Ignorance and Imagination : The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of ConsciousnessOxford University Press, USA, 1. mai 2006 - 262 pages Ignorance and Imagination advances a novel way to resolve the central philosophical problem about the mind: how it is that consciousness or experience fits into a larger naturalistic picture of the world. The correct response to the problem, Stoljar argues, is not to posit a realm of experience distinct from the physical, nor to deny the reality of phenomenal experience, nor even to rethink our understanding of consciousness and the language we use to talk about it. Instead, we should view the problem itself as a consequence of our ignorance of the relevant physical facts. Stoljar shows that this change of orientation is well motivated historically, empirically, and philosophically, and that it has none of the side effects it is sometimes thought to have. The result is a philosophical perspective on the mind that has a number of far-reaching consequences: for consciousness studies, for our place in nature, and for the way we think about the relationship between philosophy and science. |
Common terms and phrases
appear argue basic behaviorism c-fibers categorical argument Chalmers chapter claim cognitive closure conceivability argument conclusion conscious experience consciousness consider contingent contrast course David Chalmers Descartes discussion distinction eliminativism emergentism empirical problem epistemic view example experiential conditional experiential supervenience experiential truths false follows further fact view hypothesis is true idea identical ignorance hypothesis imagine implausible inconceivability intentionalism issue knowledge argument Kripke Kripke’s logical problem machine argument manifest supervenience mind-body problem mistaken modal arguments mode confusion moths nature nonexperiential truths notion objectivity argument pain argument panpsychism particular phenomenal character phenomenal conception philosophical problems philosophy of mind physical objects physical truths plausible possible posteriori entailment view premise primitivism primitivist priori entailment view problem of experience proponent proposition confusion psychological qualia question reason relation response revelation Russellian view sense skepticism slugs sort standard mistakes structure and dynamics suggestion suppose thesis things type of truth u-revelation understand
Popular passages
Page 99 - ... the passage from the current to the needle, if not demonstrable, is thinkable, and that we entertain no doubt as to the final mechanical solution of the problem. But the passage from the physics of the brain to the corresponding facts of consciousness is unthinkable. Granted that a definite thought, and a definite molecular action in the brain occur simultaneously ; we do not possess the intellectual organ, nor apparently any rudiment of the organ, which would enable us to pass, by a process...
Page 18 - No doubt it occurs in countless forms totally unimaginable to us, on other planets in other solar systems throughout the universe. But no matter how the form may vary, the fact that an organism has conscious experience at all means, basically, that there is something it is like to be that organism.
Page 37 - She knows all the physical facts about us and our environment, in a wide sense of 'physical' which includes everything in completed physics, chemistry, and neurophysiology, and all there is to know about the causal and relational facts consequent upon all this, including of course functional roles. If physicalism is true, she knows all there is to know. For to suppose otherwise is to suppose that there is more to know than every physical fact, and that is just what physicalism denies.
Page 87 - Certain matters of sheer complexity defeat us - there are an awful lot of neurons - but in principle we have it all. But consider the antecedent probability that everything in the Universe be of a kind that is relevant in some way or other to the survival of homo sapiens. It is very low surely. But then one must admit that it is very likely...
Page 123 - For we can certainly conceive of a machine so constructed that it utters words, and even utters words which correspond to bodily actions causing a change in its organs (eg if you touch it in one spot it asks what you want of it, if you touch it in another it cries out that you are hurting it, and so on).
Page 88 - ... an unduly pessimistic view of our capacity to articulate a truly comprehensive picture of our world and our place in it. But suppose we discovered living on the bottom of the deepest oceans a sort of sea slug which manifested intelligence. Perhaps survival in the conditions required rational powers. Despite their intelligence, these sea slugs have only a very restricted conception of the world by comparison with ours, the explanation for this being the nature of their immediate environment. Nevertheless...
Page 69 - All men are mortal, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal, the subject and predicate of the major premiss are connotative terms, denoting objects and connoting attributes.
Page 124 - But it is not conceivable that such a machine should produce different arrangements of words so as to give an appropriately meaningful answer to whatever is said in its presence, as the dullest of men can do.
Page 60 - ... wave packet, or what have you. You may have been convinced that the full causal story of how the deeds of mind are accomplished involves the causal interactions not only of material bodies but also of astral bodies; not only the vibrations of the electromagnetic field but also the good or bad vibes of the psionic field; not only protoplasm but ectoplasm. I doubt it, but never mind. It's irrelevant to our topic. The Knowledge Argument is targeted against you no less than it is against Materialism...
Page 141 - The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.