(39) (which is the same case without the word "other"), and Langley v. Baldwin (62), Doe v. Halley (49) and Parker v. Tootall (63), we think it would not, and that the word "other" is not a governing word in such a limitation. There are some authorities to this effect, with which the learning and industry of the counsel for the defendant supplied us, where the word "other" was used with a similar context. The first was that of James v. Richardson (46). It should be noticed that the report is not of the judgment of the Court, but of Pollexfen's own argument, which seems however to have been adopted by the King's Bench, and afterwards by the House of Lords. The case was a devise of an estate to a trustee during the life of A, in trust to permit A to receive the rents; and the will proceeded-" after the death of A, I devise the estate to the heirs male of the body of A, now living, and to such other heirs, males and females, as he shall hereafter happen to have of his body," and for want of such heirs there was a devise over. -A had an eldest and only son, George, alive at the making of the will and at the death of the testator. The question was what estate George took; and it was considered he took an estate tail by force of the words, "such other heirs, male and female, as he shall have of his body." Now George was the heir male of A, and could not take if the word "other" had the effect of excluding him, because he had been named before. The argument (64) was that the word other does not exclude George; it only provides for the other heirs-male that should be of another sort. And it is said, “If lands be given to A for life, remainder to the heirs male of the body of B, remainder to the other heirs of B; in this case the heir of B takes two estates, one as heir male and the other as heir general." But it is obvious he could not do this, if the word "other" did not include him, though he had been named before. No doubt what has been quoted is only (62) 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 185, 188. (63) 11 H.L. Cas. 143; s. c. 34 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Exch. 198. (64) Pol. pp. 462, 463. the argument, but if it be correct it is strictly applicable to the present case, and shews that under the present will the second baronet took two estates under the will of the first baronet, an immediate estate for life, and an estate tail general in remainder, upon failure of the preceding limitations. We Another authority was the case of Burchett v. Durdant (47). In that case the same will appears to have come in question, and it is said the matter was three times argued in the Exchequer Chamber, and the third resolution is to the effect that George Durdant took an estate tail by force of the words, "and to such other heirs, male and female, as he (Robert Durdant) should have of his body." This is to the same effect as Pollexfen's argument, and it was affirmed in the House of Lords; and the word "other" could not have the effect of excluding G., who was the heir male previously named. were also referred to a passage in Preston on Estates (vol. ii., p. 506), to shew what his opinion was of the effect of the word "other" in a limitation similar to the present. Preston was of undoubted eminence in his branch of the profession, and of great experience in the drawing of deeds and wills, and a good authority as to the meaning of particular words. The case put by him is of a gift to R. and K., his wife, and their heirs, and to the other heirs of R., if the heirs of R. and K. should die without heirs of themselves. The remark of the writer upon this case is, "That two estates were limited, one by a special entail (that is, to the heirs of the body of R. and K.), the other a fee simple, by the words other heirs of R.," for the donee (donor ?) had declared that the order of succession should, in the first place, be regulated by a reference to the joint heirs of husband and wife, and extend to and include, in a secondary consideration, and under a more remote gift, all the heirs of the husband. Thus the words, "other heirs," include all heirs, and do not exclude the eldest son, though he would come within the previous limitation. We will now recapitulate in this rather complicated case the conclusions upon the various arguments submitted to us, upon which our judgment is founded for the reasons which have already been given First, the words "issue of my body in the penultimate limitation, are to be read in the same sense as "heirs of my body." Secondly, having regard to the context and the whole will, we cannot read the devise to the issue of my body as having the effect which in an ordinary will taken by itself it might have, namely, of giving the estate per capita in joint tenancy among all who came within the class at the time of vesting in possession. Thirdly, the words "all and every do not import that all and every are to take at the same time, but are well satisfied by all taking in succession. Fourthly, the word "other" is not to be read in the strict sense of intending to exclude those coming within the class who have been provided for before and are supposed to have failed; but rather to complete a provision for all the issue so as to make the estates go over by force of the words at the end of the penultimate limitation "in default of such issue," only upon failure of all the issue of the testator. And the result is that by virtue of the penultimate limitation there was at the death of the testator a vested remainder in the heirs of his body in tail general, to which the second baronet then became entitled; that this remainder descended to the third baronet, the grandson; and that as he was also tenant for life in possession he was qualified to execute a disentailing deed so as to acquire the absolute disposition of the property subject to all the estates preceding the penultimate limitation. It is only necessary to add that this estate tail, if suffered to continue until it takes effect in possession, exactly and completely gives effect to the words of the penultimate limitation, because upon failure of all the issue named in the particular limitations, the persons who would take under the penultimate limitation, and the only persons who would take under it, are all and every other the issue of the body of the testator. And this is a great proof of the soundness of the conclusion, notwithstanding the objections made to the mode of arriving at it, which we have already considered. And this conclusion agrees with the recital in the disentailing deed, which was no doubt made upon mature consideration. It was admitted that the disentailing deed was properly executed and effectual in law, if