ACCIDENTAL DEATH. See Damages. Negligence.

ACTION--for costs given by statute on indictment for
libel]-An action lies to recover the costs on an
indictment for libel given by 6 & 7 Vict. c.
96. s. 8. Richardson v. Willis (No. 2), Exch., 68

When maintainable generally. See Banker
and Banking Company. Bankruptcy. Damages.
Master and Servant. Medical Act. Negligence.
Vendor and Purchaser. Watercourse.

brought without authority. See Staying
Proceedings.

ADMIRALTY COURT-Jurisdiction of. See Prohi-
bition.

ADULTERATION OF FOOD-Proof that article was
represented to be unadulterated. Guilty know-
ledge. Fitzpatrick v. Kelly (M.C., 132), Q.B.,

243

ALEHOUSE Sale of intoxicating liquors on Sunday
to bona fide travellers. Onus of proof under
Licensing Act, 1872. Roberts v. Humphreys
(M.C., 147), Q.B., 233

License for sale of exciseable liquors. Ap-
plication to special sessions after unsuccessful
application to general sessions. Neglect to ap-
peal. New tenant. R. v. Taylor (M.C., 13),
Q.B., 244

Beerhouse having a license on May 1, 1869.
Wine and Beerhouse Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict.
c. 27), s. 19. Discretion of justices to refuse
certificate. R. v. Curzon (M.C., 155), Q.B., 243

Alehouse license. Annual value. Improve-
ment of premises. Illegal condition in license.
NEW SERIES, 42.-INDEX, Com. Law.

Certiorari. "The Review of Justices Decisions
Act, 1872." R. v. Justices of Exeter (M.C., 35),
Q.B., 56

Repeal of sections giving appeal to Quarter
Sessions. Wine and Beerhouse Act, 1869.
Alehouse Act. R. v. Smith. (M.C., 46); Q.B.,
74

AMENDMENT of order of justices. R. v. Tomlin-
son (M.C., 1), Q.B., 12

altering defendant's name in writ of sum-
mons]-Plaintiff having sued a local board in
their clerk's name instead of their own, the
writ of summons was held to be amendable by
substituting the name of the clerk for that of
the board. Bolingbroke v Townsend, C.P., 255

of description of plaintiff in County Court
plaint: action by local authority of county
to recover expenses under Contagious Diseases
(Animals) Act, 1869]-By the Contagious Dis-
eases (Animals) Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 70),
s. 57, the local authority constituted by the Act
may exercise compulsory powers with regard to
horses and other animals, "and the local autho-
rity may recover the expenses of the execution
by them of this section from the owner of the
horse or animal:"-Held, that in proceed-
ings in the County Court to recover such ex-
penses, where the plaintiff was described as
"J. M., the inspector appointed by the local
authority for the county of H. under the Contagi-
ous Diseases (Animals) Act, 1869," first, that the
County Court Judge might, without defendant's
consent, amend the plaint by substituting the
proper description of the party suing; secondly,
that the plaint was rightly amended by describ-
ing the action as brought by "The Local Autho-
rity for the county of H.," as s. 57 enabled the

A

local authority to sue for the expenses under
that description, although they were not a cor-
poration. Mills v. Scott, Q.B., 234

ANNUITY-Irrevocable grant of. See Corporation.
APOTHECARY. See Medical Act.

APPEAL from County Court: refusal to sign case:
memorandum of deposit not given to registrar or
signed by the party]-At the hearing of a plaint
before a County Court Judge he nonsuited the
plaintiff, who gave due notice of appeal and de-
posited the amount fixed by the registrar who
gave a receipt for it to the plaintiff, stating it to
be received to abide the event of the appeal.
The parties could not agree on a statement of
facts, and the plaintiff applied to the Judge to
settle and sign the case, but the Judge refused
on the ground that no memorandum of the de-
posit with the conditions on which it was de-
posited was approved by the registrar, left with
him and signed by the party or his attorney in
accordance with 19 & 20 Vict. c. 208. s. 71:-
Held, that the statute had been substantially
complied with, and upon the authority of
Griffin v. Colman (28 Law J. Rep. Ex. 134),
that the giving of such memorandum was not
a condition precedent to the right to appeal.
Walters v. Coghlan, Q.B., 20

