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alehouse licenses under the original Act. Then a new Act was passed in 1869, which by section 8 provided that the provisions as to appeal in the Act of George the Fourth should have effect with regard to grants of certificates under the new Act. Then followed the last Licensing Act, 35 & 36 Vict. c. 94, which in its second schedule repeals portions of previous Acts, and amongst others, sections 26, 27, 28 and 29 are repealed except with regard to the renewal of licenses. Now there can be no doubt that these sections are repealed with regard to proceedings under the Act of George the Fourth, but when it is said that the repeal takes away the right of appeal under section 8 of the Act of 1869, I pause to consider whether this is quite evident. I agree with what my Lord has said as to the effect of repealing a statute, part of which has been incorporated in a second Act, and I will add that it is rather singular that in the repealing schedule the words which apply to 4 & 5 Will. 4. c. 85. s. 11, are "so much of section 11 as incorporates or applies any repealed enactment." I wish to say that I do not think that the draughtsman is necessarily to be blamed for the mode in which the Acts are framed, as it may well be that he acts under the instructions of those who have charge of

the bill.

MELLOR, J., concurred.

QUAIN, J.-I am of the same opinion. It has been argued that the general scope of the Licensing Act of 1872 is to assimilate the procedure in the grant of licenses or certificates, and that to allow the appeal in one case and not in another would be an anomaly. But I think the observations of my brother Blackburn as to the other part of the schedule are very pertinent, and the description, so much of a section as incorporates or applies any repealed enactment," is to be found in several other places in the schedule.

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Rule discharged.

Attorneys-Bailey, Shaw, Smith & Bailey, agent for K. Walton, Southport, for applicant; Gregory, Rowcliffes & Rawle, agents for Welsby & Hill, Southport.

NEW SERIES, 42.-MAG. CAS.

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Parks Regulation Act, 1872 (35 & 36 Vict. c. 15), ss. 4, 9, Sch. 1, Regulations 8 & 19-Rules not laid before ParliamentRight of Meeting in Royal Parks.

By the Parks Regulation Act, 1872, 35 & 36 Vict. c. 15 (passed June 27, 1872), s. 4, "If any person does any act in contravention of any regulation contained in the first schedule annexed hereto, he shall, on conviction by a Court of summary jurisdiction, be liable to a penalty not exceeding five pounds; but the regulations contained in the said schedule shall not take effect until the expiration of one calendar month after the passing of this Act." By sec. 9,

66

Any rule made in pursuance of the first schedule to this Act shall be forthwith laid before both Houses of Parliament, if Parliament be sitting, or if not, then within three weeks after the beginning of the then next ensuing session of Parliament; and if any such rules shall be disapproved of by either House of Parliament within one month after the same shall have been so laid before Parliament, such rules, or such parts thereof as shall be disapproved of, shall not be enforced." By Regulation 8 in schedule 1, "No person shall deliver, or invite any person to deliver, any public address in a park, except in accordance with the rules of the park;" and by Regulation 19, "Rules of the Park" mean rules made by the Kanger as to matters within his jurisdiction, and as to other matters, rules made by the Commissioners of Works and Public Buildings.

Rules for Hyde Park were made and published on the 1st of October, 1872, signed by the Ranger and under the seal of the Commissioners of Works. By rule 11, "No public address may be delivered, except within forty yards of the notice-board on which this rule is inscribed." By rule 13, "No public address may be delivered unless a written notice of the intention to deliver the same, signed with the names and addresses of two householders residing in the metropolis, be left at the office of the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Works and Public Buildings, at least two clear days before: such notice must state the day and

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hour of intended delivery. After such a notice has been received, no other notice for the delivery of any other address on the same day will be valid."

The appellant, in the November following, and before the meeting of Parliament, delivered a public address in Hyde Park, more than forty yards from a notice-board on which the rule above mentioned was inscribed, and having been summoned before a police magistrate was convicted and fined:

Held, that the conviction was right, as it was the intention of the legislature that the rules should come into operation in the recess, and before the approval of Parliament had been obtained, and that in case Parliament should disapprove of them, they should cease to be further enforced; that the rules were sufficiently authenticated by having the signature of the Ranger and the seal of the Commissioner attached to the same copy; that they were within the jurisdiction of either the Ranger or the Commissioner; and that there was nothing in section 11 which prevented the appellant from being convicted, as at the date of the act there was no right of way or of holding public meetings in Hyde Park.

