hand the supremacy of the law and on the other the discipline of the army." Mr. Chamberlain, in a reply on the 16th inst. to a memorial of 170 members of the House of Commons, which insisted on a scrupulous economy in administration and avoidance of expenditure not sanctioned by the House of Commons, said, no doubt in reference to the payment of the salary of Dr. Addison as Minister without portfolio, for which there had not been the sanction of a vote in. Supply, to say nothing of the more precise authority of an Appropriation Act: "There are cases in which preliminary sanction by Parliament is impossible, and the Civil Contingencies Fund (out of which Dr. Addison's salary has been paid) was established and is maintained by Parliament for the purpose of enabling the Government to deal with those cases. I am not aware that the Government has departed in any way from the practice of its predecessors: in the use of this Fund." The Civil Contingencies Fund is a small fund limited to £120,000, on which the Treasury is entitled to draw from time to time to defray new and unforeseen expenditure for civil sevices at home for which no votes had been taken, or to meet deficiencies in ordinary votes. Every advance made from this fund must, however, be repaid out of the Parliamentary votes passed in the ensuing year to provide for the services for which such advances had been made, and no expenditure whatever is. |