- from Lord Mayor's Court: leave to appeal]—
The Lord Mayor's Court Act, 20 & 21 Vict. c.
clvii. ss. 8, 10, provides that in certain cases a
party may appeal, if he give notice within two
days of the decision, and give security; and
that, "if upon the trial" the Judge gives him
leave to move in a Superior Court, he may
move within the time limited for like motions
in such Court. At the conclusion, on a Thurs-
day, of a trial in the Lord Mayor's Court, the
Judge refused to give the plaintiff, who was
nonsuited, leave to move, but on the ensuing
Monday on application made to him granted
such leave:-Held, by the majority of the
Court (BOVILL, C.J., KEATING, J., and GROVE,
J.), that he had no power to do so, because, even
if there had been no refusal (which per BoVILL,
C.J., determined the time), the leave must be
given within a reasonable time, and that would
be two days; but per BRETT, J., four days is a
reasonable time, and the refusal did not curtail
it. Folkard v. Metropolitan Rail. Co., C.P., 162

to Exchequer Chamber: verdict against evi-
dence] Upon an appeal to the Exchequer
Chamber from a decision of the Court below,
making absolute a rule for a new trial, the
respondent cannot support that decision on the
ground that the verdict was against the weight
of evidence; for under the Common Law Pro-
cedure Act, 1854, the Court of Appeal has no
jurisdiction to entertain that question in any
form. Morrison v. The Universal Marine
Insur. Co. (Ex. Ch.), Ex., 115

time for giving notice of appeal to Judge of
County Court. See Limitations, Statute of.
ARBITRATION—liability of arbitrator for want of
care or skill: average adjuster-Where parties,
in order to ascertain average contribution in
dispute, agree that an average adjuster for
reward shall ascertain and adjust the amount
and agree to abide by his decision, such average
adjuster, having given his decision, is not liable
to an action for carelessness, negligence and
unskilfulness, if he has acted in good faith.
The Tharsis Sulphur and Copper Co. (lim.) v.
Loftus, C.P., 6

ARREST—of fugitive criminal. See Extradition
Act.

ATTACHMENT. See Attorney and Solicitor.

ATTACHMENT OF DEBT-garnishee order: rule of
court]-After a rule has been discharged with
costs, the person in whose favour the rule has been
discharged cannot obtain a garnishee order under
the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, ss. 60, 61;
the Act 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110. s. 18, giving to rules of
the Courts of Common Law the effect of judg-
ments for the purposes of the Act, but not actually
making them judgments. The Sunderland Local
Marine Board v. Frankland, Q.B., 13

interpleader order for payment of costs:
garnishee]-An order for the payment of
costs, made in pursuance of 1 & 2 Will. 4.
c. 58, which, by s. 7, may be entered of
record, and shall then have the force and
effect of a judgment, does not become a judg-
ment so as to enable the person in whose
favour it is made, to obtain the benefit of the
garnishee clauses of the Common Law Proce-
dure Act, 1854. Best v. Pembroke, Q.B., 212

-bankrupt's money]-The surplus money due
to a bankrupt out of his estate after payment of
20s. in the pound to the creditors under the
bankruptcy, is not a "debt" due to the bankrupt
from the official assignee (though the bankrupt's
estate remains vested in him) which can be at-
tached under the garnishee clauses of the Com-
mon Law Procedure Act, 1854, by a judgment
creditor of the bankrupt. Hunter v. Greensill ;
Fitzgerald v. same, C.P., 55

See Foreign Attachment. Prohibition.
ATTORNEY AND SOLICITOR attachment: rule
for payment of money]-The Court will
refuse to grant an attachment against an
attorney for disobeying a rule of Court
ordering him to pay money, unless special
circumstances be shewn, as the remedy for such
disobedience is by execution under 1 & 2 Vict.
c. 110. s. 18. In re Ball, C.P., 104

suspension of by superior courts]-When
another superior Court has made an order to

suspend an attorney for misconduct, this Court will grant a rule nisi for a similar suspension, upon proof of all the materials used before the other Court, of the judgment delivered, and order made by such other Court, and of the identity of the attorney. This rule nisi will make itself absolute unless cause be shewn

within the time prescribed therein. In re Turner, Ex., 63

AUCTION-goods withdrawn from sale: liability of auctioneer: indemnity]-Defendant advertised in newspapers that a sale by auction would take place on a particular day in a country town. He also circulated catalogues specifying the articles to be sold. Plaintiff attended the sale intending to buy certain articles specified in the catalogue, but on the day of sale they were withdrawn by defendant:-Held, that there was no implied contract by defendant to indemnify plaintiff against the expense and inconvenience which he had incurred. v. Nickerson, Q.B., 171

ALLOT ACT. See Municipal Election.

