aud Meteors, as well as passages in the letters. His optical investigations are perhaps the subject in which he most contributed to the progress of science; and the lucidity of exposition which marks his Dioptrics stands conspicuous even amid the generally luminous style of his works. Its object is a practical one. to determine by scientific considerations the shape of lens best adapted to improve the capabilities of the telescope, which had been invented not long before. The conclusions at which he arrives have not been so useful as he imagined, in consequence of the mechanical difficulties. But the investigation by which he reaches them has the merit of first prominently publishing and establishing the law of the refraction of light. Attempts have been made, principally founded on some jealous remarks of Huyghens, to show that Descartes had learned the principles of refraction from the manuscript of a treatise by Willebrord Snell, but facts do not bear out the charge; and, so far as Descartes founds his optics on any one, it is on the researches of Kepler. In any case the glory of the discovery is to a large extent his own, for his proof of the law is founded upon the theory that light is the tendency or inclination of the subtle particl of ethereal matter to propagate their movement in straight lines from the sun or luminous body to the eye. And thus he approximates to the wave theory of light, though he supposed, like his contemporaries, that the transmission of light was instantaneous. The chief of his other contributions to optics was the explanation of the rainbow—an explanation far from complete, since the unequal refrangibility of the rays of light was yet undiscovered-but a decided advance upon his predecessors, notably on the De radiis visus et lucis (1611) of Marc-Antonio de Dominis, archbishop of Spalato, from whom careless critics have assumed that he derived his ideas.

If Descartes had contented himself with thus explaining the phenomena of gravity, heat, magnetism, light, and similar forces by means of the molecular movements of his vortices, even such a theory would have excited admiration by its daring grandeur. But Descartes did not stop short in the region of what is usually termed physics. Chemistry and biology are alike swallowed up in the one science of physics, and reduced to a problem of mechanism. This theory, he believed, would afford an explanation of every phenomenon whatever, and in nearly every department of knowledge he has given specimens of its power. But the most remarkable and daring application of the theory was to account for the phenomena of organic life, especially in animals and man. "If we possessed a thorough knowledge," he says,1 "of all the parts of the seed of any species of animal (e.g., man), we could from that alone, by reasons entirely mathematical and certain, deduce the whole figure and conformation of each of its members, and, conversely, if we knew several peculiarities of this conformation, we could from these deduce the nature of its seed." The organism in this way is regarded as a machine, constructed from the particles of the seed, which in virtue of the laws of motion have arranged themselves (always under the governing power of God) in the particular animal shape in which we see them. The doctrine of the circulation of the blood, which Descartes adopted from Harvey, supplied additional arguments in favour of his mechanical theory, and he probably did much to popularize the discovery. A fire without light, compared to the heat which gathers in a haystack when the hay has been stored before it was properly dry-heat, in short, as an agitation of the particles-is the motive cause of the contraction and dilatations of the heart. Those finer particles of the blood which become extremely rarefied during this process Eavres, iv. 494,

pass off in two directions-one portion, and the least important in the theory, to the organs of generation, the other portion to the cavities of the brain. There not merely do they serve to nourish the organ, they also give rise to a fine ethereal flame or wind through the action of the brain upon them, and thus form the so-called "animal" spirits. From the brain these spirits are conveyed through the body by means of the nerves, regarded by Descartes as tubular vessels, resembling the pipes conveying the water of a spring to act upon the mechanical appliances in an artificial fountain. The nerves conduct the animal spirits to act upon the muscles, and in their turn convey the im pressions of the organs to the brain.

Man and the animals as thus described are compared to automata, and termed machines. The vegetative and sensitive souls which the Aristotelians had introduced to break the leap between inanimate matter and man aro ruthlessly swept away; only one soul, the rational, remains, and that is restricted to man. One hypothesis supplants the various principles of life; the rule of absolute mechanism is as complete in the animal as in the cosmos. Reason and thought, the essential quality of the soul, do not belong to the brutes; there is an impassable gulf fixed between man and the lower animals. The only sure sign of reason is the power of language-i.e., of giving expression to general ideas; and language in that sense is not found save in man. The cries of animals are but the working of the curiously-contrived machine, in which, when one portion is touched in a certain way, the wheels and springs concealed in the interior perform their work, and, it may be, a note supposed to express joy or pain is evolved; but there is no consciousness or feeling. "The animals act naturally and by springs, like a watch."2 "The greatest of all the prejudices we have retained from our infancy is that of believing that the beasts think."3 If the beasts can properly be said to see at all, "they see as we do when our mind is distracted and keenly applied elsewhere; the images of outward objects paint themselves on the retina, and possibly even the impressions made in the optic nerves determine our limbs to different movements, but we feel nothing of it all, and move as if we were automata."4 I will not believe, said the Cartesian Chanet, that a beast thinks until the beast tells me so itself. The sentience of the animal to the lash of his tyrant is not other than the sensitivity of the plant to the influences of light and heat. It is not much comfort to learn further from Descartes that "he denies life to no animal, but makes it consist in the mere heat of the heart. Nor does he deny them feeling in so far as it depends on the bodily organs."

