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Hanley, in the county of Stafford, and as the jury upon the facts. We have now an accountant, and it appeared that he was to decide whether that description which, perfectly well known, and that though he upon the face of the affidavit, if it stood acted as agent to one Hayes, he was also alone, seems to be insufficient, may be an accountant on his own behalf, it was explained or supplemented by referring held by this Court that the description
to the bill of sale. It must be remem. was sufficient, and such as would, without bered that this sufficiency or insufficiency giving unreasonable trouble, lead to his is matter of degree. The affidavitdescribes being found out by any person who was the name of the grantor and his occupation interested in ascertaining who he was, and truly, so also the date of the execution of made enquiries about him. In each case the bill of sale, and it gives some descripthe question must be one of more or less. tion of the residence, and by reference to I agree with
Lord that “ Dynevor the bill of sale verifies the fact of the Lodge" standing alone in the affidavit residence and of the occupation. I think would not be sufficient, because, to a that the description in the affidavit may be person in London, it would be no intima- explained or supplemented by the verified tion of who the grantor was; but if there copy of the bill of sale. Mr. Coleridge had been the words Isaac Anthony, who says that the bill of sale is not verified resides at Dynevor Lodge, in the parish by the affidavit, but I think that it is, of Llanarthy, in the county of Carmar- and I am satisfied, although of course then, and is an auctioneer, it would have our judgment must rest on other grounds, given information so as to enable anyone that this decision is in furtherance of the who went down to the place to find out rules of justice and sense. It would be who he was. Mr. Coleridge says that a hardship if this bill of sale were to be the bill of sale cannot be used to supply upset upon a technical objection, where the deficiency in the affidavit, because everything was intended to be done prothe bill of sale is not sworn to, but Routh perly, and in accordance with the direcv. Roublot (7) is an authority which shews
tions of the statute. that it may be looked at to supply what
Rule discharged. is wanting in the affidavit. [His Lordship stated the facts of that case, and Attorneys–T. Clark, agent for L. Bishop, Llanthen continued.] So here, we find that
dilo, for plaintiff'; Ingledew, Ince & Greening, in the atlidavit “Dynevor Lodge” is
for defendaut. sworn to as the residence of Isaac Anthony, and that the affidavit incorporates the
copy of the bill of sale, which shews that it was made by Isaac Anthony, of Dy nevor Lodge, in the parish of Llan- 1871.
DAVIES AVD WIFE , SOLOMON. arthy, in the county of Carmarthen. I Nov. 29. cannot doubt that if this was in the aflidavit it would suffice. In every case it
Slander- Words imputing Incontinence is a question of more or less, and I do
--Ls8 of Hospitality of Friends-Special not say that the addition of the parish Dumage - Ilusband and Wife. would always suffice, but it would in this Declaration, by husband and wife for case give ample information to creditors or maliciously speaking and publishing of the to persons who were about to lend money female plaintiff the words following: “I can or deliver goods.
prove that J. D.'s wife (the female plaintiff') MELLOR, J.-I am of the same opinion, had connection with a man named L. tuo and I do not think that our present de- years ago, but I would rather have the cision conflicts with any former decision. tongue cut out of my mouth than separate At the trial Mr. Coleridge took the tech- man and wife.” Special damage, that the nical objection that the description of the female plaintiff was thereby injured in her residence was not sufficient, and, as I character ai reputation, and became think, wisely determined to rest upon alienated from, and deprived of, the cohabithe objection so taken, without going to tation of her husband, and lost, and was
deprived of, the companionship, and ceased expressed his opinion that a wife cannot to receive the hospitality, of divers friends, maintain anaction (joining her husband for and especially of her husband, and D., T. conformity) for the loss of the consortium and M. who hod, by reason of the premises, of her husband, who deserts her in conwithdrawn from the companionship of, and sequence of slander spoken of her by ceased to be hospitable to, or be friendly another. with, the female plaintiff.—Held, on de- [BLACKBURN, J.-Here it is stated that murrer, first, that the loss of the hospitality the wife has lost the hospitality of her of friends was a sufficient special damage
friends. In Moore v. Meagher (2) it to make the slander actionable ; secondly, appears to have been held that an action that the wife was properly joined in the is maintainable by a woman for slander in action,
consequence of which she has lost the
