windows as were new without at the same time obstructing its passage to such portions of the new windows as were on the sites of the old windows. It was held by the Exchequer Chamber, confirming the judgment of the Common Pleas on a special case, that the plaintiffs, under these circumstances, could not maintain an action against the defendants for obstructing the passage of light to their warehouse windows, as no one of the existing windows substantially corresponded with any of the ancient lights; and per Channell B. and Blackburn J., that it was not necessary in the present case to decide whether there is a right to block up a new window, if it cannot be done without also blocking up an ancient unaltered one. And per Curiam: “We entirely concur in the judgment of Patterson J., in Blanchard v. Brydges, (4 Ad. & E, 176), that lights in respect of which the right of action is sought to be enforced must be substantially the same as the lights which have been gained by user or grant, and that no new light can be substituted without the consent of the owner of the servient tenement" (Hutchinson and Others v. Copestake and Others). Right of digging for brick earth to be taken into consideration under the General Inclosure Act.-Where proceedings were taken under the General Inclosure Act, 8 & 9 Vic. c. 118, for the inclosure of certain land at the instigation of persons who claimed rights of common over the same, and the owner of such land was interested therein in respect of brick-earth which he could get from it without interfering with the rights of common, it was held that the interest of such owner in respect of the brick-earth ought to be taken into consideration by the Assistant Commissioner in calculating the interests of the assenting and dissenting parties, under sec. 27, notwithstanding all "mines, minerals, stones, and other substrata” had been expressly reserved to such owner by the provisional order; and the Court granted a prohibition against the Commissioners proceeding with the inclosure without the consent of such owner, or taking the value of his interest in the brick-earth into account in reckoning the assents and dissents (Church v. Inclosure Commissioners). Custom to dig clay in a copyhold not unreasonable.-A custom in a manor that copyholders of inheritance may, without licence of the lord, break the surface and dig and get clay without stint out of their copyhold tenements, for the purpose of making bricks for sale off the manor, is good in law. This was decided in error on a bill of exceptions to the ruling of Byles J., and the judgment of the Exchequer affirmed. It was contended that the custom to take the soil and surface without stint tends to the destruction of the inheritance, and is unreasonable and void in law, but per Curiam: “We are, however, anable to draw any sound distinction between a custom for copyholders to take all the timber or trees, or all the minerals, in their copyholds, and such a custom to take clay as that in question. It appears to us that the cases of profit a prendre or easement on the waste of the lord or in alieno solo, have no application to the present question. A copyholder may, by custom, not only have a possessory but a proprietory right in the trees and minerals in his copyhold tenement. In the case of minerals, the taking them is, in effect, a taking of a portion of the corpus of the copyhold tenement. There appears to be no doubt but that a copyholder of inheritance may not only, by custom, work old mines already opened, but that he may also by custom dig within his tenement for new ones, and, if successful, work them. The case of the Bishop of Winchester v. Knight (2 Ld. Raymond, 1056; and 1 P. Williams, 406), [see Law of the Farm, p. 231] is an authority for the proposition that by custom a copyholder of inheritance may open and work new mines. Gilbert, C.B., in his treatise on tenures, p. 327, says that a copyholder of inheritance cannot without a custom dig for mines; obviously meaning that with a custom he could. In Scriven on Copyholds, p. 420, it is said that by custom a copyholder of inheritance may be entitled to the trees and mines in his copyhold. The plaintiff's counsel in his argument did not doubt but that a custom for a copyholder to have and work quarries