CASE stated by a Metropolitan Police Magistrate, under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43.

The appellant appeared, November 18, 1872, on a summons to answer a complaint against him by the respondent, who is a Superintendent of the Metropolitan Police, which charged him with an offence under section 4 of the Parks Regulation Act, 1872 (35 & 36 Vict. c. 15) (1),

(1) By 35 & 36 Vict. cap. 15, entitled "An Act for the Regulation of the Royal Parks and Gardens," after reciting that it is expedient to protect from injury the Royal parks, gardens and possessions under the management of the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Works and Public Buildings, hereinafter called the Commissioners, and to secure the public from molestation and annoyance while enjoying such parks, gardens and possessions, it is enacted

2. This Act shall apply to all the Royal parks, gardens and possessions, the management of which is for the time being vested in the Commissioners, and such parks, gardens and possessions are hereinafter included under the term " park."

4. If any person does any act in contravention of any regulation contained in the first schedule annexed hereto, he shall, on conviction by a court

for unlawfully acting in contravention. of a regulation contained in the first schedule annexed thereto, by delivering a public address in Hyde Park not in accordance with the rules of the park, contrary to the statute, &c. The magistrate convicted the appellant of the offence, and adjudged him to pay a fine of 51. and 28. costs, or in default of payment to be imprisoned in the House of Correction for Middlesex for one calendar month. The following facts were provedA copy of the rules of Hyde Park,

of summary jurisdiction, be liable to a penalty not exceeding 5.; but the regulations contained in the said schedule shall not take effect until the expiration of one calendar month after the passing of this Act.

9. Any rule made in pursuance of the first schedule to this Act shall be forthwith laid before both Houses of Parliament, if Parliament be sitting, or if not, then within three weeks after the beginning of the then next ensuing session of Parliament; and if any such rules shall be disapproved of by either House of Parliament within one month after the same shall have been so laid before Parliament, such rules, or such parts thereof as shall be disapproved of, shall not be enforced.

10. Copies of regulations to be observed in pursuance of this Act by persons using a Royal Park to which this Act applies, shall be put up in such park in such conspicuous manner as the Commissioners may deem best calculated to give information to the persons using the park.

11. Nothing in this Act shall authorize any interference with any rights of way or any right whatever to which any person or persons may be by law entitled.

12. All powers conferred by this Act shall be deemed to be in addition to and not in derogation of any powers conferred by any other Act of Parliament, and any such powers may be exercised as if this Act had not been passed.

13. Nothing in this Act contained shall be deemed to prejudice or affect any prerogative or right of Her Majesty, or any power, right or duty of the Commissioners, or any powers or duties of any officers, clerks, or servants appointed by Her Majesty or by the Commissioners.

By the first schedule, Regulation 8, "No person shall deliver, or invite any person to deliver, any public address in a park, except in accordance with the rules of the park." By Regulation 19, For the purposes of this schedule, "the rules of the park" shall be deemed to be such rules as may, in relation to any matter within the jurisdiction of the Ranger (if any) of the park be from time to time made by the Ranger, and in relation to any other matter to which these regulations are applicable, be from time to time made by the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Works and Public Buildings.

made under the 19th and 20th regulations in the first schedule to the Act, was put in evidence (2).

That copies of the regulations and of the rules so made for Hyde Park were posted in conspicuous places in the park, at the several entrances thereto, on boards, on the 30th September, 1872.

The 8th regulation taken from the first schedule to the Act is as follows

"No person shall deliver, or invite any person to deliver, any public address in a park, except in accordance with the rules of the park."

That in one spot in the park a notice was put up on an iron post, which was firmly fixed in the ground on a granite base, and on which was inscribed, in a conspicuous manner on an iron plate, the 11th of the rules, with a heading to it as follows

"The Notice Board respecting Public "Addresses.

"No public address may be delivered except within forty yards of the notice board on which this rule is inscribed."

That on Sunday, the 3rd of November, 1872, several hundreds of persons, some carrying flags, and headed by a band of music, walked into the park, and assembled there for the purpose of holding a public meeting; that a chairman was appointed, who addressed the assembly, and that the appellant then addressed the persons there assembled, and concluded by moving the first resolution, and that others also afterwards delivered addresses at the same meeting.