Harris

BANKER AND BANKING COMPANY - misrepresentation by manager: credit of customer: joint liability of bank and manager: signature of agent] Plaintiff, a customer of the S. & H. Bank, was asked to sell some iron of the value of 2,000l. or 3,000l. to R.; he required a reference as to the credit of R., and was referred to the C, branch of the G. Banking Company. At his request the manager of the S. and H. Bank wrote to the manager of the C. branch of the G. Banking Company, of which one of the defendants was a public officer-"I shall be much obliged by the favour of your opinion, in confidence, of the respectability and standing of Sir W. Russell, and whether you consider him responsible to the extent of 50,000l." Defendant Goddard, who was the manager of the C. branch, wrote in answer-" I am in receipt of your favour of the 8th instant, and beg to say, in reply, that Sir William Russell is the Lord of the Manor of Charlton Kings, near this town, with a rent roll, I am told, of over 7,000l. per annum, the receipt of which is in his own hands, and has large expectancies, and I do not believe he would incur the liability you name, unless he was certain to meet the engagement." The representation contained in the last-mentioned letter was false, to the knowledge of the defendant Goddard, who, in writing it, acted within the scope of the general authority conferred upon him as manager of the branch, but the banking company had no knowledge otherwise than through Goddard, that such a letter had been written, nor did they give him any express authority to write the particular letter. The G. Banking Company was a co-partnership, formed under 7 Geo. 4. c. 46:-Held, that the signature of defendant Goddard was, under the circum

stances, a signature not of an agent merely, but of the banking company, and therefore "of the party to be charged therewith," within the 6th section of 9 Geo. 4. c. 14. Held, also, that the communication contained in the letter was not that of the defendant Goddard personally, but of the banking company; that plaintiff being a customer of the S. and H. bank was entitled to maintain an action in respect of the misrepresentation made in the letter written by Goddard; that the banking company was liable for the fraudulent representations of its manager made in the course of conducting the business of the company; and that Goddard the manager and the banking company were both liable to be sued jointly. Swift v. Winterbotham, Q.B.,

111

accounts at separate branches of bank: setoff-In the absence of any special contract or arrangement, there is no obligation on a banking company to honour the cheque of a customer presented at one of their branch offices where he has a balance standing to his credit, when he has overdrawn his account at another branch office to an amount greater than such balance, so that the company are in fact not indebted to him. Garnet v. M'Kewan, p.o., Ex., 1

BANKRUPTCY-bill given for debt discharged by bankruptcy]-No action can be maintained on a bill accepted in consideration only of a debt discharged by a bankruptcy or arrangement under the Bankruptcy Act, 1861, although such bill was given after the repeal of that Act by the Bankruptcy Repeal Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 83). Rimini v. B. Van Praagh, Q.B., 1

-jurisdiction of county court]-Where a petition in bankruptcy is preferred under 32 & 33 Vict. c. 71 in a County Court against a person as residing within its district, and he is adjudicated bankrupt thereon, such adjudication not being rescinded or appealed against is final and conclusive, though it turns out that he traded within the London district; and the trustee in bankruptcy is entitled to the proceeds of an execution on such trader's goods which are retained in the sheriff's hands under section 87, due notice of the petition having been given under that section, as it is not necessary that the adjudication should be against such person as a trader, and it is sufficient if there be an adjudication against him and he be in fact a trader. Revell v. Blake (Ex. Ch.), C.P.,

165

extraordinary resolution of creditors: composition payable by instalments: security to be given]-In accordance with the provisions of s. 126 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, an extraordinary resolution was passed by the proper majority in number and value of the creditors of the defendant, a debtor, that a composition

should be accepted, payable by three instal-
ments, and that the second and third instal-
ments should be secured by the promissory
notes of the defendant and a third person :-
Held, in an action by a creditor who did not
attend or vote on the resolution, that such resolu-
tion, although duly passed and registered, did
not constitute any defence, there being no proof
that the defendant had paid or tendered the
two instalments which had become due before
action, or that he had delivered the promissory
notes. Goldney v. Lording, Q.B., 103