the grandson was qualified to make it. The claim of the plaintiffs-if without the disentailing deed they would have had any claim-is therefore barred, and the defendant who claims under the disentailing deed is entitled to the judgment of the Court. Having come to the conclusion in the first action, that the defendant is upon the facts stated entitled to the property, it follows that in the other actions, as the facts are the same, the defendant is also entitled to judgment. But it seems proper to state the objections to the title set up by the plaintiff's in these actions. In the second action, Roach v. Blake, the plaintiff is Eleanor Ann Roach, the only surviving daughter of Eleanor Ann, who was herself the last surviving child of the second baronet, and the last tenant in tail male under the specific limitations of the will. She was the heir in tail general of the body of the testator at the time when the penultimate limitation took effect in possession. It was contended that she was therefore the person entitled. The argument was that the penultimate limitation was a contingent remainder, that is, contingent as to the person who was to take under it until the happening of the event, and of course the whole argument was based upon the introduction of the word "other," which caused the contingency. In addition to the answer already given, by attributing the proper sense to the word "other," and to another objection, viz., that this reading introduces a contingent remainder after so many limitations, when another reading introduces a vested remainder (always so much preferred because it enables the property to be dealt with)-in addition to these objections another objection is that though this reading provides one of the issue to take when the event happens, it makes no provision for the succession of all and every the other issue. And accordingly Mandeville's case (22) was relied on, and it was contended that all and every the other issue might succeed as upon a sup posed entail or quasi entail in the testator to himself and the other heirs of his body (excluding certain lines of descent which would include the real heirs of his body). Cases of limited entail were put, such as the entail upon the Electress Sophia of Hanover, and the heirs of her body being Protestants, or upon a man and the heirs of his body tenants of the manor of Dale. It is unnecessary to enlarge upon the obvious distinction between such cases (where a condition is imposed upon a person who is the real heir of the body), and the present. Such a distinction might be of importance in the case of a grant or devise to the ancestor as well as to the heirs of his body. But we should certainly not extend Mandeville's case (22) to such remote and contingent interests as we are now considering or suffer the testator to be quasi tenant in tail of au estate descendable, not to the heirs of his body, but to some person who might, at a remote period and upon the happening of a certain event, fill the character of heir of his body, and upon the failure of his issue to some other heir of the body not easily ascertained. In the case put, the heir of the body who took as by descent would take an entirely different estate from that of the ancestor from whom he is supposed to inherit. In the third action, Clennell v. Blake, the claimant is Percival Fenwick Clennell. His mother was the survivor of all the issue of the testator living at his death (other than those included in the particular limitation), and he claims either the entirety as the survivor of the issue living at the death, or his share in case the other issue are allowed to come in. His case as regards the claim to the entirety differs from the first case only in this, that he insists the distribution ought to be made among the issue at the death of the testator, and as to the share claimed his case is the same as the first. same objections apply quite as strongly. Distribution among the issue per capita is equally against the language and intent of the will, whether finally made at the death of the testator, or modified by the introduction of other issue. The In the fourth case, Reed v. Blake, the claimant is Francis Reed, and he claims the entirety as heir in tail of the testator at his death, all those being excluded who came within the particular limitation. He relies upon the exclusive effect of the word "other," and the distinction between his case and that of Roach is that he claims as upon a remainder, vested at the death of the testator, whereas in Roach's case the remainder is contingent as to the person to take. The same objections apply as to Roach's case, except that founded upon the construction making the remainder contingent. It provides one person to take under the limitation, but makes no provision for all and every the other issue, except by the eccentric application of Mandeville's Case (22). The following would be one of the consequences of the construction contended for by this plaintiff. If the third baronet (the grandson) had left one child, a daughter, surviving him, that daughter would have clearly been excluded from all the particular limitations. And though upon the extinction of all the male lines she would be the proper representative of the family, she would be excluded by the grandson of her great great aunt, Sarah Reed, whose issue the testator purposely excluded in the enumeration of all who were to take. According to the construction which we put upon the will, the estate would have come to her in a regular course of descent as tenant in tail in the events which have happened. There was a fifth case, Allgood and others v. Blake, mentioned upon the argument, in which the plaintiffs are the same as in the first, and which is only a different action because it is brought in respect of other property. In that case also judgment will be for the defendant. BRAMWELL, B.