Descartes, with an unusual fondness for the letter of Scripture, quotes oftener than once in support of this monstrous doctrine the dictum that "The blood is the life;" and he remarks, with some sarcasm possibly, that it is a comfortAnd the doctrine able theory for the eaters of animal flesh. found acceptance among some whom it enabled to get rid of the difficulties raised by Montaigne and those who allowed more difference between animal and animal than It also encouraged between the higher animals and man. vivisection-a practice common with Descartes himself. The recluses of Port Royal seized it eagerly, discussed automatism, dissected living animals in order to show to a morbid curiosity the circulation of the blood, were careless of the cries of tortured dogs, and finally embalmed the doctrine in a syllogism of their logic,-No matter thinks; every soul of beast is matter: therefore no soul of beast thinks.

But whilst all the organic processes in man go on

mechanically, and though by reflex action he may repel attack unconsciously, still the first affirmation of the system was that man was essentially a thinking being; and, while we retain this original dictum. it must not be supposed that the mind is a mere spectator, or like the boatman in the boat. Of course a unity of nature is impossible between mind and body so described. And yet there is a unity of composition, a unity so close that the compound is "really one and in a sense indivisible." You cannot in the actual man cut soul and body asunder; they interpenetrate in every member. But there is one point in the human frame-a point midway in the brain, single and free, which may in a special sense be called the seat of the mind. This is the so-called conarion, or pineal gland, where in a minimized point the mind on one hand and the vital spirits on the other meet and communicate. In that gland the mystery of creation is concentrated; thought meets extension and directs it; extension moves towards thought and is perceived. Two clear and distinct ideas, it seems, produce an absolute mystery. Mind, driven from the field of extension, erects its last fortress in the pineal gland. In such a state of despair and destitution there is no hope for spiritualism, save in God; and Clauberg, Geulincx, and Malebranche all take refuge under the shadow of His wings to escape the tyranny of extended matter.

"It seems

In the psychology of Descartes there are two fundamental modes of thought,-perception and volition. to me," he says, "that in receiving such and such an idea the mind is passive, and that it is active only in volition; that its ideas are put in it partly by the objects which touch the senses, partly by the impressions in the brain, and partly also by the dispositions which have preceded in the mind itself and by the movements of its will." The will therefore, as being more originative, has more to do with true or false judgments than the understanding. Unfortunately, Descartes is too lordly a philosopher to explain distinctly what either understanding or will may mean. But we gather that in two directions our reason is bound up with bodily conditions, which make or mar it, according as the will, or central energy of thought, is true to itself or not. In the range of perception, intellect is subjected to the material conditions of sense, memory, and imagination; and in infancy, when the will has allowed itself to assent precipitately to the conjunctions presented to it by these material processes, thought has become filled with obscure ideas. In the moral sphere the passions or emotions (which Descartes reduces to the six primitive forms of admiration, love, hatred, desire, joy, and sadness) are the perceptions or sentiments of the mind, caused and maintained by some movement of the vital spirits, but specially referring to the mind only. The presentation of some object of dread, for example, to the eye has or may have a double effect. On one hand the animal spirits "reflected "2 from the image formed on the pineal gland proceed through the nervous tubes to make the muscles turn the back and lift the feet. so as to escape the cause of the terror. Such is the reflex and mechanical movement independent of the mind. But, on the other hand, the vital spirits cause a movement in the gland by which the mind perceives the affection of the organs, learns that something is to be loved or hated, admired or shunned. Such perceptions dispose the mind to pursue what nature dictates as useful. But the estimate of goods and evils which they give is indistinct and unsatisfactory. The office of reason is to give a true and distinct appreciation of the values of goods and evils; or firm and determinate judgments touching the knowledge of good and evil are our proper arms against the influence of the passions. We are free, therefore, through knowledge: ex