hospitality of friends.] Declaration, that before and at the time In Roberts v. Roberts (3), where a simi. of, &c., the plaintiff, Isabella Davies, was lar slander caused the plaintiff to be exa person of unblemished character and cluded from a society of dissenters, it was repute, and had always conducted herself held that this was not such a special with decorum, chastity, modesty, and damage as to make the words actionable. propriety, living and cohabiting with her Besides, the damage is not the natural husband, and was on terms of intimate result of the speaking of the words. relationship and companionship with her Secondly, it is a pecuniary damage, and the husband, and with divers good and husband ought to sue alone for it without worthy friends, and was in the habit of joining his wife. visiting them and partaking of their hospi- Prentice, in support of the declaration, tality, and being received by them as a com- was not heard. panion, yet the defendant well knowing the premises, falsely and maliciously spoke BLACKBURN, J.-I think that we need and published of the plaintiff, Isabella not trouble the counsel for the plaintiffs. Davies, the words following, that is to The authority of Lord Wensleydale in the say, “ I can prove that John Davies's wife case of Lynch v. Knight (1) is entitled to (meaning thereby the plaintiff, Isabella so much weight, that if the facts in that Davies) had connection with a man named case and the present one had been the Labrach two years ago, but I would same, I should have wished to take time rather have the tongue cut out of my to consider, but here the declaration, after mouth than separate man and wife,' stating the slander, goes on to allege that whereby the p'aintiff Isabella Davies was the wife was thereby deprived of the in ured in her character and reputation, hospitality of divers friends, and that her anl became alienated from, and deprived husband and other persons whose names of, the cohabitation of her husband, and are given, have withdrawn from her comJo it and was deprived of the companion- panionship, and ceased to be hospitable ship, and ceased to receive the hospitality of to or friendly with her.
Now is this a divers friends, and especially of her husband, consequence which might necessarily and John Davies, and one Morrice Davies, naturally follow from the speaking of the and one George Henry Turner (clerk), words? I should say that it would follow and one Abraham Joseph Murray, who most naturally. The friends who had have by reason of the premises withdrawn been in the habit of inviting ber to their from the companionship, and ceased to be houses would naturally cease to do so hospitable to, or be friendly with, the after such an imputation. Then the case plaintiff, Isabella Davies.
of Moore v. Meagher (2) is an authority Demurrer and joinder in demurrer. to shew that the loss of the hospitality of
A. T. Lawrence in support of the de- friends is a material damage which may murrer.— The declaration is bad. In Lynch v. Knight (1) Lord Wensleydale
(2) I Tauit. 39.
(3) ; B. & S. 384 ; s. C. 33 Law J. Rep. (1.s.) (1) 9 H. L. Cas. 577.
render slander actionable. The case of Roberts v. Roberts (3) is not in point, for there the plaintiff
' merely suffered the discomfort of being excluded from a society, while here she suffers a pecuniary loss, though it may
be a small one. With regard to the objection that the action ought to be brought by the husband alone, as he is bound to supply his wife with necessaries, and the pecuniary damage affects him exclusively, I cannot agree to such artificial reasoning. It is quite pos. sible that the wife
derive ditional benefit from the hospitality of friends, though her husband is bound to support her according to his rank in life, and where it is plain that the real damage is to the wife, we cannot go into nice questions as to whether what is recovered will go into the pocket of her husband. Our judgment is therefore for the plaintiff's. MELLOR, J., and HANNEN, J., concurred.
Judgment for the plaintiff's.
Attorneys---G. L. Norman, for plaintiffs ; Taylor,
Hoare & Taylor, for defendant.
against him, to shew by what authority he fills the office of councillor for the borough and city of Chichester, on the ground that he was an assessor to revise the burgess lists for the borough at the time of his election to such office.
The city of Chichester is divided into wards, called respectively the north and south wards, and on the 1st of March, 1871, James Adames and Edmund Peachey were elected assessors, to hold the Court for revising the burgess or citizen lists with the Mayor. Alfred Orchard and Alfred Dunn were the assessors clected for the same time for holding the election with the Mayor for such south ward. On the 5th of October in that
year Adames and Peachey acted as such assessors, and held such Court and revised the lists. They were subsequently nominated and elected councillors for the south ward, at the election of councillors held on the 1st of November in the same year.