-

BANKRUPTCY (continued) resolution for com-
position pleadable in bar to action for debt
before default in payment of composition]-
If, after an extraordinary resolution to accept
a composition payable at a future time or by
instalments, in satisfaction of the debts due
to creditors by their debtors, has been duly
passed, confirmed and registered under sec-
tion 126 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, a
creditor who is bound by the resolution sues
for his original debt before default in payment
of the composition, or of any instalment, the
resolution is pleadable in bar of the action. Slater
v. Jones; and Capes v. Ball, Ex., 122

declaration of inability to pay: when filing
complete]--A declaration of a debtor's inability
to pay his debts is filed within the meaning of
the Bankruptcy Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c.
71), s. 6. subs. 4, so as to constitute an act of
bankruptcy, when it is delivered to the proper
officer at the proper office for that purpose
with the intention that it should be filed.
Ransford v. Maule, C.P., 231

act of bankruptcy: pledge of trader's whole
property to secure previously contracted debt to
reditor in possession with lien]-Traders ver-
bally pledged their goods, which formed sub-
stantially the whole of their property, as security
for a previously contracted debt, to a creditor,
who already had possession of the goods and a
lien on them for money advanced. The debtors
were in fact insolvent, but the jury found that
the transaction was entirely bona fide :-Held,
that the pledge was not "a fraudulent convey-
ance, gift, delivery, or transfer," within the
Bankruptcy Act, 1869, section 6, sub-section 2.
Philps v. Hornstedt, Ex., 12

See Attachment of Debt.

BARON AND FEME. See Husband and Wife.

BASTARDY-Evidence after death of mother. Hear-
ing at petty sessions. R. v. Armitage (M.C., 15),
Q.B., 244

BILL OF EXCHANGE-alteration of date: evidence
of alteration under plea of non-acceptance]—
Where plaintiff sues on a bill of exchange pay-
able after date, and the date of the bill pro-

duced corresponds with the date stated in the
declaration, defendant may, under a plea tra-
versing the acceptance, prove that when he
accepted the bill it bore a different date, and
that the alteration was made without his know-
ledge and after the bill had been put into
circulation. Hirschmann v. Budd, Ex., 113

leave to appear: defence in abatement] —
Where a writ is issued under "The Summary
Procedure on Bills of Exchange Act, 1855," a
defence in abatement that the defendant was
joint acceptor of the bill of exchange with
another, is a legal defence entitling him to leave
to appear under section 2. Casella v. Darton,
C.P., 58

consideration. See Bankruptcy.

BILL OF LADING-" value, weight, and contents un-
known"]-Where, on a closed package being
shipped for carriage, a bill of lading, containing
an innocent misdescription of its contents is pre-
sented to the master of the ship, and he, without
asking questions or examination, stamps thereon
"weight, value and contents unknown," there is
a contract to carry the package whatever its
contents may be. What is the measure of damages
for loss of the contents seems doubtful. Lebeau
v. The General Steam Navigation Co., C.P., 1

goods carried under bill of lading: lien for
freight although goods landed: when costs of
defending an action recoverable] - Defendant
shipped goods on board a vessel, chartered by
plaintiffs on a voyage to a foreign port, under
a bill of lading, which stated that the goods
were to be landed at the expense and risk of
the consignee. On the arrival at the port of des-
tination there was no consignee ready to receive
the goods, and the vessel was thereby detained
there for a considerable time. An action for
unliquidated damages for such detention was
brought against plaintiffs by the owners of the
vessel, and plaintiffs defended the action, after
giving notice thereof to defendants, who re-
fused to have anything to do with it. Plaintiffs
afterwards sought to recover from defendants
not only the sum awarded in that action for
such detention, but also the cost incurred in de-
fending it. At the trial the judge left it to the
jury to say whether it was reasonable in the
present plaintiffs to have defended that action,
and whether they defended it in a reasonable
way. The judge also told the jury that the
captain would lose his lien for freight by land-
ing the goods, as it did not appear that there
was any warehouse at such foreign port similar
to those under the English warehousing statutes.
The jury having found for plaintiffs for the
amount claimed,-Held, that the question was
rightly left to the jury as to the liability of the
defendants to the costs of the action brought
against the plaintiffs. Also, that the direction
of the judge that the captain could not land
the goods without losing his lien for freight was

wrong, as being too general in its terms, since he might land them and yet preserve his lien for freight if he kept them entirely within his own exclusive control. Mors le Blanch v. Wilson, C.P., 70

Quare-whether the captain would not lose such lien if the goods when landed were placed in the hands of an independent person, who would have a lien on his own behalf, even though he should undertake to the captain not to deliver the goods to the consignee without being paid the claim for freight. Ibid.