Œuvres, ix. 166. * l'assions de l'âme, 36. * Passions de l'âme, 48.

magna luce in intellectu sequitur magna propensio in volun tate, and omnis peccans est ignorans. "If we clearly see that what we are doing is wrong, it would be impossible for us to sin, so long as we saw it in that light." Thus the highest liberty, as distinguished from mere indifference, proceeds from clear and distinct knowledge, and such knowledge can only be attained by firmness and resolution, i.e., by the continued exercise of the will. Thus in the perfection of man, as in the nature of God, will and intellect must be united. For thought, will is as necessary as understanding. And innate ideas therefore are mere capacities or tendencies,-possibilities which apart from the will to think may be regarded as nothing at all.

The philosophy of Descartes fought its first battles and gained its first triumphs in the country of his adoption. In his lifetime his views had been taught in Utrecht and Leyden. In the universities of the Netherlands and of Lower Germany, as yet free from the conservatism of the old-established seats of learning, the new system gained an easy victory over Aristotelianism, and, as it was adapted for lectures and examinations, soon became almost as scholastic as the doctrines it had supplanted. At Leyden, taught by De Raey, Heerebord, Heidan, and Volder; at Utrecht, by De Bruyn and P. Burmann, and Lambert Welthuysen (the last a private student); at Groningen, by Maresius, Gousset, and Tobias André; at Franeker, by Ruardas Andala; at Breda, Nimeguen, Harderwyk, Duisburg, and Herborn, and at the Catholic university of Louvain, Cartesianism was warmly expounded and defended in seats of learning, of which many are now left desolate, and by adherents whose lucubrations have for the most part long lost interest for any but the antiquary. The Cartesianism of Holland was a child of the universities, and its literature is mainly composed of commentaries upon the original texts, of theses discussed in the schools, and of systematic expositions of Cartesian philosophy for the benefit of the student. Three names stand out in this Cartesian professoriate,-Wittich, Clauberg, and Geulincx. Wittich (1625-1688), professor at Duisburg and Leyden, is a representative of the moderate followers, who professed to reconcile the doctrines of their school with the faith of Christendom, and to refute the theology of Spinoza. Clauberg (like Wittich, a German), professor of philosophy at Herborn and Duisburg, died while still young in 1665. Like a schoolman on Aristotle, he has, clause by clause, commented upon the Meditations of Descartes; but he specially claims notice for his work De corporis et animæ in homine conjunctio, where he maintains that the bodily movements are merely procatarctic causes (i.e., antecedents, but not strictly causes) of the mental action, and sacrifices the independence of man to the omnipotence of God. The same tendency to absorb all particular causes and movements in God is still more pronounced in Geulincx (1625-1669), who for the last six years of his life taught privately at Leyden. With Geulincx the reciprocal action of mind and body is altogether denied ; they resemble two clocks, so made by the artificer as to strike the same hour together. The mind can only act upon itself; beyond that limit, the power of God must intervene to make any seeming interaction possible between body and soul. Such are the half-hearted attempts at consistency in Cartesian thought, which eventually culminate in the pantheism of Spinoza.

Descartes occasionally had not scrupled to interpret the Scriptures according to his own tenets, while still maintaining, when their letter contradicted bim, that the Bible was not meant to teach the sciences. Similar tendencies are found amongst his followers. Whilst Protestant

4 Œuvres, ix. 170,

opponents put him in the list of atheists like Vanini. and the Catholics held him as dangerous as Luther or Calvin. there were zealous adherents who ventured to prove the theory of vortices in harmony with the book of Genesis. It was this rationalistic treatment of the sacred writings which helped to confound the Cartesians with the allegorical school of John Cocceius. as their liberal doctrines in theology justified the vulgar identification of them with the heresies of Socinian and Arminian. The chief names in this advanced theology connected with Cartesian doctrines are Meyer, the friend and editor of Spinoza, author of a work termed Philosophia Scripturæ Interpres (1666); Balthasar Bekker. whose World Bewitched helped to discredit the superstitious fancies about the devil; and Spinoza, whose Tractatus Theologico-Politicus is in some respects the classical type of rational criticism up to the present day. Against this work and the Ethics of Spinoza the orthodox Cartesians (who were in the majority), no less than sceptical hangers-on like Bayle, raised an all but universal howl of reprobation, scarcely broker for about a century.