and nines might be good, but contended that the surface must be left. But no case was cited to warrant such a conclusion. It may be that the mine or minerals, or a quarry of stone, might occupy the whole surface of the particular copyhold tenement, and that a general right to take stone or minerals would necessarily involve the taking of the surface. But in the present case there is nothing to show that the aking the clay would necessarily involve the taking of the surface. All the clay might be so situate as to be capable of being got at, as coals or other minerals. But however that may be, we think there is 1othing to show that such a custom as that in question is unreasonable or bad in point of law; and we may further observe that it is said, in Scriven on Copyholds, p. 26, that a custom is not unreasonable beause it is prejudicial to or diminishes the lord's casualty profit as to scheat. For these reasons, we think the defendant is entitled to our judgment" (Marquis of Salisbury v. Gladstone). Definition of surface damage. The words "surface damage" in tie Forest of Dean Act (1 & 2 Vic., c. 43 s. 68) do not include danage to buildings on the land, by reason of the subsidence occasioned ly underground workings. This "surface damage" is damage to tie mere surface, injury to the crops, or destruction of the grass, compensation for which can be ascertained by computation, and deternined upon by the gaveller. To cause a subsidence of the soil, partally or wholly destroying the future fertility of it, is not a surface danage; it may be damage to the house and land, but it is not surface dmage (Allaway v. Wagstaff). Injury to surface by working mines.-Rowbotham v. Wilson, vas [see Law of the Farm, p. 63] affirmed in the House of Lords, and the judgment of the Queen's Bench upheld, and it was dcided that the right to work mines is an incident to the grant oj mines, that though the covenants could not operate as a release of the general right of a surface owner to the support of the subjacent soil, it did operate as a grant of the right to work the mines, and thereby injure the surface, provided such injury was not the reult of negligence or unskilfulness (Rowbotham and Others v. Wilson. Support to land from drowned mine.-Although as between con Stavely v. Uzzielli, 2 F. & F., 30-page 28 Sloper v. Saunders, 29 L.J. (N.S.), Ex., 275-76 Stockport Water Works Company v. Potter and Others, 31 L.J. (N.S.), Ex., 9-55 Stott v. Clegg, New Reports, Jan. 31, 1863, Weekly Reporter, Feb. 21, 1863-14 Swaisland v. Dearsley, 30 L.J. (N.S.), Ch. 653, 4 Law Reporter, 432 -100 Swinfen v. Bacon, 6 H. & N. 183 (in error) 846, 7 Jurist (in error) 897, 6 Jurist 1257, 30 L.J. (N.S.), Ex. 109 (in error), 5 Law Reporter 83, 3 Law Reporter 440-78 Symons [Symonds] v. Marine Society, 29 L.J. (N.S.), Ch. 623, 6 Jurist, 910-1 T. Tappley v. Sheether, Weekly Reporter, Nov. 15, 1862-74 Taylor (Alice) (App.) v. Carr and Porter (Resps.), 31 L.J. (N.S.), M.C. 111, 2 B. & S., 335-32 Tildesley v. Clarkson, 31 L.J. (N.S.), Ch. 362–73 Trent v. Hunt, 9 Ex. 14, and 22 L.J. (N.S.), Ex., 318-78 Trimmer v. Walsh, Weekly Reporter, Nov. 29, 1862, 32 L.J. (N.S.), 20, Q.B.-67 Tucker v. Newman, 11 Ad. & E., 40-14 Turner v. Barnes and Others, 31 L J. (N.S.), 170 Q.B.-41 v. Hutchinson, 2 F. & F., 185-75 v. Spooner, 30 L.J. (N.S.), Ch., 801-5 v. Wright, 29 L.J. (N.S.), Ch. 470, 598, 6 Jurist 647, 800, 2 Law Reporter 277, 649-17 Tutton v. Darke, 29 L.J. (N.S.), Ex. 271, 5 H. & N. 647, 6 Jurist 983, 2 Law Reporter, 361-40 V. Vaughan v. Taff Vale Railway Company, 5 H. & N. 679, 6 Jurist 899, 2 Law Reporter, 394-53 Vidler (ex parte) re Terry, Weekly Reporter, Dec. 13, 1862-98 W. Wallis v. Littell, 31 L.J. (N.S.), C. P., 100-74 Wanstead Local Board of Health (App.) v. Hill (Resp.), New Reports Jan. 23, 1863, Weekly Reporter, Feb. 21, 1863-55 Walmsley v. Milne, 29 L.J. (N.S.), C.P. 97, 7 C.B., 893-page 77 Watkins v. Reddin, 2 F. & F., 629-54 Watts v. Ainsworth, 31 L.J. (N.S.), Ex. 448, 3 F. & F. 12, 6 Law Reporter, 252-96 Webb v. Bird, 30 L.J. (N.S,), C.P. 384, 31 L.J. (N.S.), (in error), C.P. 335, 10 C.B. 268, Jurist, July 12, 1862-4 Wellington's (Duke of) Settled Estates Act (In re), 30 L.J. (N.S.), Ch., 187-27 Wheeler (App.) v. Overseers of Burmington (Resps.), 31 L.J. (N.S.), M.C., 57-70 White v. Leeson, 29 L.J. (N.S.), Ex. 105, 5 H. & N., 53—12 Whitty v. Lord Dillon, 2 F. & F., 67—16 Wilden v. Stanley (Veterinarian, June, 1860)—106 Willett (App.) v. Boote, 30 L.J. (N.S.), M.C., 6—31 Williams (App.) v. Adams, 31 L.J. (N.S.), M.C., 109-10 v. Eyton, 27 L.J. (N.S.), Ex. 176, 28 L.J. (N.S), Ex. 146, 5 Jurist, 770-12 (App.) v. Overseers of Langeinwen (Resps.), 31 L.J. (N.S.), M.C., 54-69 Williamson v. Barton, 31 L.J. (N.S.,, Ex., 176, 7 H. & N., 899-100 Wilson v. Stevens, M.S.S.