That the addresses delivered by the

(2) The only rules which are material are the following

11. No public address may be delivered except within forty yards of the notice-board on which this rule is inscribed.

12. No public address of an unlawful character or for an unlawful purpose may be delivered.

13. No public address may be delivered unless a written notice of the intention to deliver the same, signed with the names and addresses of two householders residing in the metropolis be left at the office of the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Works and Public Buildings at least two clear days before; such notice must state the day and hour of intended delivery. After such a notice has been received no other notice for the delivery of any other address on the same day will be valid.

appellant and by the other speakers were delivered at more than forty yards' distance from the notice board containing only the 11th rule before mentioned, viz., at a distance of 106 yards therefrom, and at a very much larger distance from the notice boards containing complete copies of the regulations and rules.

That several persons were selling fruits in the park on that occasion.

That there were numerous park-keepers and police-constables in the park at that time; that they were well aware of the aforesaid proceedings; that they did not in any way interfere with those persons who delivered addresses or sold fruits, nor did they demand their names or addresses, nor did they warn them that they were infringing the law, but summonses were applied for by the police on the afternoon of the 4th November, and granted, against the appellant and other speakers who addressed the meeting.

That no notice was left at the office of the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Works as required by the 13th rule.

On the part of the appellant it was contended as follows

That the Parks Regulation Act imposed upon the park-keepers and policeconstables the duty of demanding the name and address of any person infringing the rules of the park, and, in the event of refusal to give such name and address, of taking the offender into custody.

That it was the duty of such parkkeepers and police-constables to have taken this course with the chairman who first addressed the meeting, and that, not having done so, the appellant was justified in concluding that the delivery of an address under the circumstances was a lawful act, and sanctioned by the parkkeepers and police-constables.

That under the 7th section of the Act the duties and responsibilities of policeconstables were imposed on the parkkeepers, and that the latter were consequently bound as soon as the rules of the park were infringed to prevent the continuance or the repetition of such infringe

ment.

That by the 9th section of the Act any rules made in pursuance of the Act should,

CASES CONNECTED WITH

in order to become valid, be first approved
of by Parliament.

That if the rules acquired any validity
without such approval of Parliament, it
was only such as would have enabled the
park-keepers and police-constables to en-
force compliance with such rules, but not
such as would render non-compliance
with such rules a misdemeanour punish-
able by fine or imprisonment.

That the 11th section of the Act prohibited interference with any right to which any person was at the passing of the Act by law entitled. That the appellant was, at the time of the passing of the Act, entitled by law to deliver a public address in Hyde Park, and that the rules for the violation of which the appellant was summoned and convicted amounted to such interference with the right as was prohibited by the Act.

That the eleventh of the rules made in pursuance of the Act was ambiguous, unreasonable and bad, inasmuch as the area within which it was lawful to deliver public addresses in Hyde Park was not measured from a fixed point. A notice board, being movable, would render it possible for the Ranger of Hyde Park to reduce by a half or by three-fourths, according to the position in which such notice board was placed, the area within which public addresses might be delivered.

That the 11th rule was inscribed, forming part of a complete copy of the regulations and rules, on several boards posted at the various entrance gates of the park. That no information was consequently conveyed to the appellant of the precise place at which it was lawful to deliver public addresses, and that the appellant could not be convicted of the offence that he had delivered a public address at a greater distance than forty yards from one particular spot only where a notice containing such rule was posted up.

That the authority given by the 19th section of the first schedule of the Act to the Ranger and Commissioners of her Majesty's Works to make rules from "time to time," was intended by the Legislature to be used only in exceptional. circumstances which could not in the ordinary course of things be foreseen.

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That the twelfth of the rules, by impli Park of a public address, if of a lawful cation, legalised the delivery in Hyde character and for a lawful purpose; and that the public address delivered by the appellant was of such a character and for such a purpose.

That the thirteenth of the rules of the park was void under the nineteenth clause of the regulations, in the first schedule of the Act, as not being within the jurisdiction either of the Ranger of Hyde Park or of the Commissioners.