In France Cartesianism won society and literature before it penetrated into the universities. Clerselier (the friend of Descartes and his literary executor), his son-in-law Rohault (who achieved that relationship through his Cartesianism), and others, opened their houses for readings to which the intellectual world of Paris-its learned professors not more than the courtiers and the fair sex,flucked to hear the new doctrines explained, and possibly discuss their value. Grand seigneurs, like the prince of Condé, the Duc de Nevers, and the Marquis de Vardes, were glad to vary the monotony of their feudal castles by listening to the eloquent rehearsals of Malebranche or Regis. And the salons of Madame de Sevigné, of her daughter Mme. de Grignan, and of the Duchesse de Maine for a while gave the questions of philosophy a place among the topics of polite society, and furnished to Molière the occasion of his Femmes Savantes. The château of the Duc de Luynes, the translator of the Meditations, was the home of a Cartesian club, that discussed the questions of automatism and of the composition of the sun from filings and parings, and rivalled Port Royal in its vivisections. The Cardinal de Retz in his leisurely age at Commercy found amusement in presiding at disputations between the more moderate Cartesians and Don Robert Desgabets, who interpreted Descartes in an original way of his own. Though rejected by the Jesuits, who found peripatetic formulæ a faithful weapon against the enemies of the church, Cartesianism was warmly adopted by the Oratory, which saw in Descartes something of St Augustine, by Port Royal, which discovered a connection between the new system and Jansenism, and by some amongst the Benedictines and the order of Ste Geneviève.

The popularity which Cartesianism thus gained in the social and literary circles of the capital was largely increased by the labours of Pierre-Sylvain Regis (1632-1707). On his visit to Toulouse in 1665, with a mission from the Cartesian chiefs, his lectures excited boundless interest; ladies threw themselves with zeal and ability into the study of philosophy; and Regis himself, like a public benefactor in some old Greek town, was made the guest of the civic corporation. In 1671 scarcely less enthusiasm was aroused in Montpellier; and.in 1680 he opened a course of lectures at Paris, with such acceptance that intending hearers had to secure their seats some time before the lecture began. Regis, by removing the paradoxes and adjusting the metaphysics to the popular powers of apprehension, made Cartesianism popular, and reduced it to a regular system.

But a check was at hand. Descartes, in his correspondence with the Jesuits, had shown an almost cringing eagerness to have their powerful organization on his side

Especially he had written to Père Mesland. one of the order. to show how the Catholic doctrine of the eucharist might be made compatible with his theories of matter. But his undue haste to arrange matters with the church only served to compromise him more deeply. Unwise admirers and malicious opponents exaggerated the theologi| cal bearings of his system in this detail: aud the efforts of the Jesuits succeeded in getting the works of Descartes, in November 1663. placed upon the Index of prohibited books,-donec corrigantur. Thereupon the power of church and state enforced by positive enactments the passive resistance of old institutions to the novel theories. In 1667, the oration at the interment was forbidden by royal order. In 1669, when the chair of philosophy at the Collége Royal fell vacant, one of the four selected candidates had to sustain a thesis against "the pretended new philosophy of Descartes." In 1671 the archbishop of Paris, by the king's order, summoned the heads of the university to his presence, and enjoined them take stricter measures against philosophical noveltie. dangerous to the faith. In 1673 a decree of the Parliament against Cartesian and other unlicensed theories was on the point of being issued, and was only checked in time by the appearance of a burlesque mandamus against the intruder Reason, composed by Boileau and some of his brother-poets. Yet in 1675 the university of Angers was empowered to repress all Cartesian teaching within its domain, and actually appointed a commission charged to look for such heresies in the theses and the students' note-books of the college of Anjou belonging to the Oratory. In 1677 the university of Caen adopted not less stringent measures against Cartesianism. And so great was the influence of the Jesuits, that the congregation of St Maar, the canons of Ste Geneviève, and the Oratory laid their official ban on the obnoxious doctrines. From the real or fancied rapprochements between Cartesianism and Jansenism, it became for a while impolitic, if not dangerous, to avow too loudly a preference for Cartesian theories. Regis was constrained to hold back for ten years his System of Philosophy; and when it did appear, in 1690, the name of Descartes was absent from the title-page. There were other obstacles besides the mild persecutions of the church. Pascal and other members of Port Royal openly expressed their doubts about the place allowed to God in the system; the adherents of Gassendi met it by resuscitating atoms; and the Aristotelians maintained their substantial forms as of old; the Jesuits argued against the arguments for the being of God, and against the theory of innate ideas; whilst Huet, bishop of Avranches, once a Cartesian himself, made a vigorous onslaught on the contempt in which his former comrades held literature and bistory, and enlarged on the vanity of all human aspirations after rational truth.

