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agents or corporeal forces, which make the particles of bodies to cohere. Nor is it the business of experimental philofophers to find them out.

249. The mechanical philofopher, as hath been already observed, inquires properly concerning the rules and modes of operation alone, and not concerning the cause, forafmuch as nothing mechanical has is or really can be a cause (u). And although a mechanical or mathematical philofopher may speak. of abfolute space, abfolute motion, and of force as exifting in bodies, caufing fuch motion and proportional thereto; yet what these forces are, which are fuppofed to be lodged in bodies, to be impreffed on bodies, to be multiplied, divided, and communicated from one body to another, and which seem to animate bodies like abstract spirits or fouls, hath been found very difficult, not to fay impoffible, for thinking men to conceive and explain, as may be. feen by confulting Borellus De vi percuffionis, and Torricelli in his Lezioni academiche, among other authors.

250. Nor, if we confider the proclivity of mankind to realize their notions, will it feem ftrange that mechanic philofophers and geometricians fhould, like other men, be misled by prejudice, and take mathematical hypothefes for real beings exifting in bodies, fo far as even to make it the very aim and end of their science to compute or measure those phantoms; whereas it is very certain that nothing in truth can be measured* or computed, befide the very effects or motions themselves. Sir Ifaac Newton asks, have not the minute particles of bodies. certain forces or powers by which they act on

(u) 236, 247.

*This fubject is handled at large in my Latin tract De motu, published above twenty years ago.

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one another, as well as on the particles of light, for producing most of the phænomena in nature? But in reality, thofe minute particles are only agited according to certain laws of nature, by fome other agent, wherein the force exifts and not in them, which have only the motion; which motion in the body moved, the Peripatetics rightly judge to be a mere paffion, but in the mover to be évépes or act.

251. It paffeth with many, I know not how, that mechanical principles give a clear folution of the phænomena. The Democritic hypothefis, faith doctor Cudworth, doth much more handfomely and intelligibly folve the phænomena, than that of Ariftotle and Plato. But things rightly confidered, perhaps it will be found not to folve any phænomenon at all. For all phænomena are, to speak truJy, appearances in the foul or mind; and it hath never been explained, nor can it be explained, how external bodies, figures and motions fhould produce an appearance in the mind. Thofe principles, therefore, do not folve, if by folving is meant affigning the real, either efficient or final caufe of appearances, but only reduce them to general rules.

252. There is a certain analogy, conftancy, and uniformity in the phænomena or appearances of na ture, which are a foundation for general rules: and these are a grammar for the understanding of nature, or that series of effects in the vifible world, whereby we are enabled to forefee what will come to pass, in the natural courfe of things. Plotinus obferves, in his third Ennead, that the art of prefaging is in fome fort the reading of natural letters denoting order, and that fo far forth as analogy ob tains in the univerfe, there may be vaticination. And in reality, he that foretells the motions of the

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planets, or the effects of medicines, or the refult, of chemical or mechanical experiments, may be faid to do it by natural vaticination.

253. We know a thing when we understand it: and we understand it, when we can interpret or tell what it fignifies. Strictly the fenfe knows nothing, We perceive indeed founds by hearing, and characters by fight but we are not therefore said to understand them. After the fame manner, the phæ nomena of nature are alike vifible to all: but all have not alike learned the connexion of natural things, or understand what they fignify, or know how to vaticinate by them. There is no queftion, faith Socrates, in Theæteto, concerning that which is agreeable to each perfon; but concerning what will in time to come be agreeable, of which all men are not equally judges. He who foreknoweth what will be in every kind, is the wifeft. According to Socrates, you and the cook may judge of a difh on the table equally well; but while the difh is making, the cook can better foretell what will ensue from this or that manner of compofing it. Nor is this manner of reasoning confined only to morals or politics; but extends alfo to natural science.

254. As the natural connexion of figns with the things fignified is regular and conftant, it forms a fort of rational discourse (a), and is therefore the immediate effect of an intelligent caufe. This is agreeable to the philofophy of Plato and other ancients. Plotinus indeed faith, that which acts naturally is not intellection, but a certain power of moving matter, which doth not know, but only do, And it must be owned, that, as faculties are multiplied by philofophers according to their operations, the will may be distinguished from the intellect.

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But it will not therefore follow, that the will, which operates in the course of nature, is not conducted and applied by intellect, although it be granted that neither will underftands, nor intellect wills. Therefore, the phænomena of nature, which ftrike on the senses and are understood by the mind, form not only a magnificent fpectacle, but also a moft coherent, entertaining, and inftructive discourse; and to effect this, they are conducted, adjusted, and ranged by the greatest wisdom. This language or difcourfe is ftudied with different attention, and interpreted with different degrees of fkill. But fo far as men have ftudied and remarked it's rules, and can interpret right, fo far they may be faid to be knowing in nature. A beaft is like a man who hears a strange tongue, but understands nothing.

255. Nature, faith the learned Doctor Cudworth, is not mafter of art or wifdom: Nature is ratio merfa & confufa, reafon immersed and plunged into matter, and as it were fuddled in it and confounded with it. But the formation of plants and animals, the motions of natural bodies, their various properties, appearances and viciffitudes, in a word, the whole series of things in this visible world, which we call the courfe of nature, is fo wifely managed and carried on, that the most improved human reafon cannot thoroughly comprehend even the leaft particle thereof; fo far is it from seeming to be produced by fuddled or confounded reafon.

256. Natural productions, it is true, are not all equally perfect. But neither doth it fuit with the order of things, the ftructure of the univerfe, or the ends of providence that they should be fo. General rules, we have seen (a), are neceffary to (a) 249, 252.

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make the world intelligible: and from the conftant observation of such rules, natural evils will fometimes unavoidably enfue: things will be produced in a flow length of time, and arrive at different degrees of perfection.

257. It must be owned, we are not confcious of the fyftole and diastole of the heart, or the motion of the diaphragm. It may not nevertheless be thence inferred, that unknowing naturè can act regularly, as well as ourfelves. The true inference is, that the felf-thinking individual, or humane perfon, is not the real author of those natural motions. And in fact no man blames himself if they are wrong, or values himself if they are right. The fame may be faid of the fingers of a musician, which fome object to be moved by habit which understands not; it being evident, that what is done by rule muft proceed from fomething that understands the rule; therefore, if not from the musician himself, from fome other active intelligence, the fame perhaps which governs bees and fpiders, and moves the limbs of those who walk in their fleep.

258. Inftruments, occafions, and figns (b) occur in, or rather make up, the whole vifible course of nature. Thefe, being no agents themselves, are under the direction of one agent concerting all for one end, the fupreme good. All those motions, whether in animal bodies or in other parts of the fyftem of nature, which are not effects of particular wills, feem to fpring from the fame general caufe with the vegetation of plants, an ætherial spirit actuated by a mind.

259. The first poets and theologers of Greece. and the east confidered the generation of things, as afcribed rather to a divine cause, but the Phyfici (b) 160.

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