-103 Wintringham (Tithes) (In re), ex parte Lord Carrington, 31 L.J. (N.S.), C.P., 274-68 Wood v. Hewitt, 8 Q.B. 913, 15 L.J. (N.S.), Q.B., 247-77 Wood (Edwards) v. Marjoribanks and Others, 30 L.J. (N.S.), Ch., 176 -99 Worthington v. Gimson, 26 L.J. (N.S.), Ex. 258, 29 L.J. (N.S.), Q.B. 116, 6 Jurist 1053, 2 Law Reporter, 320-13 Wright v. Stavert, 29 L.J. (N.S.), Q,B. 161, 6 Jurist, 867-2 Y. Yates v. Routledge, 29 L.J. (N.S.), Ex. 117, 5. H. & N., 249-77 Young v. Davis, 31 L.J. (N.S.), Ex. 250, 7 H. & N. 760, 6 Law Reporter, terminous owners the lateral support of a neighbour's soil can only be claimed for the surface of the land in its natural state, yet where person sells land to another, to be used for an express purpose, he wil not be allowed to derogate from his own grant by doing anything o the adjacent soil, which unfits the land sold for the purpose for which it is sold; and it makes no difference that the land so sold was taken under compulsory powers; but the purchaser is not entitled to any additional support afforded by the accidental state in which the acjacent soil happens to be, at the time of the purchase, however long it may have been in that state prior to the purchase. Thus where the owner of a drowned mine sold land to a railway company for the purpose of building a bridge, and the land sold derived additional support from the water in the mine, it was held that the railway company were not entitled to restrain him from pumping out the water, and restoring the mine to a working condition, although the mine hat continued in its drowned state, and the works had been abandoned fo a period of forty years prior to the purchase (North Eastern Railwa? Company v. Elliot). Right of railway to support from adjoining Lands.-A railway company is entitled to the vertical and lateral support of the adjoin ing lands of the proprietor from whom the lands or easements require for the railway were purchased; and such proprietor is not at liberty to work the minerals adjoining the railway in such a way as to caus damage to it; and in the absence of statutory provisions he canno compel the company to purchase them (North Eastern Railway Com pany v. Crosland). Title of owner of ancient house to lateral support from adjoin ing Land.-Semble by V. C. Wood V.C.: "The owner of an ancien house is entitled to the lateral support of his neighbour's land, as wel for the house as for the surface of the soil itself (Hunt v. Peeke). Statute of limitations in case where damage has been done to th surface by mining.-The judgment in Bonomi v. Backhouse, (27 L.J (N.S.), Q.B. 378), and that in Nicklin v. Williams (10 Ex. 259, [see Law of the Farm, p. 62, 63], on which it was based, wer over-ruled in Error. In the former, the defendant, owner of certai mines in 1849, withdrew the pillars of coal which had been left as suppors to roofs in some of the old workings. The consequence was that the roof of the mine fell, the adjacent strata subsided one after the othr in slow succession, and at last in 1854, the support of the intermediae strata having given way, the plaintiff's land, which was 280 yards d defendant's mines, sank, and the house on it was injured. The plairtiff brought his action in 1856. It was ultimately held, reversing the judgment of the Queen's Bench in this case, and Nicklin v. Williams s well, that the Statute of Limitations was no bar to the action, as no caue of action arose to the plaintiff's by the mere excavation by the defen!ant of the pillars of plaintiff's coal in his own land, so long asit caused no damage to the plaintiffs, and that the cause of action fist accrued when the plaintiff's received actual damage. Compensation for Injury to Buildings by Subsidence of Soil.-Whn the working of mines, in however careful a manner, has occasiond |