The greatest and most original of the French Cartesians was Malebranche. His Recherche de la Verité, in 1674, was the baptism of the system into a theistic religion which borrowed its imagery from Augustine; it brought into prominence the metaphysical base which De la Forge, Rohault, and Regis had neither cared for nor understood. But this doctrine was a criticism and a divergence, no less than a consequence, from the principles in Descartes; and it brought upon Malebranche the opposition, not merely of the Cartesian physicists, but also of Arnauld, Fénelon, and Bossuet, who found, or hoped to find, in the Meditations, as properly understood, an ally for theology. Popular enthusiasm, however, was with Malebranche, as twenty years before it had been with Descartes; he was the fashion of the day; and his disciples rapidly increased both in France and abroad.

In 1705 Cartesianism was still subject to prohibitions from the authorities; but in a project of new statutes,

drawn up for the faculty of arts at Paris in 1720, the Method and Meditations of Descartes were placed beside the Organon and the Metaphysics of Aristotle as text-books for philosophical study. And before 1725, readings, both public and private, were given from Cartesian texts in some of the Parisian colleges. But when this happened, Cartesianism was no longer either interesting or dangerous; its theories, taught as ascertained and verified truths, were as worthless as the systematic verbiage which preceded them. Already antiquated, it could not resist the wit and raillery with which Voltaire, in his Lettres sur les Anglais (1728), brought against it the principles and results of Locke and Newton. The old Cartesians, Mairan and especially Fontenelle, with his Théorie des Tourbillons (1752), struggled in vain to refute Newton by styling attraction an occult quality. Fortunately, the Cartesian method had already done its service, even where the theories were rejected. The Port Royalists,. Nicole and Arnauld, had applied it to grammar and logic; Domat and Daguesseau to jurisprudence; Fontenelle, Perrault, and Terrasson to literary criticism, and a worthier estimate of modern literature. Though it never ceased to influence individual thinkers, it had handed on to Condillac its popularity with the masses. A Latin abridgment of philosophy, dated 1784, tells us that the innate ideas of Descartes are founded on no arguments, and are now universally abandoned. The ghost of innate ideas seems to be all that it had left.

In Germany a few Cartesian lecturers left their names at Leipsic and Halle, but the system took no root, any more than in Switzerland, where it had a brief reign at Geneva after 1669. In Italy the effects were more permanent. What is termed the iatro-mechanical school of medicine, with Borelli (1608-1679) as its most notable name, entered in a way on the mechanical study of anatomy suggested by Descartes, but was probably much more dependent upon the positive researches of Galileo. At Naples there grew up a Cartesian school, of which the best known members are Michel Angelo Fardella (1650-1708) and Cardinal Gerdil (1718-1802), both of whom, however, attached themselves to the characteristic views of Malebranche.

In England Cartesianism took but slight hold. Henry More, who had given it a modified sympathy in the life time of the author, became its opponent in later years; and Cudworth differed from it in most essential points. Antony Legrand, from Douay, attempted to introduce it into Oxford, but failed. He is the author of several works, amongst others a system of Cartesian philosophy, where a chapter on "Angels " revives the methods of the schoolmen. His chief opponent was Samuel Parker, bishop of Oxford, who, in his attack on the irreligious novelties of the Cartesian treats Descartes (such is the irony of history) as a fellow criminal in infidelity with Hobbes and Gassendi. Robault's version of the Cartesian physics was translated into English; and Malebranche found an ardent follower in John Norris (1667-1711). Of Cartesianism towards the close of the 17th century the only remnants were an overgrown theory of vortices, which received its death-blow from Newton, and a dubious phraseology anent innate ideas, which found a witty executioner in Locke.

For an account of the metaphysical doctrines of Descartes, in their connections with Malebranche and Spirfoza, see the article CARTESIANISM.

