the subsidence of the land of another, although not immediately adjoining, damages may be recovered in respect of injury to buildings thereon erected or enlarged within twenty years, provided their weight did not occasion or contribute to the subsidence; and the action is maintainable for damage to the possession and the reversion (Hamer and Stroyan v. Knowles).

Right of soil to support for additional weight of buildings.—A right to support for additional weight of buildings may be acquired as an easement by twenty years of uninterrupted enjoyment (Partridge v. Scott, 3 M. and W. 220), and after twenty years a house acquires a right to the lateral support of soil round it (Browne v: Robins).

Three-fourths of a right of common.-A plea of prescriptive right to three-fourths of a right of common of pasture for one cow is bad (Nichols v. Chapman).

Evidence of existence of highway. In an action of trespass for breaking and entering the plaintiff's land, on an issue raised whether there was a highway over the locus in quo, there was evidence that there had been a highway over the adjacent land, which was then, together with such locus in quo, an open common. There was also evidence that for many years the highway was obstructed by part of it being included in an enclosure, which had been illegally made on such common; and that during twenty years of that time, the public had deviated a little from the line of way, by going outside such enclosure, and on the locus in quo. At the end of such time, and before the plaintiff became the owner of the locus in quo, the use of such substituted line of way was discontinued by reason of a new road having been laid out in a different direction by an adjoining land proprietary. Afterwards, the obstruction to the old road was removed, and the original line of way was reopened to the public. It was held by Erle C.J. and Byles J. (Williams J. diss), that there was no reasonable evidence on the above facts, on which a jury might find that there was, in addition to any other highway, a highway running over the locus in quo (Dawes v. Hawkins).

Evidence of user and dedication.-Although a cul de sac may be a highway, and although the old doctrine that a highway must lead from one public place to another may not be strictly correct, yet where a road leads to a place which is not public, and which the public enter only by permission (as where it leads to the gates of a park), the user of the road by all persons who seek such entry without evidence of user for any other purpose, is not a user sufficient to warrant the conclusion of a dedication to the public as a highway and a liability in the parish to repair (Reg. v. Parish of Hawkhurst).

Full right of public to enjoyment of highway. Where an ordinary highway runs between fences, one on each side, the right of the passage which the public have along it extends primá facie, and unless there be evidence to the contrary, over the whole space between the fences; and the public are entitled to the use of the entire space (Reg. v. U.K. Electric Telegraph Company (limited).)

Enclosing to within fifteen feet of centre of highway.-The com

mon notion that owners of land on the sides of a highway may encroach or enclose up to within fifteen feet of the centre is an error, and the question will always be as to the extent of the highway by user: per Erle J. (Reg. v. Johnson).

Right of Justices to determine whether road is a highway.-On the hearing of a complaint under 5 and 6 Wm. IV., c. 50, sec. 73, for leaving rubbish on a highway, after notice to remove it, the defendant, who was the owner of the land on both sides of the alleged highway, denied it to be the highway, and as he claimed the soil subject to a private right of way only, he contended that the justices ought not to adjudicate in the matter, on the ground that title to land came in question; and it was held that the objection was untenable, for that the justices had jurisdiction under the statute to determine whether the road was a highway or not. And per Wightman J., the question of title to the land does not properly arise; and per Crompton J. “I was struck by the way the point was raised, viz., that the matter of title comes into question, because the appellant claims the land subject only to the easement of a private right of road. As a general rule, no doubt, justices are not to decide on summary conviction, the title to land; and as I said in Reg. v. Cridland (27, L.J. (N. S.), M. C. 28), this does not depend on any exception in the particular statute, so much as on the principle generally applicable to summary convictions. But in this particular case, the magistrates were to decide on the question whether the alleged highway was a highway or not; this in some sort may be said to involve a question connected with title to land, but that consideration cannot oust them of jurisdiction where they are the tribunal appointed to decide that very question, highway or no highway. The very foundation of their jurisdiction in the matter depends on this question, and the very first step is to ascertain whether the locus in quo is a highway. They are not really trying a question as to any title to land; in this case the title to the land was admitted, and the only question was, is the road a highway or not? That is the very thing which, as to any other individual, the justices are to try, and why not when the person guilty of the alleged nuisance is the owner of the land? My notion is that if an Act of Parliament gives jurisdiction to justices or other inferior tribunal over a matter connected with land, there must be a special exception to the Act, in order to oust their jurisdiction, where the title comes in question, as in the County Courts and Malicious Trespass Acts. The appellant seeks to oust the magistrates' jurisdiction, by alleging that the road is not a highway; any other person might set up this defence, and it is a question of user by the public, and is not founded on title, but arises just as much as to any one of the public, as to the particular owner of the land; and this question of highway is the very question which the Legislature says the justices are to decide" (Williams (appt.) v. Adams).