Messrs. Molesworth and Allen were unsuccessful candidates at the same election of councillors on the 1st of November, but were next on the poll after Adames and Peachey. It appeared also that Adames and Peachey were nominated on the 30th of October, and that on the 31st of October public notice of their alleged disqualification was given, and that on the evening of the latter day cach resigned his office of assessor, and their resignation was accepted on the same day by the Mayor ; and one point intended to be made in the case was that this resignation was void as being too late, the nomination having taken place, but this point became immaterial from the view the Court took on the main point.
C. Pollock (Atkinson with him), in support of the rule.-An assessor is disquali. fied to be elected a councillor of the borough by the 15th section of the 7 Will. 4. & 1 Vict. c. 78, which enacts “ That no burgess shall be eligible to be elected a member of the council while holding the office of assessor or elective auditor." There is no distinction between an assessor for the borough and an assessor to revise the burgess lists. Section 17 of the same Act, which empowers the
assessor to appoint a depnty, puts both classes of assessor as on
the same footing. On principle, an asses- C. Pollock in reply:— The new assessors sor who has revised the lists ought not to have a part only of the duties of the old, be permitted to be a candidate on a list but are none the less assessors for the of his own revising.
Mr. Adames was borough. chosen assessor under the 7 Will. 4. & 1 Vict. c. 78. s. 4, “to hold the Court for Lush, J.-Wethink that this rule must be revising the burgess lists with the Mayor." refused. Messrs. Adames and Peachey were The Court for the purpose of revising the not disqualified from being elected counburgess lists is held under the 18th section cillors of this borough. The 15th section of the 5 & 6 Will. 4. c. 76.
of the 7 Will. 4. & 1 Vict. c. 78 can only
be understood by reading it in connection Sir J. Karslake (A. L. Smith with him) with the 37th section of the 5 & 6 Will. 4. shewed cause in the first instance.—The c. 76, which enacts “ that on the 1st of disqualification of the 15th section of the March in the year 1836, and in every 7 Will. 4. & 1 Vict. c. 78 applies to as- succeeding year, the burgesses of every sessors of the borough and not to assessors borough shall elect from, &c., two bur. chosen to revise the burgess lists. They gesses, who shall be called assessors of are distinct and separate persons chosen such borough, and every such assessor at the same time. The duties of the two shall continue in office until the 1st day of offices are different. The assessors for a March in the year following his election.” borough not divided into wards are ap- Then follows a first proviso, and then it pointed under 5 & 6 Will. 4. c. 76. s. 37, proceeds, “provided also that no burgess and for a borough divided into wards by shall be eligible to be or be elected such section 43 of the same Act. By that assessor as aforesaid, who shall be of the section each ward is to appoint two asses- council or the town clerk or treasurer of sors for itself. Such assessors
such borough.” Now, the assessors mencontinue in office till the following 1st of tioned in that section are assessors for the March. They are to hold the elections on whole borough, and the words such the 1st of November, and the assessors assessors as aforesaid” refer to assessors for the Mayor's ward are to be the asses- for the borough. Then comes the 43rd sors to hold the Court for revising the section providing for the division of burgess lists. Then came 7 Will. 4. & boroughs into wards. The next enact1 Vict. c. 78. s. 4, which repealed so much ment is the 7 Will. 4. & 1 Vict. c. 78. s. 4. of the former Act as made the assessors That section, however, does not say how of the Mayor's ward the assessors to re- long the assessors appointed under it to vise the list with the Mayor, and enacted hold a Court with the Mayor for revising that “in every borough divided into wards the lists of the borough are to be in office. two assessors should be chosen to hold the They are assessors of a different character Court for revising the burgess lists with from those under the first Act. the Mayor.” These assessors have no viso to the 37th section of the first Act other duty than to hold the Court with merely disqualified councillors from being the Mayor for revising the burgess lists. assessors, then came the new enactment As soon as they have held the Court and of the 15th section to supply the converse revised the lists, they have performed case, and supplement the old Act by distheir duty and are functi officio. There is qualifying the assessor from being a nothing else which they can be called councillor. The 17th section of that Act, upon to do.