The chief editions of the collected works of Descartes are the two Latin texts in 9 vols. 4to by Elzevir 1713, and in 7 vols. 4to, Frankfort, 1697, and the French edition by Cousin in 11 vols. 8vo, Paris, 182426. These include his so-called posthumous works, The Rules for the Direction of the Mind, The Search for Truth by the Sight of Nature, and other unimportant fragments, published (in Latin) in 1701. In 1859-60 Foucher de Careil published in two parts some unedited writings of Descartes from copies taken by Leibnitz from the original

papers. An edition of the philosophical works in 4 vols. 8vo, edited by Garnier, appeared at Paris, 1835. There is a good English translation of the Method, Meditations, and a small part of the Principles, first published at Edinburgh, 1853. For the life of Descartes the chief authority is Baillet, Fre de Descartes, in 2 vols. 4to, 1691; of which a small abridgment, afterwards translated into English, appeared in 1692. There is a sumNeuern Philosophie, Band i. Th. 1, 8vo, Mannheim, 1865. See mary of it in Garnier's edition, and in Kuno Fischer's Geschichte der the Eloge of Thomas in Cousin's edition.

For the philosophy of Descartes, see besides the works referred to under CARTESIANISM, Bordas-Demoulin, Le Cartesianisme, 2d ed. Renouvier, Manuel de Philosophie Moderne, Paris, 1842; Cousin, Par. 1874; Damiron, Histoire de la Philosophie du XVII. Siècle ; Fragments Philosophiques, vol. ii., Paris, 1838. Fragments de Philosophie Cartesienne, Paris, 1845. and in the Journal des Savants, 1860–61. A good estimate of the physical and mathematical labours Huxley has lately, in the Fortnightly Review, vol. xvi., called attenis given in Ersch and Gruber's Encyclopädie; and Professor

tion to automatism. There are also several German works treating of his theology and metaphysics. (W. W.)

DESCHAMPS, EUSTACHE, called MOREL, a distinguished medieval poet of France, was born at Vertus, in Champagne, early in the 14th century. The date of his birth has been approximately given as 1328, 1340, and 1345, according to the interpretation put upon certain vague statements of his own. It is certain that he lived under four kings--Philip VI., John, Charles V., and Charles VI. He studied the seven liberal arts at the university of Orleans, Early in life he proceeded to the court of France, and, after first entering the service of a prelate whose name he has not recorded, for more than thirty years took an active and prominent part in the joyous society of the day. Charged with a succession of honourable offices, he served nearly all the princes his contemporaries. His life was a long and romantic series of tournaments, feasts, and battles, and he was one of the most popular persons of his time. But before settling down to this life, he had a stormy youth of vicissitude. He was an eye-witness of the English invasion in 1358; he was in the siege of Rheims, and witnessed the march on Chartres; he was present also at the signing of the treaty at Bretigny. In 1360, as Châtelain of Vertus, he became the vassal of the young princess Isabella, to whom he paid great poetic homage. But he was then already a travelled man; he had visited Italy, Germany, and Hungary. Later on he took a part in the Flemish wars, and it was on this occasion that, about 1385, he received the surname, or nickname, of Morel, which he sometimes himself adopted in later life. He is believed, but not on very strong evidence, to have travelled in Syria and Egypt, and to have been captured and imprisoned by the Saracens. In France he lived the true life of a trouvère, wandering from castle to castle with his poems. He had a violent hatred for the English nation, fostered no doubt by the experiences of his youth; and this he has expressed very abundantly in his writings, particularly in the famous prophecy that England would be destroyed so thoroughly that no one should be able to point to her ruins. He was huissier d'armes to King Charles V., and by him appointed bailli of Senlis and governor of Fismes. It was with great reluctance that, when he felt himself growing old, he retired from public life and went into a modest seclusion, where he occupied himself in the composition of a splenetic satire against women, entitled Le Miroir de Mariage; though 12,500 lines of this exist, he left it unfinished at his death, which took place about 1420. Eustache Deschamps was an accomplished courtier, but he was extremely ugly; he disarms criticism by calling himself "Le Roi de Laidure." His poems remained unprinted until our day, the great fount of them being a manuscript in the Royal Library at Paris, containing 1175 ballads, 171 rondeaux, 80 virelays, 14 lays, 28 farces, and various epistles and satires. This bulk of MSS. was edited and published in 4to by M. G. A.