-I concur that our judgment should be for the defendant, and I agree in all the reasoning of the judgment that has been delivered, except in the dealing with the word "other " in the penultimate clause. I think the testator did not intend and has not expressed the intention that any of the issue of his body before named should take an additional estate to that he had already given them. I do not think he had so improbable a thing in view. I think he meant, that for default of such issue as named, the daughters of the sons of his eldest grandson, on their default the daughters of his eldest grandson, then the daughters of the sons of his second grandson, then the daughters of his second grandson, then in the same way as to the third, fourth and other grandsons, then the daughters of granddaughters should take in succession as purchasers, and so on according to heirship to him. This would give the estate to Mrs. Roach. But this intention is not expressed sufficiently to be carried into execution, and the only way to accomplish the testator's general or governing intent to provide for the issue of his body is to construe the will as proposed in the judgment delivered by my brother Cleasby. I therefore concur in that judgment, and the more readily for this reason, that if the penultimate clause be not interpreted as proposed, it is unmeaning, in which case also the defendant is entitled to judgment. Judgment for the defendant. and to construct thereon seven railways, which, when completed, were to be called the East London Railway. Section 128 enacted that if and while the defendants were possessed under this Act "of any lands assessed or liable to be assessed to any sewers rate, consolidated rate, poor-rate, church-rate, or other parochial or ward rate, they shall from time to time, until the railway or the works thereof are completed and assessed or liable to be assessed, be liable to make good the deficiency in the assessment for such rates by reason of those lands being taken or used for the purposes of the railway or works." The defendants took for the purposes of the Act lands in R. parish assessed to purochial rates, and completed therem all that portion of railway No. 1 which lay within R. parish, and also the stations thereof. They were constructing, but had not completed, the rest of railway No. 1. This completed portion they had let to the B. Company, who had opened it for traffic, and now occupied and worked it as a railway. The defendants had also taken lands in other parishes, whereon they had completed railway No. 4, and were constructing, but had not completed, the remaining five railways :-Held, per WILLES, J., KEATING, J., LUSH, J., and BRETT, J., reversing the judgment of the Court of Exchequer (40 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) M.C. 123), that the liability to make good the deficiency did not cease until the whole of the railway and works authorised by the Special Act was completed. Contra, per BLACKBURN, J., and MELLOR, J., that as soon as that portion of railway No. 1 which lay within R. parish was completed and worked as a railway, it became liable to be assessed," and the defendants ceased as to that portion to be liable to make good the deficiency in the rates under section 128. [For the report of the above case, see the volume for 1873-42 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Magistrates' Cases.] 1872. June 21, 26. { THE COMPANY OF PROPRIE- Water Company— Water-rate varying according to "Rent" of Houses-Poorrates, District Rates, and Water-rates when paid by Landlord to be deducted from Rent -Annual Value. The plaintiffs were required by their Special Act to furnish water to every inhabitant occupying a house within a certain district, at a rate which varied according to the amount of the "rent" of such house per annum. The defendant was the owner of many such houses, which he let to tenants for various terms not exceeding three months. In respect of some of the houses the defendant paid the poor-rates, district rates, and water-rates, instead of the tenants, either because he had let the houses on those terms, or because the obligation was imposed on him by statute:-Held, that in calculating the water-rate the payments made by the defendant in either case must be deducted from the rents at which the houses were let. Action to recover 311. for water-rates. The defendant paid into Court 24l. 10s., and the cause was afterwards turned by consent into a SPECIAL CASE, the material parts of which are as follows. The plaintiffs (hereinafter called the Company) were incorporated in 1830 by 11 Geo. iv. c. lv. In 1845, by 8 & 9 Vict. c. clxxv., further powers were given to the Company. In 1853, by 16 Vict. c. xxii., the Acts of 1830 and 1845 were repealed, subject to the provisions contained in the Act of 1853, and by s. 6 the Company was re-incorporated as from the passing of the Act of 1830. The Act of 1853 also contained the following provisions : Sect. 3. "That the Companies Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, and the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1845, and The Water Works Clauses Act, 1847, except section 54 of the last mentioned Act, and save so far as any of the clauses in any of the said Acts may be expressly varied or excepted by this Act, shall be and the same are hereby incorporated with this Act." Sect. 9. "That notwithstanding the repeal of the respective recited Acts the several clauses and provisions whatsoever in favour of the Company respectively contained in any Act or Acts (other than the said recited Acts respectively), and which immediately before the passing of this Act are in force, shall continue and be in full force accordingly, and the Company and their directors, officers and servants may and shall, accordingly and for the purposes of this Act, be entitled to and have, exercise and enjoy under or by virtue of those clauses and provisions respectively all such rights, interests, powers, authorities and privileges whatsoever as if this Act had not passed." Sect. 79. "That the Company shall and they are hereby required to furnish a sufficient supply of water to every inhabitant occupying a private dwelling-house or part of a dwelling-house in any square, street, close or lane of the town and borough of Sheffield aforesaid, and in any other place or places within the limits of this Act where the pipes of the Company are now or hereafter shall be laid for the use of his or her family at the following rate per annum (that is to say). "Where the rent of such dwelling-house or part of a dwelling-house shall not amount to 77. per annum, at a rate not exceeding 61. per centum per annum on such rent, but not in any such case to exceed the sum of 7s. 2d. per annum. "Where such rent shall amount to 71. but not to 81. per annum, at a rate not exceeding 8s. per annum.' The section then provided the scale of rates for rents between 87. and 1007. per annum, and concluded thus "Where such rent shall amount to 100%. or upwards per annum, at a rate not exceeding 31. per cent. per annum on such rent: "Provided, nevertheless, that the company shall not be entitled to receive from any such inhabitant more than the sum of 67. in any one year for such supply, nor shall such company be obliged to furnish such supply to any inhabitant for less than 78. 2d. in any one year, unless they shall think fit so to do." Sect. 80. "That in cases where the landlord or owner of a number of houses let at rents not exceeding 71. a year re 2 H |