Distinction between a private and a public way."It appears to me that there is this distinction between a private and a public right of way, that the former is not necessarily, as the latter is, over every part of the land, to which people have access, or along

which there is the right of way:" per Cockburn C.J. (Hutton v. Hamboro').

Duty of surveyor to protect foot-causeways against carriages.— The 24th section of the General Highway Act (5 and 6 Wm. IV., c. 50), which requires the parish surveyor to secure horse and footcauseways from being passed over by carriages, applies only to such as are by the side of carriage-ways; and therefore such surveyor is not bound by that statute to protect horse and foot-causeways against carriages at the extremities of such ways (Ellis (appt.) v. Woodbridge).

Surveyor of highways not liable for accident caused by nonrepair of Road.-A surveyor of highways appointed under 5 and 6 Wm. IV., c. 50, is not liable to an action for damages resulting from an accident caused by the non-repair of the highway, as was substantially decided in error in Mc Kinnon v. Penson (9 Ex., 609, and 23, L.J. (N. S., M. C. 97) (Young v. Davis).

Presumption of property on soil of private road. The presumption which prevails in the case of a public highway, that the soil usque ad medium filum viæ. belongs to the owner of the adjacent land, prevails also in the case of a private way; provided that there be no other evidence of ownership to rebut such presumption (Holmes v. Bellingham).

Right of way appurtenant.-A plot of building ground having been conveyed with a right of way over a new road leading thereto from a high road, it was held by the Court of Common Pleas that if that plot of land is subsequently demised by parol, the right of way passes also, although not specially mentioned (Skull v. Glenister).

Implied grant of way of necessity.-Where the owner of a farm severed it by will among his two sons, and the moiety devised to one son was landlocked, except where it abutted on the moiety devised to the other, yet the will made no mention of any ways whatsoever, it was held by the Exchequer Chamber, affirming the decision of the Court of Queen's Bench, that some way passed by implication under the will, and that the Court would look at the previous occupation of the testator's property to see what way was meant by him to pass. Under these circumstances, where the access to the landlocked premises, and to the farm buildings upon them, had been in the testator's lifetime by one particular road across the moiety devised to the other son, and the enjoyment of the landlocked premises in the state they were in when devised was not complete without this particular road, the Court held that this particular road passed under the will, and not merely "a way of necessity"; and semble, that if a way of necessity only had passed, the way would have been limited by the necessity (Reg. v. Pearson).

Conveyance of a close adjoining highway implies that of highway usque ad medium filum viæ.—Where a close of land adjoins a highway, the presumption of law is that half of such highway, usque ad medium filum, passes with the conveyance of the close; and such presumption is not rebutted by the fact that the close is separated from the highway by a fence, and is defined in the conveyance by admeasurement and reference to a plan which did not include such highway, and the cases

of Simpson v. Dendy (8 C. B. 433), and Lord v. the Commissioners of the City of Sydney (12 Moo. 473), are authorities to that effect (Berridge v. Ward).

Map held inadmissible under certain circumstances to prove rights of way.-To prove that there was a public right of way over certain closes, part of a manor, the defendant put in evidence a map used by a deceased steward of the manor at the Manor Courts, for the purpose of defining the copyholds. In it, there appeared a space marked out by two lines crossing the closes in question, and called Mellow Lane. There were occupation ways, as well as public highways, marked upon the map, but there was nothing to distinguish one from another, nor was there anything to show that the space marked out as above mentioned was a public highway at all. The map was held inadmissible: the deceased steward did not make the map, nor was it proved to have been made by any one who had knowledge of the facts (Pipe v. Fulcher).