66

freight: delivery of damaged cargo: invoice quantity as per bill of lading: "quantity and quality unknown"]-A charterparty, under which a ship was chartered for a grain cargo from the Danube to the United Kingdom for certain freight per imperial quarter delivered," contained a provision that in the event of the cargo, or any part thereof, being delivered in a damaged or heated condition, the freight should be payable on the invoice quantity taken on board, as per bill of lading, or half-freight upon the damaged or heated portion, at the captain's option. The bill of lading stated that 1,021 kilos. were shipped on board; but the master added at the end of the bill of lading, before signing it, the words, "quantity and quality unknown." The cargo having become heated on the voyage, the master claimed to exercise his option, and to be paid freight upon the invoice quantity, as per bill of lading:-Held, that the addition of the words "quantity and quality unknown the bill of lading by the master did not take away his right to be paid freight upon the invoiced quantity in the bill of lading, and that the object and effect of that memorandum was merely to protect the captain against any mistake that might occur in the invoice quantity in the bill of lading, in case of alleged short delivery or deterioration not caused by his default.

Tully v. Terry, C.P., 240

to

BILL OF SALE-successive bills of which the last is alone registered-Where a bill of sale is given for good consideration, but not registered, and before the expiration of the time for registration it is annulled, and a similar bill of sale given which also is not registered, and, after this process has been repeated several times, at last a bill of sale is duly registered, such last bill of sale is valid against execution creditors if made bona fide with the intention of passing the property comprised in it. Smale v. Burr, C.P., 20

BOND. See Payment into Court.

BREAD-sale of otherwise than by weight. Aerated Bread Co. v. Grigg, M.C., 117; Q.B., 192

BURIAL FEES-right of incumbent: "new parish"] -In 1851, the church of St. T. was built and consecrated. In 1852, an order in council under 59 Geo. 3. c. 134. s. 16, authorised services to be performed in the new church, assigned a district to it out of the ancient parish of W., in which it was situated, and granted the incumbent the fees. There was then no burial ground in the district, and the persons dying in it continued to be buried as before in the churchyard of the parish. The plaintiff was appointed incumbent of this church in 1854, and in 1856, a burial ground for the whole parish was consecrated, the district of the new church contributing to the rates for providing it. A new rector of the parish was appointed in 1864-Held, by the Exchequer Chamber, affirming the judgment of the Queen's Bench, that the district of St. T. was a "new parish within 20 & 21 Vict. c. 81, and that the plaintiff, on the first avoidance of the rectory, was entitled to the burial fees in respect of inhabitants of St. T. buried within the parish. Cronshaw v. The Wigan Burial Board (Ex. Ch.), Q.B., 137

CANAL AND CANAL COMPANY-rights of owner of coal mines under canal: liability of canal company]-In this case the Court of Queen's Bench (HANNEN, J., dissenting), having held that the defendants were not responsible for damage to the mines by water escaping from the canal, as there was no proof of any negligence on their part, or of anything done in excess of their statutory powers,-Held, by the Exchequer Chamber, affirming the decision below (41 Law J. Rep. Q.B. 121), that the action, for the reasons above given, was not maintainable. And semble, per KELLY, C.B., and PIGOTT, B., that plaintiffs were entitled to relief under the compensation clauses of the Canal Acts. Dunn v. The Birmingham Canal Company (Ex. Ch.), Q.B., 34

CARRIERS BY RAILWAY-negligence: cattle: injury caused by restlessness]-The G. N. R. Co. and the defendants agreed that a complete and full system of interchange of traffic should be established from all parts of one company and beyond its limits, to all parts of the other company and beyond its limits, with through tickets, through rates and invoices, and interchange of stock at junctions, the stock of the two companies being treated as one stock. The agreement provided for the division of the traffic. The plaintiff, wishing to send a cow from D. to S., went to the station of the G. N. R. Co. at D. and booked her for S. by the defendants' line. He signed a contract, by which it was agreed that the cow was to be conveyed upon certain conditions, one of which was as follows-"The G. N. R.