Then the 15th section was in my opinion, fortifies this view and menpassed with reference to and to supple
tions both classes. It speaks of “every ment the last proviso of the 37th section assessor,” and permits him to appoint a of the first Act, and refers to the assessor deputy to act “at any election or any rementioned in that section. [They referred vision of the burgess lists." The only to the dictum of Coleridge, J., in The matter capable of argument is that, whereQueen v. Mayor, foc., of Weymouth (1).] as the 4th section has created a fresh class
of assessors, the 15th section applies to (1) 7 Q.B. Rep. 52.
the whole body, but I think that the latter
The proenactment must be confined to the corres- (MELLOR, J., and HANNEN, J.), that the ponding proviso in the 37th section of the
declaration was good, on the ground that first Act.
it was a question for the jury whether the HANNEN, J.-I am of the same opinion. article did not exceed the limits of fair The 15th section of the latter Act cin only criticism, and tend to disparage the plainbe intended to supplement the 3th se- tiff's to the public in respect of their mode of tion of the former. The wording of the carrying on their business ; but by Lush, J., 15th section is peculiar; after reciting the that the declaration was bad and that there 37th section, it says
“be it also enacted.” was no evidence of a libel for the jury, as It is evidently intended to complete what there was nothing in the article which conwas before incomplete, and the words veyed an imputation on the charucter of “while holding the office of assessor,' the plaintiff's, or on the manner in which must be read to mean while holding the they conducted their business. office of such assessor as before mentioned. The mischief of the assessor to revise the Declaration, that before and at the time lists being elected a councillor on a list &c., the plaintiffs carried on the business which he has revised, if an evil, seems to amongst other businesses of manufacturers be one which the legislature has not of bags, and in such business invented, thought it worth the while to provide manufactured, and sold for gain and reagainst.
ward, in that behalf, great numbers of a Rule refused. certain bag called “The Bag of Bags."
and the defendant well knowing the preAttorneys Henry Sowton, for Molesworth ;
mises maliciously printed and published, Robinson & Preston, for the corporation.
of and conce
cerning the plaintiffs in their said business, and of and concerning them in the manufacturing and selling of the said bags aforesaid, in a certain periodical or paper called the "
Tomahawk,” the 1871.
false and defamatory words following Nov. 17. ) A'BECKETT.
(that is to say), "Novelty and enough.
Let us (meaning the defendant) premise Libel-Fair Comment–Privilege.
our (meaning the defendant's) remarks by Declaration, “that the plaintiffs carried on declaring that they are not a planned adthe business of manufacturers of bags, and vertisement, and then let us (meaning the in such business invented, manufactured and defendant) declare that Messrs. Jenner sold great numbers of a bag called . The and Knewstub (meaning the plaintiffs), of Bag of Bugs,' and the defendant maliciously St. James's Street, have introduced and prin'ed and published of and concerning the largely advertised an article of their plantiff's in their business, in a periolical manufacture as the Bag of Bags (meaning calle l ihe. Tomahawk,' the words following: the said bag so manufactured and sold by
Novelty and enough. Let us (meaning the the plaintiff's as aforesaid). As we (meandefenlant] premise our remarks that they ing the defendant) have not seen the Bag are not a planned advertisement, and then of Bags, we (meaning the defendant) canlet us declare that Messrs J. &• K. (meaning not say that it is useful, or that it is the plaintiff's], hare introduced and largely portable, or that it is elegant. All these culvertised an article of their manufacture as it may be, but the only point we can deal the Bag of Bags. As we have not seen the with, is the title, which we think very silly, Bag of Bags, we cannot say that it is usul, very slangy, and very vulgar, and which or th it it is portable, or that it is elegant. has been forced upon the notice of the All this it may be, but the only point we can public ad nauseum. ( ea' with is the title, which think
very Demurrer and joinder in demurrer. silly, very slangy, and very vulgar, and Joyce (Stecle with him) in support of which has been forced upon the notice the demurrer.—The words set out in the of the public al nauseam” :-Held, on declaration are not actionable, as they demurer by the majority of the Court convey no imputation on the plaintiffs, but
JENNER AND ANOTHER V.