Order of Justices to stop up a public carriage-road under an Inclosure Act, implied by long acquiescence.—An award made in 1830, under an Inclosure Act, which empowered the commissioners to stop up highways, subject nevertheless to the order and concurrence of two justices, directed a certain public highway for carriages to be stopped up. Ever since the award (i.e., for 28 years) the road had been stopped up by a gate, and had never been used by the public, with carriages or horses. There had, however, been some user by foot passengers. No proof was given that the requisite order of justices had ever been made. It was held by the Exchequer Chamber, confirming the decision of the Court of Exchequer, that from the non-user of the road for so long a period, the jury might presume that there was such an order (Williams v. Eyton).

Power of Inclosure Commissioners to set out private road.-Where a provisional order has been made under the Inclosure Acts, ordering certain land therein described to be allotted to an individual, in lieu of his right in the lands to be enclosed, and the order does not expressly exempt such allotment from having a right of way reserved over it, the Inclosure Commissioners have power, in proceeding with the inclosure, to order the valuer to set out a private road over such land, for the use of another landowner; and per Erle C.J., "The words of 11 and 12 Vic., c. 99, s. 4, giving the valuer power to set out private roads, are extremely wide, and give the Commissioners jurisdiction in the matter" (Grubb v. Inclosure Commissioners). Affirmed in Error.

Appropriation of a private rights of way by Private Estates Act.A Private Estate Act (6 Wm. IV., c. 13) enables tenants for life to grant building leases, and empowers the lessors to lay out, and appropriate any part of the land authorised to be leased, as for a way, street, square, passage, or sewer, or other conveniences for the general improvement of the estate, and the accommodation of the tenants and occupiers. It was held that extensive private rights of way over such appropriated land might be granted to particular lessees, as such appropriation did not confer a right of user by all the tenants and occupiers (White v. Leeson).

Right of way under deed of partition.-Pyer v. Carter was quite distinguished from Worthington v. Gimson, in which there is no ground for saying that there was any necessity at all for the way claimed. There H and P being seised of undivided moieties in the N and N V estates, entered into a deed of partition, by which the N V estate was conveyed to H, and the N estate to P. A way had existed for many years, leading from a farm on the N estate, occupied by the plaintiff over his land, and over land occupied by the defendant on the N V estate. The way had been used by the occupier of the plaintiff's farm before and after the 20th of January, in which month the the deed of partition was executed. By the deed, H conveyed his undivided moiety in the N estate to P, and as part of the farm occupied by the plaintiff with others, "with their and every of their rights, members, easements, and appurtenances." P also conveyed his undivided moiety in the N V estate to H. The plaintiff and his predecessors used the way up to January 1859, when it was obstructed by the defendant. It was held in an action brought by the plaintiff in respect of such obstruction, that the way in question did not pass under words used in the deed of partition, and that the plaintiff could not recover (Worthington v. Gimson).

Evidences of dedication of private farm road to the public.-The occasional user of a farm road by strangers chiefly for purposes of pleasure is evidence of a public rather than a private way, and may be evidence of a dedication to the public as a highway, but must be well weighed with reference to permission, repair, and all other circumstances tending to show whether the owner ever intended such a dedication, especially if it leads to a place of resort for mere purposes of pleasure: per Erle C.J. (Mildred v. Weaver).

Mere tracks in wood not proof of highway.-The mere use of tracks in a wood by people where they were free to wander about as they pleased, is not necessarily enough to show a dedication of such tracks to the public as public footways—per Erle C.J. Chapman v. Cripps and Others (2, F. and F. 864); and evidence that in a place of resort for pleasure, as a wood or the like, people have gone about wherever they pleased, there being no definite enduring trackway in any particular direction, but merely temporary and transitory tracks, not passable in wet weather, varying every season and never proved to be repaired, was held by Wightman J. not to be evidence on which a jury could properly find either a public highway or a public right of resort for air and exercise, or a prescriptive right of way (Schwinge v. Dowell).

Charging settled estate with expense of road through another part of the estates.—The court will not sanction the sale of any part of settled estates, that the purchase-money may be applied in laying out and making roads through another part of the estates: per Romilly M.R. (In re Chambers's Settled Estates).

Ploughing up footpaths.-In Bright v. Sweet, which was tried at Taunton Assizes some years since, the law as to ploughing up footpaths was thus laid down: "In this case, which was an indictment brought by certiorari from the Quarter Sessions, it appeared that there was a public footpath across the lands