That the thirteenth rule was unreasonable, and also ambiguous and bad, inasmuch as it left it uncertain whether a individual who intended delivering a pubwritten notice should be given by each lic address, or by one individual alone, and that it left it equally doubtful whether, after one individual had delivered a public address, it would be lawful for another individual to deliver another public address in the park on the same day.

right to deliver a public address in Hyde That on the question of a pre-existing Park before the passing of this Act a magistrate would have no jurisdiction.

It was contended, on behalf of the respondent, that, as the regulations which, under section 4 of the Act, came into force one month after the passing of the Act, declared that no person should deliver any public address except in accordance with the rules of the park, no public rules were made upon the subject, and address could be legally delivered unless that therefore it became necessary to make rules to give effect to the 8th and other 66 regulations" in which "rules" are referred to.

That the rules dated the 1st of October last, made by the Ranger and by the Commissioners, were valid, although they had not been laid before Parliament, as they had power under the 19th regulation from time to time to make rules, and as section 9 of the Act contemplated rules being made when Parliament was not sitting.

of way and similar rights, and had no
That section 11 only applied to rights
bearing on the present case.

That the rules 11 and 13 were both

valid, and ought to have been complied with.

That the appellant was properly brought before the magistrate by summons, and that the magistrate had jurisdiction to deal with the offence.

The magistrate was of opinion that the appellant did commit the offence mentioned in section 4 of the Act, viz., that he unlawfully and wilfully did an act in contravention of the 8th regulation, by delivering a public address in Hyde Park not in accordance with the rules of such park. That the rules dated the 1st of October last were valid, That the appellant delivered his public address not in accordance with either rule 11 or 13; and further, that notwithstanding the contention on behalf of the appellant that he had a pre-existing right under section 11 of the Act to deliver a public address in Hyde Park, there was jurisdiction to convict the appellant. The magistrate therefore convicted him accordingly.

The question for the opinion of the Court is whether the conviction is wrong.

Baker Greene (Hallett with him), for the appellant.-The conviction was wrong. The words of section 9 of the Act shew that it was the intention of Parliament that the rules should be placed before and obtain the approval of both Houses, and until this was done that they should not be enforced. It could not have been meant that a man should be fined and imprisoned in the recess, under a rule which might be set aside after the meeting of Parliament.

[BLACKBURN, J.-It is clear that the regulations are intended to come into operation at once, and the power to frame rules is for the purpose of carrying out the regulations.]

It could not have been meant that a department of the Government should have unrestricted power to make rules affecting the liberty of the subject.

[BLACKBURN, J.-Nearly every railway or dock Act contains a power to make bye-laws, which impose penalties.]

Assuming that it was intended that the rules should at once come into operation, the rule limiting the space for public addresses is unreasonable.

[BLACKBURN, J.-A Court of law cannot decide whether such rules are unreasonable or not. You can only endeavour to shew that they are ultra vires, beyond the jurisdiction of those to whom the Legislature has delegated the power to make them.]

It remains to be urged that the Act, by section 11, prevents any interference with rights of way or other rights. At the time of the passing of the Act, the appellant had a right to take part in meetings held in the park.

[COCKBURN, C.J.-I am not aware that any such right existed.]

For many years meetings had been held in the parks.

[BLACKBURN, J.-It is clear, looking at the history of the parks, that there has been no immemorial user, sufficient to confer a legal right of way.]

It has been generally supposed that the public have a right in the parks, and this is recognized by the Act. (He took other objections to the rules which it is considered unnecessary to notice, as they are fully referred to in the judgment of the Chief Justice.)

The Attorney-General (Sir J. Coleridge) (Poland with him), for the respondent, was not heard.

COCKBURN, C.J.-We are of opinion that this conviction was right, and that it must be upheld. This is a conviction under a recent Act of Parliament-an Act for the regulation of the Royal Parks and Gardens-passed to protect the Royal Parks from injury, and to protect the public in the enjoyment of those parks for the purpose of innocent recreation and exercise. The practice of using those parks for other purposes than those of recreation and exercise is of modern growth, and it has certainly produced inconveniences which required to be regulated by some such enactment as that which has passed into law. The object of the Act of Parliament is sufficiently stated in the first schedule, which declares that certain things shall not be done in the Royal Parks except under specific circumstances and conditions; but that schedule of regulations is evidently intended to be supplemented and made

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